Yu vs. The Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc.

The effectivity of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by a quasi-judicial body may be limited by that body's own guidelines, and interpretative regulations intended only for the internal guidance of administrative agency personnel need not be published to be valid and effective.

Petitioners Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico were members of the Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc., a corporation governed by its membership handbook containing rules on tee times and group sizes. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was at that time the tribunal vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate controversies, pursuant to PD 902-A. The transfer of jurisdiction over such cases to the Regional Trial Courts was impending with the effectivity of the Securities Regulation Code by August 9, 2000, prompting the SEC en banc to issue guidelines on August 1, 2000 governing pending intra-corporate cases.

Petitioners Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico were members of the Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. On May 28, 2000, a Sunday, they went to the club to play golf with another member who, at the last minute, could not join them. Because of the club's "no twosome" policy in the membership handbook prohibiting groups of less than three players from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1:00 p.m., petitioners requested management to find another player. When no third player was found, petitioner Yu tried to convince Francis Montallana, the club's assistant golf director, to allow them to play as a twosome, even from hole no. 10 of the Palmer course. Montallana refused, stating that flights starting from the first nine holes might be disrupted. Petitioner Yu then shouted invectives at Montallana, after which he told petitioner Yuhico that they should tee off anyway regardless of management's reaction. Petitioners teed off without permission and without securing a tee time control slip, again in disregard of a handbook rule.

Montallana filed a report with the board of directors on the same day. In separate letters dated May 31, 2000, the board, through respondent Clemente, requested petitioners to submit written comments on the incident report. On June 29, 2000, the board resolved to suspend petitioners from July 16 to October 15, 2000, and served notice on them. On July 11, 2000, petitioners filed separate petitions for injunction with the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), assailing the validity of their suspension. After a joint summary hearing, the SEC–SICD issued a TRO on July 14, 2000, effective for 20 days.

On August 1, 2000, the SEC en banc issued its "Guidelines on Intra-Corporate Cases Pending Before the SICD and the Commission en banc of the Securities and Exchange Commission." Section 1 provided that intra-corporate cases may still be filed with the SEC on or before August 8, 2000, but parties would be advised that jurisdiction would transfer to the RTCs upon effectivity of the Securities Regulation Code by August 9, 2000. Section 2 provided that prayers for TRO or injunction in cases filed under Section 1 may be acted upon favorably, but the effectivity of the corresponding order "shall only be up to August 8, 2000." After hearing petitioners' applications, the SEC–SICD issued an order dated August 2, 2000 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting of separate bonds of ₱40,000, which petitioners posted on August 4, 2000. On August 7, 2000, the SEC–SICD issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

On October 31, 2000, the board held a special meeting and resolved to implement the June 29, 2000 suspension order, reasoning that the writs of injunction had lapsed on August 8, 2000 under the SEC guidelines. In separate letters dated December 4, 2000, respondent Clemente informed petitioners that the board was implementing their suspensions. Petitioners then filed a petition for indirect contempt in the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 2228-00. On December 13, 2000, the RTC directed the parties to maintain the "last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things," effectively restoring the writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, which reversed the Dasmariñas RTC on August 27, 2001, prompting respondents to finally implement the suspension.

Petitioners thereafter filed a motion ad cautelam dated August 30, 2001 in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, praying for a TRO and/or writ of injunction, docketed as SEC Case Nos. 001-01 and 002-01. On September 7, 2001, the Imus RTC issued a TRO. After the Imus RTC denied respondents' motion for reconsideration and directed issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on September 21, 2001, respondents filed another petition for certiorari in the CA, which issued a TRO against the Imus RTC on March 26, 2002. Petitioners then filed their second petition in the Supreme Court, a special civil action for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 152687, seeking to restrain enforcement of the CA-issued TRO.

• Interpretation of the Guidelines: Petitioners contended that the SEC guidelines could not have limited the effectivity of their writs of preliminary injunction to August 8, 2000 because the intention of the guidelines was to cover only applications for such writs and provisional remedies made on or after August 1, 2000.
• Void for Lack of Publication: Petitioners argued that the guidelines were void for lack of publication, attaching a letter from then SEC general counsel Eugenio Reyes explaining that the guidelines were not published as they were primarily intended only for the guidance of and compliance by the hearing officers concerned.

• Effectivity of the Writs: Respondents maintained that the writs of preliminary injunction issued by the SEC–SICD had lapsed on August 8, 2000 under the SEC guidelines, justifying the board's implementation of the suspension.
• Propriety of the CA TRO: Respondents admitted that the CA allowed its TRO to lapse, its lifetime under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court being only 60 days.

• Effectivity of the Injunction: Whether Sections 1 and 2 of the SEC guidelines dated August 1, 2000 shortened the life span of the writs of preliminary injunction issued on August 7, 2000 by the SEC–SICD, thereby making them effective only until August 8, 2000.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by issuing a TRO against the Imus, Cavite RTC and enjoining the implementation of its writ of preliminary injunction against respondents.

• Effectivity of the Injunction: Yes. The guidelines were clear and categorical, and the SEC order and writ of injunction issued on August 2 and 7, 2000 respectively were both covered by the stated cut-off date of August 8, 2000. The guidelines were interpretative regulations internal in nature that did not require publication.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The petition became moot and academic because the CA's TRO had long lapsed, its lifetime under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court being only 60 days, and there was nothing stopping the Imus RTC from implementing its writ of preliminary injunction.

• Effectivity of the Injunction: The Court applied the well-settled rule that where the language of the law or guidelines is clear and unequivocal, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Section 1 established a cut-off date for filing intra-corporate cases, while Section 2 provided a cut-off date for the effectivity of provisional remedies granted in such cases. The parties were allowed to file their cases before August 8, 2000, but any provisional remedies the SEC granted were effective only until that date. Regarding publication, the Court found the guidelines to be interpretative regulations and internal in nature, regulating only SEC personnel and not the public, and thus exempt from the publication requirement. The clause "the parties-litigants or their counsels or representatives shall be advised" appearing in both sections demonstrated that the guidelines were meant as an advisory to SEC officers to refrain from accepting new cases because of the impending transfer of jurisdiction to the RTCs. The guidelines were issued in line with PD 902-A, which explicitly conferred on the SEC the power to issue injunctions, including the power to limit the duration of writs of preliminary injunction issued by SEC hearing officers. The Court further held that the issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains at all times within the control of the court or quasi-judicial body that issued it, so petitioners could not claim a vested right to an injunctive writ.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court noted that the TRO issued by the CA on March 26, 2002 had long lapsed, its lifetime under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court being only 60 days. Because there was nothing that would stop the Imus RTC from implementing its writ of preliminary injunction against respondents, there was no need for the Court to issue any order enjoining respondents from implementing petitioners' suspension. The petition was thus dismissed as moot and academic.

• Doctrine of Plain Meaning — Where the language of a law or regulation is clear and unequivocal, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court applied this rule to the SEC guidelines, finding no need for extended interpretation where Sections 1 and 2 were clear and categorical.
• Publication Requirement for Administrative Regulations — Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public need not be published. The Court applied this doctrine to the SEC guidelines, which were addressed to SEC officers and contained language indicating they were meant as an advisory to those officers.
• Control of the Issuing Body Over Preliminary Injunctions — The issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains at all times within the control of the court or quasi-judicial body that issued it. The Court relied on this principle to hold that petitioners could not claim a vested right to an injunctive writ.

• "It is well-settled that where the language of the law (or, in this case, the guidelines) is clear and unequivocal, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says." — This passage states the controlling rule of statutory construction applied to the SEC guidelines, establishing that no extended interpretation was warranted.
• "Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public need not be published." — This passage articulates the doctrine exempting internal and interpretative regulations from the publication requirement, which was dispositive of petitioners' void-for-lack-of-publication argument.
• "The issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains at all times within the control of the court or quasi-judicial body that issued it." — This passage defines the nature of preliminary injunctive writs as interlocutory and subject to the issuing body's continuing control, precluding any vested right in the writ.

• Victoria vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 109005, 10 January 1994, 229 SCRA 269 — Cited as authority for the rule that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
• Globe-McKay vs. NLRC, 3 March 1992, 206 SCRA 701 — Cited in support of the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.
• Kapisanang Manggagawang Pinagyakap vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-60328, 16 July 1987, 152 SCRA 96 — Cited in support of the plain meaning rule.
• National Amnesty Commission vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 156982, 8 September 2004, 437 SCRA 655 — Cited for the doctrine that interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature need not be published.
• Tañada vs. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986) — Cited for the publication requirement doctrine and its exceptions for interpretative and internal regulations.
• Alvaro vs. Zapata, 204 Phil. 356 (1982) — Cited for the principle that the issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter within the control of the issuing court or quasi-judicial body.

• Section 6, PD 902-A — Conferred on the SEC the power to issue preliminary or permanent injunctions in cases within its jurisdiction, and to exercise powers implied from or necessary to carrying out its express powers. The Court relied on this provision to uphold the SEC's authority to limit the duration of preliminary injunctions through its guidelines.
• Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Provided that a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals shall be effective for 60 days from service on the party sought to be enjoined. The Court applied this rule to find that the CA's TRO had lapsed, rendering the petition in G.R. No. 152687 moot.
• Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Cited in the certification that the conclusions in the decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Puno, C.J. (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Azcuna, J., and Garcia, J., concurred in the decision.