Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr.

For violations of municipal ordinances governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure, the prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information directly in court, not by the filing of a complaint with the prosecutor's office for preliminary investigation.

Luz M. Zaldivia was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit, a violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. A referral-complaint was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, but the corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court only on October 2, 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the information, arguing the crime had prescribed.

• Nature of the Charge: Luz M. Zaldivia was charged with violating Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal, for quarrying commercially without a mayor's permit.
• Timeline: The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The complaint was received by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office on May 30, 1990. The Information was filed in court on October 2, 1990.
• Defense Argument: The petitioner moved to quash, arguing that under Act No. 3326, violations of municipal ordinances prescribe after two months. Since the Information was filed beyond the two-month period from May 11, 1990 (i.e., after July 11, 1990), the charge had prescribed.
• Prosecution's Position: The prosecution contended that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states that the institution of a complaint "in all cases" interrupts prescription.

• Applicability of Summary Procedure: Petitioner argued that violations of municipal ordinances are expressly covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
• Prescriptive Period: Petitioner invoked Act No. 3326, which provides that violations of municipal ordinances prescribe after two months.
• Interruption of Prescription: Petitioner maintained that under the Rule on Summary Procedure (Sec. 9), the case is commenced only by filing the complaint or information directly in court. Therefore, the filing with the prosecutor's office did not interrupt the prescriptive period.

• General Rule on Interruption: Respondents countered that Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the institution of a complaint, whether filed in court or with the fiscal's office, "in all cases" interrupts the period of prescription.
• Scope of "In All Cases": Respondents argued that the phrase "in all cases" is all-encompassing and includes offenses covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
• Reliance on Precedent: Respondents invoked the doctrine in Francisco v. Court of Appeals, which held that filing a complaint for preliminary investigation interrupts prescription.

• Applicable Procedural Rule: Whether the Rule on Summary Procedure, and not Section 1 of Rule 110, governs the commencement of a case and the interruption of prescription for a violation of a municipal ordinance.
• Interruption of Prescription: Whether the filing of a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor interrupts the two-month prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 for a municipal ordinance violation.

• Applicable Procedural Rule: The Rule on Summary Procedure, as the special law, prevails over the general provisions of Rule 110. Section 1 of Rule 110 expressly applies to "offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure." Therefore, the specific rules for commencing cases under the Summary Procedure apply.
• Interruption of Prescription: The prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing with the prosecutor. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure (Sec. 9), the complaint or information must be "filed directly in court." Consequently, only the filing of the information in court on October 2, 1990, could have interrupted prescription. Since this occurred after the two-month period (which ended July 11, 1990) had already expired, the crime had prescribed. Act No. 3326 specifies prescription is interrupted by the institution of "judicial proceedings," which does not include the preliminary investigation stage.

• Primacy of Special Procedural Rules — When a specific rule (the Rule on Summary Procedure) governs a particular class of cases (e.g., municipal ordinance violations), its provisions control over general procedural rules (Rule 110). The Court applied this principle to hold that the mode of commencing a case under the Summary Procedure dictates when prescription is interrupted.
• Prescription as a Substantive Right — The Court affirmed that the right to prescription in criminal cases is substantive. Therefore, in any conflict between a procedural rule (Rule 110) and a substantive statute (Act No. 3326), the statute must prevail, as the Court's rule-making power cannot "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" (Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), Constitution).

• "The phrase 'in all cases' appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure." — This clarifies the limited scope of Rule 110's general interruption rule.
• "The proceedings referred to in Section 2 [of Act No. 3326] are 'judicial proceedings,' contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings." — This defines the type of action required to interrupt prescription under the governing statute.

• Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538 — Distinguished. The Court noted that Francisco involved an offense under the Revised Penal Code, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, its doctrine that filing a complaint for preliminary investigation interrupts prescription was inapplicable to the present case involving a municipal ordinance violation.

• Act No. 3326, Sections 1 & 2 — Provides that violations of municipal ordinances prescribe after two months, and prescription is interrupted by the institution of judicial proceedings.
• Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 1(B)(3) — Includes violations of municipal or city ordinances within its scope.
• Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 9 — Mandates that for cases under its scope, prosecution shall be by complaint or information "filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."
• 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 1 — States that for offenses not subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure, the institution of a complaint with the fiscal's office interrupts prescription. The Court held this provision did not apply to the instant case.

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Marcelo B. Paras, Florentino P. Feliciano, Teodoro R. Padilla, Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, Arturo B. Medialdea, Florenz D. Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.