Yusay vs. Court of Appeals

Certiorari under Rule 65 is not available to assail legislative resolutions of local Sanggunians, as these constitute policy-making functions rather than judicial or quasi-judicial acts; moreover, the power of eminent domain delegated to LGUs under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 strictly requires an ordinance, not a resolution, to authorize the local chief executive.

The case involves the City of Mandaluyong’s attempt to exercise eminent domain for urban land reform and low-cost housing, highlighting the procedural prerequisites for LGUs under the Local Government Code of 1991 and the proper remedies available to property owners to challenge preliminary legislative acts.

• Filed in RTC (Branch 214, Mandaluyong City) as a petition for certiorari and prohibition (SCA Case No. 15-MD).
• RTC Decision (January 31, 2001): Dismissed the petition for lack of merit; held that certiorari does not lie against legislative acts and prohibition does not lie as no judicial/quasi-judicial/ministerial act was involved.
• RTC Order (February 19, 2002): Granted petitioners' motion for reconsideration; declared Resolution No. 552 null and void for lack of due process and not being for public use.
• CA Decision (October 18, 2002): Reversed the RTC; upheld Resolution No. 552 as valid, enjoying presumption of regularity, and held that notice to petitioners was not required for due process in legislative enactments.
• CA Resolution (January 17, 2003): Denied motion for reconsideration.
• Elevated to SC via petition for review.

• Petitioners Spouses Antonio and Fe Yusay owned a 1,044-square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City, situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street.
• Half of the land served as their residence; the other half was rented to nine families. This was allegedly their sole property and source of income.
• On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, authorizing then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the Yusays' land to develop it into a low-cost housing project for less privileged constituents.
• The resolution recited that the land was occupied by financially hard-up families, that negotiations to purchase had failed, and that expropriation would serve public interest and social justice.
• Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC to annul the resolution, claiming it was unconstitutional, confiscatory, and improper.
• The City countered that the suit was premature because the resolution was merely an initial authorization to negotiate and make a definite offer, not the actual exercise of eminent domain.

• Resolution No. 552 is unconstitutional, confiscatory, and without force and effect because it paves the way for the deprivation of their only property without just compensation.
• There was no due process in the passage of the resolution because petitioners were not invited to hearings to ventilate their opposition.
• The purpose of the expropriation is not for public use and will not benefit the greater number of inhabitants.
• Certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to prevent the unlawful taking of their property and to restrain the City from proceeding with expropriation.

• Resolution No. 552 is merely an authorization to initiate legal steps (including making a definite offer to purchase); hence, the suit is premature.
• Certiorari does not lie against legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which is not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
• Prohibition does not lie because the adoption of a resolution is not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial act.
• The resolution enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity, and notice to affected landowners is not required for legislative enactments.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail Resolution No. 552 adopted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
  • Whether prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent the implementation of the resolution prior to the filing of actual expropriation proceedings.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a resolution (as opposed to an ordinance) is sufficient to authorize the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU under Section 19 of the Local Government Code.
  • Whether petitioners must await actual takeover and possession of the property before they can mount a judicial challenge to the expropriation.

• Procedural:
  • Certiorari does not lie. The Sangguniang Panglungsod was exercising leglative and policy-making functions—declaring its sentiment or opinion—when it adopted Resolution No. 552. Certiorari under Rule 65 only lies against tribunals, boards, or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The resolution was not a determination of rights in an actual controversy.
  • Prohibition does not lie. The resolution merely expressed the collective sentiment of the Sanggunian; no expropriation proceedings had been initiated (no verified complaint filed under Rule 67). Prohibition is premature at the stage of a mere legislative resolution. The remedy is not "plain, speedy, and adequate" at this juncture because no actual taking or deprivation had occurred.
• Substantive:
  • A resolution is insufficient to authorize eminent domain. Section 19 of RA 7160 explicitly requires the local chief executive to act "pursuant to an ordinance." An ordinance is a law of general and permanent character, whereas a resolution is temporary and merely expresses the sentiment of the lawmaking body on a specific matter.
  • The change from "resolution" (under the old BP 337) to "ordinance" (under RA 7160) was deliberate and must be strictly construed because eminent domain involves a derogation of private property rights.
  • The petition for certiorari was dismissible for lack of cause of action because Resolution No. 552, being merely a resolution, could not by itself initiate expropriation proceedings.

• Certiorari under Rule 65 — Requisites: (a) writ directed against a tribunal/board/officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) acted without/in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (c) no appeal or plain remedy. Application: The Sangguniang Panglungsod performing legislative functions (adopting resolutions) is not subject to certiorari, which corrects defects in jurisdiction, not errors in legislative judgment.

• Prohibition under Rule 65 — Directed against proceedings done without/in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to prevent unlawful exercise of authority. Application: Not available against legislative resolutions; premature until the LGU files a verified complaint for expropriation and seeks immediate possession. The landowner’s interest is subordinate to the State’s power of eminent domain until just compensation is determined.

• Eminent Domain by LGUs (Section 19, RA 7160) — Four essential requisites:

  1. An ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power.
  2. Exercise for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and landless.
  3. Payment of just compensation (Section 9, Article III of the Constitution).
  4. A valid and definite offer previously made to the owner but not accepted. Application: Resolution No. 552 failed the first requisite; hence, no valid exercise of eminent domain could be initiated based on it.

• Resolution vs. Ordinance — A resolution is temporary, specific, and expresses sentiment/opinion; an ordinance is permanent, general in character, and has the force of law. Application: The SC strictly construed the statutory change from "resolution" (BP 337) to "ordinance" (RA 7160) to protect property rights, holding that Congress deliberately imposed a stricter requirement.

• Prematurity of Challenge — A landowner cannot challenge the exercise of eminent domain via special civil actions until the LGU actually institutes expropriation proceedings by filing a verified complaint; only then can the courts determine just compensation and entertain remedies.

• "Certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion."
• "A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding."
• "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation."
• "Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner."

• Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation — Controlling precedent establishing the four requisites for LGU eminent domain under RA 7160, specifically the requirement of an ordinance; distinguished from Camarines Sur which applied the old BP 337 allowing resolutions.
• Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals — Cited by petitioners but distinguished; applied the old Local Government Code (BP 337) where a resolution sufficed, not applicable under RA 7160.
• Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong — Cited in relation to eminent domain procedures and public use.
• Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga — Cited for the principle that until a verified complaint for expropriation is filed, no expropriation proceeding exists and the owner cannot be deprived of property.

• Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Delegates eminent domain power to LGUs but requires an ordinance; specifies public use/purpose, just compensation, and prior definite offer requirements.
• Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs certiorari and prohibition; limits certiorari to judicial/quasi-judicial acts and requires grave abuse of discretion for prohibition.
• Section 9, Article III of the Constitution — Mandates payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use (cited via Municipality of Parañaque).
• Section 1, Rule 67, Rules of Court — Requires a verified complaint to initiate expropriation proceedings.

N/A (Carpio Morales, Brion, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concurred without separate opinions).