Yangco vs. Rohde

A court trying a divorce suit lacks jurisdiction to grant alimony pendente lite where the alleged marriage is denied and has not been established by final judgment, because the Civil Code grants the right to alimony only to a wife and the civil status of marriage is the basis of the action for support; prohibition lies to restrain such an interlocutory order made in excess of jurisdiction when no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists.

Luis R. Yangco and Victorina Obin were the opposing parties in a divorce suit before the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge William J. Rohde. Obin claimed the status of Yangco’s lawful wife and sought divorce, alimony, and attorney’s fees. The governing backdrop included the Civil Code’s provisions on support and alimony, which recognize the right to support among spouses and alimony to a wife, and the Code of Civil Procedure’s remedy of prohibition for proceedings without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Luis R. Yangco was the defendant in a divorce suit before the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge William J. Rohde. Victorina Obin filed a complaint praying that she be declared the lawful wife of Yangco and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and attorney’s fees during the pendency of the suit. Obin alleged a mutual agreement to be husband and wife entered into before witnesses. Yangco filed a demurrer, which Judge Rohde overruled, stating that the marriage alleged in the complaint was valid under the laws in force although the question was not clear nor without doubt, and that the facts alleged compelled him to resolve the doubt in favor of the plaintiff. Yangco answered the complaint, denying the principal allegation of fact, namely, the mutual agreement to be husband and wife alleged by Obin.

While the case was in that condition, Obin filed a motion for a monthly allowance as alimony, costs, and attorney’s fees. On July 22, Judge Rohde ordered Yangco to pay Obin, in advance, a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and after March 11 last past, and to pay on August 1 following all accrued allowances, in addition to the allowance for the said month, amounting to the sum of 1,500 pesos. Obin owned no property, and the judge did not require from her any security. It was therefore certain that Yangco, should judgment be rendered in his favor, would be unable to recover such sums as the judge might compel him to disburse.

Against the ruling of the court, Yangco had no right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. He filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court, alleging that Judge Rohde acted in excess of his jurisdiction in attempting to oblige him to pay Obin the said allowance, and praying that a writ of prohibition issue to prohibit the judge from attempting to compel payment. Respondent Judge Rohde filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss upon the grounds that the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action and that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In oral argument and brief, no denial was made; on the contrary, the fact alleged by Yangco was affirmed, namely, that in the ruling on the demurrer in the Court of First Instance, the respondent had expressed his opinion that the question as to the alleged marriage was not clear nor free from doubt. Respondent nevertheless argued that Obin acquired a right to all conjugal rights, and in particular to the allowance of alimony pendente lite, citing articles of the Civil Code as to rights enjoyed by a married woman by virtue of marriage and those she may exercise by reason of divorce pending litigation.

The lower court found the alleged marriage valid under the laws in force, although the question was not clear or free from doubt, and resolved the doubt in Obin’s favor. Yangco denied the marriage. Obin owned no property, and no security was required for the alimony paid.

• Excess of Jurisdiction: Petitioner alleged that Judge Rohde acted in excess of his jurisdiction in attempting to oblige petitioner to pay Victorina Obin the monthly allowance, because the alleged marriage was denied and the judge himself considered the question not clear or free from doubt.
• Irreparable Damage and No Adequate Remedy: Petitioner alleged that Obin owned no property and that the judge did not require security, so that if judgment were rendered in petitioner’s favor he would be unable to recover the sums paid; against the interlocutory order, petitioner had no right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.
• Prohibition: Petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that Judge Rohde acted in excess of jurisdiction and that a writ of prohibition issue prohibiting him from attempting to compel petitioner to pay the allowance.

• Lack of Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Respondent demurred and moved to dismiss on the ground that the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action.
• Failure to State a Cause of Action: Respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
• Jurisdiction over Divorce and Its Incidents: Respondent argued that the judge had jurisdiction to try the divorce case and its incidents, including alimony; that in an interlocutory ruling he held the alleged matrimony existed although it appeared not clear or free from doubt; that Obin acquired a right to conjugal rights, particularly alimony pendente lite; that no appeal lies from the interlocutory order; and that although erroneous and causing irreparable damage, the order could not be reviewed by another court during trial.

• Jurisdiction to Grant Alimony Pendente Lite: Whether the Court of First Instance, in a divorce suit where the alleged marriage is denied and not established by final judgment, has jurisdiction to order the defendant to pay alimony pendente lite.
• Propriety of Prohibition: Whether prohibition lies to restrain an interlocutory order granting alimony pendente lite where the order is not appealable during trial and would cause irreparable damage.
• Sufficiency of the Petition and Demurrer: Whether respondent’s demurrer and motion to dismiss should be sustained on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter and failure to state a cause of action.

• Jurisdiction to Grant Alimony Pendente Lite: No. The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the divorce suit but not to grant alimony because the right had not accrued under the Civil Code; alimony belongs only to a wife, and that status did not appear by final judgment.
• Propriety of Prohibition: Yes. Prohibition lies where proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; the interlocutory alimony order was not appealable during trial but was subject to prohibition.
• Sufficiency of the Petition and Demurrer: Overruled. The petition stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and respondent was authorized to answer within twenty days from the date of the decision.

• Jurisdiction to Grant Alimony Pendente Lite: Under the old Law of Civil Procedure, articles 1591 and 1592 required a person claiming provisional alimony or support to file documents proving conclusively the title by which it was sued for, and the judge could not admit the complaint unless those documents were submitted. Thus, alimony could not prosper on the judge’s mere opinion expressed in an interlocutory order. Under Civil Code article 143, the right to support is granted to spouses inter se and others, and the basis of the action is a civil status or juridical relation. Because Obin alleged she was a wife, she had to prove the civil status of a spouse—marriage—without which she had no right to the title of wife. Marriages celebrated before the Civil Code had to be proven by the means established by former laws, such as the canonical certificate under article 53. With that evidence lacking and the marriage in litigation, nothing could be taken for granted. There is no law or reason authorizing alimony to a mere claimant as to one who conclusively establishes legal proof of spousehood; legal evidence raises a presumption, while a mere allegation is a fact in issue. Until an authoritative declaration, no effect could be given to the claim. The Court concluded that the court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit but was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right had not accrued under the Civil Code, which grants alimony only to a wife; because that status did not appear by final judgment, the court was without jurisdiction to make any order on alimony. The Court expressly left open whether an exception would apply if the marriage were admitted of record, noting that here it was denied.

• Propriety of Prohibition: Although an interlocutory order such as the alimony order is not appealable during trial, the prohibition on incidental appeals was not intended to give executory force to all interlocutory orders, especially those causing irreparable damage. Under article 516 in relation to article 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure, prohibition lies when proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The Court applied American and California law, treating the California Code as the true legal precedent. In Havemeyer & Co. vs. Superior Court, Judge Wallace, the California Supreme Court issued prohibition where a receiver was appointed over property of nonparties, holding that an appeal was not an adequate remedy because the petitioners had a right to keep their property, not merely to recover it after long litigation. The Court also cited Mayor of London vs. Cox on want of jurisdiction apparent on the face of proceedings, Quimbo Appo vs. People on the writ lying to prevent unauthorized power even in a cause within the subordinate tribunal’s jurisdiction, and McDowell vs. Bell on excess of jurisdiction in subjecting third-party property. Because the alimony order was made without jurisdiction and Yangco had no plain, speedy, adequate remedy, prohibition was proper. The opinion’s concluding sentence states that “mandamus is the proper remedy upon the facts related,” although the petition and the preceding analysis concern prohibition.

• Sufficiency of the Petition and Demurrer: The demurrer and motion to dismiss were overruled. The petition stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the respondent was authorized to answer within twenty days from the date of the decision. The Court did not decide whether an exception would lie if the fact of marriage were admitted of record, because Yangco denied it.

• Alimony pendente lite requires established civil status of marriage — Under the Civil Code, the right to support is based on civil status or juridical relation, and alimony is granted only to a wife. A court trying a divorce suit has jurisdiction over the suit but not to grant alimony pendente lite when the alleged marriage is denied and not established by final judgment. The claimant must prove the civil status of spouse; a mere allegation is a fact in issue, not an established right.
• Prohibition for excess of jurisdiction despite interlocutory order — Under the Code of Civil Procedure, prohibition arrests proceedings of an inferior tribunal when without or in excess of jurisdiction and no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists. The rule barring incidental appeals from interlocutory orders does not leave a party without remedy when the judge acts in excess of jurisdiction and the order causes irreparable damage.
• Jurisdiction over main action does not imply jurisdiction over incidents without accrued right — A court may have jurisdiction to try a divorce suit but still lack jurisdiction to grant alimony where the right to alimony has not accrued under substantive law. The writ may issue to prevent the exercise of unauthorized power in a cause within the lower court’s jurisdiction.
• Proof of marriage celebrated before the Civil Code — Marriages celebrated before the adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the means established by former laws, such as the canonical certificate. Without such proof and with marriage in litigation, no presumption of marriage arises.

• "The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only grants the rights to alimony to a wife. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on jurisdiction: the lower court may try the divorce but cannot grant alimony before the wife’s status is established by final judgment.
• "It is indeed a wise rule of procedure which refuses to permit the interruption of a trial by means of incidental appeals; but, if the judge incidentally in the course of a trial proceeds without or in excess of his jurisdiction, this rule which prohibits an appeal does not leave the party aggrieved without remedy." — This passage explains why the non-appealability of an interlocutory order does not bar prohibition when the order is issued in excess of jurisdiction.
• "In the present case the action for the support or alimony is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse — that is, a marriage, without which one has no right to the title to husband or wife." — This passage defines the substantive prerequisite for alimony: proof of the civil status of marriage, not mere allegation.
• "Prohibition arrests the proceedings of an inferior judicial tribunal or officer when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal or officer, and the writ issues in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." — This passage, quoted from the California decision in Havemeyer, states the canonical formulation of the prohibition remedy applied by the Court.

• Havemeyer & Co. vs. Superior Court, Judge Wallace (Cal., July 9, 1890) — Cited as an illustration that prohibition lies where a lower court exceeded jurisdiction and no plain, speedy, adequate remedy existed, and that an appeal is not adequate where the petitioner has a right to keep property rather than recover it after litigation.
• Quimbo Appo vs. People, 20 N.Y., 542 — Cited for the principle that prohibition lies to prevent the exercise of unauthorized power in a cause or proceeding of which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction, no less than when the entire cause is without jurisdiction.
• McDowell vs. Bell, judge of the superior court of Shasta County (Cal., Dec. 8, 1890) — Cited to illustrate that a judge exceeds jurisdiction when he subjects third-party property to satisfaction of a judgment, and that his only power was to authorize a separate action.
• Mayor of London vs. Cox, L.R., H.L., 278-280 — Cited for propositions on when want of jurisdiction must appear on the face of proceedings and when a preliminary objection is necessary before suing out prohibition.

• Article 143, Civil Code — Grants the right to support to spouses inter se, legitimate descendants and ascendants inter se, parents and certain legitimated and acknowledged natural children, other illegitimate children, and brothers and sisters. The Court applied it to hold that the basis of an action for support is a civil status or juridical relation, so a claimant alleging marriage must prove that status.
• Article 53, Civil Code — Provides that marriages celebrated before the adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the means established by former laws. The Court cited it to require proof of the alleged marriage.
• Articles 1591 and 1592, old Law of Civil Procedure — Required a person claiming provisional alimony or support to file documents proving conclusively the title by which it was sued for, and prohibited the judge from admitting the complaint without those documents. The Court used these provisions to show that alimony could not be granted on a mere interlocutory opinion.
• Article 516 in relation with Article 226, Code of Civil Procedure — Establishes the remedy of prohibition for proceedings without or in excess of jurisdiction and where there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The Court applied it to allow the petition despite the interlocutory nature of the alimony order.

Torres, Willard, and Ladd, JJ., concur. Smith and Mapa, JJ., did not sit in this case.

• Justice Cooper — Dissented. He regarded the majority as establishing an inequitable rule and an unauthorized practice for writs of prohibition. The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over divorce suits and their incidents, including alimony pendente lite, under Civil Code articles 103 and 107; the word “wife” in article 68 could not limit the court’s jurisdiction. The old Spanish procedural provisions, articles 1591-1599, were likely repealed by section 795 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under American practice, alimony is an incident and auxiliary proceeding to the divorce suit, and separating it would require multiplicity of suits. Because the court had power to hear and determine the issues, it did not exceed jurisdiction, and prohibition would not lie to correct errors; appeal was the ordinary remedy, and if inadequate, the legislature should provide relief. He also argued the majority’s rule would make alimony pendente lite impossible for a wife without resources and unable to give security, citing Bennet vs. Southard, 35 Cal., 691, and stating Havemeyer vs. Superior Court, 84 Cal., 327 did not conflict.