Yu vs. Yu

A judgment may be annulled for extrinsic fraud where the prevailing party deliberately supplies an address known to be abandoned as the defendant's "last known address" for extraterritorial service of summons by publication, thereby preventing the defendant from receiving notice and participating in the proceedings.

Philip Yu and Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 18, 1984, and had four children. They maintained their conjugal home at Room 1603 Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila. In 1993, Viveca left the conjugal home with their children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Philip before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 261, alleging repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life. Philip denied the accusations and filed a counterclaim for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Viveca's alleged psychological incapacity. The parties were thus simultaneously involved in proceedings concerning their marital status before different courts, with Philip eventually withdrawing his counterclaim in the legal separation case and filing a separate petition for declaration of nullity before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas.

Philip Yu and Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 18, 1984, and had four children. They maintained their conjugal home at Room 1603 Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila. In 1993, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Philip before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 261, alleging repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct against her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life. She prayed for permanent custody over the children, support, and the dissolution and distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at approximately ₱5,000,000.00. Philip denied the accusations, claiming that Viveca had attacked him on a few occasions and that their marriage, arranged according to Chinese tradition, was later marred by her excessively jealous, cynical, and insecure behavior. He filed a counterclaim for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Viveca's alleged psychological incapacity.

According to Philip's own admissions in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim in the legal separation case, Viveca had abandoned the conjugal abode on August 24, 1993, and temporarily resided at her parents' house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until she moved to her present address in October 1993. Viveca eventually left the Philippines and took up residence in the United States of America. On April 24, 2007, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw his Counterclaim for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC of Pasig, stating he no longer desired to have the marriage declared void and explaining he wished to explore the possibility of a "universal settlement" of all pending cases for the sake of his children. Despite Viveca's opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the motion.

On February 15, 2008, less than a year after withdrawing his counterclaim, Philip filed a separate Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas—a city where he did not even reside, as certified by the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas. In the petition, Philip declared Viveca's "last known address" as their conjugal home at Unit 1603 Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, despite his knowledge that she had long abandoned that address and was residing in the United States. The Batangas court ordered extraterritorial service of summons by publication in Tempo, a newspaper of general circulation, on March 27 and April 3, 2008, and the sheriff personally served copies of the summons, complaint, and order at the conjugal home address. Viveca never received any of these documents. The RTC of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 10, rendered a Decision on August 20, 2008, declaring the marriage null on the ground of Viveca's psychological incapacity, which attained finality on October 13, 2008.

On July 1, 2009, the RTC of Pasig City dismissed the legal separation petition, finding both parties in pari delicto and noting that the marriage had already been declared a nullity by the Batangas court. It was only upon the promulgation of this decision that Viveca learned of the Batangas proceedings. Claiming complete ignorance of the nullity case, she filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals, alleging that jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest because she was not duly served with summons and that Philip had fraudulently declared her address as the conjugal home when he knew she had long left for the United States. The CA granted the petition on September 30, 2011, finding that Philip's deceitful scheme in supplying the erroneous address deprived Viveca of her constitutional right to due process, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration on January 5, 2012.

• Jurisdiction over the Res: Philip maintained that the Batangas RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the action in rem through summons by publication, and that the decision was already final and executory, rendering it immutable.
• Constructive Notice by Publication: Philip argued that publication of the summons, complaint, and decision in a newspaper of general circulation constituted notice to the whole world, including Viveca, and that she was therefore not denied due process.
• Last Known Address: Philip asserted that Viveca's last known address was their conjugal home, since the other addresses she had resided at—her parents' house in Greenhills and a temporary residence in Quezon City—were merely temporary in nature, and that the rules require the defendant's last known permanent address.
• Applicability of Cited Jurisprudence: Philip questioned the CA's reliance on Spouses Belen vs. Judge Chavez, Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, and Ancheta vs. Judge Ancheta, arguing these cases involved substituted service of summons rather than service by publication and were therefore inapplicable.
• Withdrawal of Counterclaim: Philip contended that he could not be faulted for moving to withdraw his counterclaim for declaration of nullity in the legal separation case, as such withdrawal was allowed under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court and was approved by the RTC of Pasig.
• Defective Petition for Annulment: Philip argued that Viveca's Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA was defective for failing to state and allege the defenses available to her against the petition for nullity, as required under Rule 47.
• Appearance of the Solicitor General: Philip asserted that the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of the City Prosecutor of Balayan, Batangas, appeared as counsel for the State and fully protected the interest of the State, including Viveca's interest.

• Lack of Due Process: Viveca alleged that she was deprived of her constitutional right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared that her address for service of summons was still their conjugal home, when he clearly knew she had long left that address for the United States.
• No Proper Service of Summons: Viveca maintained that jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest because she was not duly served with summons, and that had Philip complied with the legal requirements for effective service of summons by publication, she would have been able to participate in the proceedings before the Batangas court.
• Fraudulent Suppression of Proceedings: Viveca contended that Philip deliberately withheld knowledge of the Batangas nullity proceedings from her, knowing she would vigorously resist it as demonstrated by her tenacious opposition in the legal separation case.

• Annulment of Judgment — Extrinsic Fraud: Whether the CA correctly annulled the Batangas RTC decision on the ground of extrinsic fraud committed by Philip in the service of summons.
• Extraterritorial Service of Summons: Whether the service of summons by publication and mailing to the conjugal home address, which Philip knew Viveca had long abandoned, satisfied the requirements of Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
• Due Process: Whether Viveca was denied her constitutional right to due process as a result of Philip's use of an address he knew to be abandoned.
• Venue: Whether Philip's filing of the nullity petition before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas, a city where he did not reside, violated the venue requirements under Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

• Annulment of Judgment — Extrinsic Fraud: Yes. The CA correctly annulled the Batangas RTC decision, Philip's deliberate use of an address he knew Viveca had abandoned constituting extrinsic fraud that prevented her from presenting her case.
• Extraterritorial Service of Summons: No. The service of summons at the conjugal home address did not comply with the requirements of Section 15, Rule 14, as the address supplied was not Viveca's last known address and Philip knew she could not receive summons there.
• Due Process: Yes. Viveca was denied due process because Philip's deceptive scheme in the service of summons prevented her from receiving notice of and participating in the nullity proceedings.
• Venue: Yes. Philip violated the venue requirement under Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC by filing the petition in Batangas, where he was not a resident, further evidencing bad faith.

• Annulment of Judgment — Extrinsic Fraud: Annulment of judgment is an equitable remedy allowed only in exceptional cases, available on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process under Section 2, Rule 47. Extrinsic fraud exists when a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial prevents the defeated party from presenting fully his side. The overriding consideration is whether the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. The Court found that Viveca was completely prevented from participating in the declaration of nullity case because of Philip's fraudulent scheme regarding the service of summons. Philip knew Viveca had already intentionally abandoned the conjugal home, as he himself disclosed in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim in the legal separation case. His declaration before the Batangas court that her last known address was still the conjugal home, with full knowledge that she had left and established a more recent local residence, evinced a clear lack of good faith. The combination of circumstances—withdrawal of his counterclaim, filing in a city where he did not reside, and supplying an abandoned address—painted a deceitful picture that resulted in a violation of Viveca's constitutional right to due process.

• Extraterritorial Service of Summons: Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, extraterritorial service of summons by publication requires that a copy of the summons and order of the court be sent by registered mail to the defendant's last known address. The Court found that the conjugal home was not Viveca's last known address. Philip himself had stipulated in the legal separation case that Viveca had abandoned the conjugal abode on August 24, 1993, and had resided at her parents' house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, and later moved to another address in October 1993. From the beginning of the legal separation case in 1994 until the Pasig RTC's decision in 2009, there was no showing that Viveca had ever received any document at the conjugal address, nor any proof that Philip had ever sent any pertinent file to her there. Philip's contention that the rules require a "permanent" rather than "temporary" address was found to have no basis in law or jurisprudence. Citing Acance vs. Court of Appeals and Dulap vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the failure to strictly comply with the requirements regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons, and that courts must exact the fullest compliance with all requirements of the statute permitting service by publication.

• Due Process: While service of summons in an action in rem is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but for satisfying due process requirements, Philip's employment of deceptive means meant that the purpose of satisfying due process was never accomplished. Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of the declaration of nullity suit, only discovering it when the Pasig City RTC promulgated its decision on the legal separation case. Because of the service of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings. Due process requires that those with interest in the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests. When defendants are deprived of such opportunity due to a deceitful scheme employed by the prevailing litigant, there exists a violation of their due process rights, and any judgment issued in violation thereof suffers a fatal infirmity.

• Venue: Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. A certification from the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas, categorically stated that Philip was not a resident of that barangay. Philip thus violated a basic mandate of law by filing the action before a court in a city where he was not a resident, further evidencing his bad faith and inconsistent conduct.

• Extrinsic Fraud as Ground for Annulment of Judgment — Extrinsic fraud exists when a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial prevents the defeated party from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception. It includes situations where the unsuccessful party was prevented from exhibiting fully his case, such as by keeping him away from court, or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. In this case, Philip's deliberate supply of an abandoned address as Viveca's "last known address" for service of summons constituted extrinsic fraud because it prevented Viveca from receiving notice of and participating in the nullity proceedings.

• Extraterritorial Service of Summons Under Section 15, Rule 14 — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to property within the Philippines in which the defendant has a lien or interest, service may be effected by: (1) personal service out of the country with leave of court; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and sending a copy of the summons and order by registered mail to the defendant's last known address, with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. The Court applied this rule strictly, holding that the "last known address" must be an address where the defendant may actually be found or reached, and that the fullest compliance with all requirements must be exacted.

• Strict Compliance with Service by Publication — It is the duty of the court to require the fullest compliance with all the requirements of the statute permitting service by publication. Where service is obtained by publication, the entire proceeding should be closely scrutinized and strict compliance with every condition of law should be exacted. Otherwise, great abuses may occur, and the rights of persons and property may be made to depend upon the elastic conscience of interested parties rather than the enlightened judgment of the court. The Court relied on this doctrine to find that Philip's service of summons at an address he knew to be abandoned was a fatal defect.

• "Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine on extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of judgment, establishing the legal standard against which Philip's conduct was measured.

• "It is the duty of the court to require the fullest compliance with all the requirements of the statute permitting service by publication. Where service is obtained by publication, the entire proceeding should be closely scrutinized by the courts and a strict compliance with every condition of law should be exacted." — This formulation, cited from Dulap vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the standard of strict scrutiny applicable to service of summons by publication and explains why the defect in Philip's service was fatal.

• "When Philip declared before the Batangas court that Viveca's last known address was still their conjugal home with full and undisputed knowledge that she had already intentionally abandoned the same and had even established a more recent, local residence herein evinces a clear lack of good faith." — This passage states the Court's application of the extrinsic fraud doctrine to the specific facts, identifying the act that constituted the fraudulent scheme warranting annulment.

• "Any judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal infirmity for courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction." — This passage establishes the principle that jurisdiction, even when technically acquired over the res, cannot validate a judgment rendered in violation of due process rights.

• Acance vs. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676 (2005) — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons, particularly in cases involving extraterritorial service on non-resident defendants.

• Dulap vs. Court of Appeals, 149 Phil. 636 (1971) — Followed. Cited within Acance for the doctrine that courts must require the fullest compliance with all requirements of the statute permitting service by publication, and that the entire proceeding should be closely scrutinized with strict compliance exacted.

• Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 544 Phil. 45 (2007) — Cited. Philip argued this case was inapplicable because it involved substituted service rather than service by publication. The Court did not directly address this argument but relied on the general principle that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the defendant is not a prerequisite, provided the court acquires jurisdiction over the res—while still requiring compliance with due process.

• Spouses Belen vs. Judge Chavez, 573 Phil. 58 (2008) — Cited. Philip argued this case was inapplicable for the same reason as Biaco. The Court's analysis focused instead on the extrinsic fraud and due process violations.

• Ancheta vs. Judge Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004) — Cited. Similarly argued by Philip to be inapplicable due to involving substituted service rather than publication.

• Pinasukan Seafood House, Roxas Bouley Ard, Inc. vs. Far East Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014 — Cited for the definition and objectives of annulment of judgment as a remedy, including the distinction between annulment on grounds of lack of jurisdiction versus extrinsic fraud.

• Alba vs. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 451 (2005) — Cited for the definition of extrinsic fraud.

• De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014 — Cited for the principle that due process requires that those with interest in the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests, and that judgments issued in violation of due process suffer fatal infirmity.

• Section 2, Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. The Court applied this provision to determine that Viveca's petition for annulment was properly grounded on extrinsic fraud and denial of due process.

• Section 15, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Governs extraterritorial service of summons on non-resident defendants. The Court applied this provision to determine the proper mode of service on Viveca, who was residing in the United States, and found that Philip's service at the abandoned conjugal home did not comply with the requirement to send copies to the defendant's "last known address."

• Section 4, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) — Provides the venue rule for petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, requiring filing in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to filing. The Court found that Philip violated this provision by filing in Batangas, where he was not a resident.

• Article 55, Family Code of the Philippines — Enumerates the grounds for legal separation, referenced in the Pasig RTC's decision dismissing the legal separation petition, which found both parties in pari delicto under paragraphs 1, 8, 9, and 10 of Article 55.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concurred.