People vs. Pomar

A law compelling employers to pay wages to pregnant employees for periods during which they render no service constitutes an arbitrary interference with liberty of contract and violates substantive due process, even when enacted under the guise of police power to protect public health.

During the American colonial period, the Philippine Legislature enacted labor protection statutes under the assumption that the police power authorized broad regulation of employment contracts to protect vulnerable workers. Act No. 3071 represented early maternity protection legislation requiring paid leave for pregnant women factory workers. The case arose during an era when the U.S. Supreme Court vigorously applied substantive due process to strike down labor regulations (e.g., Lochner era), viewing freedom of contract as a fundamental liberty right.

• Filed in the CFI (Court of First Instance) of Manila by the Prosecuting Attorney on October 26, 1923
• Defendant filed a demurrer alleging facts did not constitute an offense; demurrer overruled
• Defendant answered and admitted all allegations at trial, raising constitutional defenses
• CFI (Judge C.A. Imperial) convicted defendant, imposed P50 fine per Section 15, plus subsidiary imprisonment and costs
• Defendant appealed to the SC, assigning errors regarding constitutionality of Section 13

• Nature of Action: Criminal prosecution for violation of Act No. 3071 (Maternity Leave Law)
• Parties:
  • Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippine Islands
  • Defendant-Appellant: Julio Pomar, manager of La Flor de la Isabela (tobacco factory owned by La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas)
• Factual Events:
  • Pomar employed Macaria Fajardo as a cigarmaker in 1923
  • Fajardo was granted vacation leave beginning July 16, 1923 due to pregnancy
  • She gave birth on August 12, 1923
  • Act No. 3071, Section 13 required payment of regular wages for 30 days before and 30 days after confinement (total P80)
  • Pomar willfully failed/refused to pay despite Fajardo's demands
  • Defendant admitted all factual allegations but contested the constitutionality of the statute

• The Legislature validly exercised police power to protect the health and welfare of pregnant women laborers and their children
• The law constitutes a reasonable regulation of employment contracts to ensure minimum subsistence for mothers during the critical period surrounding childbirth
• The requirement of paid leave safeguards public health by enabling pregnant women to cease labor without financial ruin, reducing infant and maternal mortality
• The penalty provision (Section 15) is necessary to secure compliance with a valid health regulation

• Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional and void as it violates the due process clause (Section 3, Philippine Bill of Rights)
• The law arbitrarily interferes with liberty of contract by compelling employers to pay for services not rendered, creating a contractual term without consent
• It is not a valid exercise of police power because it takes private property (wages/compensation) without due process and without compensation
• The law is analogous to the Minimum Wage Act struck down in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, as it compels payment based on the employee's needs rather than the value of services rendered
• It imposes a burden on individual employers that properly belongs to society as a whole, arbitrarily shifting the cost of supporting pregnant women to employers regardless of their financial capacity or the terms of employment

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is a reasonable and lawful exercise of police power
  • Whether Section 13 violates the due process clause and liberty of contract
  • Whether Section 15 (penalty provision) is valid if Section 13 is unconstitutional

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • Section 13 is not a valid exercise of police power. While police power is broad and expanding, it cannot transcend constitutional limitations or violate express inhibitions of the fundamental law. The law does not merely regulate conditions of employment but compels the payment of wages for periods when no service is rendered, effectively taking property without compensation.
  • Section 13 violates liberty of contract. The right to contract about one's affairs is part of the liberty protected by the due process clause. The law creates a mandatory term in every employment contract with women without the parties' consent, depriving employers of the freedom to negotiate terms. It compels payment irrespective of the value of services or the employer's ability to pay.
  • Section 15 is invalid. As the penalty provision depends on the unconstitutional substantive provision (Section 13), it cannot stand. The conviction is reversed and the complaint dismissed.

• Police Power — The power vested in the legislature to make wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, not repugnant to the constitution. It is a growing power that expands with civilization and public conscience, but cannot grow faster than the fundamental law or violate express constitutional inhibitions. Applied here: The SC acknowledged police power includes public health regulations, but held that compelling payment for non-services exceeds its scope and violates due process.

• Liberty of Contract — The right to enter into contracts and to terminate them is part of the liberty protected by the due process clause. Included is the right to sell labor and purchase labor upon such terms as the parties deem proper, with equality of right between employer and employee. Applied here: The SC held that Section 13 arbitrarily interferes with this liberty by compelling employers to pay for 60 days of leave regardless of contractual terms or actual work performed.

• Substantive Due Process — The guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, which includes protection against arbitrary legislative interference with fundamental rights. Applied here: The SC ruled that forcing employers to pay wages for services not rendered constitutes a deprivation of property without due process, as there is no "casual connection" between the employer's business and the employee's maternity needs.

• Nuisance Exception to Property Rights — Property may be destroyed or regulated without compensation under police power only when used to violate law or constitutes a nuisance (e.g., counterfeit apparatus, illegal firearms, gambling houses). Applied here: The SC distinguished this case, noting that the employer's property (money/wages) was not being used for illegal purposes, making the compelled payment an unconstitutional taking.

• "The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power... But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people's law—the constitution."

• "The right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause... In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can as the result of private bargaining."

• "The law creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract."

• "It exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no casual connection with his business, or the contract, or the work the employee engages to do."

• "The necessities of the employee are alone considered, and these arise outside of the employment... In principle, there can be no difference between the case of selling labor and the case of selling goods."

• Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia (261 U.S. 525) — Controlling precedent; SC cited this extensively to show that a Minimum Wage Act fixing wages based on employee needs rather than service value violated due process and liberty of contract. The SC found Act No. 3071 "exactly analogous" to the statute struck down in Adkins.

• Case v. Board of Health and Heiser (24 Phil. 250) — Cited for the definition of police power and the principle that property rights are subject to reasonable regulations for the common good, but with the limitation that such power cannot justify positive wrong and oppression.

• Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Alger (7 Cushing 53) — Cited for the classic definition of police power as the authority to make wholesome and reasonable laws for the common welfare, and the principle that property is held subject to implied liability that its use shall not be injurious to others.

• Mugler v. Kansas (123 U.S. 623) — Cited for the principle that police power cannot justify the destruction of property without compensation unless the property is used in violation of law or constitutes a nuisance.

• Allgeyer v. Louisiana (165 U.S. 578) — Cited for establishing that liberty includes the right to contract about one's affairs and that freedom of contract is part of the liberty protected by the due process clause.

• Adair v. United States (208 U.S. 161) — Cited for the principle that the right to sell labor upon terms deemed proper is the same as the right of the purchaser to prescribe conditions, and that legislation disturbing this equality is arbitrary interference with liberty.

• Coppage v. Kansas (236 U.S. 1) — Cited for the principle that the right to make contracts for personal employment is essential to liberty and property rights, and that striking down this right substantially impairs liberty.

• Lochner v. New York (198 U.S. 45) — Cited as part of the line of authority establishing liberty of contract as a fundamental right protected by due process.

• Gillespie v. People (188 Ill. 176) — Cited for the principle that the right to terminate contracts is protected by due process, and that the legislature cannot make criminal the exercise of constitutional rights to terminate employment contracts.

• Section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (Philippine Bill of Rights) — The due process clause ("no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law") which the SC held was violated by Section 13 of Act No. 3071.

• Act No. 3071, Section 13 — The provision requiring employers to grant 30 days paid vacation before and after confinement to pregnant employees, which the SC declared unconstitutional and void.

• Act No. 3071, Section 15 — The penal provision imposing fines and imprisonment for violations of the Act; invalidated as dependent on the unconstitutional Section 13.

• Article 1255, Civil Code — Provides that contracting parties may establish any agreements not contrary to law, morals, or public policy; cited to emphasize that legislative restrictions on contract must respect constitutional limits.

• N/A — Justice Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez concurred without separate opinions.

• N/A — No dissenting opinions recorded.