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Title	IDs & Reference #s	Background	Primary Holding	Subject Matter
Guido vs. Rural Progress Admlnistration (31st October 1949)	AK713211 84 Phil. 847 , No. L-2089	The RPA sought to expropriate two adjoining commercial lots owned by Justa G. Guido in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to resell them to tenants. Guido challenged the expropriation, arguing that the land was commercial and thus excluded from the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 539, which allows expropriation for agrarian reform.	The expropriation of private commercial land by the RPA for resale to tenants does not constitute public use and is therefore unconstitutional under Commonwealth Act No. 539 and the Philippine Constitution.	Philosophy of Law
Sunripe Coconut Product Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations (30th April 1949)	AK046797 83 Phil. 518 , No. L-2009	The case arose when the Sunshine Coconut Workers' Union filed a claim on behalf of parers and shellers seeking sick leave benefits. Sunripe Coconut Products Co., Inc. contested the claim, arguing these workers were independent contractors. The dispute reached the Court of Industrial Relations, which ruled in favor of the workers. Sunripe appealed to the Supreme Court.	Parers and shellers under the "pakiao" system are considered employees or laborers entitled to statutory benefits despite being paid on a piecework basis.	Philosophy of Law
Bustos vs. Lucero (20th October 1948)	AK135112 81 Phil. 640 , No. L-2068	The petitioner, Dominador B. Bustos, was accused in a criminal case and underwent a preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace (JP) of Masantol, Pampanga. After the JP found probable cause and issued a warrant based on the complainant's and witnesses' initial testimony, the case was set for the second stage of the preliminary investigation where the accused could present evidence.	An accused person is not entitled, as a matter of fundamental right, to cross-examine the complainant and witnesses during the preliminary investigation stage after the issuance of an arrest warrant; while the investigating judge has the discretion to grant such an opportunity, Section 11 of Rule 108 does not mandate it, and the constitutional right to confront witnesses applies specifically to the trial proper.	Civil Procedure I
Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila (12th May 1948)	AK914931 80 Phil., 859 , No. L-2128	Petitioners Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero were arrested on April 2, 1948, for alleged robbery, based on a complaint by Bernardino Malinao. They were detained without a warrant and brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. When no proper court process was issued for their continued detention after six hours, they filed a petition for habeas corpus.	The term "judicial authority" in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers exclusively to judges or courts, not to a city fiscal. Detaining an individual beyond the prescribed period, without delivering them to a proper judicial authority, is unconstitutional and illegal.	Criminal Law II
Vargas vs. Rilloraza (26th February 1948)	AK301504 80 Phil. 297	The case arose from a motion filed by Jorge B. Vargas, challenging the constitutionality of Section 14 of the People's Court Act. This provision disqualified certain Supreme Court Justices from participating in treason cases related to the Japanese occupation, allowing the President to designate lower court judges to temporarily sit in the Supreme Court.	The Supreme Court declared Section 14 of the People's Court Act unconstitutional, as it violates the constitutional provisions on the appointment and qualifications of Supreme Court Justices and undermines the independence of the judiciary.	Philosophy of Law
People vs. Prieto (29th January 1948)	AK237843 80 Phil. 138 , No. L-399	The case arose from actions committed during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1944-1945. The accused, Eduardo Prieto, acted as an undercover agent for the Japanese Military Police, participating in various activities against suspected guerrillas and their supporters.	The Supreme Court held that when murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason, they cannot be regarded separately under their general denomination. The brutality of killing or physical injuries may be considered an aggravating circumstance but not as a separate crime.	Criminal Law II
Primicias vs. Fugoso (27th January 1948)	AK849130 80 Phil. 71 , No. L-1800	Cipriano P. Primicias requested a permit from Mayor Fugoso to hold a political rally at Plaza Miranda on November 16, 1947, to protest alleged election fraud. Initially approved by the Vice Mayor, the permit was revoked by the Mayor the next day, citing concerns over public order and the potential for unrest. Primicias filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Mayor to grant the permit.	The Supreme Court ruled that while the government may regulate the time, place, and manner of public assemblies, it cannot grant arbitrary discretion to a single official to deny such rights. The ordinance must be interpreted to allow regulation but not prohibition of lawful assemblies.	Philosophy of Law
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila (15th November 1947)	AK700773 79 Phil. 461 , No. L-630	The case emerged during post-WWII Philippines amid efforts to enforce constitutional protections over national patrimony. Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution prohibited alien ownership of "agricultural land," but ambiguity arose over whether this term included residential parcels. The dispute reflected tensions between foreign investments and safeguarding Filipino resources, requiring the Court to clarify the scope of constitutional land restrictions.	The Supreme Court held that aliens are prohibited from acquiring residential land under the 1935 Constitution, as such land is classified as "agricultural" under Article XIII, Section 5, which restricts ownership of private or public agricultural land to Filipino citizens.	Statutory Construction
People vs. Agpangan (10th October 1947)	AK427419 79 Phil. 334 , No. L-778	The case arose during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. The defendant was accused of being a member of pro-Japanese organizations (Ganap and Pampars) and performing duties that aided the Japanese forces against Filipino and American forces between December 1944 and January 1945 in Laguna Province.	The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and acquitted the appellant, finding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the alleged treasonous acts under the two-witness rule requirement, and that evidence suggested the appellant acted under duress.	Criminal Law II
People vs. Adriano (30th June 1947)	AK298371 78 Phil. 561 , No. L-477	During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines between January and April 1945, Apolinario Adriano was accused of treason for joining the Makapili organization and allegedly participating in various activities supporting Japanese forces against the United States and Philippine Commonwealth forces.	The Supreme Court held that membership in Makapili, while constituting an overt act of treason, must be proven by two witnesses testifying to the same specific instance, not different occasions of membership.	Criminal Law II
Caraos vs. Daza (13th March 1947)	AK452149 76 Phil. 681 , No. L-442 , G.R. No. 874	Jose Caraos was convicted of homicide in 1944 and sentenced to prison. During the Japanese occupation, he was released from jail, allegedly due to a pardon. After liberation, he was rearrested to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Caraos filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming his release was due to a valid pardon.	The Supreme Court held that there was no competent evidence to prove that Caraos was pardoned, and thus, his rearrest and continued imprisonment were lawful.	Philosophy of Law
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (5th March 1947)	AK966503 78 Phil. 1 , G.R. No. 1123	The case arose after Congress passed a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment allowing American citizens and corporations to exploit natural resources in the Philippines, subject to a plebiscite for public ratification. Petitioners challenged this resolution, claiming it failed to meet the required three-fourths votes in both legislative chambers.	The Supreme Court held that the validity of a constitutional amendment proposal, including whether it meets the required threshold, is a political question not subject to judicial review. The Court emphasized the "enrolled bill doctrine" and the separation of powers.	Statutory Construction
Laurel vs. Misa (30th January 1947)	AK294241 77 Phil. 856 , G.R. No. 409	The case arose in the aftermath of World War II, specifically following the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. During this period, some Filipino citizens were alleged to have collaborated with the Japanese forces. Anastacio Laurel was one such individual accused of treason for acts committed during the occupation.	A Filipino citizen's absolute and permanent allegiance to the legitimate government of the Philippines is not suspended or abrogated by enemy occupation, and consequently, such a citizen can be prosecuted for treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code for acts of adherence and giving aid and comfort to the enemy committed during said occupation.	Constitutional Law I Criminal Law II Statutory Construction
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff (20th August 1946)	AK022565 75 Phil. 875 , No. L-533	The case arose during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. Ramon Ruffy, a Major in the Philippine Constabulary, along with other petitioners, formed a guerrilla unit called the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro after refusing to surrender. This unit was later recognized by and integrated into the 6th Military District of the Philippine Army, which itself was recognized by General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area command. The petitioners were accused of murdering Lieutenant Colonel Enrique L. Jurado, who had been sent by the 6th Military District to command the Bolo Combat Team, on October 19, 1944.	Members of recognized guerrilla units who were lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the service of the Philippine Army during wartime are subject to military law and the jurisdiction of courts-martial for offenses committed during such service, and Article 93 of the Articles of War, which allows courts-martial to impose death or life imprisonment for murder in time of war, is constitutional as courts-martial are executive, not judicial, bodies.	Constitutional Law I
United States vs. Causby (27th May 1946)	AK120283 328 U.S. 256	Historically, common law adhered to the doctrine cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum et ad infernos, granting property owners rights to the heavens and to the depths below. However, the advent of aviation in the 20th century rendered this archaic rule impractical and necessitated a re-evaluation of airspace rights. Early courts initially resisted change, but the necessity of flight for transportation and national defense forced a legal evolution recognizing that the airspace above "usable heights" was not exclusively owned by the landowner.	The Supreme Court held that flights by government aircraft at low altitudes directly over private property, which are so frequent and low as to directly interfere with the enjoyment and use of the land, constitute a "taking" of property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. This effectively created the concept of an "aerial easement."	Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain
People vs. Cruz (21st February 1946)	AK026227 76 Phil. 169 , G.R. No. L-52	On June 25, 1945, four armed men robbed Dr. Gregorio B. Sison's drug store in Manila. The appellant was identified as one of the robbers who kept watch over the victims while they were forced to lie face down. The case primarily centered on the positive identification of the appellant by two witnesses.	The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision with the elimination of subsidiary imprisonment, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery in band based on clear and convincing witness identification.	Philosophy of Law
Yamashita vs. Styer (19th December 1945)	AK037613 75 Phil. 563 , No. L-129	After Japan's surrender in World War II, General Yamashita was captured and detained by the United States Army. He was charged with war crimes for failing to control his troops, who committed atrocities in the Philippines. Yamashita sought relief from the Philippine Supreme Court, claiming violations of his rights under international and domestic law.	The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the Military Commission had been validly constituted, had jurisdiction over Yamashita and the offenses charged, and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and prohibition.	Philosophy of Law
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (12th November 1945)	AK341470 75 Phil. 285 , No. L-49	William F. Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila during the Japanese occupation, was charged with robbery under Act No. 65 and sentenced to life imprisonment by a special court created under Ordinance No. 7 of the puppet Republic of the Philippines. He began serving his sentence on August 21, 1944.	The Supreme Court held that Ordinance No. 7, which created the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, was null and void ab initio, and consequently, the proceedings that resulted in petitioner's conviction were also void.	Philosophy of Law
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (17th September 1945)	AK116370 75 Phil. 113 , No. L-5	During World War II, the Japanese forces occupied the Philippines and established the Philippine Executive Commission and later the Republic of the Philippines. After liberation by American forces, questions arose about the validity of judicial proceedings conducted during the occupation period.	The Supreme Court ruled that judicial acts and proceedings of courts during the Japanese occupation remained valid after liberation, but that courts needed proper enabling laws to continue proceedings from the Japanese occupation period.	Philosophy of Law Statutory Construction
West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette (14th June 1943)	AK381061 319 U.S. 624	Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in _Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis_, which upheld a similar compulsory flag salute, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require courses in history, civics, and the Constitutions to foster Americanism. The West Virginia State Board of Education then adopted a resolution making the flag salute a regular part of public school activities, requiring all teachers and pupils to participate. Refusal was deemed insubordination, leading to expulsion and potential delinquency proceedings for the child, and fines or jail time for parents. This resolution directly impacted Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious beliefs forbid them from saluting any flag, as they consider it a form of worshipping a graven image, contrary to Exodus 20:4-5.	The action of a State in making it compulsory for children in public schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as it compels an affirmation of belief and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which the First Amendment reserves from all official control.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Tileston vs. Ullman (1st February 1943)	AK624106 318 U.S. 44 (1943)	A physician brought a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that a Connecticut law banning contraception was unconstitutional. The physician argued that the law prevented him from providing necessary medical advice to patients whose lives would be endangered by pregnancy.	A physician lacks standing to challenge a state statute prohibiting contraception on the grounds that it deprives the physician's patients of life without due process, as the right to life is personal and must be asserted by the patients themselves.	Constitutional Law II Police Power
Minersville School District vs. Gobitis (3rd June 1940)	AK913969 310 U.S. 586	The case arose during a period of increasing international tension leading up to World War II, where national unity was a significant concern. The Gobitis family, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, believed that saluting the flag was a form of idolatry, violating biblical commands. This belief clashed with a Minersville, Pennsylvania, School Board resolution requiring all students and teachers to participate in a daily flag salute ceremony.	A state regulation requiring public school pupils to participate in a daily flag salute ceremony, on pain of expulsion, is within the scope of legislative power and does not violate the religious freedom guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when applied to children whose sincere religious beliefs forbid such obeisance.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Cantwell vs. Connecticut (20th May 1940)	AK518939 310 U.S. 296	The case arose from the activities of Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, who were Jehovah's Witnesses. They were engaging in proselytizing activities in New Haven, Connecticut, which involved distributing religious literature and playing phonograph records with religious messages. Their actions led to their arrest and conviction under a state statute regulating solicitation for religious causes and for the common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. This case tested the extent to which states can regulate religious solicitation and speech, particularly when it is deemed offensive by others.	A state statute that requires individuals to obtain a certificate from a public official before soliciting for religious or charitable causes, where the official has the discretion to determine if the cause is genuinely religious, constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on the free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Furthermore, speech that is offensive but does not create a clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order is protected under the First Amendment and cannot be the basis for a common law breach of the peace conviction.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Kasilag vs. Rodriguez et al. (7th December 1939)	AK490298 69 Phil . 217 , No. 46623	The case revolves around a homestead property dispute that began in 1932. Emiliana Ambrosio, who had been granted a homestead patent in 1931, entered into a contract with Marcial Kasilag where she received P1,000 in exchange for what was documented as a mortgage on the property's improvements (consisting of fruit trees and bamboo). The contract included provisions for a future sale if Ambrosio failed to repay within 4.5 years. After one year, when Ambrosio couldn't pay the interest or taxes, they made a verbal agreement allowing Kasilag to possess the land, collect its fruits, and make improvements in lieu of interest payments. Kasilag took possession, paid taxes, and invested P5,000 in improvements. After Ambrosio's death, her heirs (Rafaela Rodriguez and others) sued to recover the property, arguing that the original contract was actually a disguised absolute sale attempting to circumvent legal restrictions on homestead alienation. The case worked its way through the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals before reaching the Supreme Court, where the fundamental question was whether the agreement was a legitimate mortgage of improvements or an illegal attempt to transfer a homestead property during the restricted period.	The contract constituted a valid mortgage of improvements on the homestead land, not an absolute sale. The petitioner was deemed to be in good faith regarding possession and improvements.	Philosophy of Law
Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (21st April 1939)	AK412293 67 Phil. 451 , G.R. No. 46570	The case arose from an inquiry into the conduct of petitioner Jose D. Villena, Mayor of Makati, Rizal, by the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, requested by the Secretary of the Interior. This inquiry found Villena to have allegedly committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority, and unauthorized practice of law. Consequently, the Secretary of the Interior recommended Villena's suspension to the President to prevent coercion of witnesses, which the President verbally approved.	The acts of the secretaries of executive departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior's suspension of a municipal mayor, done with the verbal approval or acquiescence of the President, is valid.	Constitutional Law I
Gold Creek vs. Rodriguez and Abadilla (28th September 1938)	AK685675 66 Phil. 259 , No. 45859	Gold Creek Mining Corp. applied for a patent for the “Nob Fraction” mining claim, but the government refused, citing the 1935 Constitution’s prohibition on alienating natural resources. The case centered on whether pre-Constitution mining rights survived the constitutional ban.	A perfected mining claim located before the 1935 Constitution’s adoption is not part of the public domain and thus falls outside the constitutional ban on alienating natural resources, mandating respondents to process the patent application.	Statutory Construction
Matute vs. Hernandez (8th August 1938)	AK955194 66 Phil. 68 , G.R. No. 46028	Petitioner Amadeo Matute held a contract with the Commonwealth Government, secured through public bidding, to supply fresh meat at predetermined prices. Subsequent to the contract's execution, the City of Manila increased the fees at the municipal slaughterhouse, which led the petitioner to request an increase in the contract price for the meat he supplied to the government. This price increase was granted by the Acting Purchasing Agent with the approval of the Undersecretary of Finance, but without a new public bidding or other approvals later deemed necessary by the Auditor-General.	The Auditor-General possesses discretionary power, not merely a ministerial duty, to examine the legality and regularity of government expenditures before countersigning treasury warrants; consequently, any novation of a government contract, such as a price increase altering a principal condition, must strictly comply with existing laws and executive orders, including requirements for public bidding and specified approvals, and failure to do so renders the novation invalid and the resulting expenditure unauthorized.	Constitutional Law I
Aglipay vs. Ruiz (13th March 1937)	AK840573 64 Phil. 201 , G. R. No. 45459	The case arose from the decision of the Director of Posts in May 1936 to issue and sell postage stamps commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress, an event organized by the Roman Catholic Church and scheduled to be held in Manila. This action was perceived by the petitioner, the head of another religious denomination, as an unconstitutional use of public resources to favor a specific church, leading to the legal challenge.	The issuance of postage stamps by the government, even if related to an event with religious significance, does not violate the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public funds for the use, benefit, or support of any sect or church, provided that the primary purpose of such issuance is secular (e.g., promoting the country, tourism, or commemorating an event of national or international interest) and any benefit accruing to a religious institution is merely incidental and not the direct aim of the governmental action.	Constitutional Law I
Philippine National Bank vs. National City Bank of New York (31st October 1936)	AK161292 63 Phil. 711 , G. R. No. 43596	In April 1933, Motor Service Company (MSC) accepted two checks as payment for automobile tires from unknown individuals. These checks were purportedly issued by the Pangasinan Transportation Co. and signed by J.L. Klar as Manager and Treasurer, payable to International Auto Repair Shop. MSC deposited these checks with the National City Bank of New York, which then cleared them through the Philippine National Bank (PNB). After honoring the checks, PNB discovered that J.L. Klar's signatures were forged when informed by Pangasinan Transportation Co. PNB immediately demanded reimbursement from both MSC and National City Bank, but both refused. PNB filed suit, and the case was eventually dismissed against National City Bank before trial, proceeding solely against MSC for recovery of the funds paid on the forged checks.	Payment of a check does not constitute acceptance under Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. A drawee bank can recover payments made on forged checks from negligent holders who failed to exercise due diligence in accepting the checks.	Philosophy of Law
Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo (7th August 1935)	AK655680 61 Phil. 709 , No. 40411	Davao Saw Mill operated a sawmill business on land it leased. They erected a building and installed machinery within it, some affixed to cement foundations. A lease agreement stipulated that improvements and buildings would become the property of the landowner upon lease expiration, but specifically excluded machineries from these improvements.	Machinery installed in a leased building by the lessee for its own industry, which is movable by nature and not intended to be a permanent fixture belonging to the landowner, especially when the lease agreement explicitly excludes machineries from improvements passing to the lessor, retains its character as personal property and is therefore subject to chattel mortgage and execution as such.	Property and Land Law
Near vs. Minnesota (1st June 1931)	AK767235 283 U.S. 697	The case arose under a 1925 Minnesota law, Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota, which declared that any person engaged in the business of regularly publishing a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" was guilty of a nuisance. The statute authorized actions in the name of the State to perpetually enjoin such publications. This law, often referred to as a "gag law," was enacted amidst concerns about yellow journalism and scurrilous publications but raised significant First Amendment issues.	A state statute that permits public authorities to enjoin the future publication of a newspaper or periodical found to be "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" constitutes a prior restraint on publication in violation of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional, particularly when applied to charges of official misconduct.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Expression
United States vs. Schwimmer (27th May 1929)	AK629766 279 U.S. 644	The case arose from Rosika Schwimmer's application for naturalization under the Naturalization Act of 1906. At the time, international tensions and the experience of World War I had heightened concerns about national loyalty and the obligations of citizenship, including the duty to defend the country. Schwimmer, a well-known lecturer and writer with strong pacifist convictions, sought U.S. citizenship, leading to a legal challenge regarding whether her refusal to bear arms was compatible with the requirements for naturalization.	An applicant for naturalization must be willing to take up arms in defense of the United States when required by law; an unwillingness to do so, even if based on pacifist beliefs, demonstrates a lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution and an inability to take the oath of allegiance without mental reservation, thereby disqualifying the applicant for citizenship.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Expression
Olmstead et al. vs. United States (4th June 1928)	AK928688 277 U.S. 438	The case arose during the Prohibition era, involving a large-scale conspiracy to import, transport, possess, and sell intoxicating liquors in violation of the National Prohibition Act, operating primarily in the Seattle, Washington area and extending to British Columbia.	The interception of telephone conversations by government agents through wiretapping conducted outside the defendants' premises (without physical trespass) does not constitute a "search" or "seizure" prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the use of such intercepted conversations as evidence in a criminal trial does not violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.	Constitutional Law II Searches and Seizures
Sibal vs. Valdez (4th August 1927)	AK944731 50 Phil. 512 , No. 26278	This case arose from a dispute over sugar cane and palay (rice) crops planted on land previously owned by the plaintiff, Leon Sibal, but later involved in execution sales. Sibal attempted to redeem sugar cane sold to the defendant, Emiliano Valdez, and sought to prevent Valdez from harvesting palay on the same land. The core issue revolves around the classification of standing crops as either personal or real property under Philippine law.	Standing sugar cane, when produced by annual crops and yearly labor, is considered personal property and is therefore not subject to redemption as real property under the provisions of the Civil Code regarding redemption of real estate.	Property and Land Law
Whitney vs. California (16th May 1927)	AK988741 274 U.S. 357	The case arose during a period of heightened concern over radical political movements and labor unrest in the United States following World War I and the Russian Revolution. California, like several other states, enacted a Criminal Syndicalism Act to counter organizations perceived as advocating for violent overthrow of the government or unlawful industrial and political change. Ms. Whitney, a niece of former Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field and a social activist, became involved with the Communist Labor Party.	A state, in the exercise of its police power, may constitutionally punish those who abuse the rights of free speech and assembly by knowingly becoming a member of, or assisting in organizing, an association that advocates, teaches, or aids and abets criminal syndicalism, defined as doctrines advocating unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political change, without violating the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Expression
Buck vs. Bell (2nd May 1927)	AK816985 274 U.S. 200	* The case arose in the context of the eugenics movement in the early 20th century, which promoted the idea that societal problems could be reduced by preventing reproduction among individuals considered genetically unfit or "defective." * Virginia enacted a statute in 1924 reflecting these views, allowing for the sterilization of inmates of certain state institutions if deemed beneficial for the patient and society, based on concerns about heredity and the societal burden of supporting "defective persons."	A state statute permitting the compulsory sterilization of institutionalized individuals found to have hereditary forms of insanity or imbecility does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when adequate procedural safeguards are provided.	Constitutional Law II Due Process
Riel vs. Wright (5th August 1926)	AK274483 49 Phil. 194 , G. R. No. 25679	The petitioner was employed as a "temporary clerk" in the Philippine Senate. Following the adjournment of the legislative session, his services continued for an extended period. A dispute arose when the Insular Auditor refused to approve the payment warrant for services rendered significantly later than the session's close, citing limitations in the relevant appropriation act regarding temporary legislative employees. This case arose as a "test case" potentially affecting numerous similarly situated employees.	The phrase "several days after a session" as used in Section 18, subdivision 2 of Act No. 2935, governing appropriations for "supplementary force" in the Legislature, cannot be legally construed to cover a period of eighty-two days after the adjournment of the legislative session; consequently, temporary employees rendering services during such an extended period are not legally employed under that specific appropriation and have no clear legal right to compensation.	Constitutional Law I
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (US SC Case) (7th June 1926)	AK944319 271 U.S. 500	The Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2972, primarily targeting Chinese merchants who constituted a significant portion of the commercial sector (around 60%) and traditionally kept their books in Chinese. The stated purpose was to facilitate tax inspection and prevent fraud, as revenue officials struggled to examine books kept in Chinese. This led to concerns about tax evasion but also significant opposition from the Chinese community, who argued the law would effectively drive them out of business due to their inability to understand or use books in the permitted languages.	Act No. 2972 of the Philippine Legislature, which prohibits keeping business account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or a local dialect, is unconstitutional because it violates the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights by arbitrarily interfering with the liberty and property of Chinese merchants without reasonable justification under the police power.	Constitutional Law II Due Process, Equal Protection
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (PH SC Case) (6th February 1925)	AK907253 47 Phil. 385 , G.R. No. L-20479	* The case arose from the Philippine government's efforts to effectively collect sales and income taxes, particularly from Chinese merchants, many of whom kept their account books exclusively in Chinese, making inspection difficult for revenue agents. * An earlier attempt by the Collector of Internal Revenue to mandate bookkeeping in English or Spanish via administrative circular was invalidated by the Supreme Court (_Young vs. Rafferty_) for exceeding administrative authority, prompting the Legislature to enact Act No. 2972. * The Act faced significant opposition from the Chinese community and diplomatic channels, and its enforcement was initially suspended before being pursued, leading to the arrest of petitioner Yu Cong Eng and this challenge.	Act No. 2972 is interpreted to mean that persons and entities engaged in business in the Philippines must keep account books necessary for taxation purposes (specifically, sales books and other records and returns required by Bureau of Internal Revenue regulations) in English, Spanish, or a local dialect; this construction renders the Act constitutional as a valid fiscal measure.	Constitutional Law II Due Process
People vs. Pomar (3rd November 1924)	AK753803 46 Phil. 440 , No. 22008	In 1923, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3071, which mandated employers to provide paid maternity leave to pregnant women workers. Under Section 13 of this law, women employees were entitled to receive wages for thirty days before and thirty days after childbirth. The case arose when Julio Pomar, managing La Flor de la Isabela tobacco factory, refused to pay such maternity benefits to Macaria Fajardo, a cigar-maker who had given birth. The prosecution filed charges against Pomar for violating the Act, leading to his conviction in the lower court. Pomar challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing it violated fundamental rights to freedom of contract and property, ultimately bringing the case before the Supreme Court for review.	The provisions of Section 13 of Act No. 3071 are unconstitutional and void as they violate the constitutional right to liberty of contract under the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916.	Philosophy of Law
Pensader vs. Pensader (7th February 1924)	AK902639 47 Phil. 959 , No. 21271	The case centers on a claim of inheritance versus a claim of ownership through donation and adverse possession. The plaintiffs, nephews of the deceased Canuto Pensader, sought to partition land they considered common inheritance. The defendants, niece and grand-nephew of Canuto, asserted exclusive rights based on donations made by Canuto and decades of uninterrupted possession. The legal context is property rights, inheritance laws, donation, and the principle of prescription through adverse possession.	The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs' action for partition was barred by prescription because the defendants and their predecessors had been in continuous, adverse possession of the coconut land for over thirty years, under claim of ownership.	Property and Land Law
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw (27th February 1922)	AK656044 43 Phil. 19 , No. 17958	The case arose from a horrific act of piracy in the Dutch East Indies where Moro pirates attacked Dutch subjects, committed robbery, rape, and attempted murder. The perpetrators later returned to the Philippines where they were arrested and tried, raising important questions about jurisdiction and the applicability of Spanish-era piracy laws.	The Court held that piracy is a crime against all mankind (hostes humani generis) that can be punished by any country regardless of where it was committed, and that the Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy remained valid law in the Philippines after the American occupation.	Criminal Law II
Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co. (30th March 1921)	AK543470 41 Phil. 531 , No. 16544	D. Antonio Osorio had a share in a shipping business with Ynchausti & Co. Upon his death, his estate, including this share, was to be partitioned among his heirs, including his widow Da. Petrona Reyes. Before the formal partition, Da. Petrona Reyes donated a portion of her expected inheritance to her son, Leonardo Osorio. This donation later became contested when the shares of stock representing the inherited business interest were inventoried as part of Da. Petrona Reyes' estate after her death.	The donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes to Leonardo Osorio of her share in her deceased husband's inheritance, even before formal adjudication, is valid because she had a vested right to the inheritance at the time of donation, and such inheritance is not considered "future property" in the prohibitive sense of Article 635 of the Civil Code.	Property and Land Law
Chartered Bank vs. Imperial and National Bank (15th March 1921)	AK799964 48 Phil. 931 , No. 17222	PNB sued Umberto de Poli to recover goods under a chattel mortgage. After PNB obtained a writ of attachment, other creditors petitioned for de Poli’s insolvency. The insolvency court took control of all assets, including the attached goods. PNB argued its mortgage rights superseded insolvency proceedings. The lower court allowed PNB to proceed, prompting creditors to challenge via certiorari.	Secured creditors retain the right to enforce their liens independently under the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956) and are not compelled to participate in insolvency proceedings.	Statutory Construction
Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila (11th October 1920)	AK900808 41 Phil. 103 , G. R. No. 15972	The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 532, which mandated that all laundries, dyeing, and cleaning establishments issue signed duplicate receipts in English and Spanish, specifying the kind and number of articles received for service, aiming to regulate the delivery and return of clothes and prevent disputes and fraud, particularly targeting issues arising from receipts issued in Chinese characters.	Municipal ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause and the specific power to regulate businesses, requiring reasonable measures like issuing detailed receipts in official languages to prevent fraud and disputes and protect the public, constitute a valid exercise of police power, even if they impose some burden on business owners, provided they are not discriminatory, arbitrary, or unduly oppressive.	Constitutional Law II Due Process
Abrams vs. United States (10th November 1919)	AK287637 250 U.S. 616	The case arose during World War I, shortly after the U.S. sent troops to parts of Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution, an action perceived by the defendants (Russian immigrants and self-proclaimed anarchists/revolutionists) as an attempt to crush the revolution. The Espionage Act of 1917, amended in 1918, criminalized various forms of dissent and anti-war expression deemed harmful to the U.S. war effort against Germany.	The distribution of circulars advocating a general strike in ammunition factories during wartime, even if primarily motivated by a desire to protest U.S. policy towards Russia, constitutes sufficient evidence of an unlawful intent to curtail war production and hinder the prosecution of the war against Germany, thereby violating the Espionage Act and falling outside the protection of the First Amendment.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Expression
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila (31st October 1919)	AK178680 40 Phil. 349 , No. 14355	The City of Manila sought to extend Rizal Avenue and filed a petition to expropriate certain parcels of land in Binondo, Manila, owned by the Chinese Community of Manila, which included a cemetery. The Chinese Community opposed the expropriation, arguing it was unnecessary, would desecrate a cemetery, and alternative routes were available.	In expropriation proceedings initiated by the City of Manila, the courts have the authority to inquire into and hear evidence regarding the necessity of the expropriation; the determination of necessity is not solely a legislative prerogative but a judicial question subject to review when general authority to expropriate is granted.	Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (7th March 1919)	AK549703 39 Phil. 660 , G.R. No. 14078	Rubi and other Manguianes (indigenous people of Mindoro) were ordered by the provincial governor to leave their native habitats and establish residence on a reservation at Tigbao in Mindoro. One Manguian named Dabalos escaped and was imprisoned. The Manguianes filed for habeas corpus, challenging the provincial governor's authority to confine them to reservations.	The Supreme Court ruled that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, which authorized provincial governors to direct "non-Christian" inhabitants to live in reservations, was constitutional and did not violate due process or equal protection guarantees, nor did it constitute slavery or involuntary servitude.	Constitutional Law II Police Power
United States vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua (29th January 1919)	AK487241 39 Phil. 552 , No. 13708	The case originated from a loan of P100 made by Chua to Pedro Andres in 1911. Over five years, the debt grew to approximately P700 due to excessive interest. The transaction was later disguised as a pacto de retro sale to evade the Usury Law.	The court held that the transaction was a usurious loan disguised as a pacto de retro sale, and Chua was guilty of violating the Usury Law.	Philosophy of Law
Manzanares vs. Moreta (22nd October 1918)	AK506216 38 Phil. 821 , No. 12306	In this landmark case from 1918, an automobile accident occurred on the morning of March 5, 1916, at the intersection of Solana and Real Streets in Manila. Rafael Moreta was driving his automobile from the southern part of Solana Street when he encountered other vehicles at Real Street. After this encounter, instead of proceeding cautiously, he continued at high speed without sounding his horn. As he entered Solana Street, his vehicle struck and fatally injured Salvador Bona, a child between 8 and 9 years old, who was crossing from the right sidewalk to the left. The impact was so severe that even after hitting the child, the automobile continued moving for about two meters. The victim's mother, Simona Manzanares, a poor washerwoman, filed a civil case seeking P5,000 in damages. The Court of First Instance awarded her P1,000 as indemnity, which Moreta appealed after his motion for a new trial was denied. The case reached the Supreme Court through a bill of exceptions, where it became a pivotal decision establishing important principles about damage compensation in cases involving wrongful death, particularly concerning minor children.	The Supreme Court held that an action for damages can be maintained in Philippine jurisdiction for the death of a person by wrongful act, and that in cases involving the death of a minor child, the law presumes pecuniary loss to the parent without need for specific proof of actual earnings or support.	Philosophy of Law