Yambao vs. Zuñiga

An employer is liable for damages caused by the negligence of an employee under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, and the employer's claim of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee must be proven with adequate and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence.

Petitioner Cecilia Yambao is the registered owner of a passenger bus with a public transport franchise. Respondents are the legal heirs of the late Herminigildo Zuñiga, who died after being hit by the petitioner's bus. The case involves the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code on employer liability for quasi-delicts committed by employees, as distinguished from the law on common carriers under Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the same Code.

Petitioner Cecilia Yambao is the registered owner of "Lady Cecil and Rome Trans" passenger bus with Plate No. CVK 606, holding a public transport franchise to ply the Novaliches-via Quirino-Alabang route. Respondents are the legal heirs of the late Herminigildo Zuñiga: Melchorita Zuñiga is the surviving spouse, while Leovigildo, Reginaldo, Herminigildo, Jr., and Lovely Emily are their children.

At around 3:30 p.m. of May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner was being driven by her driver, Ceferino G. Venturina, along the northbound lane of Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), within the vicinity of Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City. With Venturina was the bus conductor, Fernando Dumaliang. Suddenly, the bus bumped Herminigildo Zuñiga, a pedestrian. Such was the force of the impact that the left side of the front windshield of the bus was cracked. Zuñiga was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was given medical attention, but due to the massive injuries sustained, he succumbed shortly thereafter.

Private respondents, as heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint against petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for damages. The complaint essentially alleged that Venturina drove the bus in a reckless, careless and imprudent manner, in violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due regard to public safety, thus resulting in the victim's premature death. In her Answer, the petitioner denied the material allegations of the complaint, theorizing that Herminigildo bumped into her bus while avoiding an unidentified woman who was chasing him. She further alleged that she was not liable for any damages because as an employer, she exercised the proper diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of her bus driver.

The trial court found for the respondents, observing that the defense's theory that the victim bumped the bus was "incredible if not preposterous," as no sane person would bump his head or body against a running bus along a big highway. The trial court applied Article 1756 of the Civil Code, observing that petitioner had failed to prove that she observed the diligence required by Articles 1733 and 1755 of the said Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings that Venturina had been reckless and negligent, but found the trial court's reliance on Articles 1755 and 1756 misplaced, holding that this was a case of quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties. The appellate court found the petitioner directly and primarily liable as Venturina's employer pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code as she failed to present evidence to prove that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees.

• Proximate Cause: Petitioner argued that the victim Herminigildo Zuñiga was the one who bumped the bus and disregarded traffic rules and regulations, and that it was the victim's own negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of his death.
• Due Diligence of a Good Father of a Family: Petitioner contended that she exercised the proper diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of her driver, and therefore should be relieved from any liability for the latter's misdeed. She pointed out that when Venturina applied in January 1992, she required him to produce his driver's license, clearances from the NBI, the Philippine National Police, and the barangay, and his SSS Number. She also claimed she inquired from Venturina's previous employer about his employment record.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the respondents' arguments beyond their complaint allegations that Venturina drove the bus recklessly, carelessly, and imprudently, in violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due regard to public safety, resulting in the victim's premature death.

• Proximate Cause: Whether the victim Herminigildo Zuñiga was the one who bumped the bus owned by the petitioner and disregarded traffic rules, making his own negligence the immediate and proximate cause of his death.
• Employer's Due Diligence: Whether the petitioner is liable for damages, considering her claim that she exercised the proper diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her driver.

• Proximate Cause: No. The trial court's finding, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was Venturina's reckless and imprudent driving of petitioner's bus which was the proximate cause of the victim's death was sustained. Whether a person is negligent is a question of fact that the Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.
• Employer's Due Diligence: No. The petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on her part under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Her bare allegations of due diligence in the selection and supervision of her driver were unsubstantiated by evidence, and her own admissions showed that the driver submitted his requirements only on the very day of the fatal accident.

• Proximate Cause: The Court stated that the first issue raised by the petitioner is a factual one. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which the Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the trial court, and its findings on these matters are, as a general rule, binding on the Court, more so where these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court found no cogent reason to disregard the general rule or to reverse the factual findings of the trial court as upheld by the appellate court.

• Employer's Due Diligence: The Court held that the law governing petitioner's liability, as the employer of bus driver Venturina, is Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of the statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. When an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises a juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, the employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family.

The Court found that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption. Her claim that she required Venturina to submit his driver's license and clearances before hiring him was deemed worthless due to her failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence. Moreover, the petitioner contradicted herself: she declared that Venturina applied in January 1992 and she required him to submit his license and clearances, but she also admitted that Venturina submitted the said requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal accident itself. The Court also noted that even assuming the requirements were submitted in January 1992, the petitioner still failed the test of due diligence in selection, as case law teaches that an employer should not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license; he must also carefully examine the applicant as to his qualifications, experience, and record of service. The petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she verified Venturina's qualifications, safety record, and driving history.

Nor did the petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. She did not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees, and the record was bare of any showing that she required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, the petitioner could not claim exemption from liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina. The Court concluded that the petitioner's liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code was manifest and clear, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or the employer's own negligence.

• Juris Tantum Presumption of Employer Negligence — When an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises a juris tantum (rebuttable) presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption, as her bare allegations of due diligence were unsubstantiated by evidence.
• Diligence of a Good Father of a Family in Selection and Supervision — The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of Article 2180 means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. For an employer to have exercised this diligence in selection, he should not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, experience, and record of service. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she verified Venturina's qualifications, safety record, and driving history.
• Quasi-Delict vs. Common Carrier Liability — A quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code applies when there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the law on common carriers (Articles 1755 and 1756) was inapplicable to this case, as there was no pre-existing contractual relationship between the petitioner and the victim, a pedestrian.

• "The 'diligence of a good father' referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees." — This passage defines the scope of the employer's duty under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and is central to the Court's analysis of the petitioner's liability.
• "Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence." — This statement articulates the evidentiary standard applied by the Court in rejecting the petitioner's claim of due diligence, as she failed to offer certified true copies of the driver's license and clearances she allegedly required.
• "Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service." — This passage establishes the standard for due diligence in the selection of employees, which the petitioner failed to meet.

• Thermochem Incorporated vs. Naval, G.R. No. 131541, 20 October 2000, 344 SCRA 76 — Cited for the rule that whether a person is negligent is a question of fact, and that factual findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court.
• Almira vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115966, 20 March 2003 — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law.
• Mckee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 68102-03, 16 July 1992, 211 SCRA 517 — Cited for the rule that the resolution of factual issues is the function of the trial court, and its findings are binding on the Court, and for the definition of "diligence of a good father" as diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
• Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, G.R. Nos. 79050-51, 14 November 1989, 179 SCRA 384 — Cited for the doctrine that a juris tantum presumption of employer negligence arises when an employee causes damage while performing his duties.
• Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141089, 1 August 2002 — Cited for the rule that an employer must rebut the presumption of negligence by presenting adequate and convincing proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
• Manzano vs. Perez, Sr., 414 Phil. 728 (2001) — Cited for the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence.
• Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 125 Phil. 701 (1967) — Cited for the rule that an employer must not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license but must also examine the applicant's qualifications, experience, and record of service.
• Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, 21 June 1993, 223 SCRA 521 — Cited for the principle that the basis of employer liability under Article 2180 is the relationship of pater familias or the employer's own negligence.

• Article 2180, Civil Code — The governing law on employer liability for damages caused by employees. The Court applied this provision in holding the petitioner liable for the negligent acts of her driver, as she failed to prove that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employee.
• Article 2176, Civil Code — Defines a quasi-delict as fault or negligence causing damage to another where there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. The Court noted this provision in affirming the Court of Appeals' ruling that the case was a quasi-delict, not a breach of contract.
• Article 1756, Civil Code — Provides that in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The trial court applied this provision, but the Court of Appeals found it misplaced, as there was no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.
• Article 1733, Civil Code — Requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods and for the safety of passengers. The trial court cited this provision, but the Court of Appeals found it inapplicable to the case.
• Article 1755, Civil Code — Requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. The trial court applied this provision, but the Court of Appeals found it misplaced.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.