Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

For election purposes, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which denotes a fixed, permanent residence to which one intends to return, and is not lost by mere absence or registration as a voter in another place. A candidate's domicile of origin is retained until it is unequivocally abandoned in favor of a new domicile of choice, which requires (1) actual presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there (animus manendi), and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi).

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Representative of the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995, stating in Item 8 that she had resided in the constituency for "seven" months. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent, filed a petition for disqualification, arguing she failed to meet the one-year constitutional residency requirement. On March 29, 1995, petitioner attempted to file an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry to "since childhood," but the Provincial Election Supervisor rejected it as filed beyond the March 20 deadline. The COMELEC Second Division subsequently disqualified petitioner, finding her original certificate's entry truthful and her amendment invalid, and concluding she had not been a resident of the district for one year.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioner sought to nullify COMELEC resolutions disqualifying her as a congressional candidate for alleged failure to meet the one-year residency requirement.
• Filing of Candidacy: On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) stating in Item 8: "RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months."
• Disqualification Petition: On March 23, 1995, private respondent Montejo filed a petition alleging disqualification based on this entry and her Voter Registration Record, which showed six months' residence in Tolosa, Leyte.
• Amended COC: On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected COC, changing "seven" months to "since childhood." The Provincial Election Supervisor rejected it as late. It was subsequently filed with the COMELEC Head Office on March 31.
• COMELEC's Reasoning: The COMELEC Second Division found the amendment invalid, holding the original entry was accurate and not an honest mistake. It concluded petitioner's domicile was not in the First District, as she had lived in various places (e.g., San Juan, Metro Manila) after her marriage, and her return to Leyte in 1994 was too recent to satisfy the one-year requirement.
• Election Results: In a supplemental petition, petitioner alleged she won the May 8, 1995 election with 70,471 votes versus Montejo's 36,833 votes.

• Honest Mistake in COC: Petitioner argued the entry of "seven months" was an honest misinterpretation, referring to her actual physical stay in Tolosa, not her legal domicile in the First District (Tacloban City).
• Domicile of Origin: Petitioner maintained her domicile of origin was Tacloban City, which she never abandoned. Her various residences (e.g., in Manila) were due to her husband's official positions and were temporary.
• Effect of Husband's Death: Upon her husband's death in 1989, her legal disability to choose a domicile ceased, and she reverted to or reacquired her domicile of origin.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction Lapse: Petitioner contended the COMELEC lost jurisdiction to decide the disqualification case after the election, as the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) then had exclusive jurisdiction.

• Accurate Original Entry: Respondent Montejo argued the "seven months" entry was a deliberate, accurate admission, corroborated by her Voter Registration Record showing six months' residence in Tolosa as of January 28, 1995.
• Abandonment of Domicile: Respondent countered that petitioner abandoned her Tacloban domicile upon marriage in 1954, acquiring her husband's domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte by operation of law. Subsequent residences in San Juan and Malacañang were not merely temporary.
• No Reacquisition of Domicile: Respondent maintained that after her husband's death, petitioner retained his last domicile (Batac or Manila) until she actively acquired a new one. Her acts (e.g., running for president in 1992 as a San Juan resident) showed no intent to re-establish Tacloban as her domicile until shortly before the 1995 elections.
• COMELEC's Continuing Jurisdiction: Respondent argued the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to disqualify a candidate even after the election under Section 6 of R.A. 6646.

• Residency Qualification: Whether petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for one year preceding the May 8, 1995 election.
• Validity of Amended COC: Whether the COMELEC erred in rejecting petitioner's Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Whether the COMELEC properly exercised jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner, both before and after the elections.

• Residency Qualification: Petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement. "Residence" in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution means "domicile." Petitioner's domicile of origin was Tacloban City. Her marriage did not result in an automatic, permanent change of domicile; it only obligated her to reside with her husband. Her subsequent residences in Manila were for official purposes and did not demonstrate an intent to abandon Tacloban. Upon her husband's death, she was free to re-establish her domicile of origin, which she did by returning to Leyte in 1992.
• Validity of Amended COC: The original entry of "seven months" was an honest mistake, rectified by the amended certificate. The decisive factor is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate. The amendment was properly filed and should have been considered.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction: The COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction to decide the disqualification case after the election. Statutory deadlines for rendering judgment are directory, not mandatory. Furthermore, under R.A. 6646, the COMELEC may continue proceedings and suspend proclamation if a candidate is voted for and wins but was not declared disqualified by final judgment before the election. However, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House; since petitioner was not yet proclaimed, the HRET had no jurisdiction at that stage.

• Residence as Domicile in Election Law — In election cases, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place (animus manendi) but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
• Domicile of Origin and Its Abandonment — A person's domicile of origin is that of his parents. It is retained until it is successfully abandoned in favor of a new domicile of choice. To acquire a new domicile, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. The presumption is strongly in favor of the retention of the domicile of origin.
• Effect of Marriage on Domicile (Civil Code) — Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, the husband fixes the family residence. This does not, however, automatically strip the wife of her domicile of origin; it merely obliges her to live with her husband at the residence he fixes. The wife does not lose her domicile of origin unless she voluntarily abandons it.
• Amendment of Certificate of Candidacy — An honest mistake in a certificate of candidacy, such as an erroneous statement of the period of residence, may be corrected by an amended certificate. The fact of residence, not the statement, is decisive.

• "It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement."
• "The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence."
• "The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium."

• Romualdez vs. RTC, 226 SCRA 408 — Applied the definition of domicile in election law and the three-part test for acquiring a new domicile.
• Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 — Held that absence from one's residence to pursue studies or profession, or registration as a voter elsewhere, does not constitute loss of residence.
• Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 — Established that "residence" in election law is synonymous with "domicile."
• Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 — Concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution adhered to the definition of "residence" as "domicile."
• Alialy vs. COMELEC, 2 SCRA 957 — Allowed the amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a defect, even after the deadline, as substantial compliance.

• Article VI, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is "a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
• Article 110, Civil Code — States that "The husband shall fix the residence of the family."
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881) — Governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation.
• Section 6, R.A. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law) — Provides that if a candidate is not declared disqualified by final judgment before an election and receives the winning number of votes, the court or commission shall continue the case and may order the suspension of his proclamation if evidence of guilt is strong.

The decision was penned by Justice Kapunan. Concurring opinions were filed by Justices Puno, Francisco, and Romero. Separate opinions were filed by Justices Vitug and Mendoza. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Padilla, Regalado, Davide Jr., and Hermosisima Jr. Chief Justice Narvasa concurred with Justice Mendoza's separate opinion.

• Justice Padilla argued that the one-year residency requirement is a clear constitutional mandate. He found petitioner's original COC entry of "seven months" to be a binding admission. He also asserted that under R.A. 6646, votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, and the second-place candidate should be proclaimed.
• Justice Davide Jr. maintained that petitioner lost her domicile of origin upon marriage by operation of law (Article 110, Civil Code) and acquired her husband's domicile in Batac. After his death, she retained that domicile until she made an actual change, which she failed to prove occurred more than one year before the election. He found no grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC.
• Justice Regalado opined that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a domicilium necessarium upon marriage. He rejected the theory of automatic reversion to the domicile of origin upon the husband's death, finding no legal basis for it. He held that petitioner had not validly abandoned her husband's domicile and established a new one in the First District of Leyte more than one year before the election.