Rev. Fr. Cayat vs. COMELEC (1st Div.)

A candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. If disqualification becomes final before election day, the candidate is legally non-existent in the election; the doctrine rejecting the second placer does not apply, and the remaining candidate (even if receiving fewer votes) is the winner by default as the sole and only placer.

The case involves the 2004 local elections in Buguias, Benguet, where a convicted felon under probation attempted to run for mayor. The controversy addresses the interplay between disqualification proceedings, finality of judgments, and the proper remedy when a disqualified candidate wins an election—specifically whether the "second placer" doctrine applies when disqualification is final before versus after the elections.

• Filed: Palileng filed petition to disqualify Cayat (SPA PES No. C04-001) on January 26, 2004 before the COMELEC Regional Election Office in Baguio City
• Regional Level: Atty. Torres (Provincial Election Supervisor) conducted proceedings ex parte and recommended disqualification
• COMELEC First Division: Issued Resolution dated April 12, 2004 cancelling Cayat's COC; denied MR on May 9, 2004 for non-payment of filing fee
• Elections: May 10, 2004 — Cayat received 8,164 votes vs. Palileng's 5,292; Cayat proclaimed May 12, 2004
• Execution: COMELEC First Division issued Order dated October 25, 2004 granting motion for execution, annulling Cayat's proclamation, and proclaiming Palileng
• SC: Cayat filed G.R. No. 163776 (assailing April 12 and May 9 orders) and G.R. No. 165736 (assailing October 25 order); Bayacsan (Vice-Mayor) intervened in G.R. No. 165736 seeking to be declared mayor instead of Palileng

• Nature: Petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing COMELEC resolutions and orders
• Parties:
  • Petitioner: Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat — disqualified mayoralty candidate, convicted by MTC Baguio of forcible acts of lasciviousness (Crim. Case No. 110490), granted probation on November 6, 2003
  • Respondents: COMELEC (First Division and En Banc); Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. — rival candidate who filed disqualification petition
  • Intervenor: Feliseo K. Bayacsan — duly elected Vice-Mayor who claimed entitlement to mayorship under succession if Cayat was disqualified
  • Conviction: Cayat was convicted for acts involving lewd desire and sexual gratification (holding complainant's arm on his crotch, grabbing, embracing, kissing, mashing breasts) — acts deemed involving moral turpitude
  • Procedural History: Cayat failed to file answer to disqualification petition; COMELEC cancelled his COC on April 12, 2004; he filed MR on April 16 without paying P300 filing fee required under Sec. 7, Rule 40 of 1993 COMELEC Rules; denied May 9, 2004
  • Election Day Situation: Despite disqualification, Cayat's name remained on official ballots; he won and was proclaimed; COMELEC later ordered new canvass excluding Cayat's votes, proclaiming Palileng (sole remaining candidate)

• Jurisdictional defect: COMELEC never acquired jurisdiction because summons was not personally received; service by telegram to cousin (Ferdinand Guinid) was invalid
• Notice defect: No advance notice of promulgation of April 12, 2004 Resolution as required by Sec. 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6452; only learned of resolution on April 13 via telegram; 3-day period to file MR should run from actual receipt (April 13), making April 16 filing timely
• Filing fee: Non-payment should not be fatal in election cases which are imbued with public interest; rules should be liberally construed
• Finality: Disqualification was not final on election day; May 9, 2004 order denying MR was received only on May 13, 2004 (after elections)
• En Banc requirement: Motion for reconsideration of a final decision must be resolved by COMELEC En Banc, not the First Division (Constitution, Art. IX-C, Sec. 3)
• Voters' intent: 8,164 voters cast ballots for him in good faith unaware of disqualification; to discard votes is disenfranchisement; second-placer doctrine should apply making Bayacsan (or at least acknowledging Palileng as second placer with no right to office) the proper analysis

• Proper service: Telegram was sent to address stated in COC (Bayoyo, Buguias) before promulgation date; delivery to cousin was valid as Cayat admitted receiving the telegram on April 13
• Procedural finality: Failure to pay filing fee for MR rendered it a mere scrap of paper; resolution became final on April 17, 2004 (3 days after deemed receipt on April 13)
• Disqualification final before election: By operation of Sec. 6, RA 6646, since disqualification was final 23 days before election, Cayat was not a candidate; votes were stray
• Second placer inapplicable: Palileng is not a "second placer" but the sole and only placer because Cayat was legally non-existent on election day; no succession issue arises
• Doctrine distinction: Labo doctrine (second placer rejected) applies only when disqualification becomes final after elections, not before

• Procedural Issues:

  • Whether Cayat's motion for reconsideration was filed late (3-day period calculation)
  • Whether failure to pay the P300 filing fee under Sec. 7, Rule 40 of 1993 COMELEC Rules rendered the MR a mere scrap of paper
  • Whether the COMELEC First Division had authority to deny the MR (should have been resolved by En Banc)

• Substantive Issues:

  • Whether Cayat's disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections
  • Whether votes cast for a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election should be counted or treated as stray
  • Whether the doctrine on rejection of the second placer applies where disqualification was final before election day
  • Whether Palileng (sole remaining candidate) or Bayacsan (Vice-Mayor under succession) should occupy the mayoralty

• Procedural:

  • Timeliness: The 3-day period to file MR under Sec. 8 of Resolution No. 6452 commenced from promulgation; notice was validly sent by telegram to Cayat's COC address before April 12; actual personal receipt on April 13 was irrelevant as service to designated address was complete
  • Filing Fee: Failure to pay the required filing fee under Sec. 7, Rule 40 of 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure made the MR pro forma — a mere scrap of paper; deemed as if no MR was filed; thus, the April 12, 2004 Resolution became final on April 17, 2004
  • En Banc jurisdiction: (Addressed in dissent but not in majority) Majority did not rule on this specific procedural argument, focusing instead on the filing fee defect

• Substantive:

  • Finality of disqualification: Cayat's disqualification became final on April 17, 2004 — 23 days before the May 10, 2004 elections; on election day, he was legally non-existent as a candidate
  • Effect of final disqualification: Under Sec. 6, RA 6646 (first sentence), a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted; the 8,164 votes for Cayat were stray
  • Second placer doctrine inapplicable: The doctrine (from Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC) applies only when disqualification becomes final after the election (second sentence of Sec. 6, RA 6646); here, since Cayat was already disqualified, Palileng was not a "second placer" but the sole and only placer (second to none)
  • Succession rejected: Bayacsan's claim to succeed as Mayor under the succession rules was denied because the vacancy was not due to disqualification becoming final after proclamation, but rather the office was never validly occupied by Cayat who was a non-candidate ab initio
  • Proclamation proper: Palileng's proclamation as the only remaining candidate was valid; Cayat's proclamation was void as he was disqualified by final judgment before the election

• Two-Tiered System under Section 6, RA 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law):

  • First situation (disqualification final BEFORE election): The candidate "shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted." The candidate is a non-person in the election; votes are stray.

  • Second situation (disqualification final AFTER election): The case continues despite the proclamation; the winning candidate may be suspended; the second placer is rejected (succession applies, but not automatic proclamation of second placer).

  • Finality of Judgment via Probation: A judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation (citing jurisprudence). Cayat's application for and grant of probation on November 6, 2003 rendered his conviction final long before the 2004 elections.

  • Moral Turpitude: Defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen." The crime of forcible acts of lasciviousness inherently involves moral turpitude regardless of statutory prohibition, because the act itself is immoral.

• Second Placer Doctrine (Rejection of):

  • Elements for application: (1) Disqualification decision remained pending on election day; (2) Disqualification became final only after the elections.

  • Effect when inapplicable: If disqualification is final before election, there is no "second placer" to reject; the remaining candidate is the sole valid candidate and wins by default regardless of vote margin.

  • Filing Fee in Election Cases: Under Sec. 7, Rule 40 of 1993 COMELEC Rules, the COMELEC may refuse to take action until fees are paid, and failure to pay renders motions (like MR) pro forma — equivalent to not having been filed at all, causing immediate finality of the underlying decision.

• "Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted." (Sec. 6, RA 6646, as emphasized by the SC)
• "The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a candidate's disqualification had become final before the elections."
• "The 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and 'shall not be counted.' There is no disenfranchisement... Rather, [they] are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate."
• "Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none."

• Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 105111 & 105384 (1992) — Distinguished; established the doctrine on rejection of the second placer but only applies when disqualification is final after elections; cited extensively to contrast the two situations under Sec. 6, RA 6646
• IRRI v. NLRC, May 12, 1993 — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude
• Loyola v. COMELEC, 337 Phil. 134 (1997) — Cited to support the rule that failure to pay filing fee renders a motion pro forma
• Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912) — Cited in dissent as origin of second placer doctrine; that a disqualified winner does not entitle the second placer to office
• Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 (1985) — Cited in dissent for the democratic rule rejecting the second placer
• Abella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100710 (1991) — Cited in dissent; emphasized the need to determine whether the electorate knew of the disqualification when casting votes

• Section 40(a), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Disqualification from running for elective local position if sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude punishable by 1 year or more imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — Effect of disqualification case: bifurcated rule depending on whether finality occurs before or after election
• Section 7 & 8, COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 — Rules on promulgation of decisions (advance notice required) and 3-day period to file motion for reconsideration
• Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Imposition of P300 filing fee for motions for reconsideration; COMELEC may refuse action until paid
• Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — (Raised in dissent) Mandates that motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by COMELEC en banc, not by a division

N/A — No separate concurring opinions noted; decision was by majority with a dissenting opinion.

• Justice Tinga (joined by Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Nachura, JJ.):
  • Argued for liberal construction of election laws; procedural technicalities (filing fees) should not defeat the will of the electorate
  • Contended that Cayat never received advance notice of promulgation as required by Sec. 5, Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules; MR period should run from actual notice (April 13), making April 16 filing timely
  • Asserted that under Art. IX-C, Sec. 3 of the Constitution and Sec. 5, Rule 19 of COMELEC Rules, the First Division lacked jurisdiction to deny the MR; only the En Banc can resolve MRs of final decisions
  • Argued that the May 9, 2004 order could not have become final before the May 10 elections because Cayat received it only on May 13; decisions in special actions become final only after 5 days from promulgation unless restrained
  • Maintained that the second placer doctrine should apply because voters were unaware of the disqualification; there was no notorious knowledge of ineligibility, thus votes were not "stray" but reflected genuine will
  • Criticized the COMELEC for forum-shopping by Palileng (filing simultaneously for annulment of proclamation and motion for execution) and for acting on execution while the SC petition was pending
  • Concluded that Cayat's proclamation should be deemed effectual subject to final outcome, and that the electorate of Buguias (8,164 voters) would be disenfranchised by the majority ruling