Garcia vs. Commission on Audit

When executive clemency is granted based on the recipient's innocence (as opposed to mere forgiveness of guilt), it completely obliterates the administrative dismissal, renders reinstatement automatic ipso facto upon grant of the pardon, and entitles the recipient to full back wages from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement, without deduction and beyond the standard 5-year limit for local government employees.

The case involves the intersection of administrative disciplinary actions and criminal prosecutions arising from the same factual circumstances, specifically addressing the effects of executive clemency when granted on the basis of the employee's innocence.

• Administrative Case: Dismissal from service rendered by the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 on April 1, 1975; petitioner did not appeal.
• Criminal Case: Acquittal by the Court of First Instance (RTC) of Quezon on January 23, 1980 for qualified theft based on same facts.
• Reinstatement Request: Denied by Bureau of Telecommunications on April 7, 1980.
• Executive Clemency: Granted by the President through Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr. via Resolution No. O.P. 1800 on August 26, 1981.
• First COA Claim: Denied by COA 5th Indorsement dated October 12, 1982 (silent on back wages; not yet reinstated).
• Reinstatement: Actually recalled to service on March 12, 1984.
• Second COA Claim: Denied by COA Decision No. 362 (3rd Indorsement dated July 23, 1985) — clemency silent on back wages; no service rendered.
• Appeal to Office of the President: Denied by Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. on April 21, 1986; held SC is proper forum under Art. IX-(A), Sec. 7 of 1987 Constitution (formerly Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2 of 1973 Constitution).
• SC: Petition for review on certiorari filed; granted by SC on September 14, 1993.

• Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman at the Bureau of Telecommunications, Region IV Station, Lucena City.
• Dismissed on April 1, 1975 for dishonesty in connection with the loss of telegraph poles at Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon lines.
• Criminal case for qualified theft filed based on identical facts; acquitted on January 23, 1980 by the trial court which found he did not commit the offense and actually commended him for preventing government losses.
• Following acquittal, sought reinstatement; denied by Bureau of Telecommunications on April 7, 1980.
• Sought executive clemency from the President; granted on August 26, 1981 via Resolution No. O.P. 1800 based on: (a) acquittal founded on innocence, not lack of evidence; (b) favorable recommendations from Ministry of Transportation and Communications and Civil Service Commission noting he was authorized to recover the poles and was unjustly accused by superiors.
• Actually reinstated on March 12, 1984 (records unclear if same position).
• Filed claim with COA for back salaries from April 1, 1975 (date of dismissal) to March 12, 1984 (date of reinstatement).

• The grant of executive clemency implicitly carries with it the award of back wages as it is meant to accord full justice to the recipient.
• The clemency was granted based on his innocence, as evidenced by the trial court's acquittal which found he did not commit the offense and the favorable recommendations from the Ministry and CSC.
• Since the pardon was based on innocence, it should restore him to his status prior to dismissal, including all rights and privileges such as back wages.

Commission on Audit (COA): - Acquittal in the criminal case does not necessarily result in exoneration from administrative liability (they are separate and distinct). - Petitioner's failure to appeal the administrative decision constituted waiver or renunciation of his right to back wages. - The executive clemency was silent on back wages and granted only for the purpose of reinstatement. - Award of back wages is allowed only if the respondent is exonerated from the administrative charge or if the suspension/dismissal is declared illegal or unjustified by a court. - "No service, no pay" rule: Petitioner did not render service during the period of dismissal, hence not entitled to salaries.

• Procedural Issues: N/A (jurisdiction established by referral from Office of the President under constitutional provision making SC the proper forum for COA decisions)
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether petitioner is entitled to back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to executive clemency.
  • Whether the grant of executive clemency based on innocence operates to automatically reinstate the petitioner and entitle him to back wages.
  • Whether the "no service, no pay" rule applies to a recipient of executive clemency granted on the basis of innocence.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • Yes, petitioner is entitled to back wages from April 1, 1975 to March 12, 1984.
  • Yes, when executive clemency is based on the recipient's innocence, it automatically reinstates the employee ipso facto upon grant of the pardon without need for separate application or appointment.
  • The "no service, no pay" rule does not apply where the employee is innocent and his dismissal is nullified by executive clemency; he should not be considered to have left his office for all legal purposes.
  • Deviation from the 5-year rule: While established jurisprudence limits back wages to 5 years for illegally dismissed local government employees, the SC awards full back wages without deduction in this case because: (a) the dismissal was based on the same acts for which he was criminally acquitted based on innocence; (b) law, equity and justice dictate compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and injustice caused to him and his family; (c) the circumstances (innocence vs. mere procedural defect in dismissal) warrant different treatment from the usual illegal dismissal cases.

• Effects of Presidential Pardon — Distinguishes between two types:

  • General Rule (Forgiveness of Guilt): Pardon blots out guilt and removes penalties and legal disabilities, but does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime or the conviction. It does not result in automatic reinstatement (offender must apply for reappointment) and does not entitle the recipient to back wages.

  • Exception (Based on Innocence): If the pardon is grounded on the person's innocence, it affirms this innocence and makes him "a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty." This type of pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences, restores his clean name and reputation, and renders reinstatement automatic ipso facto upon grant of the clemency.

  • Presidential Power of Control — Defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." In granting clemency, the President exercised this power to set aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, nullifying the dismissal and relieving petitioner from administrative liability.

  • Right to Back Wages upon Reinstatement — Afforded to those who have been illegally dismissed and ordered reinstated, or to those acquitted of the charges against them. When clemency is based on innocence, the employee is entitled to all rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office held, including back wages, to afford relief and make reparation for unjust dismissal.

• "The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness."
• "But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged."
• "The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service."
• "Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service."
• "Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal."

• Monsanto v. Factoran (G.R. No. 78239, 170 SCRA 190) — Established the general rule that while a pardon blots out guilt, it does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime; distinguished in this case because the pardon here was based on innocence.
• Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture & Sports (G.R. No. 87687, 180 SCRA 623) — Cited for the rule that right to back wages is afforded to those illegally dismissed and ordered reinstated or those acquitted of charges.
• Mondano v. Silvosa (97 Phil. 143) — Cited for the definition of the President's power of control over executive departments.
• Macabuhay v. Manuel, Cristobal v. Melchor, Tañada v. Legaspi — Cited for the rule that after acquittal, the employee should not be considered to have left his office and is entitled to rights and privileges including back wages.
• Ginzon v. Municipality of Murcia, Gementiza v. Court of Appeals, Balquidra v. CFI — Cited as examples of the general rule limiting back wages to 5 years for local government employees; distinguished from the instant case which warrants deviation due to innocence.

• Art. VII, Sec. 19, 1987 Constitution — Grants the President the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment.
• Art. IX-(A), Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution (formerly Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2, 1973 Constitution) — Provides that decisions of the Commission on Audit may be appealed to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.
• Sec. 43, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) — Procedure for seeking comment from CSC on petitions for clemency.

N/A (Cruz, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concurred without separate opinions)