XXX vs. Court of Appeals

A judgment awarding support in a criminal case for violation of RA 9262 is akin to a protection order and is immediately executory under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, such that execution pending appeal does not require a showing of "good reason" under Rule 39, Section 2; the appellate court nonetheless retains discretion under Section 4 to suspend, modify, or grant the award upon proper terms for the protection of the adverse party's rights.

Petitioner XXX and private respondent AAA are legally married spouses with a minor child, BBB. The case arises from a criminal charge under Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262, the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," which penalizes economic abuse, including the deliberate deprivation of financial support to control a woman's conduct. RA 9262 provides for protection orders under Section 8, which may include the relief of directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child. Section 22 of the law makes the provisions on protection orders applicable in criminal cases and/or in civil actions deemed impliedly instituted therein. A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," supplements the law procedurally: Section 33(b) deems a petition for protection order instituted with the criminal action unless separately reserved, and Sections 30 and 31 declare judgments granting protection immediately executory and provide that appeals shall not stay enforcement.

Petitioner XXX and private respondent AAA are legally married spouses with a minor child, BBB. According to the Information filed in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-17-03746-CR, on or about March 2013 and persisting up to the present, petitioner willfully and unlawfully committed economic abuse upon AAA and BBB by deliberately depriving them of financial support for the purpose of controlling AAA's conduct — specifically, to compel her to allow him to regularly visit their child as a condition for the grant of support — thereby depriving them of their basic needs. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262 before Branch ██ of the RTC of Quezon City.

On October 28, 2019, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as maximum. In addition, petitioner was ordered to pay a fine of PHP 100,000.00, to undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the court, and to pay private respondent and BBB monthly support of PHP 15,000.00, as well as unpaid accumulated monthly support of PHP 15,000.00 reckoned from March 2013 up to the present.

Petitioner thereafter applied for probation and moved for partial reconsideration of the civil liability, contending that the RTC failed to consider that he was unemployed during a certain period of the case's pendency and was therefore not capable of giving support. He prayed that the portion of the Decision ordering him to give monthly support be deleted. The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated December 6, 2019, stating that the issues raised had already been resolved in the Decision. Petitioner then elevated the civil aspect of the case to the CA via a Notice of Appeal.

Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Pending Appeal before the CA, seeking execution of both the future monthly support of PHP 15,000.00 and the unpaid accumulated monthly support of PHP 15,000.00 reckoned from March 2013. The CA partially granted the motion on May 31, 2021, allowing execution as to future support but denying it as to support in arrears. The CA reasoned that under Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal requires a good reason, and while Section 4 of the same Rule sufficed as a good reason for future support, private respondent's dire financial straits did not constitute a good reason for executing the arrears. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on April 18, 2022, prompting the present Petition for Certiorari.

• Misapplication of Rule 39, Section 4: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in applying Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court because the provision pertains to judgments in actions for support, while the present case involves a judgment for civil liability arising from a criminal offense.
• Support Not Automatically Included: Petitioner contended that an action for support is not automatically included in a case for violation of RA 9262.
• Contractual Support: Petitioner maintained that the amount of support awarded by the RTC was based on a contract entered into between him and private respondent on February 5, 2013, making it contractual support under Article 208, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, which is subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.
• Diminished Financial Capacity: Petitioner averred that while he had the capacity to pay PHP 15,000.00 monthly in 2013, his financial means had significantly diminished and he was presently no longer gainfully employed.
• Pre-empting the Appeal: Petitioner argued that the civil liability which private respondent sought to execute was the subject of his pending appeal before the CA, and the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal may have the effect of pre-empting the CA's decision on appeal.

• Irrelevance of Liability Nature: Private respondent countered that the nature of petitioner's liability, whether ex delicto or an independent civil liability, is irrelevant as to whether the judgment should be executed pending appeal.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Private respondent maintained that petitioner failed to establish that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed Resolutions.
• Better Threshed Out on Appeal: Private respondent pointed out that the amount of support is better threshed out in the main appeal and not in the present petition.
• Entitlement to Support Pendente Lite: The OSG, representing the People of the Philippines, insisted that private respondent and BBB are entitled to support during the pendency of the case pursuant to Rule 61, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, considering that the civil aspect of the crime had not been waived, reserved, or instituted prior to the filing of the criminal case.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal insofar as it ordered petitioner to pay future monthly support.
• Applicable Legal Basis: Whether Rule 39, Section 4 (judgments not stayed by appeal) or Rule 39, Section 2 (discretionary execution) of the Rules of Court is the proper basis for execution pending appeal of a support award in a criminal case for violation of RA 9262.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in partially granting execution pending appeal as to future support, the grant being duly supported by factual and legal justifications.
• Applicable Legal Basis: Rule 39, Section 4 is the proper basis. The award of support in a RA 9262 case is akin to a protection order, immediately executory under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, and falls under Rule 39, Section 4, which does not require a "good reason." The CA's reliance on Rule 39, Section 2 was misplaced.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The CA partially granted private respondent's motion, allowing execution as to future support of PHP 15,000.00 monthly but denying it as to support in arrears. While the CA relied on the wrong provision — Rule 39, Section 2, which requires a "good reason" stated in a special order — the result was correct. The RTC's award of support may be deemed a protection order under Section 11(h) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, as it granted relief to private respondent and BBB. Being akin to a protection order, the judgment is immediately executory under Sections 30 and 31 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, and falls under Rule 39, Section 4, which covers judgments "declared to be immediately executory." The CA's partial grant — allowing future support but not arrears — was a proper exercise of its discretion under the exception in Rule 39, Section 4, which allows the appellate court to suspend, modify, or grant the award of support upon proper terms for the security or protection of the adverse party's rights. No grave abuse of discretion was committed; petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief was denied for patent lack of merit.
• Applicable Legal Basis: Section 22 of RA 9262 provides that the provisions on protection orders shall be applicable in criminal cases involving violence against women and their children and/or in the civil actions deemed impliedly instituted therein. A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, Section 33(b), reiterates that a petition for protection order is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party reserves the right to file it separately. Sections 30 and 31 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provide that judgments granting protection are immediately executory and that appeals shall not stay enforcement. The RTC's award of support falls under Section 11(h) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, which directs the respondent to provide support. Being akin to a protection order, the judgment falls under Rule 39, Section 4, not Section 2. Unlike Section 2, Section 4 does not require a good reason for execution pending appeal. However, Rule 39, Section 4 also provides that the appellate court may, in its discretion, suspend, modify, restore, or grant the award of support, and that the stay of execution shall be upon such terms as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party. This is why the CA could partially grant the motion — allowing future support while denying arrears — as a proper exercise of discretion under the circumstances.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Protection Orders under RA 9262 — Judgments granting protection orders under RA 9262 and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC are immediately executory, and appeals therefrom do not stay enforcement. In this case, the RTC's award of support in a criminal case for violation of RA 9262 was deemed akin to a protection order under Section 11(h) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, making it immediately executory under Sections 30 and 31 thereof and falling under Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. The requisites are: (1) the case involves a criminal action for violation of RA 9262; (2) the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted therein unless separately reserved; and (3) the judgment grants relief in the nature of a protection order, including support.
• Execution Pending Appeal — Rule 39, Section 4 vs. Section 2 — Under Rule 39, Section 4, judgments in actions for support and such other judgments as are declared to be immediately executory are enforceable upon rendition and are not stayed by appeal, without requiring a "good reason." In contrast, Rule 39, Section 2 (discretionary execution) requires three conditions: (1) the prevailing party must file a motion; (2) there must be a good reason for the issuance of a writ of execution; and (3) the good reason must be stated in a special order. The CA erred in relying on Section 2 when Section 4 was the proper basis, as the support award was akin to a protection order declared immediately executory by A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. However, even under Section 4, the appellate court retains discretion to suspend, modify, or grant the award of support upon proper terms for the security or protection of the adverse party's rights, as illustrated by the CA's partial grant — allowing future support but denying arrears.

• "In the case, the RTC Decision, insofar as the award of support is concerned, may be deemed as a protection order as it granted a relief to private complainant and BBB under Section 11(h) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. Being akin to a protection order, the judgment falls under Section 4 of Rule 39 because A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly provides that it shall be immediately executory. For this reason, the CA's reliance on Rule 39, Section 2 pertaining to the discretionary execution of judgments is misplaced." — This is the ratio decidendi, establishing that support awards in RA 9262 criminal cases are akin to protection orders and immediately executory under Rule 39, Section 4, not Section 2.
• "Unlike Section 2 of the same Rule upon which the CA anchored the assailed Resolutions, Section 4 does not require a good reason for the execution of a judgment pending appeal." — This distinguishes the two provisions and clarifies that no "good reason" need be shown for execution of judgments falling under Rule 39, Section 4.
• "Consequently, while a writ of execution may be issued directing petitioner to pay support to private respondent and BBB on the basis of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the CA may nonetheless suspend or modify the award of support, upon such terms as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of petitioner." — This establishes that even under Rule 39, Section 4, the appellate court retains discretion to suspend or modify the award, which justified the CA's partial grant.

• National Power Corp. vs. Heirs of Antonina Rabie, 793 Phil. 479 (2016) — Cited for the three conditions of execution pending appeal under Rule 39, Section 2: (1) the prevailing party must file a motion; (2) there must be a good reason; and (3) the good reason must be stated in a special order. Followed as the standard for discretionary execution, though the Court ultimately held Section 2 was the wrong basis for this case.
• Villote vs. Cangco, G.R. No. 207132 & 207205, April 14, 2015 — Cited for the principle that under Rule 39, Section 4, while judgments in actions for injunction are enforceable upon rendition and not stayed by appeal, the appellate court may in its discretion make an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting the injunction as an exception. Applied by analogy to support awards, justifying the CA's discretion to partially grant the motion.

• Section 5(e)(2), RA 9262 — Defines economic abuse as depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing insufficient financial support. Petitioner was charged and convicted under this provision for conditioning support on visitation rights.
• Section 8, RA 9262 — Defines protection orders and enumerates reliefs, including under subsection (g) directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support, with automatic withholding from the respondent's income or salary.
• Section 22, RA 9262 — Provides that the provisions on protection orders shall be applicable in criminal cases and/or in civil actions deemed impliedly instituted with criminal actions involving violence against women and their children. This was the statutory basis for treating the support award as akin to a protection order.
• Sections 30 and 31, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC — Provide that judgments granting protection orders are immediately executory and that appeals shall not stay enforcement of the final order or judgment. These provisions placed the support award within Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
• Section 33(b), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC — Provides that where the offended party files a criminal action, the petition for protection order is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party reserves the right to institute it separately. This established that the protection order was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
• Rule 39, Section 2, Rules of Court — Governs discretionary execution pending appeal, requiring a motion by the prevailing party, a good reason, and a special order stating the good reason. The CA relied on this provision, but the Supreme Court held it was misplaced.
• Rule 39, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that judgments in actions for support and other judgments declared immediately executory are enforceable upon rendition and not stayed by appeal, without requiring a good reason; the appellate court may in its discretion suspend, modify, or grant the award. The Supreme Court held this was the proper basis for execution of the support award.
• Rule 61, Section 6, Rules of Court — Provides for support pendente lite in criminal cases where the civil liability includes support for the offspring and the civil aspect has not been waived, reserved, or instituted prior to filing. The OSG cited this provision to argue entitlement to support during the pendency of the case.
• Article 208, Family Code — Provides that contractual support is subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. Petitioner invoked this provision to argue that the support award was contractual and subject to modification given his diminished financial capacity.

Caguioa, Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concur.