Yu vs. Pacleb

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove prior physical possession and deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; the plaintiff cannot prevail where the defendant had possession antedating the plaintiff's own. A forcible entry complaint fails where the plaintiff cannot establish prior physical possession, especially where the defendant, as registered owner, had continuing possession through caretakers and tax payments.

Lot No. 6853-D, located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite and covered by TCT No. T-118375, was registered in the names of respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his wife. Petitioners Ernesto and Elsie Yu claimed the lot through an unregistered chain of alleged sales originating from respondent and his wife, passing through Rebecca del Rosario and Ruperto Javier. The instruments supporting the alleged transfers were not registered, and the registered title remained with respondent.

Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered to sell Lot No. 6853-D to petitioners Ernesto and Elsie Yu for P75 per square meter. The lot was approximately 18,000 square meters and located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Javier supposedly purchased the lot from Rebecca del Rosario, who in turn acquired it from respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his wife. TCT No. T-118375, however, remained in the names of respondent and his wife, and the instruments in support of the series of alleged sales were not registered.

On September 11, 1992, petitioners accepted the offer and gave Javier P200,000 as downpayment. Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of title to petitioners. After the execution of a contract to sell, he formally turned over the property to petitioners. At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied by Ramon C. Pacleb, respondent's son, and his wife as tenants. On September 12, 1992, Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered possession of their portion to petitioners. Later on, petitioners appointed Ramon as their trustee over the subject lot. Petitioners also caused the annotation on TCT No. T-118375 of a decision rendered in their favor in Civil Case No. 741-93, which attained finality on April 19, 1995.

Petitioners alleged that they exercised ownership rights and enjoyed open, public, and peaceful possession over the property from September 12, 1992 until the early part of September 1995. During this time, respondent was in the United States. Upon respondent's return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly entered the property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy, and stealth, thereby ousting petitioners and their trustee, Ramon. Despite repeated demands, respondent, asserting his rights as registered owner of the property, refused to vacate the premises and surrender its possession to petitioners. Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry in the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite on November 23, 1995.

The factual findings material to the Supreme Court's analysis included the trial court's statement in Civil Case No. 741-93 that petitioners were never placed in possession of the subject property on which a piggery was planned, nor were they given a clearance or certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer. Tax declarations and receipts in respondent's name for 1994 and 1995 established respondent's possession. Ramon, as respondent's son, had been named caretaker when respondent left for the United States in 1983; due to the eventual loss of trust and confidence in Ramon, respondent transferred the administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his return in May 1995. Thus, the subject land was in the possession of respondent's sons during the contested period.

Petitioners relied on a document entitled Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan dated March 10, 1995, executed by them and Ramon, to prove a turn-over of possession. They also sought to prove their exercise of rights over the land through alleged frequent visits and the designation of Ramon as their own trustee as declared in a joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the MTC. These instruments, however, failed to convince the Court of petitioners' actual occupancy: petitioners themselves acknowledged that Ramon and his wife occupied part of the land as tenants of respondent; Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign the March 10, 1995 document waiving all rights to the land; there was no clear proof of Ramon's appointment as petitioners' trustee save their self-serving statements; and at the time the Kusangloob document was executed, the caretaker of the land was no longer Ramon but Oscar. Most important, TCT No. T-118375 remained in the name of respondent.

• Prior Physical Possession: Petitioners maintained that they had prior physical possession of Lot No. 6853-D from September 12, 1992 until early September 1995, after Javier formally turned over the property and Ramon surrendered his portion, and that respondent ousted them by force, threat, intimidation, strategy, and stealth upon returning in May 1995.
• Turnover Documents and Trustee Arrangement: Petitioners cited the Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan dated March 10, 1995 and a joint affidavit to prove Ramon's turnover of possession and designation as their trustee, and alleged frequent visits as exercise of ownership rights.
• Right Based on Civil Case No. 741-93: Petitioners based their right to possess on the final decision in Civil Case No. 741-93, which they caused to be annotated on TCT No. T-118375.
• Court of Appeals Error: Petitioners claimed that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent had prior physical possession of the subject property.

• Registered Ownership: Respondent asserted his rights as registered owner of the property and refused to vacate the premises or surrender possession to petitioners.

• Prior Physical Possession: Whether petitioners established prior physical possession of Lot No. 6853-D to sustain their action for forcible entry and damages against respondent.
• Continuing Possession of Respondent: Whether respondent had continuing possession of the subject property through his caretakers and tax payments, such that petitioners could not claim prior possession.
• Factual Review under Rule 45: Whether the Supreme Court may review the conflicting factual findings of the MTC and RTC, on one hand, and the Court of Appeals, on the other, regarding prior possession.

• Prior Physical Possession: No. Petitioners failed to establish prior physical possession; the evidence showed respondent's continuing possession through his sons and tax payments, so the forcible entry complaint could not prosper.
• Continuing Possession of Respondent: Yes. Respondent's tax declarations and receipts in 1994 and 1995, his registered title, and the administration of the land by his sons established continuing possession.
• Factual Review under Rule 45: Yes, exceptionally. Although a Rule 45 petition generally precludes factual review, the conflicting factual findings of the MTC/RTC and the Court of Appeals required the Supreme Court to make an exception.

• Prior Physical Possession: In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove prior possession and deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The plaintiff cannot prevail where the defendant had possession antedating his own. Petitioners failed to establish prior physical possession. Their claim that the lot was turned over to them in 1992 was self-serving in light of the trial court's categorical statement in Civil Case No. 741-93 that they were never placed in possession of the subject property, nor given a clearance or certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer. The Kusangloob document and joint affidavit did not prove actual occupancy because Ramon was a tenant without authority to waive rights, there was no clear proof of his appointment as petitioners' trustee, and at the time of the document the caretaker was already Oscar. TCT No. T-118375 remained in respondent's name. Thus, petitioners' allegation that respondent deprived them of actual possession by force, intimidation, and threat was untenable.
• Continuing Possession of Respondent: Under Civil Code Art. 523, possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Possession requires occupancy, apprehension or taking, and intent to possess (animus possidendi); it may be exercised through another who occupies in the possessor's name, and without occupancy there is no possession. Respondent's tax declarations and receipts in 1994 and 1995 established his possession and showed his will to possess in concepto de dueño or with claim of ownership. Ramon was named caretaker when respondent left for the United States in 1983; after respondent lost trust and confidence in Ramon, he transferred administration to Oscar in January 1995 until his return in May 1995. The land was therefore in the possession of respondent's sons during the contested period. As registered owner under TCT No. T-118375, respondent had a right to possession, an attribute of ownership. Civil Code Art. 538 likewise provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in co-possession, and sets preference rules favoring the present possessor, the longer possessor, or the one presenting a title.
• Factual Review under Rule 45: The Court is generally precluded in a Rule 45 petition from reviewing factual evidence tracing the events prior to the first act of spoliation. However, the conflicting factual findings of the MTC and RTC, on one hand, and the Court of Appeals, on the other, required the Court to make an exception. Upon review, petitioners' contentions were overruled because the evidence established respondent's continuing possession and petitioners' failure to prove prior physical possession.

• Forcible entry — prior physical possession — In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove prior physical possession and deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. A plaintiff cannot prevail where the defendant had possession antedating the plaintiff's own. The Court applied this to deny the petition because petitioners failed to show prior possession.
• Possession — elements — Under Civil Code Art. 523, possession is the holding of a thing or enjoyment of a right. Two elements are paramount: occupancy, apprehension or taking, and intent to possess (animus possidendi). Possession may be exercised through another who occupies in the possessor's name; without occupancy, there is no possession. The Court used this to find respondent's possession through his sons.
• Registered ownership and possession — As registered owner, the owner has a right to possession, which is an attribute of ownership. Payment of real estate tax is one of the most persuasive and positive indications of the will to possess in concepto de dueño or with claim of ownership. The Court relied on respondent's title and tax payments.
• Civil Code Art. 538 preference rules — Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except co-possession. If a question arises, the present possessor is preferred; if two possessors, the one longer in possession; if dates are the same, the one who presents a title; if all equal, judicial deposit pending determination. The Court cited this in view of respondent's continuing possession.
• Rule 45 factual review exception — Although a Rule 45 petition generally precludes review of factual evidence tracing events prior to the first act of spoliation, the Supreme Court may make an exception where the factual findings of the MTC/RTC conflict with those of the Court of Appeals. The Court did so here.
• Gaza vs. Lim rule — Where a dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual possession is entitled to maintain the action granted by law; otherwise a mere usurper without right could acquire the right to maintain forcible entry and detainer by momentary intrusion. The Court cited this to support respondent's prior/continuing possession.

• "In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth." — This states the essential elements of forcible entry that petitioners failed to satisfy.
• "The plaintiff, however, cannot prevail where it appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own." — This is the controlling rule on prior possession that defeated petitioners' claim.
• "Two things are paramount in possession. First, there must be occupancy, apprehension or taking. Second, there must be intent to possess (animus possidendi)." — This defines the elements of possession applied to respondent's possession through his caretakers.
• "Where a dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual possession is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law; otherwise, a mere usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the property of another and, by allowing himself to be ordered off, could acquire the right to maintain the action of forcible entry and detainer, however momentary his intrusion might have been." — This is the Gaza vs. Lim formulation cited by the Court to justify dismissal of the forcible entry complaint.

• Gaza vs. Lim, G.R. No. 126863, 16 January 2003, 395 SCRA 261, 269 — The Court cited this for the rule that in a dispute over possession, the person first having actual possession is entitled to maintain the action; a mere usurper cannot acquire that right by momentary intrusion. It was controlling in affirming dismissal.
• Dela Rosa vs. Carlos, G.R. No. 147549, 23 October 2003, 414 SCRA 226, 235, citing Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302 (1927) — Cited for the proposition that possession in the eyes of the law does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground. The Court used it to support possession through caretakers.
• Co vs. Militar, G.R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455, 460 — Cited for the rule that as registered owner, one has a right to possession, an attribute of ownership. The Court relied on it in favor of respondent as registered owner.
• Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302 (1927) — Cited in Dela Rosa vs. Carlos for the principle that possession does not require physical presence on every square meter. The Court used this to support respondent's possession through his sons.

• Civil Code, Art. 523 — Defines possession as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. The Court used it to require occupancy and animus possidendi and to recognize possession through another.
• Civil Code, Art. 538 — Provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except co-possession, and lays down preference rules. The Court cited it in finding respondent's continuing possession.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari; generally limits review to questions of law and precludes factual review. The Court made an exception due to conflicting factual findings.

Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Adolfo S. Azcuna, and Cancio C. Garcia concurred. Reynato S. Puno was listed as Chief Justice and Chairperson with the notation "(No Part)".