Yu vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Tagaytay City, Branch 18

The discharge of an accused to become a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is distinct and independent from discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; admission into the Witness Protection Program is an executive function of the Department of Justice, and upon the DOJ’s certification of qualification and petition for discharge, the trial court is mandated to order the discharge and exclusion of the accused from the information without need of a prior hearing on the qualifications enumerated in Rule 119.

Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted in Muntinlupa on 14 November 1994 and brought to Cavite, where they were killed and buried in a shallow grave. The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) investigated and filed a complaint with the Department of Justice against several individuals, including private respondents Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos. Petitioner Eugene C. Yu and his wife were initially named respondents but were excluded for lack of evidence. An information was later filed against Ochoa, de los Santos, and others before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. While in PACC custody after the filing, Ochoa and de los Santos executed sworn statements implicating petitioner Yu. The PACC then re-filed a separate complaint against Yu, leading to the filing of three informations for murder and kidnapping against him in the same court. The prosecution subsequently moved to discharge Ochoa and de los Santos as state witnesses under Republic Act No. 6981, which the trial court granted over Yu’s opposition.

• The Abduction and Killing: In the evening of 14 November 1994, Atty. Eugene Tan, former IBP President, and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, brought to Cavite, and shot to death. Their bodies were exhumed from a shallow grave at Barangay Malinta, Dasmariñas, Cavite, on 17 November 1994.
• Initial Complaint and Informations: The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) investigated and filed a complaint docketed as I.S. No. 94-557 with the Department of Justice against Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon, John Does, and private respondents Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos, among others. Petitioner Eugene C. Yu and his wife were initially named respondents, but the DOJ Resolution dated 13 December 1994 dropped the charges against them for lack of evidence to establish probable cause. An information was subsequently filed against the remaining accused, including Ochoa and de los Santos, before Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City.
• Implication of Petitioner Yu: On 16 and 17 December 1994, while under PACC custody, Ochoa and de los Santos executed separate sworn statements implicating petitioner Yu in the abduction and killing. The PACC re-filed a complaint docketed as I.S. No. 94-614 for murder and kidnapping against Yu. During preliminary investigation, Yu moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the sworn statements were inadmissible and failed to establish probable cause; the motion was denied on 30 January 1995. Three separate informations were thereafter filed against Yu before the same trial court.
• Initial Trial Court Actions: Yu filed an omnibus motion to determine probable cause, to deny issuance of a warrant of arrest, and to quash the informations. On 8 December 1995, the respondent judge issued a resolution finding probable cause against Yu as an accomplice, directing the prosecution to amend the informations to include Yu as an accomplice, and ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest with bail fixed at ₱60,000.00 per case. Both the prosecution—which sought to maintain the charge against Yu as principal—and Yu moved for reconsideration; the motions were denied on 6 February 1996. The prosecution’s subsequent certiorari petition before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 124380) was dismissed, and the refiled petition before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 42208) remained pending.
• Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses: On 17 April 1996, the prosecution filed a “Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos,” invoking Republic Act No. 6981. Yu opposed the petition. In the impugned Order dated 6 March 1997, the trial court granted the petition and discharged Ochoa and de los Santos from the informations to be utilized as state witnesses.
• DOJ Findings: The Department of Justice, based on the extrajudicial statements of Ochoa and de los Santos, found that they were included in an alleged military operation and were misled by their military superiors into believing that the persons they surveilled were unnamed communist rebels, not innocent civilians; they claimed to have been unaware that the subjects were to be abducted and killed.

• Judicial Function Under Rule 119: Petitioner maintained that because private respondents Ochoa and de los Santos were already charged as accused before their admission to the Witness Protection Program, their discharge to become state witnesses is a judicial prerogative that requires prior compliance with the hearing and qualification requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Inapplicability of Webb v. De Leon: Petitioner argued that the trial court’s reliance on Webb v. De Leon was misplaced, as the witness in that case had not yet been charged before admission to the Program and the question of discharge from an existing information never arose. Allowing discharge without a Rule 119 hearing would permit the prosecution to supplant the court’s discretion over the proceedings.
• Lack of Evidentiary Support: Petitioner contended that the prosecution failed to present any evidence of the private respondents’ qualifications under Republic Act No. 6981, as neither the certificate of admission from the DOJ nor the memorandum of agreement required by Section 5 of the law was produced before the trial court.

• Distinct Nature of Discharge Under R.A. No. 6981: Respondents countered that the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 is a mode entirely separate and distinct from discharge under Rule 119; the DOJ has the sole authority to determine qualification for admission to the Witness Protection Program, and the trial court’s role upon certification is mandatory, not discretionary.
• Mandatory Court Duty: Respondents argued that Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 explicitly commands the trial court to order the discharge and exclusion of the accused from the information once the DOJ certifies admission and the prosecutor petitions for discharge; no prior hearing on the Rule 119 requisites is required.
• Sufficiency of DOJ Certification: Respondents asserted that the DOJ’s certification of admission and the petition for discharge were sufficient compliance with the law, and that there is no statutory requirement that the sworn statement or memorandum of agreement be presented in court before discharge is ordered.

• Nature of Discharge Function: Whether the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is a judicial function requiring prior compliance with the hearing and qualification requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the discharge of private respondents as state witnesses despite the prosecution’s alleged failure to present evidence of their qualifications under Republic Act No. 6981.

• Nature of Discharge Function: The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 is an executive, not judicial, function and is distinct and separate from discharge under Rule 119, Section 17. The determination of who may be admitted to the Witness Protection Program and utilized as a state witness belongs to the Department of Justice. Under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981, once the DOJ issues a certification of admission and the prosecutor petitions for discharge, the trial court is mandated to order the discharge and exclusion of the accused from the information. The procedural requirements of Rule 119, Section 17—including the need for the prosecution to present evidence and sworn statements at a hearing—do not apply. At this stage, only compliance with Section 14, Rule 110 (amendment before plea upon motion with notice and leave of court) is required. As held in Soberano v. People, the decision of whom to criminally charge is essentially an executive function, and the Rule 119 hearing requirement does not yet come into play when an accused is excluded from the information before plea to be utilized as a state witness.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion attended the trial court’s discharge order. The DOJ, having examined the extrajudicial statements of private respondents, had already determined that they satisfied the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981 and were qualified for admission to the Program. The discharge of an accused who does not appear to be the most guilty is a highly factual matter, and the trial court’s discretionary judgment on this point will not be disturbed absent grave abuse, which was not present. Republic Act No. 6981 does not require that the sworn statement or memorandum of agreement be presented in court before discharge. Moreover, the interpretation of the statute by the DOJ—the agency tasked with its implementation—is entitled to great weight and ordinarily controls judicial construction.

• Distinction Between Discharge Under R.A. No. 6981 and Rule 119 — The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program) is an independent mode of immunity, wholly separate from discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under R.A. No. 6981, the power to determine qualifications for admission lies with the Department of Justice as an executive function; upon issuance of a certificate of admission and petition for discharge, the trial court’s duty to order the discharge is mandatory and does not require the prior hearing on qualifications mandated by Rule 119. In contrast, Rule 119 operates during trial and requires the prosecution to present evidence and sworn statements at a hearing to satisfy the court of the statutory requisites.

• Executive Nature of the Decision Whom to Prosecute — The determination of who should be criminally charged and who may be utilized as a state witness is primarily an executive function, not a judicial one. The prosecutor’s wide discretion in deciding whether, what, and whom to charge is a necessary component of the executive power to enforce laws. Legislation such as R.A. No. 6981 that vests in the DOJ the authority to grant immunity to state witnesses is constitutionally permissible and does not encroach upon judicial prerogative.

• Mandatory Effect of Section 12, R.A. No. 6981 — Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 commands that upon certification of admission into the Program by the DOJ, the prosecutor is required not to include the witness in the complaint or information, or if already included, to petition for discharge, and the court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the accused from the information. The provision renders the court’s action ministerial once a valid admission has been certified.

• Soberano v. People Doctrine on Pre-Plea Exclusion — An amendment of the information made before plea that excludes an accused for utilization as a state witness is governed by Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires a motion by the prosecutor, notice to the offended party, and leave of court. The procedural requirements of Rule 119, Section 17—presentation of evidence and sworn statements at a hearing—do not apply at that pre-trial stage because the determination of whom to charge is an executive function.

• Deference to Administrative Interpretation — The interpretation by the administrative agency tasked to implement a statute is entitled to great respect and ordinarily controls judicial construction, absent clear error or conflict with the law.

• “The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.”

• “The determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. … The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.”

• “Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that the issuance of a certification of admission into the program shall be given full faith by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in the criminal complaint or information, and if included, to petition for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information.”

• “The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty, is highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion.”

• Webb v. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758 (1995) — Followed; established that the power to determine who qualifies as a state witness under R.A. No. 6981 is an executive function, not an inherent judicial prerogative, and that Congress may validly vest such power in the DOJ.
• People v. Peralta, 435 Phil. 743 (2002) — Cited as reiterating Webb v. De Leon, supporting the rule that a discharge under the witness protection law does not require a Rule 119 hearing.
• Soberano v. People, G.R. No. 154629, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA 125 — Applied; clarified that an amendment before plea excluding an accused to be a state witness need only comply with Section 14, Rule 110, and that the Rule 119, Section 17 hearing requirements are not yet operative at that stage.
• People v. Sison, 371 Phil. 713, 724 (1999) — Cited for the principle that the discharge of an accused as state witness is a factual matter and the trial court’s discretion will not be disturbed absent grave abuse.
• Batelec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Energy Industry Administration Bureau, G.R. No. 135925, 22 December 2004, 447 SCRA 482 — Cited for the doctrine that the interpretation of a statute by the implementing administrative agency is accorded great respect and controls judicial construction.

• Republic Act No. 6981, Sections 3, 5, 10, and 12 — Establish the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Section 10 enumerates the requisites for a participant in a crime to be admitted as a state witness. Section 12 mandates that the DOJ certification of admission shall be given full faith and credit, the prosecutor shall not include the witness in the information or shall petition for discharge, and the court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the accused. The Court applied Section 12 as the controlling provision that made the trial court’s order mandatory.
• Rule 119, Section 17, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Prescribes the procedure for discharge of an accused to be a state witness during trial, requiring the prosecution to present evidence and sworn statements at a hearing and the court to be satisfied of specific requisites. The Court held that this rule is inapplicable to a discharge under R.A. No. 6981, which operates on an independent executive track.
• Rule 110, Section 14, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs amendment or substitution of an information; the Court, citing Soberano, ruled that an amendment before plea excluding an accused for utilization as a state witness requires only a motion by the prosecutor, notice to the offended party, and leave of court, and does not trigger the Rule 119 hearing requirements.

Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Acting Chairman), Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez. Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban was on official leave. Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. took no part.