Yap vs. Lagtapon

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, attaching to a process server's Return of Service, can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Where a defendant in a personal service of summons claims non-service, self-serving assertions and inconclusive documentary evidence are insufficient to overcome this presumption, and the trial court thereby validly acquires jurisdiction over the defendant's person.

Petitioner Susan A. Yap and respondent Elizabeth Lagtapon were parties to a civil suit for sum of money filed by Lagtapon against Yap before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-9991. The case was raffled to the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 46. The dispute arose from a default judgment rendered against Yap, which she later sought to annul on the ground of defective service of summons. The remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is extraordinary in character and may be based either on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the latter including lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Respondent Elizabeth Lagtapon filed a civil suit for sum of money against petitioner Susan A. Yap on October 9, 1997, with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-9991 and raffled to Branch 46, Bacolod City. Summons was issued, and according to the Return of Service dated November 4, 1997, prepared by process server Roy R. Precioso, he served the summons on Yap personally on November 4, 1997 at about 4:35 p.m., but she refused to acknowledge receipt, compelling him to tender and leave a copy for her. The Return did not indicate the place of service, but Precioso later executed an Affidavit dated February 21, 2001, attesting that he served the summons on Yap at "Frankfurt Street, Hesusa Village, Bacolod City."

When no answer was filed, Lagtapon filed a motion to declare Yap in default on December 16, 1997, which was granted by the RTC on January 12, 1998. Lagtapon presented her evidence ex-parte, and on February 12, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision in her favor. Lagtapon filed a motion for execution on March 6, 1998, which was granted on May 21, 1998. The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for Negros Occidental issued a notice of sale on execution dated September 25, 2000, setting the auction sale of Yap's property — a parcel of land identified as Lot 11, Block 2 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-91608, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-110467, situated at Herminia Street, Villa Valderrama, Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City — on October 17, 2000.

On or about October 11, 2000, Joey de la Paz, to whom Yap had mortgaged the property, informed her that a notice of embargo relative to Civil Case No. 97-9991 was annotated on the title, that a notice of sale on execution had been issued, and that the property was scheduled for auction on October 17, 2000. Yap then discovered for the first time that she had been sued and that a judgment by default had been rendered against her.

Yap filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA, alleging that summons was not validly served on her. She claimed that at the time of the alleged service on November 4, 1997, she was not residing at either of the addresses supplied by Lagtapon in her Complaint — Herminia Street, Villa Valderama, Bacolod City, and Frankfurt Street, Jesusa Heights, Bacolod City. Yap admitted that she used to reside at the first address but claimed she had moved out in June 1997 and started leasing it out in July 1998. She averred that she never resided at the second address, and that at the time of service she was residing at "Frankfurt Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City," which she leased from June 1997 until September 1999. Yap also denied receipt of the Motion to Declare in Default, which was served via JRS Express mail and received by a certain "Tommy Lim" at the Hesusa Heights address.

Lagtapon denied Yap's allegations and raised grounds for dismissal of the Petition for Annulment: (i) Yap was constructively notified of the RTC Decision and Writ of Execution when the Notice of Embargo or Levy was annotated on her title on May 26, 1998, and her failure to file a petition for relief within sixty days rendered the Petition dismissible; (ii) Yap failed to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and (iii) there was no extrinsic fraud extant from the records.

To rebut the presumption of regularity, Yap presented: (i) affidavits of her neighbors attesting that she resided at the Sunshine Valley address beginning June 1997; (ii) utility receipts bearing the name of her alleged landlord, Liberato Reyes; and (iii) mail matters from the RTC in envelopes with handwritten notations reading "UNCLAIMED." The CA found this evidence insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity, and the Supreme Court agreed.

• Defective Service of Summons: Petitioner argued that summons was not validly served on her because she was not residing at either of the addresses supplied by respondent in the Complaint at the time of the alleged service on November 4, 1997, and that she was instead residing at Frankfurt Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City.

• Lack of Jurisdiction Over Her Person: Petitioner maintained that the defective service of summons prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over her person, which rendered the default judgment void and subject to annulment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

• Failure to Indicate Place of Service: Petitioner argued that the process server's failure to include the place of service in the Return, contrary to Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, rendered the service defective, relying on the pronouncements in Santiago Syjuco, Inc. vs. Castro.

• Unavailability of Other Remedies: Petitioner contended that she could no longer avail of the remedies of new trial or petition for relief from judgment because she only became aware of the RTC Decision on October 11, 2000, at which time a writ of execution had already been issued and the periods for those remedies had lapsed.

• Extrinsic Fraud Bar: Respondent argued that the Petition for Annulment should be dismissed because it was based on extrinsic fraud, and extrinsic fraud cannot be a valid ground if it was not availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment.

• Constructive Notice: Respondent contended that assuming Yap did not receive the RTC Decision, she was constructively notified thereof and of the Writ of Execution when the Notice of Embargo or Levy was annotated on her title on May 26, 1998, and her failure to file a petition for relief within sixty days from that date rendered the Petition for Annulment dismissible.

• Failure to Exhaust Remedies: Respondent argued that Yap failed to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to question the Order declaring her in default, the RTC Decision, or the Notice of Embargo or Levy.

• Absence of Extrinsic Fraud: Respondent maintained that there was no extrinsic fraud extant from the records of the case that would serve as basis for the Petition for Annulment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

• Jurisdiction Over the Person: Whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Petition for Annulment and ruling that the RTC had validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Yap's person through service of summons.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: Whether the Petition raised questions of fact not cognizable in a Rule 45 petition.

• Ground for Annulment of Judgment: Whether the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 could still be availed of by petitioner Yap on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person, notwithstanding her failure to avail of new trial or petition for relief.

• Jurisdiction Over the Person: No. The RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over Yap's person through service of summons. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties attached to the process server's Return of Service, and Yap failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut it.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: Yes, the Petition raised factual issues. An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law, and the Court may deny the Petition on this score alone, as jurisdiction over factual questions has been devolved to the trial courts.

• Ground for Annulment of Judgment: Yes. Yap's claim of defective service of summons brought to fore the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over her person, which is a valid ground for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, Section 2. The restriction on extrinsic fraud as a ground does not apply to lack of jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction Over the Person: The Court held that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official duties, and in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of summons by process server Precioso was deemed regular and valid. The Return of Service constituted prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein. To overcome this presumption, case law demands clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The Court found that Yap's evidence failed to meet this standard. The affidavits of alleged neighbors were insufficient because no contract of lease covering the Sunshine Valley address was presented, no affidavit from the supposed lessor was submitted, and the affiants could not explain why they retained the specific time in their minds. The utility receipts did not indicate any address and were dated months after the service of summons, making them immaterial to proving her residence on November 4, 1997. The mail matters bearing "UNCLAIMED" notations involved orders dated after the service of summons and were highly inconclusive. Following Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., self-serving assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after service of summons.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: The Court reiterated that an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is limited in scope to questions of law. Resolving whether summons was validly served would necessitate a re-examination and re-weighing of the evidence on record, which is beyond the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition. To the extent that the evidence on record amply supports the factual findings of the trial court, such findings are deemed conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal.

• Ground for Annulment of Judgment: The Court rejected respondent's argument that the Petition was based on extrinsic fraud and thus barred. Yap's claim of defective service of summons brought to fore the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over her person, which is a separate and valid ground for annulment under Rule 47, Section 2. Moreover, Yap could no longer avail of the remedies of new trial or petition for relief because she only became aware of the RTC Decision on October 11, 2000, at which time a writ of execution had already been issued. Execution issues upon the expiration of the period to appeal, a motion for new trial can only be filed within the period for taking an appeal, and a petition for relief was no longer available since the writ of execution had been issued more than six months prior.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties — A public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official duties and functions. This presumption is an aid to the effective and unhampered administration of government functions, and can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the presumption attached to the process server's Return of Service, and Yap's evidence was insufficient to rebut it.

• Prima Facie Evidentiary Value of the Return of Service — The Return of Service of a process server constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein. In the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of summons is deemed regular and valid. Self-serving assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after service of summons.

• Grounds for Annulment of Judgment — Under Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for annulment of judgment are: (i) extrinsic fraud and (ii) lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud cannot be a valid ground if it had been availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Lack of jurisdiction means either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The restriction on extrinsic fraud does not apply to lack of jurisdiction.

• Personal Service of Summons — Place is Immaterial — Where there is personal service of summons, the place of service is of no moment. The place becomes material only where the service is by substituted service, for in such a case the rule requires that the summons be served only either at the defendant's residence or office/place of business. Insofar as personal service is concerned, what matters is that the defendant has been personally put on notice regarding the institution of an action against him and was furnished with a copy of the summons and the complaint. Service to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the defendant's actual residence.

• "The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is an aid to the effective and unhampered administration of government functions. Without such benefit, every official action could be negated with minimal effort from litigants, irrespective of merit or sufficiency of evidence to support such challenge. To this end, our body of jurisprudence has been consistent in requiring nothing short of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary to overthrow such presumption." — This passage states the controlling doctrine of the case: the presumption of regularity in official duties and the high quantum of evidence required to rebut it.

• "Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons on petitioner Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid. Correspondingly, the Return of Service of Precioso as process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein." — This excerpt establishes the application of the presumption of regularity to the process server's Return of Service, which is central to the Court's ruling.

• "Insofar as personal service is concerned, what matters is that the defendant has been personally put on notice regarding the institution of an action against him and was furnished with copy (sic) of the summons and the complaint. Service to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the defendant's actual residence." — This passage, quoted from the CA's disquisition, clarifies that the place of service is immaterial in personal service of summons, addressing Yap's argument regarding the failure to indicate the place of service in the Return.

• "All told, the Court hereby upholds the finding of the CA in its questioned Decision that petitioner Yap's evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity attendant to the Return of Service. Following Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., self-serving assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after service of Summons." — This excerpt summarizes the Court's conclusion that Yap failed to rebut the presumption of regularity and cites the controlling precedent on the insufficiency of self-serving assertions.

• Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., 393 Phil. 657 (2000) — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that self-serving assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after service of summons.

• Guanzon vs. Arradaza, 539 Phil. 367 (2006) — Cited for the propositions that the Return of Service constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein, and that clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome the presumption of regularity.

• Gatmaitan vs. Gonzales, 525 Phil. 658 (2006) — Cited for the axiom that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official duties and functions.

• Santiago Syjuco, Inc. vs. Castro, 256 Phil. 621 (1989) — Distinguished by the Court. In that case, the service of summons involved a juridical entity and the defect was the process server's failure to properly identify the person served under Section 11, Rule 14. Here, the service was made personally upon Yap as defendant pursuant to Section 6 of the said Rule.

• Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing, 162 Phil. 804 (1976) — Cited in connection with Santiago Syjuco, Inc. vs. Castro regarding service of summons on juridical entities, distinguished from the present case involving personal service on a natural person.

• Miro vs. Vda. De Erederos, 721 Phil. 772 (2013) — Cited for the rule that the Court is not expected to recalibrate the evidence already considered by inferior courts, and that factual findings amply supported by the evidence are conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal.

• Yuk Ling Ong vs. Co, G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015, 752 SCRA 42 — Cited for the definition of lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment, meaning either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Manalastas, G.R. No. 208264, July 27, 2016 — Cited for the proposition that the burden of proof to discharge the presumption of regularity lay with the party challenging the official action.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court is limited to questions of law. The Court applied this provision to deny the Petition, as the resolution of whether summons was validly served required a re-examination of the evidence.

• Section 2, Rule 47, Rules of Court — Provides that the grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and that extrinsic fraud cannot be a valid ground if it had been availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. The Court applied this provision to hold that Yap's claim of defective service of summons raised lack of jurisdiction over her person, a valid ground not subject to the extrinsic fraud restriction.

• Section 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that execution shall issue upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom, if no appeal has been duly perfected. The Court cited this to show that the remedies of appeal or new trial were no longer available to Yap.

• Section 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court — Provides that a motion for new trial can only be filed within the period for taking an appeal. The Court cited this to show that Yap could no longer avail of a new trial by the time she acquired knowledge of the proceedings.

• Section 6, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Governs personal service of summons on a defendant. The Court applied this provision to the disputed service of summons made personally upon Yap.

• Section 11, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Provides an exclusive list of persons that may be served summons when the defendant is a corporation. The Court distinguished this provision as applicable in Santiago Syjuco, Inc. vs. Castro, not in the present case involving personal service on a natural person.

• Section 18, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Requires the process server to indicate the place of service in the Return. The Court acknowledged that the Return lacked this detail but held that Precioso's subsequent Affidavit supplying the place of service constituted substantial compliance with the Rules.

• Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
• Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
• Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe

N/A — The case text does not indicate any dissenting opinion.