Adasa vs. Abalos

Once an accused has been arraigned, the Secretary of Justice is mandatorily barred from giving due course to a petition for review filed under DOJ Circular No. 70, because arraignment constitutes a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation (or reinvestigation) and the right to question any irregularity surrounding it, including the right to appeal the prosecutor's resolution.

The case involves two complaints for estafa filed by respondent against petitioner for allegedly encashing two checks issued in respondent's name without her knowledge or consent. After the City Prosecutor found probable cause and filed informations, petitioner sought reinvestigation. Following the reinvestigation, the City Prosecutor affirmed the finding of probable cause. Petitioner was subsequently arraigned, but thereafter filed a petition for review with the DOJ, which reversed the prosecutor's resolution and ordered the withdrawal of the information.

• January 18, 2001: Respondent filed complaints-affidavits for estafa against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City.
• April 25, 2001: City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause and ordering the filing of informations (Criminal Cases No. 8781 and 8782) with the RTC of Iligan City.
• June 8, 2001: Upon motion, the RTC (Branch 5) granted petitioner's motion for reinvestigation.
• August 30, 2001: City Prosecutor issued a resolution affirming the finding of probable cause after reinvestigation.
• October 1, 2001: Petitioner was arraigned and entered an unconditional plea of not guilty.
• October 15, 2001: Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ.
• July 11, 2002: DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor's resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Information for estafa.
• January 30, 2003: DOJ denied respondent's motion for reconsideration, ruling that the Secretary had discretion to entertain the appeal despite arraignment.
• February 27, 2003: RTC issued an order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782.
• July 21, 2004: The CA granted respondent's petition for certiorari, nullifying the DOJ resolutions.
• June 10, 2005: CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
• February 19, 2007: SC denied the petition and affirmed the CA.

• Respondent filed complaints for estafa alleging petitioner encashed two checks without her consent.
• The City Prosecutor found probable cause and filed informations.
• Petitioner moved for and was granted reinvestigation by the RTC.
• After reinvestigation, the City Prosecutor affirmed the finding of probable cause (August 30, 2001).
• Crucial Timeline: Petitioner was arraigned on October 1, 2001, entering an unconditional plea of not guilty assisted by counsel.
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ on October 15, 2001, seeking reversal of the August 30, 2001 resolution.
• The DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information (July 11, 2002).
• The RTC dismissed the case based solely on the DOJ resolution (February 27, 2003).
• Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, arguing the DOJ gravely abused its discretion by entertaining the petition after arraignment.

• Permissive Language: Sections 7 and 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 are directory, not mandatory; the use of "may" in Section 12 grants the Secretary discretion to entertain appeals even after arraignment.
• Contemporaneous Construction: The DOJ's own interpretation—that it can entertain petitions despite arraignment—should be given great weight.
• Scope of Section 7: Section 7 applies only to original resolutions of the prosecutor, not to resolutions on reinvestigation.
• Mootness: The RTC's dismissal order rendered the petition moot and academic.
• Invalid Arraignment: The arraignment was void because it was improvidently conducted and forced upon her.
• Revival of Rights: The RTC's order granting reinvestigation nullified or recalled any waiver of the right to preliminary investigation caused by the arraignment.
• Reliance on Crespo v. Mogul: The DOJ retains authority to review resolutions regardless of arraignment, and the trial court retains discretion to dismiss based on the Secretary's recommendation.

• Mandatory Prohibition: Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 uses the mandatory phrase "shall not," constituting a positive prohibition against entertaining petitions filed after arraignment.
• Harmonious Construction: Section 7 (action on the petition) and Section 12 (grounds for dismissal) should be read together; Section 7 mandates dismissal when arraignment precedes the petition, while Section 12 merely lists grounds.
• Erroneous Construction: The DOJ's contemporaneous construction is erroneous and not binding because the rule is unambiguous.
• Applicability to Reinvestigation: Section 7 applies to all resolutions, including those on reinvestigation; "when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish."
• Valid Arraignment: The arraignment was valid and unconditional, constituting a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation and the right to appeal.
• Void Judgment: The DOJ resolutions were void for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion; the RTC dismissal order, being based on void resolutions, was also void. A void judgment needs no appeal.

• Procedural: Whether the CA correctly ruled that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in entertaining the petition for review after petitioner was arraigned.
• Substantive:
  • Whether Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 bars the Secretary of Justice from entertaining a petition for review after the accused has been arraigned.
  • Whether the trial court's order of dismissal was void.
  • Whether the petition was rendered moot by the dismissal order.

• Procedural: Yes. The CA correctly nullified the DOJ resolutions. The SC affirmed, finding the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion by ignoring the mandatory bar of Section 7.
• Substantive:
  • Yes. Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 is clear and mandatory: "If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned." The word "shall not" denotes a positive prohibition, leaving no discretion. Section 12 (using "may") is not in conflict; it enumerates general grounds for dismissal, but Section 7 specifically mandates the action when arraignment precedes the petition.
  • Yes. The DOJ resolutions were void for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The RTC's order of dismissal, founded solely on these void resolutions without independent judicial assessment, was likewise void. A void judgment is a complete nullity.
  • No. The dismissal order was void, so the case was not moot. Furthermore, the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review.
  • Ancillary: Petitioner's arraignment was valid (unconditional plea with counsel). The waiver of the right to preliminary investigation/reinvestigation by virtue of arraignment is final; the RTC's grant of reinvestigation does not revive the right to appeal to the DOJ after arraignment. Crespo v. Mogul is inapplicable because it did not involve a petition for review filed after arraignment.

• Waiver by Arraignment — An unconditional plea at arraignment waives the right to preliminary investigation (or reinvestigation) and the right to question any irregularity therein, including the right to appeal the resolution to the DOJ Secretary.
• Mandatory vs. Directory Language — The phrase "shall not" constitutes a positive prohibition and is mandatory, while "may" is permissive. When "shall not" is used, the act is prohibited without discretion.
• Harmonious Construction — Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 are not irreconcilable. Section 7 prescribes the specific mandatory action (not giving due course) when arraignment has occurred, while Section 12 enumerates general grounds for dismissal. The specific provision (Sec. 7) controls the general (Sec. 12).
• Void Judgment — A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction is a complete nullity and without legal effect; all proceedings founded thereon are invalid.
• Contemporaneous Construction — While entitled to weight, an administrative agency's construction of its own rule is not controlling if clearly erroneous or if the rule is unambiguous.
• Crespo v. Mogul Doctrine — Once an information is filed, disposition rests with the trial court, and the fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the court. However, this does not authorize the DOJ to review a case after the accused has been arraigned, as arraignment waives the right to such review.

• "If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned." (Section 7, DOJ Circular No. 70)
• "When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same."
• "When petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result thereof to the DOJ Secretary."
• "A void judgment is a complete nullity and without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions founded thereon are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose."

• Crespo v. Mogul — Distinguished. The ruling regarding the trial court's discretion on motions to dismiss does not apply to petitions for review filed after arraignment. In Crespo, the accused had not yet been arraigned when the petition for review was filed with the DOJ.
• Roberts v. Court of Appeals — Distinguished. Did not involve a petition filed after arraignment.
• Marcelo v. Court of Appeals — Distinguished. Did not involve a petition filed after arraignment.
• Soberano v. People — Cited in the concurring opinion for the rule that reinvestigation after arraignment is a recognized remedy, but the disposition must be addressed to the court.
• Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How — Cited in the concurring opinion, but distinguished as not involving a court-directed reinvestigation.
• Kuizon v. Desierto — Cited for the rule that arraignment waives the right to preliminary investigation.

• DOJ Circular No. 70, Section 7 — Mandates that if an information has been filed and the accused has already been arraigned, the petition for review "shall not be given due course."
• DOJ Circular No. 70, Section 12 — Enumerates grounds for dismissal of a petition for review, including that the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken.
• Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Rules of Court — Suspension of arraignment if petition for review is pending (cited in concurring opinion).
• Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — Limits petitions for review on certiorari to questions of law.

• Justice Ynares-Santiago (Concurring) — Agrees that the trial court's dismissal order is void, but for a different reason: the trial court failed to exercise independent judicial discretion and merely relied on the DOJ resolution. Argues that Crespo v. Mogul applies because the trial court granted reinvestigation, thereby deferring to the prosecution, so the DOJ should not be barred from reviewing. However, since the trial court dismissed based solely on the DOJ resolution without independent assessment, the order is void. Suggests remanding to the trial court for proper determination of probable cause.