Zacarias vs. Anacay

The nature of an ejectment action and the court’s jurisdiction are determined by the allegations of the complaint; a complaint alleging entry without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent makes out forcible entry, not unlawful detainer, and cannot vest the MCTC with jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and never becomes final.

Petitioner Amada C. Zacarias, through her son and attorney-in-fact Cesar C. Zacarias, claims a 769-square-meter parcel in Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite under Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182; respondents Victoria Anacay and members of her household are the occupants. The dispute is governed by Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides the summary remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer and ties MCTC jurisdiction to the allegations in the complaint.

On December 24, 2008, petitioner Amada C. Zacarias, through her son and attorney-in-fact Cesar C. Zacarias, filed a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer against Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Cynthia Anacay-Guisic, Angelito Anacay, Jermil Israel, Jimmy Roy Israel, and all other persons claiming authority under them. The complaint concerned a 769-square-meter parcel at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in petitioner’s name and issued by Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007. Petitioner alleged that she was in lawful possession and control of the property, had it planted to bananas and other fruit-bearing trees, and that sometime in May 2007 she discovered that respondents had entered and occupied the property. She demanded that they leave; respondents requested time to leave, and she acceded, with respondents committing to vacate by the end of May 2008. Despite repeated demands, they refused to vacate, so her lawyer sent a formal and final demand to vacate and to pay reasonable compensation for their illegal use and occupancy. She also referred the matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st, but no conciliation was reached and a Certification to File Action was issued.

The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center under Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; mediation was unsuccessful and the case was returned to the court. The demand letter sent by petitioner’s counsel averred that respondents entered the property through stealth and strategy, and petitioner’s own “Sinumpaang Salaysay” was consistent with that account. On appeal, the RTC pointed out that the complaint did not state that respondents entered through stealth and strategy; instead, it alleged that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to respondents’ request to stay until May 2008, and that respondents reneged on their promise to vacate by that time. The RTC also found that the final demand to vacate was received by respondents on July 24, 2008.

After the RTC reversed the MCTC, no notice of appeal was filed by respondents within the reglementary period, and the RTC decision became final and executory. On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the hearing on January 4, 2012, respondents were given ten days to file their comment. At the next hearing on February 6, 2012, respondents’ counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation informing the court that on the same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA, copies of which were served on petitioner through counsel and on the RTC. In its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated that the manifestation was “tantamount to [a] comment to the pending motion” and gave petitioner’s counsel ten days to file a Reply, after which the incident would be submitted for resolution.

Respondents later maintained that they were not aware of the RTC proceedings and were not furnished a copy of the RTC’s adverse decision. The complaint’s own allegation was that petitioner discovered in May 2007 that respondents had entered and occupied the property; it did not allege that she had consented to or tolerated the entry from the start.

• Final and Executory Judgment: Petitioner contended that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the RTC judgment, which had long become final and executory; she argued that suspension of strict adherence to procedural rules could not be justified by respondents’ unsupported allegations of non-receipt of documents concerning the case.
• Unlawful Detainer and Tolerance: Petitioner argued on appeal to the RTC that unlawful detainer was the proper remedy because she merely tolerated respondents’ stay after demand to vacate was made, and they had entered into an agreement; she was forced to take legal action when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate after the agreed period.

• Non-Receipt of RTC Decision: Respondents maintained that they were not aware of the proceedings before the RTC and were not furnished a copy of the RTC’s adverse decision.
• Certiorari and Suspension of Procedural Rules: Respondents stressed that resort to certiorari was proper and that suspension of procedural rules was justified by compelling circumstances: the imminent destruction of the only property possessed by indigent respondents, their lack of awareness of the unfavorable RTC judgment, the substantive merits of the case on the jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, the lack of showing that the certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and the absence of prejudice to the other party.

• Nature of Ejectment Action and Jurisdiction: Whether the allegations in petitioner’s complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer, vesting the MCTC with jurisdiction, or for forcible entry, such that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer complaint.
• Final and Executory Judgment: Whether the CA erred in nullifying the RTC decision, which had already become final and executory, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

• Nature of Ejectment Action and Jurisdiction: No. The complaint alleged entry without petitioner’s knowledge or consent and did not allege tolerance from the start; it made out forcible entry, not unlawful detainer, so the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer complaint.
• Final and Executory Judgment: No. A judgment void for lack of jurisdiction never becomes final and cannot be the source of rights or obligations; jurisdiction may be raised at any stage.

• Nature of Ejectment Action and Jurisdiction: The nature of the action and the court’s jurisdiction are determined by the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint must embody a statement of facts bringing the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. The remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right under any contract, express or implied. A complaint sufficiently alleges unlawful detainer if it recites: (1) initially, possession by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (4) within one year from the last demand to vacate, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. The complaint here alleged that petitioner discovered in May 2007 that respondents had entered and occupied the property; it did not allege that respondents’ possession was initially legal or tolerated by petitioner and became illegal only upon termination of that right. Petitioner’s claim that she tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after discovery was incorrect because the possession could not have been legal from the start: it was without her knowledge or consent and not based on any contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, possession is originally legal but becomes illegal due to expiration or termination of the right to possess. Tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered; if possession was unlawful from the start, unlawful detainer is an improper remedy. The complaint’s bare allegation that petitioner discovered respondents’ entry in May 2007 showed clandestine entry without her consent, which is constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The complaint also failed to allege how and when entry was effected. Thus the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer complaint, and the RTC erred in reversing the MCTC.
• Final and Executory Judgment: Petitioner’s argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory RTC judgment deserves scant consideration. A court’s jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, because jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and render judgment. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. The RTC judgment, rendered in a case over which the MCTC had no original jurisdiction, could not attain finality and could be nullified by the CA.

• Jurisdiction determined by allegations of the complaint — In ejectment cases, what determines the nature of the action and the court’s jurisdiction are the allegations in the complaint; the complaint must show on its face facts bringing the case within Rule 70 without resort to parol evidence. The SC applied this by looking only at petitioner’s complaint, which alleged discovery of respondents’ entry in May 2007, and concluding it did not state unlawful detainer.
• Requisites of unlawful detainer — A complaint sufficiently alleges unlawful detainer if it recites: (1) initially, possession by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (4) within one year from the last demand to vacate, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. The SC used these requisites to test the complaint and found the first missing.
• Tolerance must be present from the start — For unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered; if possession was unlawful from the start, unlawful detainer is an improper remedy. The SC applied this because petitioner discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007 and did not allege that she had tolerated them from the beginning.
• Forcible entry vs. unlawful detainer — Forcible entry is deprivation of physical possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; unlawful detainer is unlawful withholding of possession after the expiration or termination of the defendant’s right under any contract, express or implied. The SC held that clandestine entry without the owner’s knowledge or consent is forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.
• Jurisdiction may be raised at any stage — A court’s jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, because jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the court’s authority to take cognizance and render judgment. The SC applied this to allow the CA to nullify the RTC decision despite its finality.
• Void judgment for lack of jurisdiction never becomes final — A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all; it cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation, all acts performed pursuant to it and claims emanating from it have no legal effect, and it can never become final; any writ of execution based on it is void. The SC applied this to reject petitioner’s reliance on the RTC decision’s finality.

• “The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.” — This states the jurisdictional test the SC used to reject unlawful detainer and affirm the MCTC.
• “We stress that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.” — This defines unlawful detainer and explains why respondents’ clandestine entry cannot qualify.
• “To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.” — This is the canonical tolerance rule applied against petitioner.
• “Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.” — This answers petitioner’s finality argument and supports the CA’s nullification of the RTC judgment.

• Cabrera vs. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009) — Controlling standard; the SC used its four requisites of unlawful detainer to test the complaint.
• Valdez vs. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 39, 46 (2006) — Followed; held that where the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court has no jurisdiction.
• Sarona vs. Villegas — Cited in Valdez vs. Court of Appeals and followed; tolerance must be present right from the start of possession, otherwise the action is forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.
• Canlas vs. Tubil, 616 Phil. 915, 925 (2009) — Followed; reiterated that possession in unlawful detainer is originally legal but becomes illegal due to expiration or termination of the right to possess.
• Pagadora vs. Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 14, 30 — Followed; the nature of the action and jurisdiction are determined by the allegations in the complaint, which must show enough on its face.
• Del Rosario vs. Sps. Manuel, 464 Phil. 1053, 1057 (2004) — Cited for the definitions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
• Sales vs. Barro, 594 Phil. 116, 123 (2008) — Followed; jurisdiction may be raised at any stage, even on appeal.
• Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Alejo, 417 Phil. 303, 318 (2001) — Followed; a void judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all and can never become final.

• Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines forcible entry and unlawful detainer and sets the one-year period for bringing the action in the proper MTC. The SC applied it by examining the complaint’s allegations and holding that they made out forcible entry, not unlawful detainer, so the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer complaint.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs petitions for review on certiorari to the SC. Petitioner invoked it to challenge the CA decision; the SC denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the CA.
• Section 2(a), Rule 18, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires referral to the Philippine Mediation Center in cases covered by mediation. The parties were ordered to proceed to mediation, which was unsuccessful, and the case was returned to court.