Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan

A public officer who participates in the preparation and processing of a disbursement voucher, even if not the accountable officer with custody of the funds, may be held liable for malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents when conspiracy with the accountable public officer is established. The acts of a de facto officer are valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer insofar as the public or third persons interested therein are concerned.

The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for participating in a scheme of questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds. The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province, which discovered irregularities including a ₱20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were mostly government personnel or relatives of officials of Sarangani Province. The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to the Ombudsman, which conducted a preliminary investigation and subsequently charged the petitioner and others with malversation of public funds by falsification of public documents under Article 217 in relation to Article 171(2) and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner, Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta, was the Executive Assistant III at the Office of the Vice-Governor of Sarangani Province and the daughter of Vice-Governor Felipe Constantino. An anonymous complaint was filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for participating in a scheme of questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds. The COA conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province, and the Special Audit Team discovered a ₱20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were mostly government personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province.

The Information charged that on January 24, 2002, the accused conspired to take, convert, and misappropriate ₱20,000.00 in public funds by falsifying Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents, making it appear that financial assistance had been sought by WIP, Malungon, Sarangani, represented by its President, the petitioner, when in truth no financial assistance had been requested nor received. The amount was released through encashment at Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002, issued in the name of Violeta Bahilidad.

The Sandiganbayan found that the petitioner committed the following acts: (a) ordered Mary Ann Gadian, a computer operator at the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani, to make a letter-request for financial assistance using a nonexistent cooperative; (b) directed Jane Tangan, the Local Legislative Staff Officer of the Office of the Vice-Governor, to falsify the signature of WIP's secretary, Melanie Remulta, on the request-letter; and (c) certified and approved the disbursement voucher, then presented it to Diaz, Camanay, and Vice-Governor Constantino for their respective signatures. The letter-request was made on January 24, 2002, but Gadian ante-dated it to January 7, 2002, so that the transaction would not look suspicious, considering that both the disbursement voucher and check were also dated January 24, 2002.

The entire transaction — from the letter-request, to the approval of the disbursement voucher, until the processing and release of the check — was completed in only one day. The disbursement was approved even without the required supporting documents such as the Articles of Cooperation and Certificate from the Cooperative Development Authority, and there was noncompliance with COA-prescribed auditing and accounting guidelines on the release of fund assistance to NGOs. Although the purported request was made by WIP, the check was made payable to Bahilidad, a private person, despite the COA's findings that there were no supporting documents proving that she was WIP's treasurer. According to Helen Cailing, the leader of the COA Special Audit Team, there were no supporting documents attached to the disbursement voucher proving that Bahilidad was indeed the treasurer of WIP.

• Validity of the Sandiganbayan Decision: The petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan's November 5, 2008 decision in Criminal Case No. 28326 was void because one of its signatories, Justice Gregory Ong, was not a natural-born Filipino citizen per Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita, and hence not qualified to be a Sandiganbayan justice.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: The petitioner argued that the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome her presumption of innocence.
• Denial of Due Process: The petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan denied her due process when it issued its Order dated April 5, 2006, amending certain portions of the pre-trial order without any hearing, and that she could not be convicted of malversation through consent, abandonment, or negligence because this allegation was not contained in the Information.

• Justice Ong's Citizenship: The People countered that Kilosbayan merely required Justice Ong to complete "all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship," and did not categorically rule that Justice Ong was disqualified. The People further pointed out that the Court in Topacio vs. Ong already acknowledged Justice Ong's actual physical possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
• Question of Fact: The People argued that the issue of sufficiency of the prosecution evidence is a question of fact beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari, and maintained that the Sandiganbayan's findings were supported by the evidence on record.
• Malversation Through Negligence: The People maintained that a person charged with willful malversation can validly be convicted of malversation through negligence.

• Validity of the Sandiganbayan Decision: Whether the Sandiganbayan's November 5, 2008 decision is void because one of its signatories, Justice Gregory Ong, was allegedly not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to overcome the petitioner's presumption of innocence.
• Denial of Due Process: Whether the petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan amended certain portions of the pre-trial order without any hearing, and whether she could be convicted of malversation through consent, abandonment, or negligence when this allegation was not contained in the Information.

• Validity of the Sandiganbayan Decision: No. The Sandiganbayan's November 5, 2008 decision is valid. Kilosbayan did not rule that Justice Ong was not a natural-born Filipino; the Court has long settled the issue of Justice Ong's citizenship, and even without this ruling, Justice Ong was a de facto officer whose acts are valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. The Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, all elements having been established by the prosecution.
• Denial of Due Process: No. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence; the dolo or culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.

• Validity of the Sandiganbayan Decision: The Court pointed out that Kilosbayan arose from a petition for certiorari assailing President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's appointment of Justice Ong as an Associate Justice of the Court on the ground that he was not a natural-born citizen. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, Kilosbayan did not rule that Justice Ong was not a natural-born Filipino; the Court merely stated that Justice Ong cannot accept an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court "until he shall have successfully completed all the necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship." After Kilosbayan was promulgated, Justice Ong filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 264, Pasig City, docketed as S.P. Proc No. 11767-SJ, which was granted on October 24, 2007, recognizing him as a natural-born Filipino. In a 2013 resolution, the Court En Banc held that the pronouncements in G.R. No. 179895 and G.R. No. 180543, and the finality of the RTC decision, have definitively settled the subject of Justice Ong's citizenship. Even without this ruling, the Court held that Justice Ong was a de facto officer during his incumbency as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice — one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court noted that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of law; it does not review factual findings of the Sandiganbayan, which are conclusive upon the Court. The petitioner's allegations — that the evidence was insufficient, that the testimonies of Gadian and Tangan were not credible, that WIP was an unregistered cooperative, that the signatures on the disbursement voucher were authentic, that Remulta's signature had been forged, and that the charges were politically motivated — are questions of fact resolved after a calibration of the evidence presented during trial. The Court would not weigh these pieces of evidence in the absence of a clear showing that the findings had been arrived at arbitrarily or are devoid of support in the records. At any rate, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner. The elements of malversation under Article 217 are: (a) the offender be a public officer; (b) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All these elements were established. The funds were public in character, belonging to the Province of Sarangani. Under Section 340 of the Local Government Code, local government officials become accountable public officers either because of the nature of their functions or on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds. The signatures of the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Accountant were needed before any disbursement of public funds could be made, and their signatures on the disbursement voucher and check allowed Bahilidad to encash ₱20,000.00. The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan's ruling that falsification was a necessary means to commit the crime of malversation, as the petitioner ordered Tangan to sign above the name of Remulta in the letter-request to make it appear that the latter, as WIP Secretary, consented to the request for financial assistance. Conspiracy was established with moral certainty, as the records showed that the petitioner and her co-accused acted in concert to achieve a common objective. The Court cited Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan for the rule that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation.

• Denial of Due Process: The Court held that the petitioner's argument lacked merit. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence; the dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. All that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. The Court cited People vs. Consigna, People vs. Ochoa, and Tubola, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan for the rule that an accused charged with wilful malversation can be validly convicted of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.

• De Facto Officer Doctrine — A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular. The acts of the de facto officer are as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that even if Justice Ong's appointment were irregular, his acts as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, including his participation in the November 5, 2008 decision, were valid.

• Elements of Malversation under Article 217 — The elements common to all acts of malversation are: (a) the offender be a public officer; (b) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. The Court applied these elements to the petitioner's case, finding all elements established by the prosecution.

• Conspiracy in Malversation — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy does not need to be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. A public officer who is not in charge of public funds by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation.

• Malversation Through Negligence — Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence; the dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. An accused charged with wilful malversation can be validly convicted of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.

• "A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular." — This passage defines the de facto officer doctrine applied by the Court to uphold the validity of the Sandiganbayan decision despite the challenge to Justice Ong's citizenship.
• "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy does not need to be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." — This passage articulates the standard for establishing conspiracy, which the Court applied to find the petitioner and her co-accused acted in concert to defraud the government.
• "Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper." — This passage states the rule that an accused charged with wilful malversation can be validly convicted of malversation through negligence, addressing the petitioner's due process argument.

• Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita, 553 Phil. 331 (2007) — Distinguished. The Court clarified that this case did not rule that Justice Ong was not a natural-born Filipino; it merely required him to complete the necessary steps to show his citizenship.
• Topacio vs. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 817 — Cited to show that the Court already acknowledged Justice Ong's actual physical possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
• Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan, 496 Phil. 764, 775 (2005) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation if such person conspires with an accountable public officer.
• People vs. Consigna, 122 Phil. 293, 296 (1965) — Cited as the first case ruling that an accused charged with wilful malversation can be validly convicted of malversation through negligence.
• People vs. Ochoa, 511 Phil. 682 (2005) — Cited for the rule that even when the Information charges wilful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission.
• Tubola, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154042, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 446 — Cited for the rule that malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence, and the dolo or culpa is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony.
• Bahilidad vs. People, G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 597 — Distinguished. The Court noted that Bahilidad's acquittal was anchored on the fact that she had no hand in the preparation, processing, or disbursing of the check issued in her name, which does not preclude ruling that the other accused conspired with each other.

• Article 217, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing malversation of public funds or property. The Court applied its elements to the petitioner's case, finding that all elements were established by the prosecution.
• Article 171(2), Revised Penal Code — The provision on falsification by public officer, employee, or notary, specifically paragraph (2) on causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The Court found that the petitioner ordered Tangan to sign above the name of Remulta in the letter-request to make it appear that the latter consented to the request for financial assistance.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — The provision on complex crimes, applied by the Court to sustain the conviction for the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, as falsification was a necessary means to commit the crime of malversation.
• Section 340, Local Government Code — The provision defining persons accountable for local government funds. The Court applied this provision to hold that local government officials become accountable public officers either because of the nature of their functions or on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the Court in modifying the maximum term of the penalty imposed on the petitioner, increasing it from sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, in accordance with Articles 48 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza
• Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per Special Order No. 1.115 dated July 22, 2015)
• Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen