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Title	IDs & Reference #s	Background	Primary Holding	Subject Matter
Brehm vs. Republic (30th September 1963)	AK978065 9 SCRA 172 , G.R. No. L-18566	Gilbert R. Brehm, an American citizen serving in the U.S. Navy and temporarily assigned at Subic Bay, married Ester Mira, a Filipina citizen. Ester had a daughter, Elizabeth, from a previous relationship with another American who had left the country. After their marriage, the couple and the child resided in Manila, with Gilbert providing care and support. To formalize their family unit and give the child a legitimate status, the spouses filed a joint petition to adopt Elizabeth.	The absolute prohibition in Article 335(4) of the New Civil Code, which states that non-resident aliens "cannot adopt," is a mandatory provision that disqualifies a non-resident alien from adopting in the Philippines, even if he is the step-father of the child to be adopted.	Persons and Family Law
Sherbert vs. Verner (17th June 1963)	AK644642 374 U.S. 398	The case arose from the conflict between an individual's religious observance, specifically the Seventh-Day Adventist practice of observing Saturday as the Sabbath, and a state's unemployment compensation law requiring availability for work. Appellant Adell Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and was discharged by her employer when she refused to work on Saturdays after her employer switched to a six-day work week. Her subsequent inability to find other employment that did not require Saturday work led to her claim for unemployment benefits.	A state cannot constitutionally apply its unemployment compensation eligibility provisions to deny benefits to an individual who refuses to work on their Sabbath due to sincerely held religious beliefs, as such a denial imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion, unless the state can demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying such infringement and that no alternative forms of regulation would suffice.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Aznar vs. Garcia (31st January 1963)	AK099588 7 SCRA 95 , No. L-16749	Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of the State of California, lived for most of his life in the Philippines, where he died. He left a will that provided a legacy of P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia, who had been judicially declared his acknowledged natural child in a separate proceeding, while leaving the bulk of his substantial estate to his other daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen. This disposition was valid under the internal law of California, which grants testators complete freedom of disposition. However, it contravened Philippine law, which designates acknowledged natural children as forced heirs entitled to a specific portion of the estate known as the legitime. The conflict arose as to which law should govern the intrinsic validity of the will's provisions.	When Philippine law directs the application of a foreign national's law to matters of succession, the term "national law" is understood to encompass the entirety of that foreign law, including its conflict-of-laws rules. If the foreign law contains a conflict-of-laws rule that refers the matter back to the law of the decedent's domicile, the Philippine court shall accept this referral (renvoi) and apply its own internal law on succession.	Persons and Family Law
Vera vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals (31st January 1963)	AK623026 117 Phil. 170 , G. R. No. L-18184	The case arose in the aftermath of World War II in the Philippines, during which various guerrilla units operated. The Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, series of 1946, was issued to provide a means for individuals who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance movement against the Japanese or against persons aiding the enemy to be absolved of criminal liability. The petitioners were members of Vera's Guerrilla Party, and the victim, Amadeo Lozañes, was a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization, with a history of rivalry between the two groups.	Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime; therefore, an accused who denies committing the offense charged cannot simultaneously invoke the benefits of an amnesty proclamation, as amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.	Constitutional Law I
Engel vs. Vitale (25th June 1962)	AK957958 370 U.S. 421	The New York State Board of Regents, a governmental agency with supervisory powers over the State's public school system, composed and recommended a prayer for recitation in public schools. The prayer was part of a "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools." The respondent Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, adopted this recommendation and directed its principal to have the prayer said aloud by each class at the beginning of each school day in the presence of a teacher.	State officials may not compose an official state prayer and require its recitation in public schools, even if the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils may remain silent or be excused, because such a practice violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Cui vs. Arellano University (30th May 1961)	AK734243 112 Phil. 135 , G.R. No. L-15127	The case arose from a dispute between Emeterio Cui, a law student, and Arellano University. Cui had been awarded scholarship grants by the university for scholastic merit. Before receiving these grants, he was made to sign a contract waiving his right to transfer to another school without refunding the scholarship amount. Cui later transferred to another university, and Arellano University refused to release his academic transcripts necessary for the bar examination unless he repaid the scholarship funds.	A contractual stipulation requiring a student to waive their right to transfer to another school unless they refund the scholarship benefits previously granted is void for being contrary to public policy, as scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit and not as a business scheme to retain students.	Obligations and Contracts
Republic vs. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas (28th February 1961)	AK396070 1 SCRA 646 , 111 Phil. 230 , No. L-12792	To alleviate traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the government planned to extend Azcarraga Street. This extension required acquiring a portion of land owned by La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, where San Beda College is located. Negotiations failed, leading the government to initiate expropriation proceedings.	The trial court erred in dismissing the expropriation case without receiving evidence on the necessity of taking the appellee's property for public use. The issue of necessity is a question of fact that requires presentation of evidence by both parties.	Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (30th September 1960)	AK130576 109 Phil. 629 , G.R. No. L-14628	The case originated from an intimate relationship between Soledad Cagigas, a 36-year-old former teacher, and Francisco Hermosisima, an apprentice pilot nearly ten years her junior. Their relationship led to Cagigas becoming pregnant. Hermosisima promised to marry her but subsequently married another woman. Cagigas filed a suit for acknowledgment of their child, support, and moral damages for the broken promise. The lower courts granted the moral damages, framing the petitioner's actions as a form of seduction, which prompted the petitioner to elevate the issue to the Supreme Court.	An action for breach of a promise to marry is not a valid basis for recovering moral damages under Philippine law, as Congress deliberately omitted provisions from the Civil Code that would have sanctioned such claims.	Persons and Family Law
Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Felias (30th June 1960)	AK597591 108 Phil. 873 , No. L-14309	Caltex sought to enforce a judgment against Felisa Felias's husband, Simeon Sawamoto, by levying and selling a land parcel (Lot No. 107) originally owned by Felisa Felias's parents and later donated to her. Caltex claimed the land became conjugal property due to the construction of a conjugal house on it during the marriage and was thus subject to levy for the husband’s debt.	Paraphernal property of the wife is not liable for the debts of the husband, even if a conjugal house is built on it, if the land was exclusively owned by the wife prior to the construction and debt incurrence.	Property and Land Law
Commissioner Internal Revenue vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros (29th April 1960)	AK186834 107 Phil. 1055 , No. L-14880	Respondent Filipinas Compañía de Seguros, a real estate dealer, paid P150 as the 1956 fixed annual tax under the original National Internal Revenue Code. RA 1612 (effective August 24, 1956) introduced graduated rates. The Commissioner later demanded an additional P350, claiming retroactive application. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled for the respondent, prompting the Commissioner’s appeal to the Supreme Court.	Tax laws are prospective unless expressly stated otherwise; Republic Act No. 1612’s increased rates for real estate dealer’s fixed annual tax applied prospectively from its effective date (August 24, 1956) and could not retroactively impose additional liability for taxes already paid for 1956.	Statutory Construction
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (12th August 1959)	AK011651 106 Phil. 2 , No. L-13954	On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265, "An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational Institutions," was approved. Section 2 of this Act authorized the Secretary of Education to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony. Consequently, on July 21, 1955, the Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, detailing the rules for the compulsory daily flag ceremony in all public and private schools.	The requirement of observing the flag ceremony, including saluting the flag, singing the national anthem, and reciting the patriotic pledge, as mandated by Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion and the exercise thereof, as the flag ceremony is a civic and patriotic exercise, not a religious one, and compliance with such non-discriminatory school regulations is a prerequisite for attendance in public schools.	Constitutional Law II Philosophy of Law Freedom of Religion
Evangelista vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc. (23rd April 1958)	AK523989 103 Phil. 401 , No. L-11139	Santos Evangelista sued Ricardo Rivera for a sum of money and obtained a writ of attachment on a house Rivera built on leased land. Later, Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. claimed ownership of the same house based on a prior auction sale resulting from a separate case against Rivera. Evangelista sued to establish his title and gain possession.	A house constructed on leased land is considered immovable property, not personal property, for purposes of attachment and execution, regardless of agreements between private parties treating it as chattel. Therefore, the rules for attaching immovable property must be followed.	Property and Land Law
Roth vs. United States (24th June 1957)	AK704418 354 U.S. 476	The cases arose from separate prosecutions under federal and state laws aimed at curbing the dissemination of obscene materials. Roth operated a publication and sales business in New York, utilizing mails for circulars and advertising. Alberts ran a mail-order business in Los Angeles, selling books deemed obscene. These prosecutions reflected societal concerns and legislative efforts to regulate materials considered harmful to public morals, specifically those dealing with sex in a manner deemed offensive or appealing to prurient interest.	Obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press under the First Amendment (as applied to the Federal Government) or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (as applied to the States); the appropriate standard for judging obscenity is whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Expression
Ichong vs. Hernandez (31st May 1957)	AK330887 101 Phil. 1155 , G.R. No. L-7995	The enactment of Republic Act No. 1180 stemmed from a deep-seated nationalistic concern, present since the 1935 Constitutional Convention and amplified over time, regarding the perceived economic dominance and control exerted by aliens, particularly in the vital retail trade sector, which was viewed as a threat to the Philippines' economic independence, national security, and the welfare of Filipino retailers and consumers.	Republic Act No. 1180, which effectively nationalizes the retail trade business by prohibiting aliens (except US citizens and those already engaged in the business as of May 15, 1954, under specific conditions) from participating, constitutes a valid exercise of the State's police power and does not infringe upon the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, nor does it violate treaty obligations or the constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill be expressed in its title.	Constitutional Law II Due Process
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila (30th April 1957)	AK332493 101 Phil. 386 , G. R. No. L-9637	The American Bible Society (ABS), a non-profit religious missionary corporation, had been distributing and selling bibles and religious materials in the Philippines since 1898. In 1953, the City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS that it was considered to be conducting the business of "general merchandise" and required it to secure a Mayor's permit and pay license fees for the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, based on City Ordinances. ABS paid the assessed amount under protest and filed suit to challenge the legality and constitutionality of these ordinances as applied to its activities.	A municipal ordinance imposing license fees on the sale of merchandise, when applied to the distribution and sale of bibles and religious literature by a non-profit religious corporation, constitutes an unconstitutional restraint on the free exercise of religion and the dissemination of religious beliefs, as it is not a nominal fee for regulation but a tax on a constitutional privilege. However, an ordinance requiring a Mayor's permit for businesses, trades, or occupations, if generally applicable and not imposing a charge on the enjoyment of a constitutional right or taxing religious practices, is not per se unconstitutional but may be inapplicable if the underlying activity it seeks to regulate (through related tax ordinances) is constitutionally protected from such taxation.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Tañada vs. Cuenco (28th February 1957)	AK454462 103 Phil. 1051 , G. R. No. L-10520	The dispute originated from the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the 1955 general elections. At that time, the Senate was overwhelmingly dominated by the Nacionalista Party, which had 23 Senators, while the Citizens Party, represented solely by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, was the party with the second largest number of votes. The constitutional provision for the Senate Electoral Tribunal requires six Senators as members: three to be nominated by the party with the largest number of votes and three by the party with the second largest number of votes. The conflict centered on how these nominations, particularly for the minority slots, should proceed given this significant disparity in party representation.	The Senate may not validly elect as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution; the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate is entitled to nominate three members, and the party having the second largest number of votes has the exclusive right to nominate the other three Senator-members. Any nomination for these constitutionally allocated party slots made by an entity other than the designated political party is null and void.	Constitutional Law I
Velayo, etc. vs. Shell Co. of the Phils., et al. (31st October 1956)	AK120965 100 Phil. 186 , G.R. No. L-7817	Commercial Air Lines, Inc. (CALI), a Philippine corporation, was in a state of insolvency, owing significant debts to multiple creditors, including a substantial amount to Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd. (Shell) for fuel supplies. CALI's management, seeking to avoid formal insolvency proceedings and ensure an equitable settlement, convened a meeting of its principal creditors to disclose its financial situation and discuss a plan for the fair distribution of its remaining assets, one of which was a valuable Douglas C-54 airplane located in California, USA.	A creditor who, after participating in a meeting with other creditors of an insolvent debtor to arrange for a fair pro-rata distribution of assets, takes advantage of information obtained therein to secretly assign its credit to another entity to attach the debtor's property abroad, acts in bad faith and contrary to morals and public policy, and is liable for damages to the insolvent's estate under the Civil Code.	Persons and Family Law
Espique vs. Espique (28th June 1956)	AK645404 99 Phil. 448 , No. L-8029	The case stemmed from a partition action where plaintiffs claimed common ownership of land and sought damages for lost profits. The defendant asserted sole ownership based on a donation propter nuptias received in 1906 and his subsequent adverse possession for over 40 years, arguing for prescription and lack of cause of action for partition.	An invalid donation of immovable property, while not transferring title, can serve as a valid basis for acquisitive prescription if accompanied by open, continuous, adverse, and public possession in the concept of owner for the period required by law.	Property and Land Law
Bermoy, et al. vs. Philippine Normal College (18th May 1956)	AK350868 99 Phil. 1031 , G.R. No. L-8670	The case revolves around employees of the Philippine Normal College seeking compensation for salary differentials and overtime pay. Their lawsuit was initially dismissed on the grounds that the college lacked the juridical capacity to be sued. This dismissal led to an appeal to the Supreme Court, where the central question became whether the Philippine Normal College could indeed be sued as a juridical entity.		Constitutional Law I
Cruz vs. Pahati (13th April 1956)	AK018322 98 Phil. 788 , No. L-8257	Plaintiff Cruz owned an automobile. He entrusted it to Belizo, along with a letter intended to request a new registration certificate, under the pretext that Belizo would find a buyer. Belizo, however, fraudulently altered the letter into a deed of sale and sold the car to Bulahan, who then sold it to Pahati. Cruz filed a replevin action to recover the automobile.	The original owner of a movable property, who was unlawfully deprived of it due to fraud, has a better right to recover possession than a subsequent purchaser, even if the latter acted in good faith and for value.	Property and Land Law
Carandang vs. Santiago, etc. and Valenton (25th May 1955)	AK105250 97 Phil. 94 , No. L-8238	After Tomas Valenton Jr. was convicted of frustrated homicide for attacking Carandang, Carandang filed a civil suit for damages. The trial court suspended the civil case pending the criminal appeal. Carandang challenged this suspension via certiorari.	Article 33 of the Civil Code permits a civil action for physical injuries to proceed independently of a criminal case, regardless of whether the offense is classified as physical injuries, frustrated homicide, or another crime involving bodily harm.	Statutory Construction
In re: Cunanan, et al. (18th March 1954)	AK641009 94 Phil. 534	Post-WWII bar candidates who narrowly failed petitions sought admission under RA 972, which retroactively reduced passing averages. The Court initially adjusted passing grades annually but rejected legislative interference, citing the need to protect public interest in legal practice standards.	The Supreme Court declared Republic Act No. 972 unconstitutional, except for the portion relating to bar examinations from 1953 to 1955, which remained valid due to a lack of unanimity in the decision.	Statutory Construction
Endencia and Jugo vs. David (31st August 1953)	AK286628 93 Phil. 696 , 146 Phil. 469 , Nos. L-6355-56	Judges Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo sued for refunds of income taxes withheld from their salaries. The lower court ruled in their favor, citing Perfecto v. Meer. The Collector of Internal Revenue appealed, arguing Congress’s enactment of RA 590 validated the taxation.	Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is unconstitutional because taxing judicial salaries violates the constitutional prohibition against diminishing judicial compensation, and Congress cannot legislate to override the judiciary’s constitutional interpretation.	Statutory Construction
Rodriguez, Sr vs. Gella (2nd February 1953)	AK552707 92 Phil. 603 , G. R. No. L-6266	Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted in 1941, declaring a state of total emergency due to World War II and authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet this emergency. Years after the war, on November 10, 1952, the President issued Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546, appropriating significant sums for public works and disaster relief, citing the continued effectivity of C.A. No. 671. This exercise of emergency powers, long after the cessation of hostilities and during a period when Congress was actively functioning, led the petitioners to challenge the validity of these Executive Orders.	The emergency powers delegated to the President by Congress under Commonwealth Act No. 671, pursuant to Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution, ceased to be operative because the "time of war" and the "total emergency" declared therein (referring to World War II) had ended, and Congress had subsequently demonstrated its readiness and ability to legislate on matters, including appropriations, thereby effectively withdrawing such delegated powers.	Constitutional Law I
Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion (29th December 1950)	AK028894 87 Phil. 843 , G.R. No. L-3936	The case arose from a naturalization proceeding governed by the then-existing law. A new statute, Republic Act No. 530, was enacted, fundamentally altering the naturalization process by mandating that a decision granting citizenship would only become executory after a two-year waiting period from its promulgation. The dispute centered on whether this new law applied to the respondent, Si Kee, whose naturalization decision was set to become final and executory on the very same day that R.A. 530 was approved by the President. The core of the conflict was the interpretation of the law's effective date and its applicability to cases that were on the cusp of finality.	A law that states it shall take effect on the day of its approval becomes effective from the very first moment of that day, as the law does not recognize fractions of a day for the purpose of determining a statute's effectivity.	Persons and Family Law
People vs. Alvero (11th April 1950)	AK350120 86 Phil. 58 , No. L-820	Aurelio Alvero was charged with 22 counts of treason before the People's Court for various collaborative activities with Japanese forces during the occupation of the Philippines in World War II. These activities included business dealings through ASA Trading, membership in pro-Japanese organizations, and military collaboration through groups like MAKAPILI and Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala.	The Supreme Court found Alvero guilty of treason and affirmed the sentence of reclusion perpetua but increased the fine from ₱10,000 to ₱20,000.	Criminal Law II
People vs. Paar (31st March 1950)	AK008848 85 Phil. 864 , No. L-2318	The case arose from allegations that Teofilo Paar actively assisted the Japanese Military Police (Kempei Tai) in identifying, arresting, and interrogating individuals suspected of being part of the underground resistance movement. The prosecution pursued only four counts out of the original fifteen, focusing on Paar’s overt acts of treasonous collaboration with the enemy.	The Supreme Court upheld Paar’s conviction for treason, finding that his actions demonstrated adherence to the enemy. However, due to the lack of evidence proving that his actions led to the execution of individuals, the penalty was reduced from reclusion perpetua to a lesser term of imprisonment.	Criminal Law II
Guido vs. Rural Progress Admlnistration (31st October 1949)	AK713211 84 Phil. 847 , No. L-2089	The RPA sought to expropriate two adjoining commercial lots owned by Justa G. Guido in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to resell them to tenants. Guido challenged the expropriation, arguing that the land was commercial and thus excluded from the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 539, which allows expropriation for agrarian reform.	The expropriation of private commercial land by the RPA for resale to tenants does not constitute public use and is therefore unconstitutional under Commonwealth Act No. 539 and the Philippine Constitution.	Philosophy of Law
Sunripe Coconut Product Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations (30th April 1949)	AK046797 83 Phil. 518 , No. L-2009	The case arose when the Sunshine Coconut Workers' Union filed a claim on behalf of parers and shellers seeking sick leave benefits. Sunripe Coconut Products Co., Inc. contested the claim, arguing these workers were independent contractors. The dispute reached the Court of Industrial Relations, which ruled in favor of the workers. Sunripe appealed to the Supreme Court.	Parers and shellers under the "pakiao" system are considered employees or laborers entitled to statutory benefits despite being paid on a piecework basis.	Philosophy of Law
Bustos vs. Lucero (20th October 1948)	AK135112 81 Phil. 640 , No. L-2068	The petitioner, Dominador B. Bustos, was accused in a criminal case and underwent a preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace (JP) of Masantol, Pampanga. After the JP found probable cause and issued a warrant based on the complainant's and witnesses' initial testimony, the case was set for the second stage of the preliminary investigation where the accused could present evidence.	An accused person is not entitled, as a matter of fundamental right, to cross-examine the complainant and witnesses during the preliminary investigation stage after the issuance of an arrest warrant; while the investigating judge has the discretion to grant such an opportunity, Section 11 of Rule 108 does not mandate it, and the constitutional right to confront witnesses applies specifically to the trial proper.	Civil Procedure I
Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila (12th May 1948)	AK914931 80 Phil., 859 , No. L-2128	Petitioners Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero were arrested on April 2, 1948, for alleged robbery, based on a complaint by Bernardino Malinao. They were detained without a warrant and brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. When no proper court process was issued for their continued detention after six hours, they filed a petition for habeas corpus.	The term "judicial authority" in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers exclusively to judges or courts, not to a city fiscal. Detaining an individual beyond the prescribed period, without delivering them to a proper judicial authority, is unconstitutional and illegal.	Criminal Law II
Vargas vs. Rilloraza (26th February 1948)	AK301504 80 Phil. 297	The case arose from a motion filed by Jorge B. Vargas, challenging the constitutionality of Section 14 of the People's Court Act. This provision disqualified certain Supreme Court Justices from participating in treason cases related to the Japanese occupation, allowing the President to designate lower court judges to temporarily sit in the Supreme Court.	The Supreme Court declared Section 14 of the People's Court Act unconstitutional, as it violates the constitutional provisions on the appointment and qualifications of Supreme Court Justices and undermines the independence of the judiciary.	Philosophy of Law
People vs. Prieto (29th January 1948)	AK237843 80 Phil. 138 , No. L-399	The case arose from actions committed during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1944-1945. The accused, Eduardo Prieto, acted as an undercover agent for the Japanese Military Police, participating in various activities against suspected guerrillas and their supporters.	The Supreme Court held that when murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason, they cannot be regarded separately under their general denomination. The brutality of killing or physical injuries may be considered an aggravating circumstance but not as a separate crime.	Criminal Law II
Primicias vs. Fugoso (27th January 1948)	AK849130 80 Phil. 71 , No. L-1800	Cipriano P. Primicias requested a permit from Mayor Fugoso to hold a political rally at Plaza Miranda on November 16, 1947, to protest alleged election fraud. Initially approved by the Vice Mayor, the permit was revoked by the Mayor the next day, citing concerns over public order and the potential for unrest. Primicias filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Mayor to grant the permit.	The Supreme Court ruled that while the government may regulate the time, place, and manner of public assemblies, it cannot grant arbitrary discretion to a single official to deny such rights. The ordinance must be interpreted to allow regulation but not prohibition of lawful assemblies.	Philosophy of Law
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila (15th November 1947)	AK700773 79 Phil. 461 , No. L-630	The case emerged during post-WWII Philippines amid efforts to enforce constitutional protections over national patrimony. Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution prohibited alien ownership of "agricultural land," but ambiguity arose over whether this term included residential parcels. The dispute reflected tensions between foreign investments and safeguarding Filipino resources, requiring the Court to clarify the scope of constitutional land restrictions.	The Supreme Court held that aliens are prohibited from acquiring residential land under the 1935 Constitution, as such land is classified as "agricultural" under Article XIII, Section 5, which restricts ownership of private or public agricultural land to Filipino citizens.	Statutory Construction
People vs. Agpangan (10th October 1947)	AK427419 79 Phil. 334 , No. L-778	The case arose during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. The defendant was accused of being a member of pro-Japanese organizations (Ganap and Pampars) and performing duties that aided the Japanese forces against Filipino and American forces between December 1944 and January 1945 in Laguna Province.	The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and acquitted the appellant, finding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the alleged treasonous acts under the two-witness rule requirement, and that evidence suggested the appellant acted under duress.	Criminal Law II
People vs. Adriano (30th June 1947)	AK298371 78 Phil. 561 , No. L-477	During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines between January and April 1945, Apolinario Adriano was accused of treason for joining the Makapili organization and allegedly participating in various activities supporting Japanese forces against the United States and Philippine Commonwealth forces.	The Supreme Court held that membership in Makapili, while constituting an overt act of treason, must be proven by two witnesses testifying to the same specific instance, not different occasions of membership.	Criminal Law II
Caraos vs. Daza (13th March 1947)	AK452149 76 Phil. 681 , No. L-442 , G.R. No. 874	Jose Caraos was convicted of homicide in 1944 and sentenced to prison. During the Japanese occupation, he was released from jail, allegedly due to a pardon. After liberation, he was rearrested to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Caraos filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming his release was due to a valid pardon.	The Supreme Court held that there was no competent evidence to prove that Caraos was pardoned, and thus, his rearrest and continued imprisonment were lawful.	Philosophy of Law
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (5th March 1947)	AK966503 78 Phil. 1 , G.R. No. 1123	The case arose after Congress passed a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment allowing American citizens and corporations to exploit natural resources in the Philippines, subject to a plebiscite for public ratification. Petitioners challenged this resolution, claiming it failed to meet the required three-fourths votes in both legislative chambers.	The Supreme Court held that the validity of a constitutional amendment proposal, including whether it meets the required threshold, is a political question not subject to judicial review. The Court emphasized the "enrolled bill doctrine" and the separation of powers.	Statutory Construction
Laurel vs. Misa (30th January 1947)	AK294241 77 Phil. 856 , G.R. No. 409	The case arose in the aftermath of World War II, specifically following the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. During this period, some Filipino citizens were alleged to have collaborated with the Japanese forces. Anastacio Laurel was one such individual accused of treason for acts committed during the occupation.	A Filipino citizen's absolute and permanent allegiance to the legitimate government of the Philippines is not suspended or abrogated by enemy occupation, and consequently, such a citizen can be prosecuted for treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code for acts of adherence and giving aid and comfort to the enemy committed during said occupation.	Constitutional Law I Criminal Law II Statutory Construction
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff (20th August 1946)	AK022565 75 Phil. 875 , No. L-533	The case arose during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. Ramon Ruffy, a Major in the Philippine Constabulary, along with other petitioners, formed a guerrilla unit called the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro after refusing to surrender. This unit was later recognized by and integrated into the 6th Military District of the Philippine Army, which itself was recognized by General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area command. The petitioners were accused of murdering Lieutenant Colonel Enrique L. Jurado, who had been sent by the 6th Military District to command the Bolo Combat Team, on October 19, 1944.	Members of recognized guerrilla units who were lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the service of the Philippine Army during wartime are subject to military law and the jurisdiction of courts-martial for offenses committed during such service, and Article 93 of the Articles of War, which allows courts-martial to impose death or life imprisonment for murder in time of war, is constitutional as courts-martial are executive, not judicial, bodies.	Constitutional Law I
United States vs. Causby (27th May 1946)	AK120283 328 U.S. 256	Historically, common law adhered to the doctrine cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum et ad infernos, granting property owners rights to the heavens and to the depths below. However, the advent of aviation in the 20th century rendered this archaic rule impractical and necessitated a re-evaluation of airspace rights. Early courts initially resisted change, but the necessity of flight for transportation and national defense forced a legal evolution recognizing that the airspace above "usable heights" was not exclusively owned by the landowner.	The Supreme Court held that flights by government aircraft at low altitudes directly over private property, which are so frequent and low as to directly interfere with the enjoyment and use of the land, constitute a "taking" of property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. This effectively created the concept of an "aerial easement."	Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain
People vs. Cruz (21st February 1946)	AK026227 76 Phil. 169 , G.R. No. L-52	On June 25, 1945, four armed men robbed Dr. Gregorio B. Sison's drug store in Manila. The appellant was identified as one of the robbers who kept watch over the victims while they were forced to lie face down. The case primarily centered on the positive identification of the appellant by two witnesses.	The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision with the elimination of subsidiary imprisonment, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery in band based on clear and convincing witness identification.	Philosophy of Law
Yamashita vs. Styer (19th December 1945)	AK037613 75 Phil. 563 , No. L-129	After Japan's surrender in World War II, General Yamashita was captured and detained by the United States Army. He was charged with war crimes for failing to control his troops, who committed atrocities in the Philippines. Yamashita sought relief from the Philippine Supreme Court, claiming violations of his rights under international and domestic law.	The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the Military Commission had been validly constituted, had jurisdiction over Yamashita and the offenses charged, and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and prohibition.	Philosophy of Law
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (12th November 1945)	AK341470 75 Phil. 285 , No. L-49	William F. Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila during the Japanese occupation, was charged with robbery under Act No. 65 and sentenced to life imprisonment by a special court created under Ordinance No. 7 of the puppet Republic of the Philippines. He began serving his sentence on August 21, 1944.	The Supreme Court held that Ordinance No. 7, which created the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, was null and void ab initio, and consequently, the proceedings that resulted in petitioner's conviction were also void.	Philosophy of Law
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (17th September 1945)	AK116370 75 Phil. 113 , No. L-5	During World War II, the Japanese forces occupied the Philippines and established the Philippine Executive Commission and later the Republic of the Philippines. After liberation by American forces, questions arose about the validity of judicial proceedings conducted during the occupation period.	The Supreme Court ruled that judicial acts and proceedings of courts during the Japanese occupation remained valid after liberation, but that courts needed proper enabling laws to continue proceedings from the Japanese occupation period.	Philosophy of Law Statutory Construction
West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette (14th June 1943)	AK381061 319 U.S. 624	Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in _Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis_, which upheld a similar compulsory flag salute, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require courses in history, civics, and the Constitutions to foster Americanism. The West Virginia State Board of Education then adopted a resolution making the flag salute a regular part of public school activities, requiring all teachers and pupils to participate. Refusal was deemed insubordination, leading to expulsion and potential delinquency proceedings for the child, and fines or jail time for parents. This resolution directly impacted Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious beliefs forbid them from saluting any flag, as they consider it a form of worshipping a graven image, contrary to Exodus 20:4-5.	The action of a State in making it compulsory for children in public schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as it compels an affirmation of belief and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which the First Amendment reserves from all official control.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Tileston vs. Ullman (1st February 1943)	AK624106 318 U.S. 44 (1943)	A physician brought a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that a Connecticut law banning contraception was unconstitutional. The physician argued that the law prevented him from providing necessary medical advice to patients whose lives would be endangered by pregnancy.	A physician lacks standing to challenge a state statute prohibiting contraception on the grounds that it deprives the physician's patients of life without due process, as the right to life is personal and must be asserted by the patients themselves.	Constitutional Law II Police Power
Minersville School District vs. Gobitis (3rd June 1940)	AK913969 310 U.S. 586	The case arose during a period of increasing international tension leading up to World War II, where national unity was a significant concern. The Gobitis family, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, believed that saluting the flag was a form of idolatry, violating biblical commands. This belief clashed with a Minersville, Pennsylvania, School Board resolution requiring all students and teachers to participate in a daily flag salute ceremony.	A state regulation requiring public school pupils to participate in a daily flag salute ceremony, on pain of expulsion, is within the scope of legislative power and does not violate the religious freedom guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when applied to children whose sincere religious beliefs forbid such obeisance.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion
Cantwell vs. Connecticut (20th May 1940)	AK518939 310 U.S. 296	The case arose from the activities of Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, who were Jehovah's Witnesses. They were engaging in proselytizing activities in New Haven, Connecticut, which involved distributing religious literature and playing phonograph records with religious messages. Their actions led to their arrest and conviction under a state statute regulating solicitation for religious causes and for the common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. This case tested the extent to which states can regulate religious solicitation and speech, particularly when it is deemed offensive by others.	A state statute that requires individuals to obtain a certificate from a public official before soliciting for religious or charitable causes, where the official has the discretion to determine if the cause is genuinely religious, constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on the free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Furthermore, speech that is offensive but does not create a clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order is protected under the First Amendment and cannot be the basis for a common law breach of the peace conviction.	Constitutional Law II Freedom of Religion