XXX261920 vs. People of the Philippines

A conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 requires proof that the woman's mental or emotional anguish was specifically caused by the act charged in the Information, and that the offender acted with criminal intent (mens rea), because offenses under Section 5(i) are mala in se, not mala prohibita. The actus reus is the willful commission of the predicate act, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman; both must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioner XXX261920 and private complainant AAA261920 were married on December 23, 2002 and had two children, BBB261920 and CCC261920. The marriage was marked by financial strain, with AAA261920 working as an Overseas Filipino Worker in Hong Kong while petitioner lacked stable employment. The dispute arose under Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, which penalizes, among other acts, causing mental or emotional anguish to a woman who is the wife of the offender through public ridicule, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody, or similar acts or omissions.

Petitioner XXX261920 and AAA261920 married on December 23, 2002 in La Union. Their union produced two children, BBB261920 and CCC261920. In 2007, the family lived in La Union with AAA261920's parents. AAA261920 went to Hong Kong to work as an Overseas Filipino Worker because petitioner had no stable job. While she was abroad, petitioner took their four-year-old child BBB261920 to Mindanao without her parents' consent and did not communicate with her for two years. She became depressed, could not eat, and could not focus on her work. Upon returning to the Philippines in 2010, she attempted to speak with petitioner, but he told her "Do not mind us anymore." She then traveled to Mindanao to find her son and reconcile with petitioner.

AAA261920 returned to Hong Kong in 2010 because her family needed financial support. Petitioner constantly demanded money from her, using their child as leverage — when she refused, he would not allow the child to speak with her online. She feared for her child, knowing petitioner was hot-tempered and might again take the child away. She eventually gave in, including giving petitioner ₱150,000.00 purportedly for an "under-the-table" payment for his appointment at the Bureau of Fire Protection. When her contract ended in 2014, she returned to the Philippines for good, and the family transferred to Pangasinan to live with petitioner's mother. There, petitioner verbally abused her, calling her "bobo," "buwisit," "basahan," and telling her "wala kang alam" and "lumayas ka." Petitioner was then transferred to a BFP station in another municipality in Pangasinan.

On May 29, 2017, petitioner and AAA261920 quarreled over petitioner's salary, which was insufficient to cover family expenses. Petitioner blamed her for mismanaging his earnings. Losing his temper, he told her to leave the house and get out of his life. AAA261920 was forced to leave their dwelling, taking their younger child CCC261920 with her to her family house in La Union. She wanted to bring BBB261920 as well, but he refused to go. She subsequently filed a complaint for support with the BFP, leading to an Agreement dated December 11, 2017 obligating petitioner to pay ₱5,000.00 as monthly support. On the night of January 12, 2019, petitioner left BBB261920 by the road outside AAA261920's house without informing her beforehand.

Petitioner was charged in two separate Informations for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262: Criminal Case No. 13025 for allegedly giving insufficient financial support, and Criminal Case No. 13026 for allegedly ousting AAA261920 and their two-year-old daughter from their conjugal dwelling in May 2017. Psychologist Jojet Lamberto R. Mondares testified that he administered various psychological tests on AAA261920 and found she was suffering from a Major Disorder, with severe depressive symptomology, elevated suicidal ideation, and feelings of worthlessness, attributing the disorder to "the abuses and repeated neglect coming from her husband." Petitioner claimed he had been giving ₱5,000.00 monthly support pursuant to the BFP Agreement, denied ousting AAA261920 and CCC261920, and testified that they left after a serious argument. He stated that from his gross salary of ₱43,000.00, he received only ₱5,000.00 net pay, which he gave as monthly support, and admitted having loans amounting to ₱300,000.00.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner maintained that the trial court in La Union had no jurisdiction over the cases against him because all the elements of the crime transpired in Pangasinan, and the prosecution failed to prove that any elements occurred in La Union.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the trial court's findings did not focus on the May 2017 ouster incident alleged in the Information, but instead discussed what transpired before the alleged ouster and its effects on AAA261920.
• Scope of Psychological Testimony: Petitioner claimed that the testimony of psychologist Mondares was not confined to the May 2017 incident or any of its supposed psychological effects on AAA261920.

• Elements Established: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that the lower tribunals correctly found that the prosecution established all the elements of the offense charged, asserting that the repeated verbal abuse upon AAA261920 and her forced removal from their conjugal dwelling caused her mental and emotional pain and anguish.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262, specifically the fourth element requiring that the anguish was caused through the act charged in the Information.
• Criminal Intent: Whether the prosecution proved that petitioner acted with criminal intent (mens rea) in ordering AAA261920 and their child out of the conjugal dwelling, as required for a mala in se offense under Section 5(i) of RA 9262.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The prosecution failed to establish the fourth element of the offense because the psychological assessment report attributed AAA261920's Major Disorder to a general pattern of abuse and neglect, not specifically to the May 2017 ouster incident, and thus no indubitable nexus between the act charged and the anguish was shown.
• Criminal Intent: No. The record was bereft of evidence that petitioner ordered AAA261920 and CCC261920 to leave the conjugal dwelling with a view to willfully and deliberately inflict mental or emotional anguish; the ouster resulted from a quarrel over finances, which does not rise to criminal intent.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court clarified that petitioner's criminal liability must hinge solely and exclusively on the act alleged in the Information — the ouster of AAA261920 and CCC261920 from the conjugal dwelling — as a necessary consequence of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. While the first two elements of Section 5(i) were undisputed (AAA261920 was petitioner's wife with whom he had children), and the third element (mental or emotional anguish) could be said to exist based on Mondares' conclusion that AAA261920 suffered from Major Disorder, the fourth element was not established. The Psychological Assessment Report only referenced a general pattern of abuse and neglect, not the May 2017 incident specifically. Mondares himself admitted his testimony was not confined to the May 2017 incident. The report, taken together with AAA261920's testimony, revealed that her Major Disorder could have been caused by any of the various quarrels and altercations between them over the years. The prosecution thus failed to show an indubitable nexus between the act complained of and the alleged anguish. Because the evidence admitted of an alternative interpretation, the Court applied in dubio pro reo, acquitting petitioner on reasonable doubt.

• Criminal Intent: Relying on Acharon vs. People, the Court held that crimes penalized under Section 5(i) of RA 9262 are mala in se, not mala prohibita, requiring concurrence of both actus reus and mens rea. Although Acharon specifically addressed denial of financial support, the Court found no cogent reason not to apply the same rationale to the other predicate acts under Section 5(i), including ouster from the conjugal dwelling. The actus reus is the willful commission of the predicate act, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish. The record showed the May 2017 incident resulted from petitioner's lost temper during a quarrel over finances — he accused AAA261920 of mismanaging their budget — which does not rise to the level of criminal intent, defined as the intentional doing of an act which the law declares to be a crime.

• Mala in se nature of Section 5(i) violations under RA 9262 — Crimes penalized under Section 5(i) and 5(e) of RA 9262 are mala in se, not mala prohibita, even though RA 9262 is a special penal law. The acts punished are inherently wrong or depraved, and the statutory language requires a mental element. There must be concurrence of both actus reus (the external or overt act or omission) and mens rea (the accused's guilty state of mind or criminal intent). For criminal liability to arise, there must be evidence that the accused willfully or consciously committed the predicate act for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. The Court extended this doctrine, originally articulated in Acharon vs. People in the context of denial of financial support, to all predicate criminal acts under Section 5(i), including public ridicule, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of custody, ouster from the conjugal dwelling, and similar acts or omissions.

• Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation — A person cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, if the same is not alleged or is not necessarily included in the Information filed against him. The accused's criminal liability must hinge solely and exclusively on the factual allegations in the Information, as a necessary consequence of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

• In dubio pro reo — When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right. When the prosecution's evidence admits of an alternative interpretation, the scales must be tilted in favor of the accused.

• "[T]he crimes penalized under Section 5(i) and 5(e) of RA 9262 are mala in se, not mala prohibita, even though RA 9262 is a special penal law. The acts punished therein are inherently wrong or depraved, and the language used under the said penal law requires a mental element. Being a crime mala in se, there must be a concurrence of both actus reus and mens rea to constitute the crime." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the nature of offenses under Section 5(i) of RA 9262, establishing that criminal intent must be proven, not merely the commission of the act.

• "[T]here must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. In other words, the actus reus of the offense under Section 5(i) is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman." — This passage defines the precise interplay between actus reus and mens rea under Section 5(i), providing the canonical formulation that the Court extended beyond financial support to all predicate acts.

• "[T]he prosecution failed to show an indubitable nexus between the act complained of and the alleged mental or emotional anguish on the part of AAA261920." — This statement captures the ratio decidendi for acquittal on the fourth element: the psychological harm must be specifically attributable to the act charged in the Information, not to a general history of abuse.

• Acharon vs. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on Acharon for the proposition that Section 5(i) violations are mala in se requiring proof of both actus reus and mens rea. Although Acharon dealt specifically with denial of financial support, the Court extended its rationale to all predicate acts under Section 5(i), including ouster from the conjugal dwelling. Acharon was also cited for the principle that an accused cannot be convicted of a crime not alleged or necessarily included in the Information.

• Dinamling vs. People, 761 Phil. 356 (2015) — Cited for the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition, and that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court. Also cited for the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262.

• Cruz vs. People, 821 Phil. 372 (2017) — Cited for the exception to the general rule on binding factual findings: when lower courts have ignored, overlooked, or misconstrued relevant facts that would change the outcome of the case.

• Zafra vs. People, 686 Phil. 1095 (2012) — Cited for the doctrine of in dubio pro reo: when moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right.

• Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) — Penalizes causing mental or emotional anguish to a woman who is the wife or former wife of the offender, or a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or a woman with whom the offender has a common child, through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children, or similar such acts or omissions. The Court applied this provision by requiring proof of all four elements, with particular emphasis on the fourth element — that the anguish must be caused through the specific act charged — and on the mens rea requirement flowing from the mala in se nature of the offense.

Lopez, J. (M. Lopez), Lopez, J., and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred. Leonen, SAJ., was on official leave.