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Title	IDs & Reference #s	Background	Primary Holding	Subject Matter
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. (30th July 1993)	AK199582 224 SCRA 792 , 296 Phil. 694 , G.R. No. 101083	The case arose amidst growing concerns over rapid deforestation in the Philippines and its detrimental environmental consequences. Petitioners highlighted the significant reduction in the country's rainforest cover over 25 years, from approximately 16 million hectares to about 1.2 million hectares by 1987, and further to a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests. This deforestation was attributed largely to commercial logging operations sanctioned by Timber License Agreements (TLAs) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), leading to severe environmental degradation, including water shortages, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, and climate change impacts.	The Supreme Court held that petitioners, including minors representing their generation and generations yet unborn, have the legal standing (locus standi) to sue for the enforcement of their fundamental constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which is self-executing and judicially enforceable. Furthermore, Timber License Agreements (TLAs) are not contracts but mere privileges granted by the State, which can be amended, modified, replaced, or rescinded when the national interest so requires, and thus are not protected by the non-impairment of contracts clause.	Constitutional Law I Philosophy of Law
Philip Morris, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (16th July 1993)	AK115794 296 Phil. 451 , G.R. No. 91332	Petitioners are foreign corporations and registered owners of the trademarks "MARK VII," "MARK TEN," and "LARK" for cigarettes in the Philippines. They alleged that Fortune Tobacco Corporation's manufacture and sale of "MARK" cigarettes infringed their trademarks. Petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but claimed to be suing on an isolated transaction and under the protection of international conventions and Philippine trademark law. The dispute centered on whether Fortune's use of "MARK" should be preliminarily enjoined pending the outcome of the main infringement case.	A foreign corporation, even if it has registered trademarks in the Philippines and possesses the capacity to sue for infringement under Section 21-A of the Trademark Law, is not automatically entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction unless it can establish actual use of its trademarks in commerce in the Philippines, as required by Sections 2 and 2-A of the Trademark Law, to demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that is being violated and that would result in irreparable injury.	Constitutional Law I
Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections (3rd July 1992)	AK581326 286 Phil. 397 , G.R. No. 105111 , G.R. No. 105384	This case arose after Ramon L. Labo, Jr., despite a previous Supreme Court ruling in 1989 (_Labo v. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1_) declaring him not a Filipino citizen, filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baguio City in the May 11, 1992 elections, asserting he was a "natural-born" Filipino. Roberto Ortega, another mayoral candidate, subsequently filed a disqualification case against Labo before the Commission on Elections (Comelec) based on this prior judgment and Labo's alleged false representation of citizenship.	A candidate previously declared by a final Supreme Court judgment to be a non-Filipino citizen remains disqualified from running for and holding public office unless reacquisition of Philippine citizenship is proven; winning an election does not cure such ineligibility, and the candidate receiving the second-highest number of votes is not entitled to be proclaimed the winner, with the vacancy to be filled by operation of the rule on succession (i.e., by the vice-mayor elect).	Constitutional Law I
Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit (8th May 1992)	AK960993 284-A Phil. 233 , G.R. No. 92585	The case revolves around the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), created by P.D. No. 1956, as amended by E.O. No. 137. The OPSF was established to minimize frequent price changes of crude oil and petroleum products due to exchange rate adjustments or world market price changes, and to reimburse oil companies for cost increases and certain cost underrecoveries. The Department of Energy (formerly Ministry of Energy/Office of Energy Affairs) administered the OPSF, with the Department of Finance determining specific reimbursable "other factors" leading to cost underrecovery.	The Commission on Audit (COA) possesses broad powers under the 1987 Constitution to examine, audit, and settle all government accounts, and to promulgate rules for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, which includes the authority to disallow claims not sanctioned by law, such as certain reimbursements from the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF).	Constitutional Law I
Bengzon Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (20th November 1991)	AK129190 280 Phil. 829 , G.R. No. 89914	Following the 1986 People's Revolution, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was tasked with recovering alleged ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and close associates. One such associate was Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. The PCGG filed Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan against Romualdez and others, including the petitioners, for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages related to numerous corporations allegedly acquired through illicit means. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee subsequently initiated an inquiry into the purported sale of these Romualdez corporations to the Lopa Group, a transaction also central to the PCGG's case.	The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is enjoined from compelling the petitioners to testify and produce evidence because its contemplated inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would violate the principle of separation of powers by encroaching upon matters already within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and would disregard the petitioners' constitutional rights, particularly the right against self-incrimination, given the pending judicial case involving the same issues.	Constitutional Law I
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals (5th August 1991)	AK696650 277 Phil. 311 , G.R. No. 93252 , G.R. NO. 93746 , G.R. NO. 95245	The cases arose from a series of administrative complaints filed in 1988 against Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon of Iloilo City and Sangguniang Panglunsod member Mary Ann Rivera Artieda. The complaints, lodged by various city officials, alleged offenses such as abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, and culpable violation of the Constitution. These complaints led to investigations by the Department of Local Government and the imposition of preventive suspensions by the Secretary of Local Government, prompting the petitioners to question the Secretary's authority under the new constitutional framework emphasizing local autonomy.	The President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses the authority to investigate and impose preventive suspensions on elective local officials in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in the Local Government Code (Batas Blg. 337), as this power is a component of the President's general supervision over local governments and was not abrogated by the 1987 Constitution; however, such power must not be exercised oppressively, and successive suspensions for numerous charges arising from acts committed prior to the first suspension may be curtailed to prevent what amounts to a de facto removal from office.	Constitutional Law I
People vs. Ritter (5th March 1991)	AK344111 272 Phil. 532 , G.R. No. 88582	The case arose from the death of Rosario Baluyot, an approximately 12-year-old street child, who died from septicemia and peritonitis caused by a foreign object (a portion of a sexual vibrator) lodged in her vaginal canal. The accused, Heinrich Stefan Ritter, a foreign national, was alleged to have brought Rosario and another child, Jessie Ramirez, to his hotel room, where the alleged rape and insertion of the object occurred. The incident gained public attention due to the victim's vulnerability and the nature of the crime, highlighting the plight of street children.	An accused cannot be convicted of Rape with Homicide if the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt the victim's age (for statutory rape) and the direct causal link between the accused's actions and the victim's death, especially when significant time has elapsed and other intervening causes are plausible; however, acquittal from criminal liability does not necessarily extinguish civil liability if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt and facts supporting civil liability for acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy are established by a preponderance of evidence.	Constitutional Law I
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary (22nd February 1991)	AK233934 194 SCRA 317 , 272 Phil. 147 , G.R. No. 83896 , G.R. No. 83815	The case arose from the issuance of Executive Order No. 284 by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. This E.O. allowed members of the Cabinet, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold, in addition to their primary positions, not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation. This was issued following DOJ Opinion No. 73, s. 1987, which interpreted Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution. The practice of high-ranking executive officials holding multiple government posts, often with substantial emoluments, had been a contentious issue, particularly during the Marcos regime, and the 1987 Constitution sought to address this.	Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional because it allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold multiple offices or employment in contravention of the express prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides a stricter rule for these officials compared to the general rule for other appointive officials in Section 7, Article IX-B. The only exceptions to this prohibition are those expressly provided in the Constitution itself, or positions held in an ex-officio capacity without additional compensation and as required by the primary functions of their office.	Constitutional Law I Statutory Construction
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr. (19th November 1990)	AK708936 269 Phil. 472 , G.R. No. 87636	The controversy arose from the President's exercise of the veto power over specific provisions in the General Appropriations Acts for Fiscal Years 1989 and 1990. Congress, in these acts, included provisions (Section 55 for FY 1989 and Section 16 for FY 1990) that aimed to prohibit the President and other designated officials from using savings to augment items of appropriation that Congress had disapproved or reduced from the President's original budget proposal. The President vetoed these provisions, citing them as unconstitutional infringements on the executive's power of augmentation and as violations of the constitutional provision allowing augmentation from savings.	The President's item-veto power extends to "inappropriate provisions" in an appropriations bill that are essentially general law measures and do not relate specifically to a particular appropriation, and such provisions can be treated as "items" for the purpose of the veto.	Constitutional Law I
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego (21st December 1989)	AK022039 180 SCRA 533 , 259 Phil. 1016 , G.R. No. 89572	The case arose from the implementation of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, specifically rule h) which states: "A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time." This rule was part of the government's effort to upgrade the quality of medical education and ensure that only competent individuals are admitted to medical schools, thereby safeguarding public health. The NMAT itself was established as a qualifying examination for admission to medical schools.	The State, in the exercise of its police power, can validly regulate admission to medical schools, including imposing a limit on the number of times an individual can take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT), to ensure that only qualified individuals enter the medical profession and to protect public health and safety.	Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II
Marcos vs. Manglapus (15th September 1989)	AK357065 177 SCRA 668 , 258 Phil. 479 , G.R. No. 88211	Following the "People Power" Revolution in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed as President and forced into exile in Hawaii. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency amidst significant political instability, including coup attempts by Marcos loyalists and military factions, communist insurgency, secessionist movements, and severe economic difficulties attributed to the previous regime. As Marcos lay dying in Hawaii, he expressed his wish to return to the Philippines, a prospect President Aquino firmly opposed due to perceived threats to national stability and recovery efforts.	The President of the Philippines possesses unenumerated residual powers, implicit in the grant of executive power, which include the authority to bar the return of a citizen to the country if deemed necessary for the paramount interests of national security and public welfare, subject only to judicial review for grave abuse of discretion.	Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II Liberty of Abode
Dario vs. Mison (8th August 1989)	AK848552 257 Phil. 84 , G.R. No. 81954 , G.R. No. 81967 , G.R. No. 82023 , G.R. No. 83737 , G.R. No. 85310 , G.R. No. 85335 , G. R. No. 81954	* Following the 1986 People Power Revolution, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE," which also served as a provisional "Freedom Constitution." * Proclamation No. 3 mandated, among other things, the complete reorganization of the government to eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, vestiges of the previous regime, and to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption. * This proclamation empowered the President to undertake this reorganization, during which appointive officials could be separated from service under specified conditions.	Government reorganization after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, while permissible under its transitory provisions (Article XVIII, Section 16), must be carried out in good faith; separations of career civil service employees resulting therefrom are valid only if they are due to bona fide reasons such as the abolition of an office, redundancy of functions, or the need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions to meet service exigencies, and not as a means to arbitrarily remove employees whose security of tenure is protected by the Constitution.	Constitutional Law I
Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr. (9th February 1989)	AK622137 252 Phil. 192 , G.R. No. 78239	Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was the assistant treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. This conviction, if finalized, carried with it accessory penalties including disqualification from public office. The core of the dispute arose after she received an absolute pardon from the President while her case was technically still pending (motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court), leading her to believe she was entitled to automatic reinstatement and other benefits.	An absolute pardon granted to a convicted public officer removes the penal consequences of the crime, including accessory penalties like disqualification from public office, thereby restoring eligibility for public employment; however, it does not _ipso facto_ restore the officer to the specific public office forfeited by reason of the conviction, nor does it extinguish civil liability arising from the offense or entitle the pardonee to back salaries for the period of suspension or non-employment.	Constitutional Law I
PLDT vs. NLRC and Abucay (23rd August 1988)	AK716437 247 Phil. 641 , G.R. No. 80609	Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator at PLDT, was accused by two complainants of demanding and receiving P3,800.00 in exchange for a promise to facilitate the approval of their telephone installation applications. Following an investigation, PLDT found her guilty and terminated her employment.	An employee dismissed for serious misconduct or for causes reflecting on their moral character (e.g., dishonesty, theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker) is not entitled to separation pay or financial assistance on the grounds of social justice or equity; such an award would effectively reward wrongdoing.	Constitutional Law I
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete (5th November 1987)	AK236019 239 Phil. 403 , G.R. No. 72492	The Ad Hoc Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete initiated an investigation "in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities," specifically focusing on the alleged use of inefficient power lines by Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NORECO II) in Dumaguete City. This led to the issuance of a subpoena to NORECO II's officials and a subsequent order for them to show cause for contempt due to non-appearance, prompting the legal challenge.	Local legislative bodies, such as a Sangguniang Panlungsod, do not possess the inherent power to compel the attendance of witnesses who are not their members through subpoena, nor the power to punish such non-members for contempt, as these powers are judicial in nature and must be expressly granted by statute or the Constitution; such powers cannot be implied from the delegation of legislative functions.	Constitutional Law I
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (20th March 1987)	AK605477 148 SCRA 659 , 232 Phil. 615 , G.R. No. 74457	The case arose during the Marcos regime when the government sought to protect carabaos (water buffalos) as essential farm animals by prohibiting their transportation across provincial boundaries, with the aim of preventing their indiscriminate slaughter.	Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional because it violated due process by allowing confiscation of property without prior hearing, employed means not reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose, conferred judicial functions on administrative authorities, and contained an invalid delegation of legislative powers.	Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II Police Power
Demetria vs. Alba (27th February 1987)	AK192412 232 Phil. 222 , G.R. No. 71977	The case arose from the petitioners' challenge to Presidential Decree No. 1177, specifically Section 44, which granted the President broad authority to transfer appropriated funds within the Executive Department. This decree was issued during a period when the President exercised legislative powers. Petitioners, concerned about potential abuse and the circumvention of constitutional safeguards on public funds, questioned the legality of this provision.	The first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional because it empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds without regard to whether the funds are savings or whether the transfer is for augmenting an item, thereby over-extending the privilege granted by Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution and constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.	Constitutional Law I
Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile (20th April 1983)	AK516942 206 Phil. 392 , G.R. No. 61388	The case arose following the official lifting of Martial Law in the Philippines via Proclamation No. 2045 on January 17, 1981. However, this same proclamation continued the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons detained for crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes committed in furtherance thereof. The arrests and detentions in this case occurred under this legal framework, amidst ongoing government efforts to suppress perceived threats to national security.	The President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it, is a political question beyond judicial inquiry; consequently, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued for offenses covered by such suspension renders the detention legal and valid, and the right to bail is deemed suspended for the duration of the emergency for those detained for such offenses.	Constitutional Law I
Macias vs. Araula (20th July 1982)	AK051208 115 SCRA 135 , 200 Phil. 524 , A.M. No. 1895-CFI	The case arose in the context of intense local political rivalry in Dauin, Negros Oriental, following the April 7, 1978 elections. Respondent Judge Araula's wife was the incumbent Mayor and KBL Chairman in Dauin, while the complainant and his witnesses were associated with the opposing Pusyon Bisaya party. The charges stemmed from incidents occurring shortly before and after these elections, reflecting the bitter political division and personal animosity between the factions, particularly involving the Judge's family and Atty. Rudy Enriquez, a relative and political opponent.	While the evidence presented was insufficient to establish prohibited partisan political activity (electioneering) or grave misconduct/oppression under the high standard of proof required in administrative cases against judges, a judge's conduct must nonetheless be free from the appearance of impropriety, and actions that could be misinterpreted as partisan, even if well-intentioned (like explaining election mechanics at a political rally), warrant admonishment under the Canons of Judicial Ethics.	Constitutional Law I
Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. (25th March 1982)	AK217409 198 Phil. 420 , G.R. No. 51122	The case arose from a contested election of the Board of Directors of International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) on May 14, 1979, which led to a quo warranto proceeding (SEC Case No. 1747) filed by the "Acero Group" against the "Puyat Group" before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez, after initially attempting to appear as counsel for the Acero Group and facing objection, purchased a nominal number of IPI shares and then sought to intervene in the SEC case as a stockholder.	A Member of the Batasang Pambansa is prohibited from appearing as counsel before any administrative body, and this prohibition extends to indirect appearances, such as intervening in a case under the guise of protecting a minimal stockholding acquired shortly before and for the purpose of such intervention, when the true intent is to participate in the proceedings in a capacity akin to counsel.	Constitutional Law I
Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile (17th September 1974)	AK831150 59 SCRA 183 , 158-A Phil. 1 , No. L-35546 , No. L-35538 , No. L-35539 , No. L-35540 , No. L-35547 , No. L-35556 , No. L-35567 , No. L-35571 , No. L-35573	The case primarily revolved around the legality of arresting individuals without a court order, based solely on martial law powers. The petitioners argued that the martial law proclamation was unconstitutional, and that the arrests violated due process. The respondents maintained that the arrests were necessary for national security given the ongoing rebellion.		Constitutional Law I
Cabanas vs. Pilapil (25th July 1974)	AK516159 58 SCRA 94 , 157 Phil. 97 , No. L-25843	The case arose from a dispute over the custody of insurance proceeds intended for a minor beneficiary. The deceased, Florentino Pilapil, had named his brother Francisco as the trustee for his daughter Millian's insurance benefits. However, Millian's mother, Melchora Cabanas, sought to obtain the proceeds, arguing that as the child's mother and guardian, she was entitled to administer the funds.		Constitutional Law I
Republic vs. Villasor (28th November 1973)	AK095335 54 SCRA 83 , 153 Phil. 356 , No. L-30671	The case arose from an arbitration award against the Republic of the Philippines. When the respondents sought to execute the judgment, they obtained an order from Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and executory. This led to the issuance of an alias writ of execution and notices of garnishment against funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Republic then filed this petition to challenge the validity of the order and execution.		Constitutional Law I
Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary (31st March 1973)	AK643524 50 SCRA 30 , 151-A Phil. 35 , 69 OG 7975 , No. L-36142	Following the declaration of Martial Law and the drafting of a new Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, President Marcos submitted the proposed constitution for ratification via Citizens Assemblies, bypassing a traditional plebiscite. This prompted several legal challenges questioning the process and the President's authority.	The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the petitions, with a majority finding the issues either moot or not properly raised. The Court was divided on whether the 1973 Constitution had been validly ratified, but a majority considered it effectively in force.	Constitutional Law I Constitutional Law II
Pelaez vs. The Auditor General (24th December 1965)	AK139410 122 Phil. 965 , G. R. No. L-23825	The President of the Philippines, from September 4 to October 29, 1964, issued thirty-three Executive Orders creating new municipalities, purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. This action prompted Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, to question the legality of these creations and the underlying statutory authority, fearing the unauthorized expenditure of public funds.	The power to create municipal corporations is strictly legislative in nature and cannot be delegated to the President; Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants the President the power to create municipalities, constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power because it fails to provide a sufficient standard for the President to follow, and is therefore unconstitutional.	Constitutional Law I
Vera vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals (31st January 1963)	AK623026 117 Phil. 170 , G. R. No. L-18184	The case arose in the aftermath of World War II in the Philippines, during which various guerrilla units operated. The Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, series of 1946, was issued to provide a means for individuals who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance movement against the Japanese or against persons aiding the enemy to be absolved of criminal liability. The petitioners were members of Vera's Guerrilla Party, and the victim, Amadeo Lozañes, was a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization, with a history of rivalry between the two groups.	Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime; therefore, an accused who denies committing the offense charged cannot simultaneously invoke the benefits of an amnesty proclamation, as amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.	Constitutional Law I
Tañada vs. Cuenco (28th February 1957)	AK454462 103 Phil. 1051 , G. R. No. L-10520	The dispute originated from the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the 1955 general elections. At that time, the Senate was overwhelmingly dominated by the Nacionalista Party, which had 23 Senators, while the Citizens Party, represented solely by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, was the party with the second largest number of votes. The constitutional provision for the Senate Electoral Tribunal requires six Senators as members: three to be nominated by the party with the largest number of votes and three by the party with the second largest number of votes. The conflict centered on how these nominations, particularly for the minority slots, should proceed given this significant disparity in party representation.	The Senate may not validly elect as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution; the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate is entitled to nominate three members, and the party having the second largest number of votes has the exclusive right to nominate the other three Senator-members. Any nomination for these constitutionally allocated party slots made by an entity other than the designated political party is null and void.	Constitutional Law I
Bermoy, et al. vs. Philippine Normal College (18th May 1956)	AK350868 99 Phil. 1031 , G.R. No. L-8670	The case revolves around employees of the Philippine Normal College seeking compensation for salary differentials and overtime pay. Their lawsuit was initially dismissed on the grounds that the college lacked the juridical capacity to be sued. This dismissal led to an appeal to the Supreme Court, where the central question became whether the Philippine Normal College could indeed be sued as a juridical entity.		Constitutional Law I
Rodriguez, Sr vs. Gella (2nd February 1953)	AK552707 92 Phil. 603 , G. R. No. L-6266	Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted in 1941, declaring a state of total emergency due to World War II and authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet this emergency. Years after the war, on November 10, 1952, the President issued Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546, appropriating significant sums for public works and disaster relief, citing the continued effectivity of C.A. No. 671. This exercise of emergency powers, long after the cessation of hostilities and during a period when Congress was actively functioning, led the petitioners to challenge the validity of these Executive Orders.	The emergency powers delegated to the President by Congress under Commonwealth Act No. 671, pursuant to Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution, ceased to be operative because the "time of war" and the "total emergency" declared therein (referring to World War II) had ended, and Congress had subsequently demonstrated its readiness and ability to legislate on matters, including appropriations, thereby effectively withdrawing such delegated powers.	Constitutional Law I
Laurel vs. Misa (30th January 1947)	AK294241 77 Phil. 856 , G.R. No. 409	The case arose in the aftermath of World War II, specifically following the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. During this period, some Filipino citizens were alleged to have collaborated with the Japanese forces. Anastacio Laurel was one such individual accused of treason for acts committed during the occupation.	A Filipino citizen's absolute and permanent allegiance to the legitimate government of the Philippines is not suspended or abrogated by enemy occupation, and consequently, such a citizen can be prosecuted for treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code for acts of adherence and giving aid and comfort to the enemy committed during said occupation.	Constitutional Law I Criminal Law II Statutory Construction
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff (20th August 1946)	AK022565 75 Phil. 875 , No. L-533	The case arose during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. Ramon Ruffy, a Major in the Philippine Constabulary, along with other petitioners, formed a guerrilla unit called the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro after refusing to surrender. This unit was later recognized by and integrated into the 6th Military District of the Philippine Army, which itself was recognized by General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area command. The petitioners were accused of murdering Lieutenant Colonel Enrique L. Jurado, who had been sent by the 6th Military District to command the Bolo Combat Team, on October 19, 1944.	Members of recognized guerrilla units who were lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the service of the Philippine Army during wartime are subject to military law and the jurisdiction of courts-martial for offenses committed during such service, and Article 93 of the Articles of War, which allows courts-martial to impose death or life imprisonment for murder in time of war, is constitutional as courts-martial are executive, not judicial, bodies.	Constitutional Law I
Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (21st April 1939)	AK412293 67 Phil. 451 , G.R. No. 46570	The case arose from an inquiry into the conduct of petitioner Jose D. Villena, Mayor of Makati, Rizal, by the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, requested by the Secretary of the Interior. This inquiry found Villena to have allegedly committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority, and unauthorized practice of law. Consequently, the Secretary of the Interior recommended Villena's suspension to the President to prevent coercion of witnesses, which the President verbally approved.	The acts of the secretaries of executive departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior's suspension of a municipal mayor, done with the verbal approval or acquiescence of the President, is valid.	Constitutional Law I
Matute vs. Hernandez (8th August 1938)	AK955194 66 Phil. 68 , G.R. No. 46028	Petitioner Amadeo Matute held a contract with the Commonwealth Government, secured through public bidding, to supply fresh meat at predetermined prices. Subsequent to the contract's execution, the City of Manila increased the fees at the municipal slaughterhouse, which led the petitioner to request an increase in the contract price for the meat he supplied to the government. This price increase was granted by the Acting Purchasing Agent with the approval of the Undersecretary of Finance, but without a new public bidding or other approvals later deemed necessary by the Auditor-General.	The Auditor-General possesses discretionary power, not merely a ministerial duty, to examine the legality and regularity of government expenditures before countersigning treasury warrants; consequently, any novation of a government contract, such as a price increase altering a principal condition, must strictly comply with existing laws and executive orders, including requirements for public bidding and specified approvals, and failure to do so renders the novation invalid and the resulting expenditure unauthorized.	Constitutional Law I
Aglipay vs. Ruiz (13th March 1937)	AK840573 64 Phil. 201 , G. R. No. 45459	The case arose from the decision of the Director of Posts in May 1936 to issue and sell postage stamps commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress, an event organized by the Roman Catholic Church and scheduled to be held in Manila. This action was perceived by the petitioner, the head of another religious denomination, as an unconstitutional use of public resources to favor a specific church, leading to the legal challenge.	The issuance of postage stamps by the government, even if related to an event with religious significance, does not violate the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public funds for the use, benefit, or support of any sect or church, provided that the primary purpose of such issuance is secular (e.g., promoting the country, tourism, or commemorating an event of national or international interest) and any benefit accruing to a religious institution is merely incidental and not the direct aim of the governmental action.	Constitutional Law I
Riel vs. Wright (5th August 1926)	AK274483 49 Phil. 194 , G. R. No. 25679	The petitioner was employed as a "temporary clerk" in the Philippine Senate. Following the adjournment of the legislative session, his services continued for an extended period. A dispute arose when the Insular Auditor refused to approve the payment warrant for services rendered significantly later than the session's close, citing limitations in the relevant appropriation act regarding temporary legislative employees. This case arose as a "test case" potentially affecting numerous similarly situated employees.	The phrase "several days after a session" as used in Section 18, subdivision 2 of Act No. 2935, governing appropriations for "supplementary force" in the Legislature, cannot be legally construed to cover a period of eighty-two days after the adjournment of the legislative session; consequently, temporary employees rendering services during such an extended period are not legally employed under that specific appropriation and have no clear legal right to compensation.	Constitutional Law I