Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co

A judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant's person where substituted service of summons is invalid because the server's return fails to specify the several attempts at personal service, their dates and times, the reasons for failure, and the recipient's competence and relationship to the defendant.

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin T. Co, a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church. The case concerns a judgment declaring their marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, which allows annulment only on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Because annulment may be based on lack of jurisdiction over the person, the rules on personal and substituted service of summons under Rule 14 provide the procedural framework.

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin T. Co, a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church. In November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation directing her to appear because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings; she was reportedly told that her marriage with respondent had been nullified by the court. When she appeared before the BID, she was furnished copies of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306, the December 11, 2002 Decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 of the RTC, Branch 260, Parañaque City, declaring her marriage with respondent void ab initio, and their marriage contract with the decision annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage had been declared void ab initio.

The documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, in which he stated petitioner's address as 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila; no showing of its status, whether pending, withdrawn, or terminated, appeared. On July 19, 2002, respondent filed another petition for declaration of nullity on the same ground before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306, indicating petitioner's address as 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306.

In his Server's Return, process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with a copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer. The return did not state the specific number of attempts, the dates and times of those attempts, the reasons for each unsuccessful service, or any inquiries made to locate petitioner, and it described Espinosa only as a security officer of sufficient age and discretion.

On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 finding respondent's marriage with petitioner void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was served on petitioner on August 1, 2002, but she failed to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary period. The public prosecutor stated that there were no indicative facts to manifest collusion, and the RTC concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 before the CA on November 24, 2008, claiming that she was never notified of the cases filed against her. She alleged extrinsic fraud because respondent, as seen in Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, allegedly indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial; lack of jurisdiction over her person because the substituted service of summons was invalid for lack of a sufficient explanation showing impossibility of personal service; service on a security guard of their townhouse rather than a member of her household; and that she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. The CA found no sufficient proof that respondent employed fraud to insure petitioner's non-participation in the trial of Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, and it found a customary practice in petitioner's townhouse that the security guard would first entertain visitors and receive communications on behalf of the homeowners.

• Invalid Substituted Service of Summons: Petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because the substituted service of summons was invalid; the process server's return contained only a general statement that substituted service was resorted to "after several futile attempts to serve the same personally," without stating the dates and reasons of the failed attempts.
• Extrinsic Fraud: Petitioner maintained that respondent committed extrinsic fraud by deliberately indicating a wrong address in Civil Case No. CV-01-0177 to prevent her from participating in the trial.
• Security Guard Not Household Member: Petitioner alleged that the substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household.
• Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner claimed that she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.

• Sufficiency of Server's Return: Respondent contended that the server's return satisfactorily stated the reason for resort to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002.
• Improbability of Non-Receipt: Respondent argued that it was improbable that petitioner failed to receive the summons because it was sent to the same address which she declared in the present petition.

• Jurisdiction over the Person: Whether the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
• Extrinsic Fraud: Whether the facts proven by petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within the purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

• Jurisdiction over the Person: No. The trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner's person because the substituted service of summons was invalid; the server's return failed to comply with the rigorous requirements of Rule 14 and Manotoc. The RTC decision was void.
• Extrinsic Fraud: No. The contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud was too unsubstantial to warrant consideration; annulment was resolved on lack of jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction over the Person: Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is equitable and exceptional, with only two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction over the person is procedural and involves service of summons or other processes. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either by valid service of summons or voluntary appearance. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear, jurisdiction may be acquired by personal or substituted service under Rule 14, Sections 6 and 7. Manotoc vs. CA requires, for substituted service: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service, shown by several attempts, at least three tries preferably on at least two different dates within a reasonable period of one month, with reasons for failure; (2) specific details in the return, including the facts and circumstances of the attempted personal service, the date and time of attempts, inquiries made to locate the defendant, names of occupants, and all futile acts; and (3) a person of suitable age and discretion, whose legal age, relationship to the defendant, comprehension of the summons, and duty to deliver or notify must be described in the return. Here, summons was issued on July 29, 2002, but substituted service was made on August 1, 2002, only two days later. The server's return merely stated that substituted service was effected "after several futile attempts" and did not state the number of attempts, dates and times, reasons for each failure, or inquiries made to locate petitioner. It also did not describe the competence of Mr. Roly Espinosa beyond calling him a security officer of sufficient age and discretion. Respondent failed to point to any portion of the records describing the specific attempts at personal service, and petitioner did not voluntarily appear or participate in Civil Case No. 02-0306. Robinson vs. Miralles is not applicable because the return there described in thorough detail how the security guard refused the sheriff's entry despite several attempts and the defendant had instructed the guard to prevent entry. The presumption of regularity does not apply where the server's return is patently defective. Thus, the substituted service was invalid, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's person, and the RTC decision was void.
• Extrinsic Fraud: The Court found petitioner's contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud too unsubstantial to warrant consideration and focused on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA had also held that there was no sufficient proof to establish that respondent employed fraud to insure petitioner's non-participation in the trial of Civil Case No. CV-01-0177.

• Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 — Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court applied the lack-of-jurisdiction ground because the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner's person.
• Jurisdiction over the Person of the Defendant — Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either by valid service of summons or by the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear, jurisdiction may be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons under Rule 14, Sections 6 and 7. In this case, no voluntary appearance occurred, and the substituted service was invalid, so no jurisdiction over petitioner's person was acquired.
• Substituted Service of Summons; Manotoc Requirements — Substituted service is allowed only for justifiable causes when the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time. Manotoc vs. CA requires: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service, shown by several attempts, at least three tries preferably on at least two different dates within a reasonable period of one month, with reasons for failure; (2) specific details in the return, including the facts and circumstances of the attempted personal service, the date and time of attempts, inquiries made to locate the defendant, names of occupants, and all futile acts; and (3) a person of suitable age and discretion, whose legal age, relationship to the defendant, comprehension of the summons, and duty to deliver or notify must be described in the return. The Court applied these requirements and found the server's return deficient.
• Presumption of Regularity in Service of Summons — The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty does not apply where it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is defective and there is no showing of substantial compliance with the rules of procedure. The Court refused to apply the presumption because the server's return did not comply with the stringent requirements of substituted service.

• "The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner." — This passage states the core defect in the substituted service and supports the conclusion that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner's person.
• "Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to uphold the CA's denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void." — This passage is the ratio decidendi: failure to comply with the Manotoc requirements invalidated the substituted service and rendered the RTC decision void.
• "For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the first Manotoc requirement, which the Court applied in invalidating the substituted service.

• Manotoc vs. CA, 530 Phil. 454, 469-470 (2006) — Landmark precedent that established the rigorous requirements for substituted service of summons; the Court applied it and found the server's return deficient.
• Robinson vs. Miralles, 540 Phil. 1 (2006) — Cited by the CA to uphold substituted service; distinguished because the return there described in thorough detail how the security guard refused the sheriff's entry despite several attempts and the defendant had instructed the guard to prevent entry.
• Pascual vs. Pascual, 606 Phil. 451 (2009) — Followed Manotoc; the return did not show actual exertion or positive steps to serve summons personally, so substituted service was invalid.
• Spouses Afdal vs. Carlos, 651 Phil. 104 (2010) — Followed Manotoc; the process server's indorsements failed to state impossibility of personal service and efforts to find the defendants personally.
• Sagana vs. Francisco, 617 Phil. 387 (2009) — Distinguished in effect; diligent efforts were determined from the sheriff's return, process server's notation, and case records, whereas respondent here failed to point to any record describing attempts at personal service.
• Wong vs. Factor-Koyama, 616 Phil. 239 (2009) — Distinguished; even if substituted service was invalid, jurisdiction was acquired because the defendant actively participated in trial amounting to voluntary appearance, which did not occur here.
• Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Spouses Evangelista, 441 Phil. 445, 453 (2002) — Cited for the rule that the presumption of regularity does not apply where the sheriff's or server's return is patently defective.
• Barco vs. CA, 465 Phil. 39, 64 (2004) — Cited for annulment of judgment as an equitable principle allowing discharge from a judgment that is an absolute nullity.

• Rule 47, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction; the Court relied on lack of jurisdiction over petitioner's person.
• Rule 14, Section 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires service in person on the defendant whenever practicable; personal service was not shown to be impossible.
• Rule 14, Section 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Allows substituted service only for justifiable causes when the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, by leaving copies at the defendant's residence with a person of suitable age and discretion or at the defendant's office with a competent person in charge; the Court found the requirements not met.
• Rule 14, Section 20, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that the defendant's voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons; no voluntary appearance by petitioner occurred.
• Article 36, Family Code — The ground of psychological incapacity invoked in the RTC nullity case; the Supreme Court voided the RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the merits of psychological incapacity.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen.