Yasoña vs. de Ramos

A malicious prosecution action requires proof of malice and absence of probable cause, and it prospers where legal prosecution is carried out without probable cause. A criminal complaint filed after an outright prosecutorial dismissal for lack of probable cause, where the complainant knew the charge was groundless, supports liability for damages. A Rule 65 petition cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

Aurea Yasoña and Jovencio de Ramos were aunt and nephew. The Yasoña family's residential house and lot in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, covered by TCT No. T-32810, was mortgaged to PNB and faced foreclosure. Jovencio was approached for financial assistance, and the parties agreed that half of the property would be sold to him upon payment of the PNB loan.

In November 1971, Aurea Yasoña and her son Saturnino went to the house of Jovencio de Ramos to ask for financial assistance in paying their loans to Philippine National Bank (PNB), otherwise their residential house and lot, covered by TCT No. T-32810, would be foreclosed. Because Aurea was Jovencio's aunt, Jovencio acceded to the request. They agreed that, upon payment by Jovencio of the loan to PNB, half of the Yasoñas' subject property would be sold to him.

On December 29, 1971, Jovencio paid Aurea's bank loan. As agreed, Aurea executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Jovencio over half of the lot consisting of 123 square meters. Thereafter, the lot was surveyed and separate titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in the names of Aurea (TCT No. 73252) and Jovencio (TCT No. 73251). Since 1973, Jovencio had been paying the realty taxes of the portion registered in his name. In 1974, Aurea even requested Jovencio to use his portion as bond for the temporary release of her son who was charged with malicious mischief. When Aurea borrowed money from the Rural Bank of Lumban in 1973 and the PNB in 1979, only her portion covered by TCT No. 73252 was mortgaged.

Twenty-two years later, in August 1993, Aurea filed an estafa complaint against brothers Jovencio and Rodencio de Ramos on the ground that she was deceived by them when she asked for their assistance in 1971 concerning her mortgaged property. In her complaint, Aurea alleged that Rodencio asked her to sign a blank paper on the pretext that it would be used in the redemption of the mortgaged property. Aurea signed the blank paper without further inquiry because she trusted her nephew, Rodencio. Thereafter, they heard nothing from Rodencio, prompting Nimpha Yasoña Bondoc to confront Rodencio; she was told that the title was still with the Register of Deeds. When Nimpha inquired from the Register of Deeds, she was shocked to find out that the lot had been divided into two, pursuant to a deed of sale apparently executed by Aurea in favor of Jovencio. Aurea averred that she never sold any portion of her property to Jovencio and never executed a deed of sale. Aurea was thus forced to seek the advice of Judge Enrique Almario, another relative, who suggested filing a complaint for estafa.

On February 21, 1994, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo B. Zayenis dismissed the criminal complaint for estafa for lack of evidence. On account of this dismissal, Jovencio and Rodencio filed a complaint for damages on the ground of malicious prosecution with the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Branch 91, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-3230. They alleged that the filing of the estafa complaint against them was done with malice and caused irreparable injury to their reputation, as Aurea knew fully well that she had already sold half of the property to Jovencio. The trial court found that respondents had established their case by preponderance of evidence. The records showed that the sale was evidenced by a duly notarized and registered deed of sale; separate titles were issued; Jovencio paid realty taxes since 1973; Aurea used his portion as bond in 1974; only her portion was mortgaged in 1973 and 1979; and petitioners presented no evidence other than bare allegations. These circumstances indicated that Aurea had long acknowledged Jovencio's ownership of half of the property and that the 22-year delay before questioning it was inconsistent with an honest belief that she still owned the entire property.

• Reliance on Drilon: Petitioners relied on Drilon vs. Court of Appeals in support of their position against liability for malicious prosecution; the decision addressed this reliance and found it misplaced because in Drilon the investigating panel found probable cause, whereas here the estafa complaint was dismissed outright.

• Malicious Prosecution: Respondents alleged in their complaint for damages that the estafa complaint was filed with malice and caused irreparable injury to their reputation, as Aurea knew fully well that she had already sold half of the property to Jovencio.
• Lack of Probable Cause: Respondents' claim rested on malicious prosecution, and the decision notes that the estafa complaint was dismissed outright because the prosecutor did not find any probable cause against them.

• Malicious Prosecution: Whether the filing of the criminal complaint for estafa by petitioners against respondents constituted malicious prosecution.
• Propriety of Rule 65: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground that it was the wrong remedy.

• Malicious Prosecution: Yes. The filing constituted malicious prosecution; both malice and absence of probable cause were present, as the estafa complaint was dismissed outright and the evidence showed Aurea knew Jovencio owned half of the property.
• Propriety of Rule 65: No. Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal; the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition on that ground.

• Malicious Prosecution: The term "malicious prosecution" is defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after termination in favor of the defendant. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to authorities for prosecution does not make one liable. Here, the sale was evidenced by a duly notarized and registered deed; separate titles were issued; Jovencio paid realty taxes since 1973; Aurea requested use of his portion as bond in 1974; only her portion was mortgaged in 1973 and 1979; and petitioners waited 22 years before filing the estafa complaint. These circumstances showed Aurea knew she no longer owned Jovencio's portion. No evidence other than bare allegations supported petitioners. Thus, malice and absence of probable cause were present. The prosecutor dismissed the estafa complaint outright for lack of probable cause. Drilon vs. Court of Appeals was misplaced because there the investigating panel found probable cause, whereas here there was none.
• Propriety of Rule 65: Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. In any event, petitioners were liable for malicious prosecution.

• Malicious Prosecution — An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless. The elements are (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable. Applied: the estafa complaint was dismissed outright for lack of probable cause, and the evidence showed Aurea knew Jovencio owned half the property, so malice and absence of probable cause were present.
• Rule 65 Cannot Substitute for Lost Appeal — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Applied: the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners' Rule 65 petition because it was the wrong remedy.

• "In this jurisdiction, the term “malicious prosecution” has been defined as “an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.”" — This passage supplies the canonical definition of malicious prosecution relied upon by the Court.
• "Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the elements of (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause." — This states the two elements the Court found present in the case.
• "A suit for malicious prosecution will prosper where legal prosecution is carried out without probable cause." — This is the ratio decidendi on the substantive cause of action.
• "Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal" — This is the procedural ground for upholding the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition.

• Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 949 (1997) — Distinguished. In Drilon, the investigating panel found probable cause to hold the private respondent for trial, so the petitioner could not be liable for malicious prosecution; here, the estafa complaint was dismissed outright as the prosecutor found no probable cause.
• Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44190, 30 October 1980, 100 SCRA 602 — Cited for the rule that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
• China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94182, 28 March 1994, 231 SCRA 472 — Cited for the elements of malicious prosecution: (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause.
• Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 37 (1998) — Cited for the rule that Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal. Applied to uphold the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' petition on the ground that they availed of the wrong remedy.

Panganiban, J. (Chairman), and Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurred. Carpio-Morales, J., was on leave.