Salvador vs. Mapa

In cases involving violations of RA 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution, the prescriptive period commences from the date of discovery of the offense by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans in 1992, not from the date of commission of the crime, because the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made due to the connivance between public officials and beneficiaries and the climate of fear during the Marcos regime.

Following the 1986 EDSA Revolution, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 on October 8, 1992, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans to investigate loans, guarantees, and financial accommodations granted by government banks at the behest of previous government officials to the detriment of the government. Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, subsequently expanded the Committee's scope to include all non-performing loans and provided criteria for identifying behest loans (under-collateralization, undercapitalization, crony involvement, etc.). The Committee investigated several loan accounts, including those involving Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), later Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI), and the DBP.

• Filed with Office of the Ombudsman: October 4, 1996 (OMB-0-96-2428) — Sworn complaint by Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Committee Consultant, against DBP officials for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019
• Resolution of Ombudsman: October 9, 1997 — Dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription (10-year period under original RA 3019 had lapsed)
• Motion for Reconsideration: Denied by Ombudsman on July 27, 1998
• Elevated to SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari filed (treated by SC as Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65)

• Nature of Action: Criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) filed by the Committee against former DBP officials (Mapa, Jr., Sison, Zosa, Zalamea, Barot, Tanedo, de Ocampo, Tantoco, Jr., Banes, Caringal, Jacinto, Tanglao, and Reyes)
• The Loans: In 1978, PEMI applied for a foreign currency loan and bank investment on preferred shares with DBP. Despite non-compliance with conditions, DBP released the loan per Board Resolution No. 95 dated October 16, 1980, in the amount of $19,680,267.00 (P146,601,979.00)
• Behest Loan Characteristics: The Committee found the loans were under-collateralized; PEMI was undercapitalized (assets valued at P72M vs. loan of P146M; paid-up capital only P46M); stockholders/officers were known cronies of then President Marcos; and release was made despite non-compliance with DBP conditions
• Ombudsman's Dismissal: Held that since the transactions were by public instruments (1978-1981), prescription commenced from execution (applying People v. Dinsay and People v. Sandiganbayan); with the original 10-year prescriptive period under RA 3019, the complaint filed in 1996 was barred. Also declared AO 13 and MO 61 unconstitutional as ex post facto laws.

• The prescriptive period should be computed from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 when the Committee was created, not from the date of commission (1978-1981), pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3326
• The government as aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time of commission because the public officials concerned connived with the beneficiaries of the loans, and no person would have dared to question the legality of transactions during the Marcos regime
• AO 13 and MO 61 are not ex post facto laws; they are not penal statutes but merely create a fact-finding body and provide criteria for identifying behest loans
• The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint

• The petition should be dismissed for using the wrong remedy (Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 instead of Rule 65)
• The prescriptive period for violations of RA 3019 is governed by Act No. 3326, which provides that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation; when transactions are contained in public documents, prescription commences from the date of execution (People v. Sandiganbayan, People v. Dinsay)
• The crimes were committed in 1978-1981; the original RA 3019 provided for a 10-year prescriptive period; thus, the complaint filed in 1996 had already prescribed
• AO 13 and MO 61 are ex post facto laws because they classify past acts (granting loans in 1978-1981) as behest loans and effectively criminalize conduct that was innocent when done

• Procedural Issue: Whether the petition was filed using the proper remedy, given that it was captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) but seeks to nullify an Ombudsman resolution in a criminal preliminary investigation
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the offenses charged under Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 had already prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996
  • Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 constitute ex post facto laws

• Procedural: While captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the SC treated the petition as one filed under Rule 65 (Certiorari). The averments in the complaint—not the nomenclature given by the parties—determine the nature of the action. The petition imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint, which is the proper subject of a Rule 65 petition, not Rule 45 which is limited to final judgments or orders of the CA, RTC, or other courts.
• Substantive:
  • Prescription: The offenses had NOT prescribed. The SC applied the doctrine established in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999) and reiterated in subsequent cases: In violations of RA 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution, the prescriptive period commences from the date of discovery of the offense by the Committee in 1992, not from the date of commission (1978-1981). The government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made because the public officials concerned connived with the beneficiaries, and no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions during the Marcos regime. Since discovery could not have been earlier than October 8, 1992 (when the Committee was created), the complaint filed on October 4, 1996 was well within the prescriptive period.
  • Ex Post Facto: Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are NOT ex post facto laws. They are not penal laws. AO 13 merely creates a fact-finding committee and defines its functions; MO 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Neither imposes criminal punishment. Furthermore, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of laws (Estarija v. Ranada).

• Prescription under Act No. 3326 (Special Laws) — Prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. However, the SC established a special rule for Marcos-era behest loans: discovery is deemed to have occurred in 1992 when the Committee was created, not at the time of the transaction, because the crimes were concealed by conspiracy and the repressive political climate.
• Ex Post Facto Law (Six Categories) — Defined as: (a) makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; (b) aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; (c) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (d) alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than required at the time of commission; (e) assumes to regulate civil rights only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled (e.g., former conviction, acquittal, or amnesty).
• Presumption of Constitutionality — Laws are presumed constitutional; to justify nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality; to doubt is to sustain.
• Lis Mota Principle — The SC does not decide a question of constitutional dimension unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to a determination of the case (the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented).
• Ombudsman's Jurisdiction — The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of laws; such power resides with the courts.

• "In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans."
• "The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain."
• "An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant."

• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (375 Phil. 697 [1999]) — Established the controlling doctrine that for Marcos-era graft cases involving behest loans, prescription runs from the 1992 discovery by the Committee, not from the date of commission.
• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto (415 Phil. 723 [2001]) — Reiterated the discovery rule for prescription in behest loan cases.
• People v. Sandiganbayan (211 SCRA 241) — Cited by the Ombudsman for the proposition that prescription runs from the date of commission if transactions are in public documents; distinguished and not applied to Marcos-era cases due to the unique circumstances of concealment.
• Estarija v. Ranada (G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006) — Held that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of laws.
• Chavez v. Romulo (G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004) — Provided the classic definition and categories of ex post facto laws.

• Section 11 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Original provision prescribing a 10-year prescriptive period for violations (later amended to 15 years by BP 195 on March 16, 1982).
• Section 2 of Act No. 3326 — Governs prescription of crimes under special laws; provides that prescription begins from the day of commission, or if not known at the time, from discovery thereof.
• Administrative Order No. 13 (October 8, 1992) — Created the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.
• Memorandum Order No. 61 (November 9, 1992) — Expanded the Committee's functions to include all non-performing loans and defined criteria for behest loans.
• Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — Proper vehicle to assail resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations (certiorari).
• Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — Improper remedy for Ombudsman resolutions in criminal preliminary investigations; limited to review of final judgments or orders of lower courts.

N/A (Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Reyes, JJ., concurred with the majority opinion without separate statements).