Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan

A will is duly executed where the testatrix signs at least a portion of her name with intent to execute and where testatrix and witnesses sign in a location permitting mutual observation, even without proof of actual seeing. Testamentary capacity at the moment of execution, freedom from undue influence, and the validity of a later will notwithstanding an earlier will were similarly sustained on preponderance and trial-court credibility.

Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on August 11, 1909. On August 23, 1909, Perfecto Gabriel, representing Yap Tua, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of her alleged will, which bore her signature and those of Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora and Timoteo Paez. At the hearing on September 18, 1909, Paez testified that he knew the decedent, was present at execution, signed as witness, and that Zacarias and Tabora also signed in the decedent's presence. Pablo Agustin testified that he was 40 years of age, knew the decedent, was present with Paez, Tabora and a person called Anselmo, saw the decedent sign voluntarily in the witnesses' presence with apparent possession of faculties and without threats, and that the witnesses signed in her presence and in each other's presence. No further witnesses or opposition was presented.

Thereafter, on September 29, 1909, Judge A. S. Crossfield admitted the will to probate as Exhibit A and ordered Yap Tua appointed executor upon bond. On February 28, 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared alleging interest and seeking intervention through a guardian ad litem. On March 1, 1910, Gabriel La O was appointed, accepted and qualified, and on March 2, 1910 moved to annul the September 29, 1909 order and allow new proof on the grounds that the August 11, 1909 will was not authorized or signed by witnesses as law prescribes, the decedent lacked mental capacity due to sickness, her signature was obtained through fraud and illegal influence without intent to execute, a prior will with legal formalities had been executed August 6, 1909, and minority excused delay, invoking section 113 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions with the alleged prior will and affidavits attached.

At the rehearing, Tomas Puzon, professor and claimed handwriting expert, testified that the given name Tomasa on Exhibit A resembled that on Exhibit 1 but the surname tracing and direction differed thoroughly, in his judgment written by different hands. Gabriel La O testified that he drew the August 6, 1909 will at the decedent's request and under her directions in her house, that she sat up in bed and signed with great difficulty in her right mind with three witnesses signing in her presence and each other's. Severo Tabora testified that his witness signature on Exhibit A was his, but stated he was unsure he saw the decedent sign Exhibit A because of many people and a screen at the door, that the will lay on a table far from the patient outside her room, that he and Paez signed there, that he was unsure Zacarias signed, that he left after signing, and that he later heard people asking the very ill decedent to sign. Physician Rufino R. Papa testified that he treated the decedent August 8, 9 and 10, found her very weak in the third stage of tuberculosis, with little sense on the first two visits and loss of intelligence on the third, in stupor believed induced by uraemia, unresponsive when asked about pain, and that she died August 11 with him requested to issue the death certificate.

Anselmo Zacarias testified that he wrote Exhibit A except the last part written by Carlos Sobaco, at the request of the decedent's uncle and on instructions of her brother Lorenzo without the decedent speaking to him on its terms, in the dining room and not in her presence, that Lorenzo carried it to the bed where two women helped her sit up, that he withdrew because of heat and upon return it was signed in Lorenzo's hands without his seeing her sign, that he did not know if she knew its contents or whether she saw him sign, that Paez and Tabora signed in the sickroom in mutual presence behind a screen, and that ten or fifteen minutes elapsed before she started to sign with a pen given to her. Clotilde Mariano testified that two wills were made, that he was present when Zacarias wrote the second and when it was taken for signature, that Lorenzo told the decedent it was exactly like the first, and that she said she could not sign it. In rebuttal, Julia de la Cruz testified that she lived in the house during the last week, was present when the second will drawn in the dining room was brought by Zacarias for signature among many people, that the decedent asked for help to sit up with a pillow, took the pen and tried to sign though the witness left before seeing where she signed, and that a notary came the next morning. Yap Cao Quiang testified that he saw the decedent sign on her bed and saw witnesses sign on a table near the bed outside the curtain near the entrance. Lorenzo Yap Caong testified that Zacarias wrote the will on the decedent's instructions, that she said she would sign, and that from her bed she could see the table where witnesses signed. A plan showed one room with the table on a lower floor one or two steps below the bed, with testimony that the table was visible from the bed.

The trial court, after the rehearing, found preponderance supported freedom from undue influence, sound mind and memory at signing, and due execution, and again admitted Exhibit A to probate with continuation of the administrator.

• Defective Authorization and Attestation: Respondents maintained that the August 11, 1909 will was null because it had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes.
• Mental Incapacity: Respondents argued that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not mentally capacitated to execute the will due to sickness.
• Fraud and Undue Influence: Respondents contended that her signature was obtained through fraud and illegal influence by benefited persons and without intent to execute the will.
• Prior Valid Will: Respondents asserted that before the contested will, the decedent had executed another will with all legal formalities on August 6, 1909.
• Excusable Negligence and Identity of Signature: Respondents pleaded that minority excused delay in opposing probate, and on appeal assigned error that undue influence was ignored, testamentary capacity was absent, the signatures on Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A were not identical, and Exhibit A was not executed in accordance with law.

• Undue Influence: Whether the August 11, 1909 will was executed through external or undue influence.
• Testamentary Capacity: Whether the testatrix possessed sound mind and memory at the time of signing.
• Sufficiency of Signature: Whether the signature on the August 11, 1909 will, claimed to differ from that on the August 6, 1909 will, satisfies the statutory signature requirement.
• Due Execution and Presence: Whether the August 11, 1909 will was executed in accordance with law as to signing by testatrix and witnesses in each other's presence.

• Undue Influence: No. No reversal was warranted, the trial court having credited testimony that no undue influence was exerted and seen the witnesses.
• Testamentary Capacity: No reversal. Preponderance supported sound mind and memory at signing, the contrary medical testimony relating to about twenty-four hours earlier.
• Sufficiency of Signature: Yes. Signing any portion of the name with intent to sign suffices, and preponderance showed at least the given name Tomasa was signed.
• Due Execution and Presence: Yes. Presence was satisfied where signatures were placed where the parties could have seen them, the table being visible from the bed in the same room.

• Undue Influence: Although some witnesses testified that Lorenzo attempted to influence the decedent, several others testified that he did not do so at execution. The trial court, having observed demeanor during examination, found preponderance against undue influence. Absent good reason in the record to disturb credibility findings, affirmance was required.
• Testamentary Capacity: Testimony conflicted. Dr. Papa's strong opinion of stupor and loss of intelligence related to visits on August 8, 9 and 10, perhaps twenty-four hours before execution. Several witnesses testified that when presented for signature she was of sound mind, asked for pen and ink, kept the will ten or fifteen minutes, and signed. The trial court's preponderance finding of capacity at the critical moment was therefore left undisturbed.
• Sufficiency of Signature: Whether the August 6, 1909 will was executed was not the issue; execution of a former will does not disprove a later will, revocable and replaceable until the last moment of life even without express revocation. The claim of non-identity implied non-signing, but several witnesses saw her write Tomasa and one testified to the full name. Under cited authorities permitting a mark, initials or part of the name, signing the given name with intent satisfies the statute, as illustrated by Knox's Appeal sustaining Harriett as signature.
• Due Execution and Presence: Protestants stressed that witnesses signed in one room and the testatrix in another. The plan and testimony showed a single room with the table one or two steps below the bed floor and visible from the bed. The rule absolutely requires mutual presence, but actual seeing is unnecessary if the signatures are made where the necessary parties, if desiring to see, may see them. Given pervasive conflict, great weight attached to the trial court's conclusion, and preponderance showed free, voluntary execution with full faculties.

• Signature by mark or partial name — A testator signs within the meaning of the wills statute by affixing a mark, initials, or all or any part of the name, provided intent to execute is shown. Applied to sustain Exhibit A where preponderance showed at least the given name Tomasa was written by the decedent with executing intent, even if the surname differed from the earlier will.
• Constructive presence in attestation — The testatrix must sign in the presence of witnesses and witnesses must sign in her presence and in each other's presence, but actual visual observation is not indispensable; compliance exists if signatures are affixed where each necessary party could have seen them if desiring to do so. Applied where the table stood in the same room, one or two steps below and visible from the bed.
• Revocability and successive wills — A testator may dispose by will until the last moment of life and may change, alter, modify or revoke former wills by a new will, whose validity is not defeated by mere existence of a prior will or by absence of express revocation. Applied to reject the inference from the August 6, 1909 will that the August 11, 1909 will was not executed.
• Appellate deference to trial-court credibility — Where proof sharply conflicts, appellate courts that did not see or hear witnesses give great weight to the trial court's conclusions on preponderance. Applied to uphold findings on undue influence, capacity and due execution.

• "She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life." — States the revocability principle rejecting the argument that the prior August 6 will negated execution of the later will.
• "It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will." — Formulates the constructive-presence test for mutual attestation applied to the single-room layout.
• "Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity." — Justifies deference on conflicting testimony concerning influence, capacity and attestation.
• "The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon the will, is held to "sign" as effectually as if he had written his initials or his full name." — Anchors the holding that writing the given name Tomasa satisfies the signature statute.

• Re Goods of Savory, 15 Jur., 1042 — Cited as supporting authority that a mark or partial subscription may constitute signing of a will.
• Addy vs. Grix, 8 Ves. Jr., 504 — Cited as supporting authority for sufficiency of informal or partial signature with executing intent.
• Baker vs. Dening, 8 Ad. and El., 94 — Cited as supporting authority on what amounts to signing a will.
• Long vs. Zook, 13 Penn., 400; Vernon vs. Kirk, 30 Penn., 218; Cozzen's Will, 61 Penn., 196; Main vs. Ryder, 84 Penn., 217 — Cited as a line of Pennsylvania authorities sustaining marks, initials or partial names as signatures.
• Re Goods of Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir., 443 — Cited as supporting authority on sufficiency of signature by mark or part of name.
• Knox's Appeal, 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 — Followed as persuasive illustration that Harriett alone, wholly handwritten, sufficed as signature, extended to Tomasa here; reinforced by contract-signature cases Palmer vs. Stephens, Sanborne vs. Flager, Weston vs. Myers, and Salmon Falls, etc. Co. vs. Goddard.

• Section 113, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions — Invoked by the minor protestants to annul the September 29, 1909 probate order for excusable negligence due to minority and to obtain rehearing and opportunity to present new proof on due execution.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.