Zulueta vs. Nicolas

A public prosecutor who refuses to file an information when, after investigation, he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code, because such refusal is not a refusal or neglect "without just cause" to perform an official duty. The fiscal is not bound to accept the complainant's opinion as to whether a prima facie case exists, and being a quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion, he is not personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority and in the line of official duty.

The plaintiff-appellant, Jose C. Zulueta, filed a complaint for libel against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of the Philippine Free Press. The defendant-appellee, Nicanor Nicolas, was the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, a quasi-judicial officer vested with authority and discretion to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to justify the filing of a criminal information. The case implicates Article 27 of the new Civil Code, which allows an action for damages against a public servant or employee who refuses or neglects without just cause to perform an official duty.

Jose C. Zulueta filed a complaint for libel against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of the Philippine Free Press. On May 6, 1954, the defendant fiscal, Nicanor Nicolas, conducted an investigation of the complaint. After the investigation, the fiscal rendered an opinion that there was no prima facie case, that the alleged libelous statements were made in good faith and for the sole purpose of serving the best interest of the public, and in consequence absolved the governor and the Free Press staff from the crime of libel.

On May 19, 1954, Zulueta instituted the present action against the fiscal to recover moral and pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000. The complaint alleged that the fiscal's refusal to prosecute constituted a refusal or neglect without just cause to perform his official duty under Article 27 of the new Civil Code. The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

The trial court observed that it would be highly dangerous to establish a judicial precedent making the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal responsible for damages for refusing to file a complaint if, rationally and in good faith, the fiscal was of the opinion in the exercise of his sound discretion that no grounds existed for filing a complaint. The trial court further noted that the complainant still had other remedies provided by law for the protection or exercise of his rights.

• Cause of Action under Article 27: Plaintiff-appellant argued that the fiscal's refusal to prosecute the libel complaint, after rendering an opinion that no prima facie case existed, constituted a refusal or neglect without just cause to perform an official duty, thereby entitling him to damages under Article 27 of the new Civil Code.

• Lack of Cause of Action: Defendant-appellee maintained that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, as the fiscal's refusal to prosecute was made in the exercise of his sound discretion and was not a refusal without just cause to perform an official duty.

• Cause of Action: Whether the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action under Article 27 of the new Civil Code against the provincial fiscal who refused to prosecute a libel complaint after finding no prima facie case.

• Cause of Action: No. The complaint does not state a cause of action. A fiscal's refusal to prosecute when after investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal without just cause to perform an official duty, and a quasi-judicial officer is not personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority.

• Cause of Action: Article 27 of the new Civil Code contemplates "a refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant or employee to perform his official duty." The fiscal has the legal duty to prosecute crimes where there is evidence to justify such action, but it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after investigation he has become convinced that the evidence available is not enough to establish a prima facie case. The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant in a criminal case as to whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of the corresponding information, and having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to dictation from the offended party. Having legal cause to refrain from filing an information against the person whom the plaintiff wanted him to charge with libel, the defendant fiscal cannot be said to have refused or neglected without just cause to perform his official duty; on the contrary, it would appear that he performed it. As a general rule, a public prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority and in the line of his official duty. Officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative or quasi-judicial are not liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.

• Quasi-Judicial Officer Immunity — A public prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority and in the line of his official duty. The Court applied this doctrine to absolve the fiscal from liability, holding that officers charged with governmental duties that are legislative or quasi-judicial in nature are not liable for the consequences of their official acts unless they act willfully and maliciously with the express purpose of inflicting injury.

• Fiscal's Discretion in Prosecution — The fiscal is vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of a criminal information, and having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, cannot be subjected to dictation from the offended party. The Court applied this principle to hold that the fiscal's refusal to prosecute, made in good faith after finding no prima facie case, was not a refusal without just cause.

• Refusal or Neglect "Without Just Cause" — Article 27 of the Civil Code contemplates a refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant or employee to perform his official duty. The Court applied this interpretation to find that the fiscal's refusal to prosecute, made after a finding of no prima facie case, was with just cause and therefore did not give rise to liability.

• "This article 'contemplates a refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant or employee to perform his official duty.' Refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after the investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty." — This passage articulates the Court's interpretation of Article 27 of the Civil Code and the controlling rule that a fiscal's refusal to prosecute based on insufficient evidence is not actionable.

• "The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant in a criminal case as to whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of corresponding the information and having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to dictation from the offended party." — This passage establishes the fiscal's discretionary authority in prosecutorial decisions and the principle that complainants cannot dictate whether a case should be filed.

• "As was said in the case of Mendoza vs. De Leon (33 Phil., 508, 513)—'Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, and with the express purpos of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.'" — This quotation states the general rule of immunity for quasi-judicial officers and the exception requiring willful and malicious action with intent to injure.

• Bangalay vs. Ursal, 95 Phil., 473 — Cited as controlling authority for the interpretation of Article 27 of the Civil Code, establishing that the provision contemplates a refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant to perform an official duty.

• People vs. Liggayu, et al., 97 Phil., 865 — Cited to support the principle that the fiscal, having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, cannot be subjected to dictation from the offended party.

• People vs. Natoza, 100 Phil., 533 — Cited to support the fiscal's authority and discretion in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to justify the filing of a criminal information.

• Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil., 508 — Quoted for the rule that officers or agents of the Government charged with quasi-judicial duties are not liable for the consequences of their official acts unless they act willfully and maliciously with the express purpose of inflicting injury.

• Article 27, New Civil Code — Provides that any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects without just cause to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter. The Court applied this provision to determine that the fiscal's refusal to prosecute, made after finding no prima facie case, was not a refusal without just cause.

Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concurred.