Laurel vs. Judge Abrogar

A motion for reconsideration that merely reiterates previous arguments without raising new or substantial issues is pro forma and does not interrupt the reglementary period to appeal; consequently, an appeal filed 42 days after the final order is dismissible for tardiness.

The land in question (part of 50 quiñones) was registered in 1914 in the name of predecessors-in-interest of J. M. Tuason & Co. The Deudor family occupied the land under an informacion posesoria. In 1948, Cruz agreed with the Deudors to improve the land. In 1952, Tuason and Araneta allegedly promised Cruz 3,000 sq.m. if he successfully mediated their dispute with the Deudors.

• Filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon City — Civil Case No. Q-7751
• Defendants filed motions to dismiss (August 1964)
• CFI issued dismissal order — August 13, 1964
• Plaintiff filed motion for reconsideration — August 20, 1964
• CFI denied motion for reconsideration — September 7, 1964
• Plaintiff filed record on appeal — September 24, 1964 (42 days from August 13)
• Elevated to SC

• Cruz made permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00 and incurred expenses of P7,781.74 on the land at the request of the Deudors
• The land (20 of 50 quiñones) was registered since 1914 under the predecessors of J. M. Tuason & Co.
• In 1952, Tuason and Araneta allegedly engaged Cruz's services as intermediary to settle Civil Case No. Q-135 involving the same land
• The alleged agreement: Cruz would own 3,000 sq.m. upon signing of the compromise, but documents would be executed within 10 years from March 16, 1953 (date of compromise agreement)
• Cruz performed his part: the compromise was signed March 16, 1953, and approved by the CFI on April 11, 1953; Cruz also assisted in clearing the land until end of 1955
• Cruz demanded execution of the deed in mid-1963; defendants refused
• Complaint filed January 24, 1964 — two causes of action: (1) reimbursement for improvements/expenses based on unjust enrichment; (2) specific performance of the verbal promise to convey 3,000 sq.m.

• The claim for reimbursement states a cause of action under Article 2142 (quasi-contract/unjust enrichment) because defendants are benefitting from improvements Cruz made, despite having no contract directly with him
• The Statute of Frauds is inapplicable because:
  • Article 1403(2)(e) covers only "sale of real property," not promises to convey in exchange for services
  • The contract was partially executed (Cruz had fully performed his part as intermediary), removing it from the Statute
  • The action has not prescribed because the 10-year period for defendants to execute the conveyance only expired on March 16, 1963; hence cause of action accrued on March 17, 1963, making the January 1964 filing timely (within 6 years for oral contracts under Article 1145)

• The complaint fails to state a cause of action for the improvements because Cruz contracted with the Deudors, not with defendants; defendants are not privies to that contract
• The Statute of Frauds applies because the agreement involves an "interest in real property" and is unenforceable without a writing subscribed by the party charged (Article 1403, Sec. 2[e])
• The action has prescribed because the agreement was entered into in 1952, and the filing in 1964 is beyond the prescriptive period
• The motion for reconsideration was a mere reiteration of previous arguments and thus did not toll the appeal period

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the appeal was filed within the 30-day reglementary period when the motion for reconsideration was denied on September 7, 1964, and the record on appeal was filed on September 24, 1964
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Statute of Frauds bars enforcement of the verbal promise to convey 3,000 sq.m. in exchange for mediation services
  • Whether the action to compel conveyance has prescribed
  • Whether the complaint states a cause of action for reimbursement of improvements under the theory of unjust enrichment/quasi-contract

• Procedural: The appeal was filed 42 days after the August 13, 1964 dismissal order. The motion for reconsideration filed August 20, 1964 was pro forma because it merely repeated the same arguments in Cruz's earlier oppositions and rejoinders without presenting new or substantial grounds. A pro forma motion does not suspend the period to appeal. The September 24 filing was tardy and the order had become final and executory.
• Substantive (Obiter):
  • Statute of Frauds: The agreement is not covered by Article 1403(2)(e) because it is not a "sale" of real property but a promise to convey in consideration of services. Moreover, the contract was partially executed (Cruz fully performed his mediation obligations), and performance removes the contract from the Statute of Frauds.
  • Prescription: The action has not prescribed. The 10-year period for defendants to execute the conveyance ended March 16, 1963. The cause of action accrued only on March 17, 1963. Filed January 24, 1964, the suit is within the 6-year prescriptive period for written or oral contracts (Article 1145).
  • Quasi-Contract: The complaint fails to state a cause of action. Article 2142 requires a voluntary and unilateral act without any pre-existing obligation. Cruz made the improvements pursuant to his 1948 contract with the Deudors, not voluntarily or unilaterally vis-à-vis Tuason and Araneta. A quasi-contract cannot emerge when the subject matter is covered by an existing contract with a third party.

• Statute of Frauds (Article 1403, Civil Code) — The Statute applies only to executory contracts, not to contracts that are totally or partially performed. Once a party has fully performed his obligations, the contract is removed from the Statute's operation.
• Partial Performance Exception — Full performance by one party (here, Cruz's completion of mediation services) eliminates the need for a writing to enforce the contract against the other party.
• Quasi-Contract (Article 2142, Civil Code) — Creates obligations arising from lawful, voluntary, and unilateral acts where no contract exists between the parties. The act must be done without any pre-existing obligation; if performed pursuant to a contract with a third party, the plaintiff's recourse is against that third party, not against the party benefited.
• Pro Forma Motion for Reconsideration — A motion that merely reiterates previous arguments and raises no new or substantial issues is pro forma and does not interrupt the running of the period to appeal.
• Computation of Prescriptive Period — For obligations with a term (e.g., "within 10 years"), the cause of action accrues only upon the expiration of that term, not from the date of the agreement's execution.

• "The statute of frauds IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO EXECUTORY CONTRACTS BUT NOT WHERE THE CONTRACT HAS BEEN PARTLY EXECUTED" — Performance takes the contract out of the Statute.
• "A presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against one party when the subject matter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with another party."
• "It is essential that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have been voluntary and unilateral on the part of the plaintiff."
• "The act is voluntary, because the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by any pre-existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it arises from the sole will of the actor who is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateral agreement."

• J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bienvenido Sanvictores (4 SCRA 123) — Cited for the fact that the compromise agreement Cruz relied upon had been subsequently rescinded by the SC in other cases.
• J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Teodosio Macalindong (6 SCRA 938) — Same rescission of the Deudor compromise agreement.
• Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo (28 SCRA 890) — Controlling precedent that a pro forma motion for reconsideration does not suspend the period to appeal.
• Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. — SC may consider issues raised in lower court pleadings even if not discussed in the briefs on appeal.

• Article 1403(2)(e), Civil Code — Statute of Frauds provision requiring writing for "an agreement for the sale of real property or of an interest therein."
• Article 2142, Civil Code — Quasi-contracts arising from voluntary and unilateral acts to prevent unjust enrichment.
• Article 1145, Civil Code — Prescriptive period of 6 years for actions upon oral or written contracts not specifically provided for in Article 1140-1144.
• Article 19, Civil Code — General principle of good faith and justice (cited in arguments but not central to the disposition).

N/A — No separate concurring opinions discussed; members of the Second Division simply concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions recorded.