XXX vs. People of the Philippines

A conviction under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of both psychological violence as the means employed and emotional anguish or mental suffering as the resulting effect on the offended party; mere failure to provide financial support, absent proof of willful intent or capacity to do so, does not constitute psychological violence — and economic abuse under Section 3(D) is penalized under Section 5(e), not Section 5(i).

The petitioner and AAA lived together from 1997 in a house owned by AAA's sister, BBB, in Tenejero, Balanga City, Bataan. Their child CCC was born on November 3, 2000, and the parties were officially married on May 17, 2001. AAA had no source of income and was entirely dependent on either petitioner or BBB for support. BBB, who had worked in the United States and received a US pension, shouldered much of CCC's private school expenses. The prosecution was brought under Republic Act No. 9262, the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004," which penalizes, under Section 5(i), causing mental or emotional anguish to a woman or her child through, among other acts, denial of financial support.

The petitioner and AAA began living together in 1997 in a house owned by AAA's sister, BBB, in Tenejero, Balanga City. Their child, CCC, was born on November 3, 2000, and the parties were officially married on May 17, 2001. AAA had no source of income and was entirely dependent on either petitioner or BBB for support. Petitioner worked as a mechanic in Makati City, commuting home to Balanga on weekends, and gave AAA and CCC between P1,000 and P2,000 per month. BBB, who had worked in the United States and received a US pension, shouldered much of CCC's expenses — including enrollment at Bataan Montessori, a private school, and later Asia Pacific — remitting US$1,000 per month. It was at BBB's behest that AAA did not work, so that AAA could care for their father, who had suffered a stroke, and later attend to BBB during hospital confinements.

Sometime in 2005, petitioner stopped coming home and providing support. AAA sought barangay conciliation in Arellano, Orion, where it was agreed that petitioner would provide P4,000 per month. Petitioner gave only P1,000 once and then ceased contact. AAA later chanced upon petitioner at a Chowking restaurant in the company of another girl. In 2016, she filed the criminal complaint because BBB was already too sick to continue supporting her and CCC.

Petitioner's account diverged materially. He testified that AAA was violent and harassing — she had thrown a stainless dustpan at him, scarring the lower left portion of his stomach — and that he left in 2005 because of her behavior. He claimed he provided money whenever he could, including P15,000 after one of AAA's siblings died, P3,000 for AAA's false teeth, and CCC's tuition at Bataan Montessori in 2006. During barangay conciliation on August 9, 2005, petitioner offered P1,000 to P2,000 per month plus CCC's education at a public school, but AAA and BBB insisted on private schooling. AAA refused the offer and filed an abandonment case, which was dismissed after she admitted that petitioner had been providing P4,000 monthly despite being unemployed. Petitioner admitted that after the barangay proceedings, he stopped providing support. He worked as a mechanic at his father's shop from 2005 to 2010, when the shop closed. In 2011, he was diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease. On November 29, 2013, one month after his father's death, AAA again complained before the prosecutor's office; petitioner again offered to give what he could, but AAA refused. Presently, petitioner lives with his mother, is without a job, and is supported by his siblings and mother for his daily needs.

Petitioner presented expert witness Jesselyn Mortejo, a licensed counseling psychologist and psychometrician, who conducted structured clinical interviews and screening instruments — including the PTSD Diagnostic Scale for DSM 5 — and found that petitioner suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder with pronounced avoidance symptoms and paranoid ideations, directly caused by AAA's public humiliation, physical violence, and threats. Mortejo testified that these symptoms incapacitated petitioner from working outside the home, though he was not insane, retained moral reasoning, and understood his obligation to support his daughter. She explained that petitioner could function normally only within the security of his home with his mother, and that cognitive-behavioral therapy could manage his symptoms and eventually restore his capacity to work. A barangay official, Remigio Aguilar, testified that no amicable settlement was reached because AAA abruptly stormed out of the conciliation proceedings. Petitioner's neighbor, Nancy Dalisay San Jose, testified that she had witnessed AAA confronting petitioner and threatening to ruin his life.

The RTC convicted petitioner, giving full weight to the prosecution evidence and finding all elements of Section 5(i) proven. The trial court rejected the defense, noting that petitioner had worked and earned as a mechanic from 2005 to 2010, that he appeared "very normal without any paralysis in the body, healthy, swift, strong and good-looking," and that he was able to post bail and hire a private lawyer. The CA affirmed with modification, adding a fine of P100,000 and mandatory psychological counseling, noting only that the RTC forgot to apply Section 6(f) of R.A. 9262.

• Failure vs. Denial of Support: Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in not distinguishing between "failing to provide" and "denying" support, the latter connoting willful intent not to provide. He maintained that there was no evidence of such intent, as he had offered to give support based on his capacity to earn but was refused by AAA. He admitted he may have failed to provide support but not in the manner contemplated as an element of a violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
• Indolence vs. Incapacity: Petitioner argued that the evidence did not support the RTC's conclusion that his failure to provide support was due to mere indolence. He took issue with the RTC's view that he was fit to work based merely on the judge's observation that he appeared healthy, strong, and without physical paralysis, especially in light of Mortejo's professional opinion that he was suffering from PTSD. He also argued that it should not be taken against him that he hired a private lawyer, as such was made possible only through the financial support of his siblings.
• Dismissal of Expert Testimony: Petitioner contended that the RTC was unduly dismissive of Mortejo's expert testimony that his incapacity to work was due to paranoid ideations caused by his PTSD.

• All Elements Proven: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained that all elements of the crime charged were duly proven at trial.
• Economic Abuse as Psychological Violence: The OSG countered that economic abuse under Section 3(D) of R.A. 9262, specifically withdrawal of financial support or deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources, is a form of violence that may fall within the purview of Section 5(i). The OSG prayed that the CA's decision be affirmed in toto.

• Elements of Section 5(i): Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's conviction when the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the indispensable elements of psychological violence and emotional anguish under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
• Intent and Capacity to Provide Support: Whether the petitioner's failure to provide financial support constituted willful denial given his attempts to negotiate support that were refused and his PTSD-incapacitated earning capacity.
• Economic Abuse vs. Psychological Violence: Whether economic abuse under Section 3(D) of R.A. 9262 is equivalent to psychological violence penalized under Section 5(i), or is instead penalized under Section 5(e).

• Elements of Section 5(i): No. The third and fourth elements — psychological violence and emotional anguish — were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution having failed to establish that the petitioner's failure to provide support was willful or that it caused AAA's mental and emotional distress.
• Intent and Capacity to Provide Support: No. The petitioner's failure to provide support was not voluntary; he attempted to negotiate support within his means but was refused, and his PTSD and paranoid ideations, while not constituting insanity, incapacitated him from earning.
• Economic Abuse vs. Psychological Violence: No. Economic abuse under Section 3(D) is penalized under Section 5(e), not Section 5(i); the two are categorically distinct, Congress having defined them separately. The variance doctrine could not be applied to convict under Section 5(e) because the petitioner's inability to provide support was not upon his own volition.

• Elements of Section 5(i): The Court emphasized that Section 5(i) is distinguished from other violations of Section 5 by the indispensable requirements of psychological violence as the means employed and emotional anguish or mental suffering as the effect on the offended party. Citing Dinamling vs. People, the focus of Section 5(i) is the causation of non-physical suffering. While the prosecution established that petitioner denied support for CCC, there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt that this constituted psychological violence or caused AAA's distress. The records showed petitioner was willing to provide support and had attempted to negotiate at the barangay and before the City Prosecutor's Office, offering P1,000 to P2,000 per month plus public school education. AAA refused because the amount was insufficient for private schooling. The Court found that petitioner was not unwilling to provide support per se but could not meet AAA's aspirations; this indicated he did not willfully set out to cause psychological violence, even when AAA was constantly harassing him. Consequently, the Court could not conclude beyond reasonable doubt that he caused AAA's emotional distress.
• Intent and Capacity to Provide Support: The Court recognized that while criminal intent need not be proved for mala prohibita under special penal laws such as R.A. 9262, the prosecution still bears the burden to prove that the prohibited act was intentional or voluntary. Citing People vs. Lacerna, the Court reaffirmed the distinction between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act: if a person did not intend to perpetrate the act defined by law as the crime itself, he is not guilty. Here, the evidence showed petitioner could not provide support because (1) AAA prevented him from doing so by refusing what he could offer, and (2) he was suffering from an incurable mental illness — PTSD with paranoid ideations — which, though not sufficient to constitute insanity, was of a degree that effectively incapacitated him from earning. Mortejo's expert testimony established that petitioner's distorted thinking and avoidance symptoms prevented him from performing minimal role expectations such as finding a job, even though he was physically capable and understood his obligation. The law will not punish a person when he suffers from a mental debilitation that deprived him of the mental faculties necessary to perform an obligation.
• Economic Abuse vs. Psychological Violence: The Court rejected the OSG's view that economic abuse under Section 3(D) is equivalent to psychological violence under Section 3(C), noting that Congress defined them separately. Citing Melgar vs. People, the Court ruled that economic abuse is penalized under Section 5(e), not Section 5(i). In Melgar, the Court applied the variance doctrine and found the accused guilty under Section 5(e) after the prosecution failed to prove mental or emotional anguish under Section 5(i). In the present case, the prosecution likewise failed to prove that petitioner caused mental or emotional anguish, but the Court declined to convict under Section 5(e) because petitioner's inability to provide support was not upon his own volition.

• Elements of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 — The elements are: (1) the offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) the woman is the wife, former wife, or a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or a woman with whom the offender has a common child, and the child may be legitimate or illegitimate; (3) the offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (4) the anguish is caused through denial of financial support or similar acts. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator; emotional anguish or mental suffering is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The focus of Section 5(i) is the causation of non-physical suffering. The Court applied this framework and found that while elements one and two were proven, elements three and four were not established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Intent in Mala Prohibita — While criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita under special penal laws, the prosecution still bears the burden to prove that the prohibited act was intentional or voluntary. There is a distinction between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act: a person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime, but if he did intend to commit an act that is by its nature the crime itself, he can be held liable. Conversely, if a person did not intend to perpetrate the act defined by law as the crime, he is not guilty. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner did not intend to deny support — he attempted to provide it but was prevented by AAA's refusal and his own PTSD-incapacitated condition.

• Distinction Between Economic Abuse and Psychological Violence — Economic abuse under Section 3(D) of R.A. 9262 (withdrawal of financial support, deprivation of financial resources, destroying household property, controlling the victim's money) is penalized under Section 5(e), not Section 5(i). Psychological violence under Section 3(C) (acts or omissions causing mental or emotional suffering such as intimidation, harassment, stalking, public ridicule, repeated verbal abuse, marital infidelity) is a separate category penalized under Section 5(i). The two are categorically distinct, Congress having defined them separately. The Court applied this distinction to reject the OSG's argument that economic abuse falls within Section 5(i).

• "The law will not punish a person when he suffers from a mental debilitation which deprived him of the mental faculties necessary to perform an obligation." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: a mental illness that incapacitates a person from fulfilling a legal obligation, even if it does not constitute insanity, negates the voluntariness required for conviction under a special penal law.

• "What distinguishes Section 5(i) from the other violations of Section 5 of R.A. 9262, are the indispensable requirements of (1) psychological violence; and (2) emotional anguish or mental suffering. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party." — This defines the canonical formulation of the elements unique to Section 5(i), distinguishing it from other violations under Section 5 of R.A. 9262.

• "There is a well-settled distinction between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act – and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself – then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum." — This states the doctrine governing intent in mala prohibita prosecutions, which the Court applied to exonerate the petitioner for lack of intent to perpetrate the act of denying support.

• "There is a categorical difference between psychological violence and economic abuse." — This terse declaration rejects the conflation of economic abuse with psychological violence, establishing that the two are separately defined and separately penalized under R.A. 9262.

• Dinamling vs. People, 761 Phil. 356 (2015) — Controlling precedent cited for the four elements of a violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 and for the principle that the focus of Section 5(i) is the causation of non-physical suffering. The Court relied on this formulation to assess whether the prosecution proved psychological violence and emotional anguish.

• Melgar vs. People, 826 Phil. 177 (2018) — Followed for the ruling that economic abuse under Section 3(D) is penalized under Section 5(e), not Section 5(i). In Melgar, the variance doctrine was applied to convict under Section 5(e) after the prosecution failed to prove emotional anguish under Section 5(i). The Court distinguished the present case from Melgar by declining to apply the variance doctrine, because petitioner's inability to provide support was not voluntary.

• People vs. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100 (1997) — Cited for the distinction between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act in mala prohibita prosecutions. The Court applied this principle to hold that petitioner did not intend to perpetrate the act of denying support.

• People vs. Aranda, 297 Phil. 630 (1993) — Cited for the basic principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all elements of the crime charged.

• Araza vs. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020 — Cited for the distinction between psychological violence as the means employed and emotional anguish as the effect sustained by the offended party.

• Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004) — Penalizes causing mental or emotional anguish to a woman or her child through, among other acts, denial of financial support. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable elements of psychological violence and emotional anguish beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 3(C), Republic Act No. 9262 — Defines "psychological violence" as acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim, including but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse, and marital infidelity. The Court held that this is categorically distinct from economic abuse.

• Section 3(D), Republic Act No. 9262 — Defines "economic abuse" as acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent, including withdrawal of financial support, deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources, destroying household property, and controlling the victim's money or properties. The Court held that economic abuse is penalized under Section 5(e), not Section 5(i).

• Section 5(e), Republic Act No. 9262 — Penalizes attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in or desist from conduct, or restricting freedom of movement by force or threat, including depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due, or deliberately providing insufficient financial support. The Court declined to convict under this provision because petitioner's inability to provide support was not voluntary.

• Section 6(f), Republic Act No. 9262 — Provides penalties including a fine and mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment. The CA noted the RTC's failure to apply this section and added a fine of P100,000 and mandatory counseling to the sentence, which was ultimately reversed.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.