Mirasol, et al. vs. Department of Public Works and Highways and Toll Regulatory Board

The authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities, including the determination of who may be permitted entry, belongs to the DOTC, not the DPWH. An agency cannot delegate a power it does not possess; thus, the DPWH cannot delegate regulatory authority to the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) where such authority properly resides with the DOTC.

The case involves the interpretation of Republic Act No. 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act of 1957), which originally granted the Department of Public Works and Communications authority over limited access facilities. The dispute arose from the DPWH's issuance of department orders declaring North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway as limited access facilities and banning motorcycles thereon, raising questions of which executive department—DPWH or DOTC—possesses the regulatory authority over access to these highways following various reorganizations of the executive branch.

• January 10, 2001: Petitioners filed before the RTC Makati (Branch 147) a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction (Civil Case No. 01-034) seeking nullity of AO 1, DO 74, and TRB regulations.
• February 8, 2001: Petitioners filed Amended Petition to include challenge to DO 215.
• June 28, 2001: RTC granted writ of preliminary injunction.
• July 18, 2001: DPWH issued DO 123 allowing motorcycles with 400cc engine displacement.
• March 10, 2003: RTC dismissed the petition but declared DO 123 unconstitutional for violating equal protection.
• June 16, 2003: RTC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
• Present: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC.

• Petitioners: James Mirasol, Richard Santiago, and Luzon Motorcyclists Federation, Inc.
• Respondents: Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
• Petitioners sought declaration of nullity of:
  • AO 1 (February 19, 1968): Issued by Secretary of Public Works and Communications, prohibiting motorcycles on limited access highways.
  • DO 74 (April 5, 1993): Declared NLEX and SLEX as limited access facilities.
  • DO 215 (June 25, 1998): Declared Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway as limited access facility.
  • TRB Revised Rules (1998): Implementing regulations.
  • Petitioners also challenged DO 123 (July 18, 2001), which allowed motorcycles with at least 400cc engine displacement, as unconstitutional.
  • The RTC dismissed the petition regarding AO 1, DO 74, and TRB Rules, but invalidated DO 123 for equal protection violation.

• Res Judicata: The RTC's Order dated June 28, 2001 granting preliminary injunction became final when not appealed; thus, the subsequent dismissal in the March 10, 2003 Decision is barred by res judicata.
• Ultra Vires: DO 74, DO 215, and TRB Regulations violate RA 2000. Section 4 of RA 2000 limits DPWH authority to physical redesign (curbings, dividers), not determining qualified users.
• Unconstitutional Classification: AO 1 singles out motorcycles without scientific data proving danger; DO 123 creates invalid classification (400cc vs. below) not based on real differences.
• Violation of Rights: The motorcycle ban violates the equal protection clause and the right to travel; possession of driver's license and vehicle registration entitles use of all roads.

• Res Judicata Inapplicable: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, not a final adjudication on the merits.
• Authority to Regulate: Section 4 of RA 2000 authorizes the DPWH to "regulate, restrict, or prohibit access," which includes determining who may use limited access facilities.
• Police Power: AO 1 is a valid exercise of police power—reasonable restrictions necessary for public safety and uninhibited traffic flow on tollways designed for high-speed traffic.
• Reasonable Classification: Real and substantial differences exist between motorcycles and four-wheeled vehicles (stability, safety); classification is not invidious.
• Right to Travel Not Violated: The right to travel does not include the right to choose any particular vehicle; alternative routes and modes exist.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the RTC's Decision dismissing the petition is barred by res judicata by virtue of the prior order granting preliminary injunction.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether DO 74, DO 215, and the TRB Regulations contravene RA 2000 (specifically, whether the DPWH has authority to regulate access to limited access facilities).
  • Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, police power limitations, or the right to travel.

• Procedural: Res judicata does not apply. The order granting preliminary injunction is not a final judgment on the merits; it is merely a provisional remedy to preserve the status quo until the court hears the merits. Section 9 of Rule 58 requires a final injunction to confirm the preliminary injunction after trial on the merits.
• Substantive:
  • YES, DO 74, DO 215, and TRB Regulations are VOID. Under EO 546 (1979), the authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities was devolved to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now DOTC), not retained by the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH). The DPWH possesses only public works functions (construction, maintenance), while the DOTC regulates transportation activities. The DPWH cannot delegate authority to the TRB that it does not possess.
  • DO 123 is VOID for want of authority. The DPWH lacked authority to promulgate DO 123; thus, the SC need not pass upon its constitutionality regarding the equal protection clause.
  • AO 1 is VALID. Issued by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications on February 19, 1968, when that department still possessed regulatory authority under RA 2000. It is a valid exercise of police power: reasonable, not oppressive, based on real differences between motorcycles and other vehicles (stability, safety), and does not violate the right to travel (which does not include the right to choose any specific vehicle).

• Res Judicata — A preliminary injunction does not trigger res judicata because it is not an adjudication on the merits; it is an ancillary, provisional remedy existing only as an incident of the main proceeding.
• Non-Delegation of Non-Existent Power — An agency cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. The DPWH could not delegate regulatory authority over limited access facilities to the TRB when such authority properly belonged to the DOTC.
• Police Power — The most essential, insistent, and illimitable of all government powers; the tendency is to extend rather than restrict its use. The sole standard is reasonableness, not scientific exactitude or certainty that the measure is the "best" solution. The test is limited to whether the restriction imposed on constitutional rights is reasonable, not whether it imposes a restriction at all.
• Equal Protection — Classification by itself is not prohibited; only invidious discrimination (not based on real or substantial differences) is invalid. Laws must operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances. Real and substantial differences exist between motorcycles and four-wheeled vehicles (stability, overturning risk) justifying different treatment.
• Right to Travel — The right refers to the right to move from one place to another, not the right to choose any particular vehicle or the most convenient route. The mode of travel is subject to reasonable regulation, and tollways, as special facilities, may impose restrictions not applicable to ordinary roads.

• "A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues. It is a provisional remedy, which merely serves to preserve the status quo until the court could hear the merits of the case."
• "The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place."
• "The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the 'most essential, insistent and illimitable' of all government powers."
• "The validity of a police power measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the governmental regulation."
• "The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another."
• "There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated."

• Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the principle that a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, not a final determination.
• Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the principle that preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy existing only as an incident of the main proceeding.
• Eslao v. Commission on Audit — Cited for the principle that administrative issuances have the force and effect of law and enjoy presumption of validity.
• JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the principle that the burden of proving unconstitutionality rests on the party assailing the regulation.
• Ichong v. Hernandez — Cited for the definition of police power as the most essential, insistent, and illimitable government power.
• Bautista v. Juinio — Cited for the test on equal protection: classification must be based on real or substantial differences, not hostility or discrimination unsupported by reason.
• American Motorcyclist Ass'n. v. Park Comm'n. of City of Brockton — Cited for the principle that the right to travel does not require the state to avoid any regulation of methods of transportation or allow any particular vehicle.

• Republic Act No. 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act), Section 3 — Originally authorized the Department of Public Works and Communications to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited access facilities.
• Republic Act No. 2000, Section 4 — Authorized the Department of Public Works and Communications to design limited access facilities and regulate, restrict, or prohibit access; this authority was later devolved to the DOTC.
• Executive Order No. 546 (July 23, 1979) — Created the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH) and Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now DOTC); transferred the regulatory function over transportation to the MOTC/DOTC.
• Executive Order No. 125 and 125-A — Confirmed DOTC authority to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation.
• Rule 58, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires issuance of final injunction to confirm preliminary injunction after trial on the merits.

• Justice Tinga (Dissenting) — Argued that the DPWH, as successor to the Bureau of Public Highways, retained the authority to administer and regulate limited access facilities under the Limited Access Highway Act. Contended that EO 546 did not transfer this authority to the DOTC because the Ministry of Public Highways continued to exist separately and was later merged into the Ministry of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Asserted that DOTC authority extends only to transportation carriers and traffic rules, not highway administration, and that long-standing DPWH practice in regulating limited access facilities should be accorded judicial deference.