Zamora vs. Caballero

Quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan requires a majority of all members elected and qualified, without exclusion of a member merely on leave or allegedly abroad, and a resolution creating liability requires the affirmative vote of a majority of all members; acts done without quorum or the required votes are null and void.

Manuel E. Zamora was a member of the fourteen-member Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley, whose other impleaded officers and members included Governor Jose R. Caballero and the provincial administrator, auditor, treasurer, and board members. The controversy is governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, particularly its provisions on sessions, quorum, presiding officers, and the vote required to authorize contracts creating liability on the local government unit. The Code also supplies the rule on compelling attendance when quorum is lacking and the implementing rules on enactment of ordinances and resolutions.

On February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent written notice of a special session on February 7, 2001. Upon the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero, the special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without written notice. The Sanggunian then held a special session on February 8, 2001 to allow the Governor to deliver his State of the Province Address, with only seven of its fourteen members present, and no resolution was considered.

On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session. During that session it issued Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 07 authorizing the Governor to enter into a construction contract with Allado Construction Company, Inc. for completion of Phase II of the capitol building, and it accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation of Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto. While only eight members were present at commencement, the Journal of Proceedings and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 indicated that a total of thirteen members attended.

According to petitioner, only seven members were actually present when the resignation was noted and the motions for Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 were approved. When the vote on Resolution No. 05 was taken, only the remaining six members voted for adoption, with then presiding officer Board Member Rolando Osorio not casting a vote. When Resolution No. 07 was taken up, after six members present unanimously voted affirmatively, presiding officer Osorio relinquished his seat to Board Member Graciano Arafol and then voted as a member in the affirmative, after which Arafol returned the chair to Osorio. Petitioner had asked permission to leave and manifested on the record that only seven members were left, to which Board Member Arafol answered that there was no problem; respondents themselves admitted that seven members were present when the motions were voted upon. The Journal called only six members to vote on the motions, did not call Vice-Governor Navarro and Board Members Zamora, Yanong, Castillo, Andres and Gentugaya, and Resolutions 05 and 07 marked the uncalled members, including petitioner who had already left, with double asterisks.

Petitioner thus sued to invalidate the February 8 and 26 acts for lack of quorum and, as to February 8, for lack of 24-hour written notice under Section 52(d) of the Local Government Code. Respondents maintained that Board Member Sotto was in the United States when the acts were done, so the actual membership in the country was thirteen for quorum purposes. The trial court found seven of thirteen sufficient for quorum and additionally held that injunctive relief was barred by Presidential Decree No. 1818.

• Quorum and Avelino Doctrine: Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously applied Avelino vs. Cuenco to a local legislative body governed by Section 53 of the Local Government Code rather than the constitutional quorum rule for the Senate.
• Judicial Notice of Absence Abroad: Petitioner maintained that the trial court could not take judicial notice, without proof, that Board Member Sotto was in the United States and beyond coercive process, noting her leave form before the Department of Interior and Local Government did not state she was leaving the country.
• Special Session – Notice and Quorum: Petitioner argued that the February 8, 2001 special session was invalid for lack of quorum with only seven members present and for lack of written notice served at least 24 hours beforehand as required by Section 52(d) of the Local Government Code.
• Votes on Resolution Nos. 05 and 07: Petitioner argued that official business was conducted without quorum, that Resolution No. 05 received only six affirmative votes without the presiding officer voting, and that Resolution No. 07 was approved through the irregular device of the acting presiding officer relinquishing the chair to vote as a member.
• Injunction Bar Under P.D. No. 1818: Petitioner faulted the trial court for ruling that granting a temporary restraining order would violate P.D. No. 1818 prohibiting injunctions in infrastructure cases.

• Actual Membership Basis for Quorum: Respondents countered that since Board Member Sotto was in the United States, the actual number of board members in the country was thirteen, which should be the basis for quorum, leaving seven present as a majority.
• Conclusiveness of Journal and Resolutions: Respondents asserted that the presence of thirteen members at the February 26, 2001 session as shown in the Journal and Resolutions should be conclusive, invoking Arroyo vs. De Venecia and U.S. vs. Pons against inquiry beyond legislative journals.
• Non-Enjoinment of Infrastructure Project: Respondents argued that construction of the capitol building could not be enjoined in light of P.D. No. 1818 and Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., stressing that the bidding won by the Allado Company was not defective and Resolution No. 07 merely authorized formalization of the contract.
• Distinction of Malaga Exception: Respondents maintained that the Malaga exception permitting restraint on questions of law should not apply because, unlike Malaga where bidding procedure was defective, no bidding defect existed here.

• Quorum – Computation Base: Whether quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan is determined by a majority of all members elected and qualified, or by the actual number remaining after excluding a member allegedly abroad on leave.
• Judicial Notice and Avelino Applicability: Whether Avelino vs. Cuenco applies and whether the court may take judicial notice without evidence that the absent member was outside the country and beyond coercive power.
• Inquiry Beyond the Journal: Whether the Court may look beyond the Journal and Resolutions to determine attendance and voting when the Journal is not clear and explicit and compliance with statute, not internal rules, is at issue.
• Validity of Resolution No. 05: Whether Resolution No. 05 declaring a state of calamity is valid when approved by only six members.
• Validity of Resolution No. 07 – Presiding Officer's Vote and Required Majority: Whether Resolution No. 07 authorizing the construction contract is valid where the temporary presiding officer voted without a tie and where eight votes of fourteen members were not obtained.
• Injunction Bar for Infrastructure Projects: Whether P.D. No. 1818 bars restraint of the questioned sanggunian authorization for the capitol construction.

• Quorum – Computation Base: No. Quorum must be a majority of all sanggunian members elected and qualified, with total membership taken into account, and filing a leave does not alter election and qualification.
• Judicial Notice and Avelino Applicability: No. Avelino vs. Cuenco is inapplicable absent proof the member was abroad and beyond coercive power, and disputed whereabouts cannot be judicially noticed without evidence.
• Inquiry Beyond the Journal: Yes. Inquiry beyond the Journal is permitted where statutory compliance under the Local Government Code is questioned and the Journal is not clear and explicit on quorum and voting.
• Validity of Resolution No. 05: No. Six affirmative votes do not satisfy the requirement of approval by a majority of members present, there being a quorum.
• Validity of Resolution No. 07 – Presiding Officer's Vote and Required Majority: No. A temporary presiding officer may vote only to break a tie, and authorization creating liability requires the affirmative vote of a majority of all members, or eight of fourteen.
• Injunction Bar for Infrastructure Projects: No. The prohibition extends only to administrative discretion in technical cases and does not bar review of questions of law such as compliance with statutory voting requirements.

• Quorum – Computation Base: Section 53(a) requires a majority of all members elected and qualified, which is more exacting than the constitutional formulation of a majority of each House. Because the qualifying phrase was intended to allow function when not all members have been proclaimed, but election and qualification are not altered by a leave of absence, the total fourteen-member composition controls. Thus seven present was short of the eight needed for quorum, and the coercion remedy in Section 53(b) addresses fears of deliberate absences.
• Judicial Notice and Avelino Applicability: Avelino vs. Cuenco involved the Senate under Article VI, Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution and a 24th senator actually outside the country and beyond Senate coercion. Here nothing on record except allegation established that Sotto was abroad, while her leave form did not mention foreign travel. Because courts may judicially notice only matters of public knowledge or unquestionable determination, disputed whereabouts required evidence with notice to parties.
• Inquiry Beyond the Journal: Arroyo vs. De Venecia refused inquiry into a House's own procedural rules absent constitutional or rights violation, and U.S. vs. Pons deferred to journals found clear and explicit. Here compliance with the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules, enacted by Congress, was at issue, and the Journal did not state how many were actually present for the votes, called only six members to vote without explanation, and bore irregular asterisks inconsistent with petitioner's departure.
• Validity of Resolution No. 05: Article 107(g) of the Implementing Rules requires approval by a majority of members present, there being a quorum. Even assuming thirteen members present, six affirmative votes could not constitute such a majority, rendering the calamity declaration null and void.
• Validity of Resolution No. 07 – Presiding Officer's Vote and Required Majority: Section 49 limits the presiding officer, including a temporary presiding officer who merely steps into those shoes with no greater power, to voting only to break a tie. Board Member Osorio therefore could not relinquish the chair after six affirmative votes in order to add a seventh vote as member, a device characterized as circumvention of an express prohibition. Moreover, Section 468 in relation to Article 107 requires the affirmative vote of a majority of all sanggunian members for resolutions creating liability, so fourteen members required eight votes, which was not obtained even counting Osorio.
• Injunction Bar for Infrastructure Projects: Under Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., P.D. No. 1818 bars injunctions against administrative acts involving facts or discretion in technical cases but not issues clearly involving questions of law. No essential difference existed between defective bidding in Malaga and defective statutory authorization here, since both concerned non-compliance with legal prerequisites to contract, not the wisdom of the project itself.

• Quorum of the sanggunian — Quorum is that number of members which, when legally assembled, enables the body to transact business and do any valid act; majority for quorum means more than half of the total. Applied here, Section 53(a) requires a majority of all members elected and qualified, so the entire fourteen-member membership had to be counted and eight members were necessary, notwithstanding a member's leave of absence.
• Election and qualification as quorum base — The phrase elected and qualified was meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members have been proclaimed and have assumed office, but it does not permit reduction of the base because a qualified incumbent filed for leave. Applied here, Board Member Sotto remained a member for quorum purposes despite the claimed absence abroad.
• Compulsion upon lack of quorum — Where there is no quorum, a majority of members present may adjourn and compel attendance of an absent member without justifiable cause through designated sanggunian and police assistance. Applied here, that coercive remedy, not recomputation of membership, answers concerns about politically motivated absences crippling the body.
• Voting by presiding officer — The vice-governor as presiding officer, and a temporary presiding officer elected by members present constituting a quorum in case of inability to preside, shall vote only to break a tie; the temporary officer has no greater power than the regular officer. Applied here, Board Member Osorio's relinquishment of the chair to cast a seventh affirmative vote as member was prohibited circumvention.
• Vote required for liability-creating resolutions — No resolution is valid unless approved by a majority of members present, there being a quorum, while any resolution authorizing payment or creating liability requires the affirmative vote of a majority of all sanggunian members. Applied here, Resolution No. 05 failed the first test with only six votes, and Resolution No. 07 failed the second test for lack of eight of fourteen votes.
• Nullity of unofficial collegial acts — A sanggunian is a collegial body whose legislation requires participation of all members through voting; acts of only a part done outside statutory parameters are legally infirm, unofficial acts done during an unauthorized session, and null and void without binding force. Applied here, noting Sotto's resignation and adopting Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 without quorum and required votes had no legal effect.
• Limits on conclusiveness of legislative journals and on P.D. No. 1818 — Courts need not confine themselves to journals that are not clear and explicit when statutory compliance rather than internal rules is questioned, and the bar on enjoining infrastructure projects does not cover questions of law on compliance with legal prerequisites. Applied here, examination of the Journal, voting records, and asterisks was proper, and review of the authorization's statutory validity was not barred, following Arroyo vs. De Venecia, U.S. vs. Pons, and Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr.

• "A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business." — States the controlling statutory quorum formula under Section 53(a) that required counting all fourteen members rather than excluding the member on leave.
• "The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie." — States the express limitation violated when the temporary presiding officer relinquished the chair to add an affirmative vote as member.
• "Any ordinance or resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating liability, shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all the sanggunian members for its passage." — States the heightened voting requirement that invalidated Resolution No. 07 authorizing the capitol construction contract.
• "The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void." — States the consequence of transacting without quorum and without the required votes, denying binding effect to the challenged acts.

• Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949) — Distinguished; its rule allowing exclusion of a senator abroad and beyond coercive power under the constitutional Senate quorum provision did not govern a sanggunian under Section 53 of the Local Government Code absent proof of foreign presence.
• Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997) — Distinguished; its restraint from reviewing internal House procedural compliance did not preclude review of compliance with the Local Government Code and Implementing Rules.
• U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916) — Distinguished; deference to clear and explicit journals did not apply where the Journal failed to show actual presence at voting and contained irregularities requiring examination of the proceedings.
• Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516 (1992) — Followed; its exception that P.D. No. 1818 does not bar courts from restraining administrative acts on questions of law governed the challenge to statutory authorization for the construction contract.
• Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 (1962) — Cited for the definition of quorum as the number enabling the body to transact business and do any valid act.
• Perez vs. Dela Cruz, 27 SCRA 587 (1969) — Followed for the meaning of majority as more than half and for the rule that a temporary presiding officer has no greater voting power than the regular presiding officer.
• Salamera vs. Sandiganbayan, 303 SCRA 217, 229 (1999) — Cited for the rule that disputed facts cannot be judicially noticed and require reception of evidence with notice to parties.

• Section 53(a) and (b), Local Government Code of 1991 — Provides the quorum formula of a majority of all members elected and qualified with roll-call procedure upon question of quorum, and the power of a majority present without quorum to adjourn and compel attendance; applied to require eight of fourteen and to reject exclusion of the member on leave.
• Section 52(d), Local Government Code of 1991 — Requires written notice served personally at the member's residence at least 24 hours before a special session and limits business to noticed matters absent two-thirds concurrence with quorum; invoked against the reset February 8 special session held without written notice.
• Section 49(a) and (b), Local Government Code of 1991 — Makes the vice-governor the presiding officer who votes only to break a tie and provides for election of a temporary presiding officer upon inability to preside; applied to invalidate the temporary presiding officer's additional vote as member.
• Section 468(a)(iii), Local Government Code of 1991, in relation to Article 107 of Implementing Rules — Requires, upon majority vote of all sangguniang panlalawigan members and affirmative vote of a majority of all members for liability-creating measures, authority for obligations such as the construction agreement; applied to require eight votes for Resolution No. 07.
• Article 107(g), Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code — Requires approval by a majority of members present, there being a quorum, and heightened majority-of-all-membership approval for payment or liability measures; applied to void Resolution No. 05 with six votes and Resolution No. 07 without eight votes.
• Presidential Decree No. 1818 — Prohibits courts from issuing restraining orders or injunctions in infrastructure and natural resource projects; construed under Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr. as inapplicable to questions of law on statutory compliance for contract authorization.
• Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court — Limits judicial notice to matters of public knowledge or unquestionable determination known to judges by judicial function; applied to reject notice of the member's alleged presence in the United States.
• Article VI, Section 10, 1935 Constitution, and Article VI, Section 16(2), 1987 Constitution — Provide that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum; contrasted with the more exacting sanggunian quorum language to show Avelino vs. Cuenco did not control.

Vitug, J., Chairman, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., and Corona, J., concur.