Zamboanga City Water District vs. Presiding Commissioner Buat

A party who voluntarily invokes the jurisdiction of a tribunal to secure affirmative relief is estopped from later repudiating that jurisdiction to escape an adverse ruling; and a Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory even pending appeal, entitling the employee to back wages accruing during the effectivity of a temporary restraining order where the restraining order is subsequently lifted and the underlying decision affirmed.

Zamboanga City Water District is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter, engaged in supplying water in Zamboanga City. Private respondents are employees of petitioner who belonged to the Zamboanga Utilities Labor Union (ZULU). As a GOCC with an original charter, petitioner's hiring and firing of employees is governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, a point not disputed by the parties. The dispute arose from a strike conducted by private respondents in March 1987, which led to their separation from employment and spawned cross-charges before the Labor Arbiter.

Zamboanga City Water District is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in the business of supplying water in Zamboanga City. Private respondents are all employees of petitioner and members of the Zamboanga Utilities Labor Union (ZULU). In March 1987, private respondents conducted and participated in a strike, for which they were separated from their employment. On March 17, 1987, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter to declare the strike illegal (NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-03-0090-87). The following day, ZULU filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages (NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-03-0092-87).

The two cases were consolidated and heard together. On April 19, 1988, the Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a consolidated decision declaring both the strike and the dismissal of private respondents illegal, ordering reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges, but without back wages. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which on July 17, 1990 affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision with the sole modification that strike leader Felix Laquio be suspended from work without pay for six months, effective ten days from receipt of the decision.

Petitioner received a copy of the NLRC decision on August 27, 1990. Three days later, private respondents filed a motion for execution. On September 24, the Executive Labor Arbiter granted the writ of execution and ordered petitioner to reinstate all private respondents. On September 28, the Supreme Court issued a restraining order in G.R. Nos. 95219-20 enjoining the execution of the NLRC decision. On March 13, 1991, the Court dismissed the petition, affirmed the NLRC decision, and lifted the restraining order.

Petitioner received a copy of the Supreme Court decision on April 10, 1991, and on April 16 reinstated 27 of the respondent employees. On the same day, petitioner informed the Executive Labor Arbiter that Laquio would be reinstated on October 16, 1991, after expiration of his six-month suspension. On April 17, private respondents filed a motion to compel immediate reinstatement of Laquio and payment of back wages, arguing that the NLRC decision became executory upon petitioner's receipt on August 27, 1990. On May 17, the Executive Labor Arbiter denied the motion. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC, which on October 24, 1991 set aside the Labor Arbiter's order, ordered Laquio's reinstatement with back wages from March 6, 1991 up to the day prior to his actual reinstatement, and granted back wages to the other private respondents from March 21, 1989 up to April 15, 1991, including the period of effectivity of the Supreme Court's temporary restraining order. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC on February 19, 1992, prompting the present petition.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner contended that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned resolutions because jurisdiction over labor disputes involving employees of government-owned and controlled corporations is vested in the Civil Service Commission.
• Back Wages During TRO: Petitioner argued that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the payment of salaries of private respondents during the effectivity of the temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 95219-20, claiming that execution of the NLRC decision was suspended by the TRO.
• Reckoning Date of Reinstatement: Petitioner claimed that private respondents, except Laquio, were entitled to reinstatement only after April 10, 1991, when petitioner received a copy of the Supreme Court decision in G.R. Nos. 95219-20, and that Laquio was properly reinstated on October 16, 1991 after expiration of his six-month suspension.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the NLRC had jurisdiction over the labor dispute involving employees of a government-owned and controlled corporation, or whether such jurisdiction is vested in the Civil Service Commission.
• Estoppel: Whether petitioner is barred from questioning the NLRC's jurisdiction despite having invoked it in the first instance.
• Immediate Executory Nature of Reinstatement: Whether the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory even pending appeal, and whether the issuance of a temporary restraining order suspends the employees' right to reinstatement and back wages during its effectivity.

• Jurisdiction: No — jurisdiction over the strike and dismissal of employees of a GOCC with an original charter properly lies with the Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC, under the Civil Service Law.
• Estoppel: Yes — petitioner is estopped from assailing the NLRC's jurisdiction, having voluntarily invoked it by filing the complaint before the Labor Arbiter and actively participating in the proceedings without ever raising the jurisdictional issue.
• Immediate Executory Nature of Reinstatement: Yes — under Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, a Labor Arbiter's reinstatement order is immediately executory even pending appeal, and employees are entitled to back wages accruing during the TRO period where the Court ultimately affirms the decision and lifts the TRO.

• Jurisdiction: The Court acknowledged that as a water district with an original charter, petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Jurisdiction over the strike and dismissal of private respondents therefore properly lies with the Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC. The Court cited Tanjay Water District vs. Gabaton, Hagonoy Water District vs. National Labor Relations Commission, National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, and Baguio Water District vs. Trajano in support of this principle.

• Estoppel: Despite the NLRC lacking proper jurisdiction, petitioner never raised the issue before the Executive Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, or even the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 95219-20. Petitioner itself filed the complaint before the Labor Arbiter, sought affirmative relief, and participated actively in the proceedings. It was only after the NLRC ordered payment of back wages that petitioner raised the jurisdictional issue. The Court applied the doctrine that it is not fair for a party who has voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a tribunal to secure affirmative relief to afterwards repudiate that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. Petitioner is thus estopped and bound to respect all proceedings below.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Reinstatement: The NLRC reckoned back wages from March 21, 1989, the date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor Code to provide that a Labor Arbiter's decision reinstating a dismissed employee "shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal." The employer must either admit the employee back to work under the same terms and conditions or, at its option, merely reinstate the employee in the payroll. Posting of a bond does not stay execution for reinstatement. The Court held that the TRO in G.R. Nos. 95219-20 did not nullify the employees' rights to reinstatement and wages but merely suspended implementation pending determination of the validity of the NLRC resolutions. Where the Court ultimately affirmed the NLRC decision and recognized the employees' right to reinstatement, they are entitled to wages accruing during the TRO's effectivity. A contrary finding — that the employees were not entitled to reinstatement — would have meant no right to collect back wages.

• Doctrine of Estoppel by Invoking Jurisdiction — A party who has voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a tribunal to secure affirmative relief is estopped from afterwards repudiating and denying that same jurisdiction to escape an adverse ruling or penalty. In this case, petitioner filed the complaint before the Labor Arbiter, sought affirmative relief, and actively participated in the proceedings without ever questioning jurisdiction; it was only after the NLRC ordered back wages that petitioner raised the issue. The Court held petitioner estopped from assailing the NLRC's jurisdiction.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Reinstatement Orders — Under Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, a Labor Arbiter's decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee is immediately executory, even pending appeal. The employer must either (a) actually admit the employee back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to dismissal, or (b) at the option of the employer, merely reinstate the employee in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer does not stay execution for reinstatement.

• Effect of Temporary Restraining Order on Reinstatement Rights — A TRO does not nullify the employee's right to reinstatement and wages but merely suspends implementation pending resolution of the validity of the underlying decision. If the Court ultimately affirms the decision and recognizes the right to reinstatement, the employee is entitled to wages accruing during the TRO period; if the Court finds no right to reinstatement, no back wages are due.

• "Indeed, it is not fair for a party who has voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a tribunal in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief therefrom, to afterwards repudiate and deny that very same jurisdiction to escape a penalty." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the estoppel issue, establishing that voluntary invocation of jurisdiction bars later repudiation to avoid adverse consequences.

• "In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal." — This quotation reproduces the text of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, the statutory basis for the Court's ruling on the immediate executory nature of reinstatement orders.

• "The issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. Nos. 95219-20 did not nullify the rights of private respondents to their reinstatement and to collect their wages during the period of the effectivity of the order but merely suspended the implementation thereof pending the determination of the validity of the NLRC resolutions subject of the petition." — This passage defines the effect of a TRO on reinstatement rights, distinguishing suspension of implementation from nullification of underlying rights.

• Tanjay Water District vs. Gabaton, 172 SCRA 253 (1989) — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that hiring and firing of GOCC employees with original charters are governed by the Civil Service Law, placing jurisdiction with the Civil Service Commission rather than the NLRC.
• Hagonoy Water District vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 165 SCRA 272 (1988) — Cited alongside Tanjay for the same proposition on Civil Service jurisdiction over GOCC employee disputes.
• National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985) — Cited as further authority that GOCC employee matters fall under Civil Service Law.
• Baguio Water District vs. Trajano, 127 SCRA 730 (1984) — Cited as additional authority on Civil Service jurisdiction over GOCC personnel actions.
• Ocheda vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 629 (1992) — Cited for the estoppel doctrine that voluntary invocation of jurisdiction bars subsequent repudiation.
• Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 (1984) — Cited in support of the estoppel doctrine.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968) — Cited as foundational authority for the estoppel-by-invocation-of-jurisdiction doctrine.

• Article 223, Labor Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 6715) — Provides that a Labor Arbiter's decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee is immediately executory, even pending appeal. The employer must either admit the employee back to work under the same terms and conditions or, at the employer's option, merely reinstate the employee in the payroll. Posting of a bond does not stay execution for reinstatement. The Court applied this provision to hold that private respondents were entitled to immediate reinstatement upon receipt of the NLRC decision, and that back wages accrued during the TRO period because the Court ultimately affirmed the decision.
• Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations — Governs the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. The Court acknowledged this as the proper legal framework for petitioner's personnel actions, placing jurisdiction with the Civil Service Commission, though petitioner was estopped from invoking this to challenge the NLRC's authority.

Davide, Jr., and Bellosillo, JJ., concurred. Cruz and Kapunan, JJ., were on leave.