Talaan ng mga Kaso

Filter by Subject

Text Search

There are 472 results on the current subject filter

Title	IDs & Reference #s	Background	Primary Holding	Subject Matter
Bengzon Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (20th November 1991)	AK129190 280 Phil. 829 , G.R. No. 89914	Following the 1986 People's Revolution, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was tasked with recovering alleged ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and close associates. One such associate was Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. The PCGG filed Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan against Romualdez and others, including the petitioners, for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages related to numerous corporations allegedly acquired through illicit means. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee subsequently initiated an inquiry into the purported sale of these Romualdez corporations to the Lopa Group, a transaction also central to the PCGG's case.	The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is enjoined from compelling the petitioners to testify and produce evidence because its contemplated inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would violate the principle of separation of powers by encroaching upon matters already within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and would disregard the petitioners' constitutional rights, particularly the right against self-incrimination, given the pending judicial case involving the same issues.	Constitutional Law I
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals (5th August 1991)	AK696650 277 Phil. 311 , G.R. No. 93252 , G.R. NO. 93746 , G.R. NO. 95245	The cases arose from a series of administrative complaints filed in 1988 against Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon of Iloilo City and Sangguniang Panglunsod member Mary Ann Rivera Artieda. The complaints, lodged by various city officials, alleged offenses such as abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, and culpable violation of the Constitution. These complaints led to investigations by the Department of Local Government and the imposition of preventive suspensions by the Secretary of Local Government, prompting the petitioners to question the Secretary's authority under the new constitutional framework emphasizing local autonomy.	The President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses the authority to investigate and impose preventive suspensions on elective local officials in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in the Local Government Code (Batas Blg. 337), as this power is a component of the President's general supervision over local governments and was not abrogated by the 1987 Constitution; however, such power must not be exercised oppressively, and successive suspensions for numerous charges arising from acts committed prior to the first suspension may be curtailed to prevent what amounts to a de facto removal from office.	Constitutional Law I
Comendador vs. De Villa (2nd August 1991)	AK165261 200 SCRA 80 , 277 Phil. 93 , G.R. No. 93177 , G.R. No. 95020 , G.R. No. 96948 , G.R. No. 97454	Following a failed December 1989 coup, AFP officers were charged with mutiny, murder, and related offenses under the Articles of War. They contested the legality of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel, the General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14’s composition, and the denial of peremptory challenges. Civilian RTCs granted provisional liberty to some officers via certiorari and habeas corpus, prompting appeals to the Supreme Court.	The pre-trial investigation substantially complied with legal requirements despite petitioners’ procedural delays. The right to peremptory challenge under the Articles of War was revived after PD 39 became ineffective post-martial law. Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) lack jurisdiction to interfere in military court-martial proceedings or grant bail to military personnel.	Statutory Construction
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (30th July 1991)	AK810844 199 SCRA 692 , 276 Phil. 758 , G.R. Nos. 92191-92 , G.R. Nos. 92202-03	Jose Ong, Jr. won the 1987 congressional election for Northern Samar’s second district. Petitioners Co and Balanquit filed protests with HRET, contesting Ong’s citizenship and residency. HRET ruled in Ong’s favor, prompting petitioners to seek certiorari before the Supreme Court.	The Supreme Court affirmed HRET’s decision, declaring Jose Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen and resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, dismissing the petitions for lack of grave abuse of discretion by HRET.	Statutory Construction
People vs. Malmstedt (19th June 1991)	AK473261 198 SCRA 401 , 275 Phil. 447 , G.R. No. 91107	The case arose amidst persistent reports received by the First Regional Command (NARCOM) of the Philippine Constabulary that vehicles originating from Sagada were being used to transport marijuana and other prohibited drugs through the Cordillera Region.	A warrantless search of a moving vehicle and its passengers is valid when based on probable cause, which can arise from specific intelligence reports combined with the suspicious conduct of the person being searched, even without a warrant obtained beforehand due to the exigencies of the situation.	Constitutional Law II Searches and Seizures
Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co (8th April 1991)	AK658021 195 SCRA 748 , 273 Phil. 115 , G.R. No. 90596	Solid Manila Corporation claimed a right-of-way over a private alley located on property owned by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. This alley was established by a prior owner and annotated on Bio Hong's title. Bio Hong constructed steel gates obstructing the alley, leading Solid Manila to file for injunction to remove the gates and enforce the easement.	The easement of right-of-way in favor of the public was validly constituted and was not extinguished by merger when Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. acquired the property; therefore, Bio Hong must respect and maintain the easement, removing any obstructions.	Property and Land Law
Ronquillo vs. Court of Appeals (20th March 1991)	AK198213 195 SCRA 433 , 272-A Phil. 412 , G.R. No. 43346	Rosendo del Rosario and his daughters claimed ownership of a dried-up estero portion adjacent to their titled land, asserting riparian rights. Mario Ronquillo occupied this portion and claimed it was public land. The Director of Lands and Development Bank of the Philippines were later impleaded as respondents.	The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land, not private property of the riparian owners, because its drying up was caused by human intervention and not a natural change in the course of the waters.	Property and Land Law
People vs. Ritter (5th March 1991)	AK344111 272 Phil. 532 , G.R. No. 88582	The case arose from the death of Rosario Baluyot, an approximately 12-year-old street child, who died from septicemia and peritonitis caused by a foreign object (a portion of a sexual vibrator) lodged in her vaginal canal. The accused, Heinrich Stefan Ritter, a foreign national, was alleged to have brought Rosario and another child, Jessie Ramirez, to his hotel room, where the alleged rape and insertion of the object occurred. The incident gained public attention due to the victim's vulnerability and the nature of the crime, highlighting the plight of street children.	An accused cannot be convicted of Rape with Homicide if the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt the victim's age (for statutory rape) and the direct causal link between the accused's actions and the victim's death, especially when significant time has elapsed and other intervening causes are plausible; however, acquittal from criminal liability does not necessarily extinguish civil liability if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt and facts supporting civil liability for acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy are established by a preponderance of evidence.	Constitutional Law I
Jagualing vs. Court of Appeals (4th March 1991)	AK813608 194 SCRA 607 , 272 Phil. 439 , G.R. No. 94283	The Eduaves, private respondents, filed an action to quiet title over a parcel of land that had become an island in the Tagoloan River against the Jagualings, petitioners, who were in possession of the island. The Eduaves claimed ownership through inheritance and presented evidence of tax declarations and acts of ownership on the land prior to its becoming an island. The Jagualings claimed ownership through adverse possession.	The owner of the land along the margin nearest to an island formed in a non-navigable and non-floatable river has a better right to the island than those in actual possession of it, based on the principle of riparian ownership and accretion as provided in Article 465 of the Civil Code.	Property and Land Law
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary (22nd February 1991)	AK233934 194 SCRA 317 , 272 Phil. 147 , G.R. No. 83896 , G.R. No. 83815	The case arose from the issuance of Executive Order No. 284 by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. This E.O. allowed members of the Cabinet, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold, in addition to their primary positions, not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation. This was issued following DOJ Opinion No. 73, s. 1987, which interpreted Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution. The practice of high-ranking executive officials holding multiple government posts, often with substantial emoluments, had been a contentious issue, particularly during the Marcos regime, and the 1987 Constitution sought to address this.	Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional because it allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold multiple offices or employment in contravention of the express prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides a stricter rule for these officials compared to the general rule for other appointive officials in Section 7, Article IX-B. The only exceptions to this prohibition are those expressly provided in the Constitution itself, or positions held in an ex-officio capacity without additional compensation and as required by the primary functions of their office.	Constitutional Law I Statutory Construction
Brocka vs. Enrile (10th December 1990)	AK940091 192 SCRA 183 , 270 Phil. 271 , G.R. Nos. 69863-65	The case arose during a period of political unrest in the Philippines, marked by demonstrations and strikes against the government. Petitioners, including prominent filmmakers and activists, were arrested during a jeepney strike and subsequently charged with Illegal Assembly and Inciting to Sedition. The case highlights the tension between the government's authority to maintain order and the protection of individual rights and freedoms.	The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, granting the petition and permanently enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the cases. The Court held that criminal prosecution may be enjoined in cases of manifest bad faith, as demonstrated by the state officials' actions in this case.	Constitutional Law II
Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (4th December 1990)	AK615135 192 SCRA 51 , 270 Phil. 151 , G.R. No. 86889	Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry raising, challenged certain provisions of R.A. No. 6657 arguing that livestock and poultry operations shouldn't be considered agricultural lands under agrarian reform laws. The petitioner claimed that the application of these provisions violated its property rights and due process.	Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17, and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 were declared unconstitutional to the extent that they included livestock, poultry, and swine raising within the agrarian reform program, as such activities are not consistent with the constitutional intent of agrarian reform.	Statutory Construction
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr. (19th November 1990)	AK708936 269 Phil. 472 , G.R. No. 87636	The controversy arose from the President's exercise of the veto power over specific provisions in the General Appropriations Acts for Fiscal Years 1989 and 1990. Congress, in these acts, included provisions (Section 55 for FY 1989 and Section 16 for FY 1990) that aimed to prohibit the President and other designated officials from using savings to augment items of appropriation that Congress had disapproved or reduced from the President's original budget proposal. The President vetoed these provisions, citing them as unconstitutional infringements on the executive's power of augmentation and as violations of the constitutional provision allowing augmentation from savings.	The President's item-veto power extends to "inappropriate provisions" in an appropriations bill that are essentially general law measures and do not relate specifically to a particular appropriation, and such provisions can be treated as "items" for the purpose of the veto.	Constitutional Law I
Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (4th June 1990)	AK579538 186 SCRA 88 , 264 Phil. 450 , G.R. No. 73085	Private respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title, asserting ownership over land based on a Spanish title. The Republic of the Philippines argued that the land was part of a forest reserve and national park, making it inalienable public land not subject to private ownership. The trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court initially ruled in favor of the private respondents.	Forest lands and national parks are not subject to private appropriation; Spanish titles are not valid proof of ownership for unregistered lands after Presidential Decree No. 892.	Property and Land Law
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego (21st December 1989)	AK022039 180 SCRA 533 , 259 Phil. 1016 , G.R. No. 89572	The case arose from the implementation of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, specifically rule h) which states: "A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time." This rule was part of the government's effort to upgrade the quality of medical education and ensure that only competent individuals are admitted to medical schools, thereby safeguarding public health. The NMAT itself was established as a qualifying examination for admission to medical schools.	The State, in the exercise of its police power, can validly regulate admission to medical schools, including imposing a limit on the number of times an individual can take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT), to ensure that only qualified individuals enter the medical profession and to protect public health and safety.	Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II
Magsaysay-Labrador vs. Court of Appeals (19th December 1989)	AK001133 180 SCRA 266 , 259 Phil. 748 , G.R. No. 58168	The case arose from a dispute over a parcel of land ("Pequeña Island") acquired during the marriage of the late Senator Genaro Magsaysay and respondent Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay. After the Senator's death, Adelaida discovered annotations on the title suggesting the property was his separate capital, a Deed of Assignment transferring the land to SUBIC Land Corporation (SUBIC), and a subsequent mortgage on the property executed by SUBIC. Adelaida filed suit to annul these transactions, claiming the land was conjugal, the transactions were fraudulent, and her consent was not obtained.	Shareholders do not possess the direct and immediate legal interest in suits involving corporate property necessary to entitle them to intervene as parties, as the corporation has a distinct legal personality and owns the property itself; an interest as a shareholder is merely indirect, contingent, and inchoate.	Civil Procedure I Intervention
Pita vs. Court of Appeals (5th October 1989)	AK292021 258-A Phil. 134 , G.R. No. 80806	The case arose from an "Anti-Smut Campaign" initiated by then-Mayor of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing. As part of this campaign, various publications, including the petitioner's "Pinoy Playboy" magazines, were seized from vendors and publicly burned based on the authorities' belief that they were obscene, pornographic, and indecent.	The seizure of allegedly obscene materials, even under the guise of an anti-smut campaign and police power, requires a prior judicial determination of obscenity and the issuance of a valid search warrant; law enforcement authorities cannot unilaterally determine obscenity and confiscate materials without violating constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Expression
Marcos vs. Manglapus (15th September 1989)	AK357065 177 SCRA 668 , 258 Phil. 479 , G.R. No. 88211	Following the "People Power" Revolution in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed as President and forced into exile in Hawaii. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency amidst significant political instability, including coup attempts by Marcos loyalists and military factions, communist insurgency, secessionist movements, and severe economic difficulties attributed to the previous regime. As Marcos lay dying in Hawaii, he expressed his wish to return to the Philippines, a prospect President Aquino firmly opposed due to perceived threats to national stability and recovery efforts.	The President of the Philippines possesses unenumerated residual powers, implicit in the grant of executive power, which include the authority to bar the return of a citizen to the country if deemed necessary for the paramount interests of national security and public welfare, subject only to judicial review for grave abuse of discretion.	Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II Liberty of Abode
Dario vs. Mison (8th August 1989)	AK848552 257 Phil. 84 , G.R. No. 81954 , G.R. No. 81967 , G.R. No. 82023 , G.R. No. 83737 , G.R. No. 85310 , G.R. No. 85335 , G. R. No. 81954	* Following the 1986 People Power Revolution, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE," which also served as a provisional "Freedom Constitution." * Proclamation No. 3 mandated, among other things, the complete reorganization of the government to eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, vestiges of the previous regime, and to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption. * This proclamation empowered the President to undertake this reorganization, during which appointive officials could be separated from service under specified conditions.	Government reorganization after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, while permissible under its transitory provisions (Article XVIII, Section 16), must be carried out in good faith; separations of career civil service employees resulting therefrom are valid only if they are due to bona fide reasons such as the abolition of an office, redundancy of functions, or the need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions to meet service exigencies, and not as a means to arbitrarily remove employees whose security of tenure is protected by the Constitution.	Constitutional Law I
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (14th July 1989)	AK989617 175 SCRA 343 , 256 Phil. 777 , G.R. No. 78742 , G.R. No. 79310 , G.R. No. 79744 , G.R. No. 79777	The case arose from the government's efforts to implement agrarian reform, aimed at redistributing agricultural lands to landless farmers. Landowners challenged the legal basis and specific provisions of the agrarian reform laws, arguing that they violated constitutional rights.	The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP), P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, subject to the condition that title to expropriated properties only transfers to the State upon full payment of just compensation to the landowners.	Constitutional Law II Police Power
Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr. (9th February 1989)	AK622137 252 Phil. 192 , G.R. No. 78239	Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was the assistant treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. This conviction, if finalized, carried with it accessory penalties including disqualification from public office. The core of the dispute arose after she received an absolute pardon from the President while her case was technically still pending (motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court), leading her to believe she was entitled to automatic reinstatement and other benefits.	An absolute pardon granted to a convicted public officer removes the penal consequences of the crime, including accessory penalties like disqualification from public office, thereby restoring eligibility for public employment; however, it does not _ipso facto_ restore the officer to the specific public office forfeited by reason of the conviction, nor does it extinguish civil liability arising from the offense or entitle the pardonee to back salaries for the period of suspension or non-employment.	Constitutional Law I
Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal (8th December 1988)	AK403328 168 SCRA 391 , 250 Phil. 390 , No. L-84297	The case arose from the 1987 congressional election in Pampanga, where Timbol contested Lazatin’s proclamation due to alleged irregularities. After prolonged COMELEC proceedings, the Supreme Court reinstated Lazatin’s proclamation, prompting Timbol to file a protest with the HRET.	The HRET’s rules, not the Omnibus Election Code, govern the filing period for congressional election protests; Timbol’s protest was timely filed under HRET’s 15-day rule.	Statutory Construction
PLDT vs. NLRC and Abucay (23rd August 1988)	AK716437 247 Phil. 641 , G.R. No. 80609	Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator at PLDT, was accused by two complainants of demanding and receiving P3,800.00 in exchange for a promise to facilitate the approval of their telephone installation applications. Following an investigation, PLDT found her guilty and terminated her employment.	An employee dismissed for serious misconduct or for causes reflecting on their moral character (e.g., dishonesty, theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker) is not entitled to separation pay or financial assistance on the grounds of social justice or equity; such an award would effectively reward wrongdoing.	Constitutional Law I
Barde vs. Posiquit (15th August 1988)	AK212779 164 SCRA 304 , 247 Phil. 268 , G.R. No. L-29445	The case originated from a dispute over the inheritance of a 173 square meter residential land originally owned by spouses Claro Barde and Juana Cordial. After their deaths, their son Pedro Barde registered the property exclusively in his name, excluding his sister Brigida and the heirs of his deceased brother Rafael. This led Brigida and Rafael's heirs to file a suit for reconveyance and partition against Pedro's heirs.	Notice of the pre-trial conference under the Revised Rules of Court must be served not only upon the counsel but also directly upon the parties, and failure to notify the parties themselves renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings and judgments null and void for violation of due process.	Civil Procedure I Pre-trial
Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia (15th April 1988)	AK305738 160 SCRA 379 , 243 Phil. 532 , No. L-49219	Spouses Del Campo and Bernarda Abesia were co-owners of a small parcel of land. During a partition action, it was discovered that Abesia's house slightly encroached onto the portion allocated to the Del Campos. The core issue was whether Abesia, as a co-owner builder, could invoke the rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448.	Article 448 of the Civil Code can apply to resolve disputes between former co-owners after partition, concerning constructions made in good faith that encroach on another co-owner's allocated portion.	Property and Land Law
Aberca vs. Ver (15th April 1988)	AK165028 160 SCRA 590 , 243 Phil. 735 , G.R. No. 69866 , No. L-69866	The case arose from alleged illegal searches, seizures, arrests, and torture committed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines' Task Force Makabansa (TFM) under the command of General Fabian Ver, purportedly targeting communist-terrorist underground houses.	The suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus does not bar a civil action for damages resulting from illegal arrests, searches, and other violations of constitutional rights. Superior officers can be held liable for such violations if they are found to be directly or indirectly responsible.	Constitutional Law II
Hustler Magazine, Inc. vs. Falwell (24th February 1988)	AK337881 485 U.S. 4	Respondent Jerry Falwell, a nationally recognized minister and political commentator, was the subject of an advertisement "parody" published in petitioner Hustler Magazine, a nationally circulated publication known for its often-offensive content. The parody was modeled on a popular Campari Liqueur ad campaign that featured celebrities discussing their "first time." This case arose from Falwell's lawsuit against Hustler Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, seeking damages for the distress caused by this publication.	Public figures and public officials may not recover damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature or parody without showing that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice"—that is, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Expression
Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (12th November 1987)	AK429625 239 Phil. 563 , 155 SCRA 577 , No. L-71283	The case originates from a cadastral proceeding where Miguel Escritor claimed ownership of a land lot based on inheritance. The Court of First Instance initially adjudicated the land to Escritor. Years later, Simeon Acuna filed a petition for review alleging fraud and misrepresentation in Escritor's acquisition. This petition was eventually granted, and the land was adjudicated to Acuna. Acuna then sued Escritor's heirs for damages for unlawful possession of the land during the period between the initial adjudication and its reversal.	A possessor who initially acquired property based on a court decision, even if later reversed, is considered a possessor in good faith until they are actually aware of a defect in their title. Bad faith is personal and not transmissible to heirs unless they have personal knowledge of the flaw. Good faith is presumed, and the burden of proving bad faith lies with the one alleging it.	Property and Land Law
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete (5th November 1987)	AK236019 239 Phil. 403 , G.R. No. 72492	The Ad Hoc Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete initiated an investigation "in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities," specifically focusing on the alleged use of inefficient power lines by Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NORECO II) in Dumaguete City. This led to the issuance of a subpoena to NORECO II's officials and a subsequent order for them to show cause for contempt due to non-appearance, prompting the legal challenge.	Local legislative bodies, such as a Sangguniang Panlungsod, do not possess the inherent power to compel the attendance of witnesses who are not their members through subpoena, nor the power to punish such non-members for contempt, as these powers are judicial in nature and must be expressly granted by statute or the Constitution; such powers cannot be implied from the delegation of legislative functions.	Constitutional Law I
People vs. Abarca (14th September 1987)	AK372672 153 SCRA 735 , 237 Phil. 718 , No. L-74433	The case arose from an illicit relationship between Khingsley Paul Koh and Jenny Abarca, the wife of accused-appellant Francisco Abarca. This relationship began while Francisco Abarca was away in Manila reviewing for the 1983 bar examinations, leaving his wife behind in Tacloban, Leyte.	Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of destierro on a legally married person who kills their spouse or the spouse's paramour immediately after surprising them in the act of sexual intercourse, does not define a crime but grants a special privilege or benefit, negating conviction for homicide or murder; consequently, the act cannot be qualified by circumstances like treachery, nor can it form part of a complex crime.	Criminal Law II Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances
De Leon vs. Esguerra (31st August 1987)	AK434466 153 SCRA 602 , 237 Phil. 582 , No. L-78059	Petitioners, elected barangay officials in 1982, faced replacement through memoranda issued by the OIC Governor in February 1987. The Court determined the memoranda were antedated and issued after the 1987 Constitution’s ratification.	The Supreme Court declared the replacements void, holding that the 1987 Constitution superseded the Provisional Constitution on February 2, 1987, and barred the OIC Governor’s post-ratification designations.	Statutory Construction
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay (29th April 1987)	AK477243 149 SCRA 305 , 233 Phil. 313 , No. L-59603	The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) sought to expropriate private land owned by San Antonio Development Corporation for the Mactan Export Processing Zone. EPZA attempted to base just compensation on valuations stipulated in Presidential Decrees, which were significantly lower than the market value. The trial court appointed commissioners to determine just compensation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, prompting EPZA to file this petition questioning the court's authority to do so.	Presidential Decrees No. 76, 464, 794, and 1533, which limit just compensation to the lower of the owner’s declared value or the assessor’s value, are unconstitutional and void as they encroach upon the judiciary’s inherent power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.	Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (20th March 1987)	AK605477 148 SCRA 659 , 232 Phil. 615 , G.R. No. 74457	The case arose during the Marcos regime when the government sought to protect carabaos (water buffalos) as essential farm animals by prohibiting their transportation across provincial boundaries, with the aim of preventing their indiscriminate slaughter.	Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional because it violated due process by allowing confiscation of property without prior hearing, employed means not reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose, conferred judicial functions on administrative authorities, and contained an invalid delegation of legislative powers.	Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II Police Power
Teja Marketing vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (9th March 1987)	AK520987 232 Phil. 321 , G.R. No. 65510	The case arose from a transaction involving the sale of a motorcycle intended for use as a trimobile under the seller's existing franchise, an arrangement commonly known as the "kabit system." This system involves a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allowing another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee, which is considered contrary to public policy.	Parties involved in an illegal "kabit system," an arrangement contrary to public policy, are deemed in pari delicto, and courts will not aid either party in enforcing their illicit agreement or recovering what has been given thereunder.	Obligations and Contracts
Demetria vs. Alba (27th February 1987)	AK192412 232 Phil. 222 , G.R. No. 71977	The case arose from the petitioners' challenge to Presidential Decree No. 1177, specifically Section 44, which granted the President broad authority to transfer appropriated funds within the Executive Department. This decree was issued during a period when the President exercised legislative powers. Petitioners, concerned about potential abuse and the circumvention of constitutional safeguards on public funds, questioned the legality of this provision.	The first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional because it empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds without regard to whether the funds are savings or whether the transfer is for augmenting an item, thereby over-extending the privilege granted by Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution and constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.	Constitutional Law I
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (29th December 1986)	AK048318 146 SCRA 509 , 230 Phil. 590 , No. L-73002	Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. sought to register five parcels of land acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe, through land registration proceedings under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. The Director of Lands opposed the registration, arguing that because the proceedings started after the 1973 Constitution came into effect, the corporation was disqualified from owning public land according to the new constitution.	The Supreme Court held that the land acquired by Acme Plywood from the Infiels in 1962 was already private land by operation of law due to the Infiels' immemorial possession, and thus Acme Plywood, as a successor-in-interest, had a registrable title despite being a corporation and despite the 1973 Constitution’s restrictions, because the right vested prior to the 1973 Constitution.	Property and Land Law
Koh vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (23rd September 1986)	AK423446 144 SCRA 259 , 228 Phil. 258 , G.R. NO. 71388	The dispute originated from an erroneous bank transaction where respondent First Interstate Bank of California, due to a computer mistake, issued a cashier's check for US-$8,500.00 to petitioner Maria Monserrat R. Kor, instead of the US-$500.00 actually remitted by her father.	A dismissal of a case based on non-compliance with a "Notice of Case Status" issued by a court's officer-in-charge, which requires parties to manifest their intent regarding modes of discovery, is null and void and does not constitute res adjudicata, as such notice is not a lawful order of the court contemplated under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.	Civil Procedure I Discovery
Javier vs. Commission on Elections (22nd September 1986)	AK367573 144 SCRA 194 , 228 Phil. 193 , G.R. Nos. L-68379-81	The 1984 Antique elections were marred by violence, including the killing of petitioner Evelio Javier’s supporters. Javier challenged irregularities in the canvass, but COMELEC’s Second Division dismissed his claims and proclaimed Arturo Pacificador winner. Javier’s assassination in 1986 and the Batasang’s abolition under the post-Marcos Freedom Constitution rendered the case moot.	The COMELEC Second Division lacked jurisdiction to decide pre-proclamation controversies involving Batasang Pambansa members, as such cases must be heard en banc under the 1973 Constitution.	Constitutional Law II
Galman vs. Pamaran (30th August 1985)	AK797659 138 SCRA 294 , Nos, L-71208-09 , Nos. L-71212-13	The assassination of Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. on August 21, 1983, led to the creation of the Agrava Fact-Finding Board under P.D. 1886. The Board investigated the incident and gathered testimonies, including those from suspects. Legal questions arose during subsequent trials regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained under mandatory compulsion by the Board.	This case arises from the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. in 1983 at Manila International Airport. The primary issue concerns the admissibility of testimonies and evidence provided by suspects before the Agrava Fact-Finding Board, especially in light of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and the immunity granted under Presidential Decree No. 1886. The Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of the testimonies and evidence submitted to the Agrava Board, reinforcing constitutional protections against self-incrimination.	Statutory Construction
Jain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People (28th September 1984)	AK063159 132 SCRA 359 , 217 Phil. 347 , No. L-63129	Wayne Jain was accused of theft based on informations filed by the City Fiscal for allegedly stealing sugar canes. The prosecution argued that Jain, in conspiracy with a watchman, fraudulently substituted train receipts to misrepresent ownership and claim proceeds from sugar canes owned by Tomasa Bermejo.	The crime of theft, under Philippine law, requires physical taking or apoderamiento of the personal property of another; substituting train receipts to fraudulently claim ownership of sugar canes does not constitute theft because there was no physical taking of the canes themselves.	Philosophy of Law
Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (29th November 1983)	AK724137 126 SCRA 69 , 211 Phil. 260 , No. L-27873 , No. L-30035	The case originated from an application for land registration filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz for Lot No. 885. Several oppositions were filed, including one from the Director of Forestry, who argued the land was forest land. The Court of First Instance partially granted the application to private litigants, but this was appealed.	Possession of forest lands, regardless of duration, cannot ripen into private ownership. Forest lands remain in the public domain and are not subject to registration for private individuals unless there is a positive act from the government declassifying them as agricultural or disposable land.	Property and Land Law
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta (24th June 1983)	AK611870 207 Phil. 648 , 122 SCRA 759 , No. L-34915	Quezon City enacted an ordinance regulating private cemeteries, including a provision (Section 9) requiring a 6% set-aside for pauper burials. This provision was not initially enforced, but seven years later, the City Council resolved to enforce it, directing the City Engineer to stop land transactions in cemeteries not complying with the 6% requirement. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc., a cemetery operator, challenged the ordinance in court.	Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 of Quezon City is unconstitutional and void as it constitutes an invalid exercise of police power amounting to confiscation of property without due process or just compensation, rather than a valid regulation.	Constitutional Law II Police Power
People vs. Narvaez (20th April 1983)	AK862181 121 SCRA 389 , 206 Phil. 314 , Nos. L-33466-67	Narvaez, a settler in South Cotabato, was embroiled in a land dispute with Fleischer and Company. He had been leasing a portion of the land in contention, but the company sought to remove him and other settlers. The deceased victims, Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were secretary-treasurer and assistant manager of Fleischer & Co. respectively, and were fencing the land when Narvaez shot them.	Narvaez is guilty of two counts of homicide, not murder, due to incomplete self-defense and mitigating circumstances. His sentence is reduced to four months of arresto mayor, and he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with a reduced amount of damages, leading to his immediate release given his lengthy pre-trial detention.	Property and Land Law
Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile (20th April 1983)	AK516942 206 Phil. 392 , G.R. No. 61388	The case arose following the official lifting of Martial Law in the Philippines via Proclamation No. 2045 on January 17, 1981. However, this same proclamation continued the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons detained for crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes committed in furtherance thereof. The arrests and detentions in this case occurred under this legal framework, amidst ongoing government efforts to suppress perceived threats to national security.	The President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it, is a political question beyond judicial inquiry; consequently, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued for offenses covered by such suspension renders the detention legal and valid, and the right to bail is deemed suspended for the duration of the emergency for those detained for such offenses.	Constitutional Law I
Sarmiento vs. Juan (28th January 1983)	AK679362 120 SCRA 403 , 205 Phil. 335 , No. L-56605	The underlying case (Civil Case No. 126113 in the Court of First Instance of Manila) was initiated by private respondent Belfast Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. against petitioner Andres C. Sarmiento and his father, Benjamin R. Sarmiento, Sr., seeking indemnification under an Indemnity Agreement related to a bail bond.	A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion when it denies a motion for postponement of pre-trial based on a party's sudden illness (even if initially lacking a medical certificate but later substantiated under oath) and declares that party in default, especially when the opposing party also failed to make a valid appearance (i.e., counsel appeared without special authority); the requirement for pre-trial to be held "after the last pleading has been filed" can be interpreted to mean after the period for filing the last pleading has expired, and failure to answer a compulsory counterclaim does not necessarily prevent pre-trial.	Civil Procedure I Pre-trial
Macias vs. Araula (20th July 1982)	AK051208 115 SCRA 135 , 200 Phil. 524 , A.M. No. 1895-CFI	The case arose in the context of intense local political rivalry in Dauin, Negros Oriental, following the April 7, 1978 elections. Respondent Judge Araula's wife was the incumbent Mayor and KBL Chairman in Dauin, while the complainant and his witnesses were associated with the opposing Pusyon Bisaya party. The charges stemmed from incidents occurring shortly before and after these elections, reflecting the bitter political division and personal animosity between the factions, particularly involving the Judge's family and Atty. Rudy Enriquez, a relative and political opponent.	While the evidence presented was insufficient to establish prohibited partisan political activity (electioneering) or grave misconduct/oppression under the high standard of proof required in administrative cases against judges, a judge's conduct must nonetheless be free from the appearance of impropriety, and actions that could be misinterpreted as partisan, even if well-intentioned (like explaining election mechanics at a political rally), warrant admonishment under the Canons of Judicial Ethics.	Constitutional Law I
Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. (25th March 1982)	AK217409 198 Phil. 420 , G.R. No. 51122	The case arose from a contested election of the Board of Directors of International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) on May 14, 1979, which led to a quo warranto proceeding (SEC Case No. 1747) filed by the "Acero Group" against the "Puyat Group" before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez, after initially attempting to appear as counsel for the Acero Group and facing objection, purchased a nominal number of IPI shares and then sought to intervene in the SEC case as a stockholder.	A Member of the Batasang Pambansa is prohibited from appearing as counsel before any administrative body, and this prohibition extends to indirect appearances, such as intervening in a case under the guise of protecting a minimal stockholding acquired shortly before and for the purpose of such intervention, when the true intent is to participate in the proceedings in a capacity akin to counsel.	Constitutional Law I
Yuvienco vs. Dacuycuy (27th May 1981)	AK311310 192 Phil. 183 , G.R. No. 55048	Petitioners expressed willingness to sell a property in Tacloban City to private respondents (occupants of the property) for P6,500,000, provided respondents decided by July 31, 1978. Respondents replied, agreeing to buy and asking petitioners' representative to "proceed Tacloban to negotiate details." A subsequent meeting occurred where petitioners' representative presented a prepared contract with payment terms (balance within 30 days) that differed from what respondents allegedly expected (balance within 90 days), leading to the non-signing of the contract and the present suit for specific performance.	For a contract of sale of real property to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, particularly when payment is to be made in installments, the note or memorandum must contain all essential elements of the contract, including the specific terms of payment; a mere indication of the total price without the agreed manner of payment is insufficient if the intent is not a cash sale. Furthermore, an acceptance of an offer that includes a call to "negotiate details" is not an absolute acceptance required for the perfection of a contract under Article 1319 of the Civil Code.	Obligations and Contracts
Azarcon vs. Vallarta (28th October 1980)	AK487327 100 SCRA 450 , 188 Phil. 481 , No. L-43679	The contested land was originally owned by Dr. Jose V. Cajucom, who sold it in two separate transactions. First, to the Vallartas' predecessors in 1932, and later to the Azarcons in 1959. Both parties subsequently obtained titles, leading to conflicting claims of ownership over the same property.	The Original Certificate of Title held by the Vallartas is valid and superior, while the Free Patent Title held by the Azarcons is declared null and void and ordered cancelled.	Property and Land Law
Ceniza vs. COMELEC (28th January 1980)	AK528318 95 SCRA 763 , 180 Phil. 597 , G.R. No. 52304	Following the enactment of the 1973 Constitution emphasizing local government autonomy, the Interim Batasan Pambansa passed Batas Blg. 51 in preparation for the January 30, 1980 local elections. This law introduced a classification system for cities based on annual income (P40 million threshold) into "highly urbanized" and "component" cities. This classification determined whether the registered voters of a city could participate in the election of officials of the province where the city is geographically located, leading to challenges from voters in affected cities like Cebu and Mandaue.	The classification of cities into highly urbanized and component cities based on annual income under Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, which determines whether their residents can vote for provincial officials, is based on substantial distinctions germane to the constitutional mandate of promoting local autonomy and does not violate the equal protection clause or the right of suffrage.	Constitutional Law II Equal Protection