Comendador vs. De Villa

Military personnel facing prosecution for violations of the Articles of War are not entitled to the constitutional right to bail, and the right to peremptory challenge under Article 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, withdrawn by P.D. No. 39 during martial law, was automatically revived upon the termination of martial law under Proclamation No. 2045.

The cases stem from the failed coup d'état staged by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) from December 1 to 9, 1989. Following the rebellion, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered the investigation and prosecution of officers allegedly involved, leading to the creation of a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel and subsequently GCM No. 14 to try the accused for mutiny, conduct unbecoming an officer, and murder.

• The AFP Chief of Staff constituted a PTI Panel on January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners.
• The PTI Panel subpoenaed the accused to submit counter-affidavits on February 12, 1990.
• After petitioners filed motions to dismiss instead of counter-affidavits, the PTI Panel recommended referral of charges to GCM No. 14.
• GCM No. 14 was convened pursuant to General Order No. M-6.
• In June 1990, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail before GCM No. 14; the application was denied.
• Ligot filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC Quezon City (Branch 104, Judge Asuncion), which granted provisional liberty.
• Other officers intervened and were similarly ordered released on provisional liberty by the RTC.
• In February 1991, other detained officers filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the SC, which was referred to RTC Quezon City (Branch 86, Judge Solano).
• Judge Solano ordered the release of the petitioners, finding they had been detained for over a year without formal charges.
• The four petitions were consolidated before the SC.

• Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 (military officers) were charged with violation of Articles of War 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
• The PTI Panel issued subpoenas requiring petitioners to appear on February 12, 1990, to submit counter-affidavits, with a warning that failure to submit would be deemed a waiver of the right to submit controverting evidence.
• Petitioners appeared but challenged the proceedings; they subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal on February 21, 1990, which was denied.
• They filed a verbal Motion for Reconsideration on March 7, 1990, reduced to writing on March 14, 1990; the PTI Panel resolved to refer the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the motion's resolution or the submission of counter-affidavits.
• Petitioners claimed the PTI failed to present prosecution witnesses for cross-examination and did not conduct a thorough investigation as required by Article of War 71.
• GCM No. 14 was constituted by General Order No. M-6, which was issued "By Command of General De Villa" but not personally signed by him.
• On May 15, 1990, petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested their exercise of peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No. 14 under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408; GCM No. 14 denied the challenge, ruling that P.D. No. 39 had discontinued peremptory challenges.
• In G.R. No. 95020, the RTC (Judge Asuncion) granted provisional liberty to Ligot and intervenors, declaring that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution applies to military men and that GCM No. 14 must conduct bail proceedings.
• In G.R. No. 97454, the RTC (Judge Solano) ordered the release of officers detained for over a year without charges, finding a violation of the right to a speedy trial.

• The PTI Panel failed to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation as mandated by Article of War 71, depriving them of due process; no prosecution witnesses were presented for cross-examination.
• The referral of charges to GCM No. 14 was premature as their Motion for Reconsideration remained unresolved.
• GCM No. 14 was illegally constituted because General Order No. M-6 was not signed by the Chief of Staff, Gen. De Villa, as required by Article of War 8.
• The denial of peremptory challenges by GCM No. 14 was erroneous because P.D. No. 39, which withdrew such right, ceased to be effective upon the termination of martial law.
• The RTCs had no jurisdiction to interfere with court-martial proceedings via certiorari, mandamus, or habeas corpus; such jurisdiction lies exclusively with the CA and SC under BP 129.
• The RTC orders for release on bail or on habeas corpus violated the established tradition that military personnel have no right to bail, and threatened national security by potentially releasing mutinous soldiers.

• There was substantial compliance with Article of War 71; petitioners were given multiple opportunities to submit counter-affidavits but chose to file dilatory motions instead, waiving their right to present controverting evidence.
• General Order No. M-6 was validly issued by command of Gen. De Villa, who appointed the members of GCM No. 14 as shown by the Summary Disposition Form; he never disowned the order.
• P.D. No. 39 remained in force and validly withdrew the right to peremptory challenge; the decree was not expressly repealed by Proclamation No. 2045.
• The RTCs properly exercised concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus against military bodies.
• Military personnel have no constitutional right to bail; this is a traditional exception justified by the unique structure of the military and national security concerns, as releasing accused mutineers could enable them to resume rebellion.
• The delay in filing charges was justified by the complexity of investigating a massive coup involving hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men dispersed throughout the Philippines.

• Procedural Issues:

  • Whether the PTI Panel violated Article of War 71 by failing to conduct a thorough investigation before referring charges to GCM No. 14.
  • Whether GCM No. 14 was validly constituted under Article of War 8 despite General Order No. M-6 not being personally signed by the Chief of Staff.
  • Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and habeas corpus against GCM No. 14 and military authorities.

• Substantive Issues:

  • Whether P.D. No. 39 withdrawing peremptory challenges remains effective after the termination of martial law, or whether Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 has been revived.
  • Whether military officers accused of violations of the Articles of War have a constitutional right to bail under Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.
  • Whether the one-year delay in filing charges against the detained officers violated their right to a speedy trial, justifying release on habeas corpus.

• Procedural:

  • PTI Compliance: The PTI Panel substantially complied with Article of War 71. The failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a GCM of jurisdiction; the requirement is directory, not mandatory. Due process was satisfied as petitioners were accorded opportunity to be heard but failed to avail of it, rendering their right to submit evidence waived.
  • GCM Composition: GCM No. 14 was validly constituted. General Order No. M-6, though not personally signed by Gen. De Villa, was issued by his command and has not been disowned or revoked by him; the Summary Disposition Form confirms he appointed the members.
  • RTC Jurisdiction: The RTC has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and habeas corpus against inferior courts and other bodies, including military tribunals. The exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA under BP 129 does not preclude original special civil actions in the RTC.

• Substantive:

  • Peremptory Challenge: P.D. No. 39 ceased to be effective upon the termination of martial law by Proclamation No. 2045 on January 17, 1981. Applying cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex, the withdrawal of peremptory challenges under P.D. No. 39, which was an instrument of martial law, automatically lapsed when martial law ended. Consequently, Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was revived, and petitioners are entitled to exercise peremptory challenges.
  • Right to Bail: Military personnel accused of violations of the Articles of War do not possess the constitutional right to bail. This is a traditional exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights, justified by the unique structure of the military and national security considerations. The equal protection clause is not violated because military personnel are not similarly situated to civilians.
  • Speedy Trial: While there was a delay of over one year in filing charges, this was justified by the magnitude of the investigation involving hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men dispersed nationwide. However, the SC admonished military authorities that indefinite confinement is not sanctioned and that immediate steps must be taken to try the accused or dismiss the charges.

• Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex — When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. The SC applied this to hold that P.D. No. 39, which withdrew peremptory challenges, was an instrument of martial law that automatically ceased to have effect when martial law was terminated by Proclamation No. 2045, thereby reviving Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
• Ratio legis est anima — The reason of the law is its soul. This maxim supports the principle that when the purpose of a law ceases, the law itself ceases.
• Pre-Trial Investigation as Directory — Under Article of War 71, the requirement for a thorough pre-trial investigation before referral to a GCM is directory, not mandatory. Failure to conduct such an investigation, or substantial non-compliance, does not deprive the GCM of jurisdiction but merely affects the regularity of the proceedings. This aligns with the rule in civil criminal procedure that absence of preliminary investigation does not affect jurisdiction.
• Military Exception to Right to Bail — The constitutional right to bail under Section 13, Article III does not extend to military personnel facing court-martial proceedings. This exception is based on the unique disciplinary structure of the military, national security concerns, and the traditional separation of military justice from civilian criminal procedure.
• Concurrent Jurisdiction over Special Civil Actions — Regional Trial Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and quo warranto against inferior courts, tribunals, and bodies, including military courts-martial.

• "Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul."
• "Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights."
• "The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers."
• "The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail."
• "The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve."

• Arula v. Espino — Cited for the doctrine that failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation under Article of War 71 does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction; also cited for the observation that the right to a speedy trial is emphasized in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
• Kapunan v. De Villa — Cited to establish that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended; held that P.D. No. 77 is only of suppletory application to the Articles of War.
• Martelino v. Alejandro — Cited for the history of peremptory challenges in the Philippine military and for the principle that civil courts may exercise jurisdiction over courts-martial via certiorari when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
• Humphrey v. Smith — US Supreme Court case cited in Arula; held that pre-trial investigation requirements under Article 70 (US counterpart to AW 71) are directory, not mandatory, and do not affect jurisdiction.
• Yang v. Court of Appeals — Distinguished; the SC noted that this case refers to ordinary appeals, not special civil actions like certiorari or habeas corpus.

• Article of War 8 — Governs the appointment of general courts-martial by the President, Chief of Staff, or other commanding officers.
• Article of War 18 — Originally provided for one peremptory challenge for each side in general courts-martial; held to have been revived after the lapse of P.D. No. 39.
• Article of War 70 — Governs arrest and confinement of persons subject to military law.
• Article of War 71 — Mandates thorough pre-trial investigation before referral to GCM; interpreted as directory, not mandatory.
• Commonwealth Act No. 408 — The Articles of War; specifically Article 18 on challenges.
• Presidential Decree No. 39 — Disallowed peremptory challenges in military tribunals; held to have ceased effect upon termination of martial law.
• Proclamation No. 2045 — Terminated the state of martial law on January 17, 1981, thereby dissolving the basis for P.D. No. 39.
• Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Right to bail; interpreted not to extend to military personnel facing court-martial.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 9(3) — Grants the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over RTCs; distinguished from original jurisdiction over special civil actions.

• Sarmiento, J. (Concurring and Dissenting) — Concurred with the majority except on the denial of bail. Dissented from the ruling that military officers have no right to bail, arguing that the Constitution grants the right to "all persons" without distinction between military and civilian. He contended that tradition is no argument against the clear text of the Constitution and that national security concerns (e.g., 1,000 putschists on bail) are equally applicable to dangerous civilian criminals (e.g., 1,000 murderers or drug pushers), who are nevertheless entitled to bail. He cited the release on bail of Senator Enrile and General Brawner as precedent for granting bail to the petitioners.