Yasin vs. Judge Shari'a District Court

A petition by a divorced woman to resume the use of her registered maiden name and surname is not a petition for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and is not governed by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Because the registered maiden name was never changed and use of the husband's surname during marriage was merely permissive, judicial confirmation of resumption after divorce may be summarily granted without the formal requirements for change of name.

Hatima C. Yasin and Hadji Idris Yasin are Muslim Filipinos whose marriage and its dissolution by divorce were governed by Presidential Decree No. 1083, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. The Civil Code, in Articles 370 to 373, governs a married woman's optional use of her husband's surname upon marriage, upon annulment, upon legal separation, and upon the husband's death. Article 376 of the Civil Code and Rule 103 of the Rules of Court govern judicial change of the true name recorded in the civil register.

Hatima C. Yasin, a Muslim Filipina resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City, was formerly married to Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino, in accordance with Muslim rites and customs. On March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic law, with the divorce rites officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification dated March 13, 1984. Thereafter, Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman.

On May 5, 1990, Hatima, through her elder brother and attorney-in-fact Hadji Hasan S. Centi under a Special Power of Attorney, filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a petition to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul. The petition invoked Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article 371(2) of the New Civil Code, after due notice and hearing. Her registered name was Hatima Centi Y. Saul, and she did not seek a new name but resumption following dissolution of the marriage and remarriage of her former husband.

On July 4, 1990, the respondent court ordered amendment within one week, finding the petition insufficient in form and substance under Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding residence and the name sought to be adopted in the title. After petitioner moved for reconsideration, the court denied the motion on August 10, 1990, holding that compliance with Rule 103 was necessary because granting the petition would result in resumption of petitioner's maiden name and surname.

• Non-applicability of Rule 103: Petitioner maintained that the petition filed was not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but was merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after dissolution of marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to another woman.
• Legal Basis for Resumption: Petitioner invoked the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article 371(2) of the New Civil Code as authority to be allowed to resume her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.

• Substantial Change of Name: Respondent countered that the petition was substantially one for change of name, particularly of surname — Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul — because granting it would result in resumption of the use of her maiden surname following dissolution of marriage.
• Judicial Authority and Procedure: Respondent argued that use of surnames is governed by Articles 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code, and no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority under Article 376, with change under judicial authorization governed by Rule 103, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court.
• State Interest and Proper Reason: Respondent maintained that the State has an interest in names for identification, change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right, and petitioner must show proper or compelling reason, otherwise the request should be denied.

• Nature of Resumption: Whether in case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, where the husband is married again to another woman and the former wife desires to resume her maiden name or surname, she is required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
• Change of Name Characterization: Whether a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name.

• Nature of Resumption: No. Resumption of the registered maiden name after divorce is not subject to the onerous formal requirements of Rule 103, there being no specific rule for judicial confirmation of a right conferred by law.
• Change of Name Characterization: No. A petition to resume the registered maiden name does not seek to change the true and official name in the civil register and is therefore not a petition for change of name under Article 376.

• Nature of Resumption: The petition to resume was deemed a superfluity because the law requires resumption where the former husband is already married to another woman after divorce under Muslim law, and no law or rule prescribes a procedure for judicial confirmation of that legal right. In the absence of a specific rule, where sufficient facts alleged are supported by competent proof satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and resumption must be given due course and summarily granted as a right conferred by law. Remand was held unnecessary since the dispute could be resolved on the records before it.
• Change of Name Characterization: The only name that may be changed under Article 376 is the true and official name recorded in the civil register, petitioner's registered name being Hatima Centi Y. Saul, which she did not seek to change. Divorce by talaq or faskh severs the marriage bond under Article 54 of P.D. No. 1086, becoming irrevocable after the idda waiting period, with P.D. No. 1083 suppletorily aided by the Civil Code and Rules of Court where not inconsistent. Even under the Civil Code, a married woman's use of her husband's surname under Article 370 is permissive and not obligatory, marriage changes only civil status and not the name, and the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial authority to revert to her maiden name.

• True and official name doctrine — The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register, which is the official record of civil status. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is that true or official name; a name known in the community or church record at variance with the civil register is unofficial and cannot be recognized as the real name. Applied here, petitioner's registered maiden name was not sought to be changed, so Rule 103 did not apply.
• Permissive use of husband's surname — Under Article 370 of the Civil Code, a married woman may use (1) her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) her husband's full name prefixed by an indicator of wifehood such as "Mrs." The word "may" makes use permissive rather than obligatory, and no law requires a wife to change her name to her husband's upon marriage. Applied here, petitioner merely exercised the option to discontinue permissive use after dissolution of the vinculum.
• Resumption after annulment; divorce analogy — Under Article 371, in case of annulment where the wife is the guilty party she shall resume her maiden name and surname; if innocent she may resume it but may continue the former husband's surname unless the court decrees otherwise or she or the former husband remarries. Under Article 373 and commentary, after the husband's death or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, use of the former husband's name is optional and judicial confirmation of reversion to maiden name is unnecessary because only civil status changed.
• Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond after exhaustion of reconciliation, effected by repudiation (talaq), among others, or judicial decree (faskh). As soon as talaq or faskh becomes irrevocable after the idda waiting period, the marriage bond is severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with the Code. Applied here, the 1984 divorce and subsequent remarriage of the husband severed the bond supporting use of his surname.
• Suppletory application and summary grant; non-remand — Under Article 187 of P.D. No. 1083, the Civil Code, Rules of Court and other laws apply suppletorily insofar as not inconsistent with the Muslim Code. Where no specific procedure governs confirmation of resumption and sufficient facts with competent supporting proof appear satisfactory, the petition must be given due course and summarily granted without Rule 103 requirements, and remand for further reception of evidence is unnecessary if the dispute can be resolved on the records.

• "We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register." — States the controlling limitation on change-of-name proceedings and why resumption of the already-registered maiden name falls outside Rule 103.
• "A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become irrevocable, shall have the following effects: (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;" — Defines the substantive effect of Muslim divorce relied upon to hold that the vinculum supporting use of the husband's surname no longer exists.
• "When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status." — Articulates the rationale that marriage and its dissolution do not alter the registered name, making judicial authority to revert unnecessary.
• "In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law." — Prescribes the summary treatment for confirmation petitions instead of the onerous Rule 103 requirements.

• Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966] — Followed as controlling on what name may be changed; only the true or official name in the civil register may be subject of change under Article 376.
• Chomi vs. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956] — Cited for the proposition that the true and real name is that entered in the civil register.
• Rendora vs. Republic, 35 SCRA 262 [1970] — Cited for the same true-name principle supporting inapplicability of change-of-name rules.
• Pabellar vs. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976] — Cited for the same true-name principle and, as invoked by respondent court, for title requirements in change-of-name petitions.
• Go vs. Republic, L-31760, May 25, 1977 — Cited by respondent court for formal title requirements under Rule 103, distinguished as inapplicable to mere resumption.
• Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, 102 Phil. 468 — Cited by respondent court for the rule that change of name requires proper or compelling reason, held inapplicable to exercise of a legal right to resume.
• Dimayuga vs. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators vs. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]; Quisumbing vs. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983] — Followed to justify deciding without remand where records suffice to resolve the dispute.

• Article 143, par. 1(c), Presidential Decree No. 1083 — Invoked by petitioner as basis to resume maiden name after divorce; applied as part of Muslim personal law governing the petition.
• Article 371(2), New Civil Code — Invoked in relation to P.D. No. 1083; provides an innocent spouse in annulment may resume maiden name but may continue husband's surname unless she or former husband remarries; applied by analogy to require resumption upon former husband's remarriage.
• Article 376, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority; construed to apply only to change of the true name in the civil register, not to resumption.
• Rule 103, Sections 1, 2(a) and 3, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for change of name, including venue, contents, and title requirements; held inapplicable to confirmation of resumption.
• Articles 370, 371, 372, 373, Civil Code — Govern optional use of husband's surname during marriage, upon annulment, upon legal separation, and upon death; applied to show use is permissive except in legal separation and reversion requires no judicial change proceeding.
• Articles 45, 54, 56, 57(b), 187, P.D. No. 1086 / P.D. No. 1083 — Define divorce by talaq and faskh, severance of the bond upon irrevocability after idda of three monthly courses, and suppletory application of the Civil Code and Rules of Court; applied to establish dissolution and severance.
• Articles 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code; Article 408, Civil Code — Govern surnames and civil register entry of birth; cited for substantive and registral basis of names.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur. Romero, J., concurring, emphasized the directory "may" in Article 370, the constitutional policy of fundamental equality of women and men, and subsequent egalitarian legislation, reasoning that dissolution by absolute divorce, nullity, or annulment provides legal ground for automatic dropping of the husband's surname and resumption of the maiden name whether or not the former husband remarries. Vitug, J., concurring, outlined the framework for surnames of married women during marriage, upon legal separation, annulment, death, divorce, and nullity, noting divorce is treated akin to death of the husband and suggesting divorce be governed instead by annulment rules distinguishing fault.