There are 340 results on the current subject filter
Title | Reference #s | Summary | Background | Subject Matter |
---|---|---|---|---|
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (3rd February 1997) |
267 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 122156 |
This landmark case interprets the "Filipino First" policy in the 1987 Constitution, specifically regarding the sale of shares in the Manila Hotel Corporation. The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional provision giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony is self-executing and applies to the privatization of the Manila Hotel. | The case revolves around the privatization of the Manila Hotel, a historic landmark and cultural icon in the Philippines. GSIS, as the owner, initiated a bidding process to sell 51% of the shares in MHC. The bidding attracted both local and foreign investors, with a Malaysian firm emerging as the highest bidder. The petitioner, a Filipino corporation, sought to invoke the "Filipino First" policy enshrined in the Constitution to match the winning bid and acquire the shares. |
Constitutional Law I Statutory Construction |
Republic vs. National Labor Relations Commission (17th October 1996) |
263 SCRA 290, 331 Phil. 608, G.R. No. 120385 |
This case deals with the execution of labor judgments against the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI). The Supreme Court ruled that while APT can be sued, its liability is limited to the assets it holds from PNEI, and government funds cannot be garnished to satisfy judgments against it. | Following the retrenchment of PNEI employees, multiple labor cases were filed against PNEI and APT. Labor arbiters ruled in favor of the employees, ordering PNEI and APT to pay various claims. When these decisions became final and executory, writs of execution and notices of garnishment were issued. The Republic, through APT, then filed this special civil action to prohibit the execution of these judgments against APT's funds. |
Constitutional Law I |
Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (16th October 1996) |
G.R. No. 79543 |
Jose D. Filoteo Jr., a police officer, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for masterminding the 1982 hijacking of a postal van containing checks and warrants. The Supreme Court upheld his guilt but reclassified the crime from brigandage under PD 532 to robbery under the Revised Penal Code, reducing his sentence. The Court ruled his uncounselled 1982 confession admissible under the 1973 Constitution’s standards and rejected claims of torture, illegal arrest, and insufficient evidence. | Filoteo, accused of leading a syndicate of police and military personnel in hijacking a postal van, challenged his Sandiganbayan conviction. The case centered on constitutional rights during custodial investigations, retroactivity of constitutional guarantees, and the distinction between brigandage and robbery. |
Statutory Construction |
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan (20th September 1996) |
330 Phil. 678, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113 |
A landmark case concerning attorney-client privilege, where ACCRA lawyers challenged the Sandiganbayan's denial of their exclusion from a complaint involving alleged ill-gotten wealth, asserting their right to maintain client confidentiality even when asked to reveal client identities. | The case originated when the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint on July 31, 1987, before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr. and several others, including lawyers from the ACCRA Law Firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. The ACCRA lawyers - Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta, and Paraja G. Hayudini - had acted as nominal stockholders for various corporations as part of their legal services to clients. When the PCGG filed a Third Amended Complaint in 1991, they excluded one of the ACCRA lawyers, Raul S. Roco, based on his alleged undertaking to reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. The remaining ACCRA lawyers sought the same treatment, but the PCGG conditioned their exclusion on three requirements: disclosure of their client's identity, submission of documents proving the lawyer-client relationship, and submission of their deeds of assignment. The lawyers refused, citing attorney-client privilege, leading to a legal battle that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, raising fundamental questions about the scope of attorney-client privilege and the equal protection of law. |
Philosophy of Law |
Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (18th June 1996) |
257 SCRA 430, 327 Phil. 214, G.R. No. 104988, G.R. No. 106424, G.R. No. 123784 |
This case involves the seizure of lumber by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) from Mustang Lumber, Inc., allegedly for failure to produce required legal documents proving the legitimacy of the lumber’s source. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled on the legality of the seizure, scope of forest laws under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended, and the inclusion of lumber within "timber" under these laws. | The case arose from DENR's seizure of lumber stockpiles from Mustang Lumber, Inc., claiming the company failed to present necessary documents proving the legal acquisition and transport of the forest products. The company contested the seizure as illegal and argued that "lumber" does not fall under the punishable scope of P.D. No. 705. |
Statutory Construction |
Fariñas vs. Barba (19th April 1996) |
256 SCRA 396, 326 Phil. 416, G.R. No. 116763 |
A vacancy in the San Nicolas Sangguniang Bayan led to conflicting appointments by the Provincial Governor and Municipal Mayor. The Supreme Court ruled that the Governor has the authority to appoint replacements for non-partisan vacancies but must follow the Sanggunian’s recommendation. | Carlito Domingo (non-partisan Sangguniang Bayan member) resigned, triggering a dispute over appointment authority between Governor Farinas and Mayor Barba. |
Statutory Construction |
Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals (9th February 1996) |
253 SCRA 391, 323 Phil. 462, G.R. No. 105944 |
This case involves a petition for certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the trial court's revocation of a donation due to ingratitude and declared petitioners as purchasers in bad faith. The Supreme Court reviewed whether falsification of a deed of donation constitutes ingratitude justifying revocation, the validity of forgery findings, and whether the petitioners were indeed purchasers in bad faith. Ultimately, the Supreme Court partly granted the petition, reversing the finding of bad faith and shifting liability for damages to the fraudulent donee, while upholding the revocation of the donation. | Pedro Calapine donated land to his niece, Helen Doria. Later, he claimed that a second deed of donation conveying the entire property was forged by Doria and sought to revoke the donation due to her ingratitude. Doria then sold the land to Spouses Eduarte. The lower courts sided with Calapine, revoking the donation and declaring the Eduartes buyers in bad faith, leading to this appeal. |
Property and Land Law |
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections (18th September 1995) |
248 SCRA 300, 318 Phil. 329, G.R. No. 119976 |
This case revolves around the disqualification of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos from running as a congressional candidate for the First District of Leyte due to the residency requirement under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled against her, leading to a legal battle before the Supreme Court, which ultimately decided in her favor. | Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Representative of the First District of Leyte, declaring seven months of residency. Her political opponent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition to disqualify her on the grounds of failing to meet the one-year residency requirement. Marcos later amended her COC, stating that she had been a resident "since childhood," but the COMELEC refused to accept this correction and ruled her disqualified. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the COMELEC's decision. |
Philosophy of Law |
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (22nd May 1995) |
314 Phil. 131, 244 SCRA 272, G.R. No. 119694 |
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI) challenged the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772, which mandated newspapers to provide free print space ("Comelec Space") for candidates. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 2 of the Resolution constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation and was not a valid exercise of police power or eminent domain. Section 8 concerning undue reference to candidates was deemed not ripe for judicial review. | COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2772 to procure free print space in newspapers for candidates to publicize their qualifications and platforms during the 1995 elections. This was intended to be similar to the voluntary practice by some publishers in the 1992 elections. PPI, representing newspaper publishers, challenged this resolution as an unconstitutional taking of private property. |
Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain |
Santos vs. Court of Appeals (4th January 1995) |
240 SCRA 20, 310 Phil. 21, G.R. No. 112019 |
The case involves a petition for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, which allows for the declaration of a marriage as void if one party is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital obligations. The petitioner, Leouel Santos, sought to nullify his marriage to Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, claiming she was psychologically incapacitated due to her failure to return home or communicate with him for over five years. The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that the circumstances did not meet the stringent requirements for psychological incapacity under Article 36. | Leouel Santos and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos married in 1986. After the birth of their child, marital issues arose, primarily due to interference from Julia's parents. Julia left for the U.S. in 1988 and failed to return or maintain communication with Leouel. Leouel filed for nullity of marriage under Article 36, claiming Julia's behavior demonstrated psychological incapacity. The trial court and Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, leading to this Supreme Court review. |
Philosophy of Law |
JUSMAG Philippines vs. NLRC (15th December 1994) |
239 SCRA 224, 309 Phil. 213, G.R. No. 108813 |
This case revolves around the immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines). The Supreme Court ruled that JUSMAG is immune from suit as it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. | Sacramento filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against JUSMAG. JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss, invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the NLRC reversed this decision, holding that JUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued. JUSMAG then filed this petition with the Supreme Court. |
Constitutional Law I |
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Guingona, Jr (5th May 1994) |
232 SCRA 110, G.R. No. 113375 |
This case involves a petition to prohibit the implementation of a "Contract of Lease" between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for an on-line lottery system, with the petitioners arguing that it violates the PCSO charter and other laws. | PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system to increase revenue, leading to a Request for Proposal (RFP). PGMC was formed by the Berjaya Group Berhad to bid on the project. The resulting contract was challenged by Kilosbayan, Inc. and others. |
Constitutional Law II |
Fernandez vs. National Labor Relations Commission (28th February 1994) |
230 SCRA 460, 300 Phil. 486, G.R. No. 106090 |
Ricardo Fernandez, a welder employed by construction firm D.M. Consunji, Inc., claimed illegal dismissal after his termination due to project completion. The Supreme Court upheld the NLRC’s reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, ruling Fernandez was a project employee without entitlement to reinstatement or backwages. | Fernandez worked for D.M. Consunji from 1974 to 1986 across multiple projects. The company argued his termination resulted from project completion, while Fernandez alleged indefinite employment. The Labor Arbiter initially ruled for Fernandez, but the NLRC reversed the decision. |
Statutory Construction |
Republic vs. Court of Appeals (8th November 1993) |
277 SCRA 509, 298 Phil. 291, G.R. No. 79732 |
The Supreme Court of the Philippines addressed the issue of retroactivity of judicial declarations of unconstitutionality, particularly concerning just compensation in expropriation cases. The Court held that such declarations should apply retroactively to pending cases, ensuring consistency and fairness in legal application. | This case involved the expropriation of land for a highway project where the government wanted to use a method of compensation that had been declared unconstitutional in a previous case. |
Constitutional Law II |
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. (30th July 1993) |
224 SCRA 792, 296 Phil. 694, G.R. No. 101083 |
This case presents a seminal issue in environmental law—whether present and future generations possess a legally enforceable right to a balanced and healthful ecology. A group of minors, through their legal representatives, sought judicial intervention against the continued issuance and renewal of timber license agreements (TLAs), arguing that rampant deforestation infringed upon their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court ruled in their favor, articulating a robust doctrine of intergenerational responsibility and affirming that environmental rights are legally cognizable and enforceable. | The case originated from Civil Case No. 90-777 filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati by a group of minors, represented by their parents, along with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. They sued then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., for failing to cancel TLAs, which they claimed led to massive deforestation, causing environmental destruction. The RTC dismissed the case, ruling that it involved a political question and that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court. |
Constitutional Law I Philosophy of Law |
Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong (27th May 1993) |
222 SCRA 644, G.R. No. 99327 |
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of Ateneo de Manila University to expel several law students for their participation in a hazing incident that resulted in the death of a student. The Court ruled that the university did not violate the students' right to due process and that the expulsion was justified under the university's disciplinary rules and academic freedom. | The case arose from a hazing incident during the initiation rites of the Aquila Legis fraternity at Ateneo Law School in February 1991. The hazing resulted in the death of Leonardo Villa and serious injuries to another student, Bienvenido Marquez. The university conducted an investigation and expelled the students involved. The expelled students challenged their dismissal, claiming a violation of due process. |
Philosophy of Law |
Mapulo Mining Corporation vs. Lopez (7th February 1992) |
206 SCRA 9, 282 Phil. 905, G.R. No. L-30440 |
The case involves a dispute over the validity of mining claims and compliance with the publication requirements under the Mining Act (C.A. No. 137, as amended). The Supreme Court ruled on whether a private respondent complied with the mandatory publication requirements for its application for a mining lease. Petitioners argued deficiencies in the publication process and alleged violations of mining laws, ultimately leading the Court to set aside the orders of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. | The case arose when Project Ventures, Inc. (PROVEN) filed mining lease applications conflicting with prior claims by Mapulo Mining Association and E.V. Chavez & Associates. Petitioners opposed PROVEN’s applications, arguing that the notice's publication did not strictly comply with the Mining Act and that PROVEN’s claims violated sections of the law relating to mining claims on private lands. |
Statutory Construction |
Comendador vs. De Villa (2nd August 1991) |
200 SCRA 80, 277 Phil. 93, G.R. No. 93177, G.R. No. 95020, G.R. No. 96948, G.R. No. 97454 |
Military officers charged with mutiny and murder after a failed 1989 coup challenged the legality of their pre-trial investigation, the denial of their right to peremptory challenge, and the jurisdiction of civilian courts to interfere in military proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the pre-trial process, revived the right to peremptory challenge, denied bail for military personnel, and reversed civilian court orders releasing the accused. | Following a failed December 1989 coup, AFP officers were charged with mutiny, murder, and related offenses under the Articles of War. They contested the legality of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel, the General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14’s composition, and the denial of peremptory challenges. Civilian RTCs granted provisional liberty to some officers via certiorari and habeas corpus, prompting appeals to the Supreme Court. |
Statutory Construction |
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (30th July 1991) |
199 SCRA 692, 276 Phil. 758, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, G.R. Nos. 92202-03 |
Petitioners challenged respondent Jose Ong, Jr.’s eligibility as a House Representative, alleging he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen and lacked residency in Northern Samar. The Supreme Court upheld the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET) decision, ruling Ong qualified under the Constitution. | Jose Ong, Jr. won the 1987 congressional election for Northern Samar’s second district. Petitioners Co and Balanquit filed protests with HRET, contesting Ong’s citizenship and residency. HRET ruled in Ong’s favor, prompting petitioners to seek certiorari before the Supreme Court. |
Statutory Construction |
Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co (8th April 1991) |
195 SCRA 748, 273 Phil. 115, G.R. No. 90596 |
This case concerns a dispute over a right-of-way easement. The Supreme Court ruled that a personal easement for the benefit of the public existed on a private alley, and that this easement was not extinguished by the subsequent purchase of the property by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc., rejecting the argument of merger. The Court upheld the trial court’s decision for injunction, ordering the removal of obstructions placed by Bio Hong and emphasizing the concept of "law of the case" due to a prior related decision. | Solid Manila Corporation claimed a right-of-way over a private alley located on property owned by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. This alley was established by a prior owner and annotated on Bio Hong's title. Bio Hong constructed steel gates obstructing the alley, leading Solid Manila to file for injunction to remove the gates and enforce the easement. |
Property and Land Law |
Ronquillo vs. Court of Appeals (20th March 1991) |
195 SCRA 433, 272-A Phil. 412, G.R. No. 43346 |
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the estero's drying up was due to human intervention (garbage dumping), not natural causes, thus Article 370 of the old Civil Code regarding riparian ownership of naturally abandoned riverbeds does not apply. The dried-up estero remains public land. | Rosendo del Rosario and his daughters claimed ownership of a dried-up estero portion adjacent to their titled land, asserting riparian rights. Mario Ronquillo occupied this portion and claimed it was public land. The Director of Lands and Development Bank of the Philippines were later impleaded as respondents. |
Property and Land Law |
Jagualing vs. Court of Appeals (4th March 1991) |
194 SCRA 607, 272 Phil. 439, G.R. No. 94283 |
This case concerns a dispute over the ownership of an island formed in the Tagoloan River, a non-navigable and non-floatable river. The Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether the possessors of the island or the owners of the adjacent land margin have a better right to the island, ultimately affirming the Court of Appeals' decision that favored the riparian owners based on the principles of accretion and riparian rights under the Civil Code. | The Eduaves, private respondents, filed an action to quiet title over a parcel of land that had become an island in the Tagoloan River against the Jagualings, petitioners, who were in possession of the island. The Eduaves claimed ownership through inheritance and presented evidence of tax declarations and acts of ownership on the land prior to its becoming an island. The Jagualings claimed ownership through adverse possession. |
Property and Land Law |
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary (22nd February 1991) |
194 SCRA 317, 272 Phil. 147, G.R. No. 83896, G.R. No. 83815 |
The Supreme Court declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional for allowing Cabinet members to hold multiple government positions, violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits high-ranking officials from holding other offices unless expressly permitted by the Constitution. | President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 on July 25, 1987, permitting Cabinet members to hold up to two additional government positions. Petitioners challenged this, arguing it violated the constitutional prohibition against dual offices. The cases were consolidated and resolved jointly. |
Statutory Construction |
Brocka vs. Enrile (10th December 1990) |
192 SCRA 183, 270 Phil. 271, G.R. Nos. 69863-65 |
Petitioners, who were arrested and charged with Illegal Assembly, sought their release on habeas corpus and a permanent injunction against the City Fiscal of Quezon City to prevent the investigation of charges of "Inciting to Sedition." The case explores the legality of enjoining criminal prosecution under certain circumstances, particularly in cases of manifest bad faith and harassment by state officials. | The case arose during a period of political unrest in the Philippines, marked by demonstrations and strikes against the government. Petitioners, including prominent filmmakers and activists, were arrested during a jeepney strike and subsequently charged with Illegal Assembly and Inciting to Sedition. The case highlights the tension between the government's authority to maintain order and the protection of individual rights and freedoms. |
Constitutional Law II |
Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (4th December 1990) |
192 SCRA 51, 270 Phil. 151, G.R. No. 86889 |
The Supreme Court declared portions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 unconstitutional, specifically provisions extending the program's coverage to land used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising. The Court ruled that agricultural lands under agrarian reform do not include such industrial undertakings, as the use of land is merely incidental to such operations. | Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry raising, challenged certain provisions of R.A. No. 6657 arguing that livestock and poultry operations shouldn't be considered agricultural lands under agrarian reform laws. The petitioner claimed that the application of these provisions violated its property rights and due process. |
Statutory Construction |
Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (4th June 1990) |
186 SCRA 88, 264 Phil. 450, G.R. No. 73085 |
This case involves a land dispute where private respondents claimed ownership of land within a declared forest reserve and national park based on a Spanish title. The Supreme Court ruled against the private respondents, reiterating that forest lands and national parks are inalienable public land and cannot be subject to private appropriation or registration, regardless of alleged Spanish titles, especially after the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 892. | Private respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title, asserting ownership over land based on a Spanish title. The Republic of the Philippines argued that the land was part of a forest reserve and national park, making it inalienable public land not subject to private ownership. The trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court initially ruled in favor of the private respondents. |
Property and Land Law |
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego (21st December 1989) |
180 SCRA 533, 259 Phil. 1016, G.R. No. 89572 |
This case centers on the right of a student to take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) for a fourth time after failing it thrice, challenging the constitutionality of the "three-flunk rule" on the grounds of academic freedom, quality education, due process, and equal protection. | The case arose from the DECS's rejection of San Diego's application to take the NMAT for the fourth time, citing the "three-flunk rule". San Diego challenged this decision in court, arguing it infringed on his constitutional rights. |
Constitutional Law II |
Magsaysay-Labrador vs. Court of Appeals (19th December 1989) |
180 SCRA 266, 259 Phil. 748, G.R. No. 58168 |
This case involves a petition for review challenging the Court of Appeals' denial of the petitioners' motion to intervene in an annulment suit filed by the respondent, Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay. The respondent sought to nullify a Deed of Assignment transferring property (allegedly conjugal) from her late husband, Senator Genaro Magsaysay, to SUBIC Land Corporation (SUBIC), and a subsequent mortgage by SUBIC. The petitioners, sisters of the late Senator, claimed a right to intervene based on an alleged assignment of SUBIC shares to them by their brother. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of intervention, ruling that the petitioners, as shareholders, lacked the direct legal interest required under the Rules of Court, emphasizing the separate legal personality of the corporation and the fact that the share transfer was not registered in the corporate books. | The case arose from a dispute over a parcel of land ("Pequeña Island") acquired during the marriage of the late Senator Genaro Magsaysay and respondent Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay. After the Senator's death, Adelaida discovered annotations on the title suggesting the property was his separate capital, a Deed of Assignment transferring the land to SUBIC Land Corporation (SUBIC), and a subsequent mortgage on the property executed by SUBIC. Adelaida filed suit to annul these transactions, claiming the land was conjugal, the transactions were fraudulent, and her consent was not obtained. |
Civil Procedure I Intervention |
Marcos vs. Manglapus (15th September 1989) |
177 SCRA 668, 258 Phil. 479, G.R. No. 88211 |
This landmark case involved the question of whether the Philippine President could bar the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos and his family to the Philippines due to considerations of national security and public safety. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the President's decision, and emphasized the President’s residual powers to protect the general welfare of the people. | After being ousted in the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, Ferdinand Marcos and his family went into exile in Hawaii. In 1989, Marcos, who was gravely ill, sought to return to the Philippines to die in his homeland. President Aquino denied his request, citing potential threats to national security and public safety. Marcos’s family and the Philippine Constitution Association filed a petition challenging the decision. |
Statutory Construction |
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (14th July 1989) |
175 SCRA 343, 256 Phil. 777, G.R. No. 78742, G.R. No. 79310, G.R. No. 79744, G.R. No. 79777 |
This landmark case consolidated several petitions challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees, Executive Orders, and Republic Acts related to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these agrarian reform measures, addressing concerns about due process, just compensation, and the exercise of eminent domain and police power. | The case arose from the government's efforts to implement agrarian reform, aimed at redistributing agricultural lands to landless farmers. Landowners challenged the legal basis and specific provisions of the agrarian reform laws, arguing that they violated constitutional rights. |
Constitutional Law II Police Power |
Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal (8th December 1988) |
168 SCRA 391, 250 Phil. 390, No. L-84297 |
The Supreme Court ruled that the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has exclusive authority to set deadlines for election protests involving congressional members, dismissing Lazatin’s claim that Timbol’s protest was time-barred under the Omnibus Election Code. | The case arose from the 1987 congressional election in Pampanga, where Timbol contested Lazatin’s proclamation due to alleged irregularities. After prolonged COMELEC proceedings, the Supreme Court reinstated Lazatin’s proclamation, prompting Timbol to file a protest with the HRET. |
Statutory Construction |
Barde vs. Posiquit (15th August 1988) |
164 SCRA 304, 247 Phil. 268, G.R. No. L-29445 |
This case involves an appeal from a Court of First Instance order denying a Petition for Relief from Judgment. The appellants (heirs of Pedro Barde) were declared in default, and judgment was rendered against them in a case for reconveyance and partition after notice of pre-trial was sent only to their counsel and returned unclaimed, without notice being served upon the appellants themselves. The Supreme Court set aside the trial court's decision, holding that notice of pre-trial must be served on both the parties and their counsel, and the lack of notice to the parties rendered the subsequent proceedings, including the judgment, null and void for violating procedural due process. | The case originated from a dispute over the inheritance of a 173 square meter residential land originally owned by spouses Claro Barde and Juana Cordial. After their deaths, their son Pedro Barde registered the property exclusively in his name, excluding his sister Brigida and the heirs of his deceased brother Rafael. This led Brigida and Rafael's heirs to file a suit for reconveyance and partition against Pedro's heirs. |
Civil Procedure I Pre-trial |
Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia (15th April 1988) |
160 SCRA 379, 243 Phil. 532, No. L-49219 |
This case examines whether Article 448 of the Civil Code, concerning builders in good faith, applies when co-owners partition their property and one co-owner's house encroaches on the portion allocated to another. The Supreme Court ruled that Article 448 can be applicable post-partition if the encroachment was built in good faith, modifying the lower court's decision which initially deemed it inapplicable within co-ownership. | Spouses Del Campo and Bernarda Abesia were co-owners of a small parcel of land. During a partition action, it was discovered that Abesia's house slightly encroached onto the portion allocated to the Del Campos. The core issue was whether Abesia, as a co-owner builder, could invoke the rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448. |
Property and Land Law |
Aberca vs. Ver (15th April 1988) |
160 SCRA 590, 243 Phil. 735, G.R. No. 69866, No. L-69866 |
This case addresses whether the suspension of habeas corpus bars civil actions for damages due to illegal searches and constitutional rights violations by military personnel, and determines the liability of both direct actors and superior officers in such violations. | The case arose from alleged illegal searches, seizures, arrests, and torture committed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines' Task Force Makabansa (TFM) under the command of General Fabian Ver, purportedly targeting communist-terrorist underground houses. |
Constitutional Law II |
Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (12th November 1987) |
239 Phil. 563, 155 SCRA 577, No. L-71283 |
This case involves a dispute over land ownership and the liability of possessors for damages. The petitioners, heirs of Miguel Escritor, were ordered by the Intermediate Appellate Court to pay damages to respondent Simeon Acuna for unlawful possession, based on a later court decision reversing the initial adjudication of the land to Escritor. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the petitioners were possessors in good faith and thus not liable for damages, as Escritor had originally been awarded the land by a court of competent jurisdiction, and good faith is presumed. | The case originates from a cadastral proceeding where Miguel Escritor claimed ownership of a land lot based on inheritance. The Court of First Instance initially adjudicated the land to Escritor. Years later, Simeon Acuna filed a petition for review alleging fraud and misrepresentation in Escritor's acquisition. This petition was eventually granted, and the land was adjudicated to Acuna. Acuna then sued Escritor's heirs for damages for unlawful possession of the land during the period between the initial adjudication and its reversal. |
Property and Land Law |
People vs. Abarca (14th September 1987) |
153 SCRA 735, 237 Phil. 718, No. L-74433 |
This case involves Francisco Abarca who, after discovering his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with Khingsley Paul Koh, obtained a rifle and shot Koh dead about an hour later at a mahjong session, inadvertently injuring Arnold and Lina Amparado in the process. The Regional Trial Court convicted Abarca of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court modified the judgment, holding that the killing of Koh fell under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code (Death Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances), resulting in the penalty of *destierro*, and found Abarca liable only for Less Serious Physical Injuries through Simple Imprudence or Negligence for the injuries sustained by the Amparados, imposing the penalty of *arresto mayor*. | The case arose from an illicit relationship between Khingsley Paul Koh and Jenny Abarca, the wife of accused-appellant Francisco Abarca. This relationship began while Francisco Abarca was away in Manila reviewing for the 1983 bar examinations, leaving his wife behind in Tacloban, Leyte. |
Criminal Law II Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances |
De Leon vs. Esguerra (31st August 1987) |
153 SCRA 602, 237 Phil. 582, No. L-78059 |
Barangay officials challenged their replacement by designees of a provincial OIC Governor after the 1987 Constitution’s ratification. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1987 Constitution invalidated the replacements, as the officials’ six-year terms under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222 remained valid. | Petitioners, elected barangay officials in 1982, faced replacement through memoranda issued by the OIC Governor in February 1987. The Court determined the memoranda were antedated and issued after the 1987 Constitution’s ratification. |
Statutory Construction |
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay (29th April 1987) |
149 SCRA 305, 233 Phil. 313, No. L-59603 |
This case addresses whether Presidential Decrees limiting just compensation in expropriation cases to the owner's declared value or assessor's value, whichever is lower, validly superseded the judicial process of determining just compensation through court-appointed commissioners under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Supreme Court declared these decrees unconstitutional, reaffirming the judiciary's role in determining just compensation in eminent domain cases. | The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) sought to expropriate private land owned by San Antonio Development Corporation for the Mactan Export Processing Zone. EPZA attempted to base just compensation on valuations stipulated in Presidential Decrees, which were significantly lower than the market value. The trial court appointed commissioners to determine just compensation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, prompting EPZA to file this petition questioning the court's authority to do so. |
Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain |
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (20th March 1987) |
148 SCRA 659, 232 Phil. 615, G.R. No. 74457 |
This landmark case challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibited the interprovincial transportation of carabaos and carabeef, with the penalty of outright confiscation. The Supreme Court declared the executive order unconstitutional for violating due process, improperly delegating legislative power, and constituting an invalid exercise of police power. | The case arose during the Marcos regime when the government sought to protect carabaos (water buffalos) as essential farm animals by prohibiting their transportation across provincial boundaries, with the aim of preventing their indiscriminate slaughter. |
Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II Police Power |
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (29th December 1986) |
146 SCRA 509, 230 Phil. 590, No. L-73002 |
This case involves a land registration dispute where the Director of Lands appealed a decision confirming Acme Plywood's title to land acquired from members of a cultural minority. The central issue is whether Acme Plywood, a corporation, could validly register land acquired in 1962 when the registration proceedings began in 1981, considering the 1973 Constitution's restrictions on corporate land ownership from the public domain. The Supreme Court upheld the registration in favor of Acme Plywood, reversing its previous stance in Meralco case and reaffirming the doctrine of vested rights and ipso jure conversion of public land to private land through long-term possession. | Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. sought to register five parcels of land acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe, through land registration proceedings under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. The Director of Lands opposed the registration, arguing that because the proceedings started after the 1973 Constitution came into effect, the corporation was disqualified from owning public land according to the new constitution. |
Property and Land Law |
Koh vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (23rd September 1986) |
144 SCRA 259, 228 Phil. 258, G.R. NO. 71388 |
This case involves a petition to review the Intermediate Appellate Court's decision which dismissed a certiorari petition seeking to annul the Regional Trial Court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on res adjudicata. The respondent bank had mistakenly overpaid the petitioner due to a computer error, filed a collection suit which was dismissed for non-compliance with a "Notice of Case Status" issued by an officer-in-charge, and then refiled the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the initial dismissal was null and void because the notice was not a valid court order, and therefore, the dismissal did not constitute res adjudicata barring the second complaint. | The dispute originated from an erroneous bank transaction where respondent First Interstate Bank of California, due to a computer mistake, issued a cashier's check for US-$8,500.00 to petitioner Maria Monserrat R. Kor, instead of the US-$500.00 actually remitted by her father. |
Civil Procedure I Discovery |
Javier vs. Commission on Elections (22nd September 1986) |
144 SCRA 194, 228 Phil. 193, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 |
The Supreme Court addressed jurisdictional and due process issues in a politically charged election dispute involving the Batasang Pambansa seat in Antique. While the case was rendered moot by the abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the petitioner’s assassination, the Court clarified that pre-proclamation controversies for Batasang members must be decided by COMELEC en banc, not divisions. | The 1984 Antique elections were marred by violence, including the killing of petitioner Evelio Javier’s supporters. Javier challenged irregularities in the canvass, but COMELEC’s Second Division dismissed his claims and proclaimed Arturo Pacificador winner. Javier’s assassination in 1986 and the Batasang’s abolition under the post-Marcos Freedom Constitution rendered the case moot. |
Constitutional Law II |
Galman vs. Pamaran (30th August 1985) |
138 SCRA 294, Nos, L-71208-09, Nos. L-71212-13 |
This case arises from the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. in 1983 at Manila International Airport. The primary issue concerns the admissibility of testimonies and evidence provided by suspects before the Agrava Fact-Finding Board, especially in light of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and the immunity granted under Presidential Decree No. 1886. The Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of the testimonies and evidence submitted to the Agrava Board, reinforcing constitutional protections against self-incrimination. | The assassination of Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. on August 21, 1983, led to the creation of the Agrava Fact-Finding Board under P.D. 1886. The Board investigated the incident and gathered testimonies, including those from suspects. Legal questions arose during subsequent trials regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained under mandatory compulsion by the Board. |
Statutory Construction |
Jain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People (28th September 1984) |
132 SCRA 359, 217 Phil. 347, No. L-63129 |
Wayne Jain was convicted of theft for substituting train receipts for sugar canes belonging to Tomasa Bermejo, intending to claim the proceeds. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, clarifying that theft necessitates physical taking of the property. Jain's actions, involving document manipulation rather than physical appropriation of the sugar canes, did not constitute theft, suggesting estafa or falsification as potential alternative charges. | Wayne Jain was accused of theft based on informations filed by the City Fiscal for allegedly stealing sugar canes. The prosecution argued that Jain, in conspiracy with a watchman, fraudulently substituted train receipts to misrepresent ownership and claim proceeds from sugar canes owned by Tomasa Bermejo. |
Philosophy of Law |
Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (29th November 1983) |
126 SCRA 69, 211 Phil. 260, No. L-27873, No. L-30035 |
This case involves two consolidated petitions questioning the Court of Appeals' decision that declared a disputed parcel of land as forest land, not subject to private titling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that forest lands remain part of the public domain and cannot be registered in favor of private individuals based on possession, no matter how long, unless officially declassified by the government. | The case originated from an application for land registration filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz for Lot No. 885. Several oppositions were filed, including one from the Director of Forestry, who argued the land was forest land. The Court of First Instance partially granted the application to private litigants, but this was appealed. |
Property and Land Law |
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta (24th June 1983) |
207 Phil. 648, 122 SCRA 759, No. L-34915 |
This case involves a petition by the City Government of Quezon City to reverse the decision of the lower court that declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to allocate 6% of their area for pauper burials, as null and void. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, finding the ordinance to be an invalid exercise of police power as it constituted confiscation without just compensation and lacked a clear reasonable relation to public welfare. | Quezon City enacted an ordinance regulating private cemeteries, including a provision (Section 9) requiring a 6% set-aside for pauper burials. This provision was not initially enforced, but seven years later, the City Council resolved to enforce it, directing the City Engineer to stop land transactions in cemeteries not complying with the 6% requirement. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc., a cemetery operator, challenged the ordinance in court. |
Constitutional Law II |
People vs. Narvaez (20th April 1983) |
121 SCRA 389, 206 Phil. 314, Nos. L-33466-67 |
Mamerto Narvaez was convicted of murder for killing two men who were fencing a disputed property, obstructing access to his house and ricemill. The Supreme Court modified the conviction to homicide, appreciating incomplete self-defense and mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion/obfuscation, reducing his sentence significantly due to disproportionate defense and considering the context of a long-standing land dispute. | Narvaez, a settler in South Cotabato, was embroiled in a land dispute with Fleischer and Company. He had been leasing a portion of the land in contention, but the company sought to remove him and other settlers. The deceased victims, Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were secretary-treasurer and assistant manager of Fleischer & Co. respectively, and were fencing the land when Narvaez shot them. |
Property and Land Law |
Sarmiento vs. Juan (28th January 1983) |
120 SCRA 403, 205 Phil. 335, No. L-56605 |
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals' decision which upheld the trial court's orders denying petitioner's motion to postpone pre-trial due to illness, declaring him "as in default," and denying his motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by prioritizing procedural rules over substantial justice, particularly since the petitioner presented a valid reason for his absence and the respondent also failed to make a valid appearance at the pre-trial. | The underlying case (Civil Case No. 126113 in the Court of First Instance of Manila) was initiated by private respondent Belfast Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. against petitioner Andres C. Sarmiento and his father, Benjamin R. Sarmiento, Sr., seeking indemnification under an Indemnity Agreement related to a bail bond. |
Civil Procedure I Pre-trial |
Macias vs. Araula (20th July 1982) |
115 SCRA 135, 200 Phil. 524, A.M. No. 1895-CFI |
Lamberto Macias filed an administrative complaint against Judge Gibson Araula for alleged serious infractions of law, oppression, grave misconduct, illegal and unethical participation in partisan politics, and electioneering related to the 1978 elections and subsequent incidents in Dauin, Negros Oriental. The Supreme Court, adopting the findings of the Investigating Justice, found the evidence insufficient to prove the charges of electioneering and oppression beyond the required standard for administrative cases but determined that the Judge's actions created an appearance of impropriety. Consequently, the Court reprimanded Judge Araula with a stern admonition. | The case arose in the context of intense local political rivalry in Dauin, Negros Oriental, following the April 7, 1978 elections. Respondent Judge Araula's wife was the incumbent Mayor and KBL Chairman in Dauin, while the complainant and his witnesses were associated with the opposing Pusyon Bisaya party. The charges stemmed from incidents occurring shortly before and after these elections, reflecting the bitter political division and personal animosity between the factions, particularly involving the Judge's family and Atty. Rudy Enriquez, a relative and political opponent. |
Constitutional Law I |
Azarcon vs. Vallarta (28th October 1980) |
100 SCRA 450, 188 Phil. 481, No. L-43679 |
This case concerns a land ownership dispute over a parcel of riceland between the Azarcons, holding a Free Patent Title, and the Vallartas, holding an Original Certificate of Title from registration proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the Vallartas' title, finding the Azarcons' title null and void due to misrepresentation in their free patent application, as the land was private property, not public domain, at the time of issuance. | The contested land was originally owned by Dr. Jose V. Cajucom, who sold it in two separate transactions. First, to the Vallartas' predecessors in 1932, and later to the Azarcons in 1959. Both parties subsequently obtained titles, leading to conflicting claims of ownership over the same property. |
Property and Land Law |
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
3rd February 1997
Republic vs. National Labor Relations Commission
17th October 1996
Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
16th October 1996
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan
20th September 1996
Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
18th June 1996
Fariñas vs. Barba
19th April 1996
Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals
9th February 1996
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections
18th September 1995
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
22nd May 1995
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
4th January 1995
JUSMAG Philippines vs. NLRC
15th December 1994
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Guingona, Jr
5th May 1994
Fernandez vs. National Labor Relations Commission
28th February 1994
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
8th November 1993
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
30th July 1993
Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong
27th May 1993
Mapulo Mining Corporation vs. Lopez
7th February 1992
Comendador vs. De Villa
2nd August 1991
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
30th July 1991
Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co
8th April 1991
Ronquillo vs. Court of Appeals
20th March 1991
Jagualing vs. Court of Appeals
4th March 1991
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
22nd February 1991
Brocka vs. Enrile
10th December 1990
Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
4th December 1990
Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
4th June 1990
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego
21st December 1989
Magsaysay-Labrador vs. Court of Appeals
19th December 1989
Marcos vs. Manglapus
15th September 1989
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
14th July 1989
Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal
8th December 1988
Barde vs. Posiquit
15th August 1988
Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia
15th April 1988
Aberca vs. Ver
15th April 1988
Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
12th November 1987
People vs. Abarca
14th September 1987
De Leon vs. Esguerra
31st August 1987
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay
29th April 1987
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
20th March 1987
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
29th December 1986
Koh vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
23rd September 1986
Javier vs. Commission on Elections
22nd September 1986
Galman vs. Pamaran
30th August 1985
Jain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People
28th September 1984
Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry
29th November 1983
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta
24th June 1983
People vs. Narvaez
20th April 1983
Sarmiento vs. Juan
28th January 1983
Macias vs. Araula
20th July 1982
Azarcon vs. Vallarta
28th October 1980