XXX vs. AAA, BBB, and Minor CCC

Republic Act No. 9262 is a valid exercise of police power; its classification limiting protection to women and children is based on substantial distinctions, is germane to the law’s purpose of addressing gender-based violence, and applies equally to all members of the protected class, thus not violating the equal protection guarantee. The ex parte issuance of temporary protection orders does not deny due process because the urgency of preventing further violence justifies the procedure, and the respondent is subsequently afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. A woman who cohabits with a man and bears his children is a “woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship” within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the law. Adult children may be designated as family or household members in a protection order under Section 8(d) when necessary to prevent further violence and minimize disruption in the victim’s life, the statutory definition of “children” as persons below eighteen years of age notwithstanding.

XXX and AAA lived together as husband and wife from the early 1980s, during which time they had three children, two of whom survived to adulthood. XXX was married to another woman throughout the relationship. After their separation in 2007, AAA filed criminal complaints against XXX for physical, psychological, sexual, and economic violence, and simultaneously sought protection orders under Republic Act No. 9262. XXX countered by challenging the constitutionality of the statute and the applicability of its protective measures to a paramour and to children who had reached the age of majority.

The Relationship: XXX and AAA began a romantic relationship in 1982 while AAA was employed and XXX, then 47, was a contractor. XXX disclosed that he was already married to EEE but was estranged from her. AAA became pregnant with their first child in 1985, after which XXX made her resign from work and live with him. The couple had three children together: BBB (born 1986), DDD (1989, who died of brain cancer at age eight), and CCC (born 1990). They cohabited for over two decades at various addresses, including a house built on property XXX had purchased.

Allegations of Abuse: In her complaint-affidavit, AAA alleged that throughout the relationship XXX committed physical, psychological, sexual, and economic violence. He forbade her from working, isolated her from friends, dictated her clothing, and verbally abused her with degrading remarks. After arguments he would abandon the family and provide only meager support, ranging from PHP 1,000 to PHP 2,000 weekly through an employee. XXX forced sexual intercourse upon her three to four times a week even during a difficult pregnancy, coerced her into sex daily for a month while their daughter was dying in a hospital, and compelled her to perform oral sex shortly after his open-heart surgery while he suffered from amoebiasis. In January 2007, during a heated argument, XXX struck AAA twice in the face with his forearm. AAA further claimed that XXX maintained multiple sexual relationships with other women, a fact she learned in July 2007 from his long-time employee.

The Separation and Demand Letter: The couple finally separated on June 24, 2007 when XXX abandoned the household and stopped providing financial support. Through counsel, AAA subsequently sent a demand letter seeking PHP 50 million representing support for the children, presumptive legitimes, and compensation for her years of hardship.

XXX’s Defenses: XXX denied the allegations. He asserted that he had purchased properties for AAA and the children, including a condominium unit, and was giving them PHP 230,000 monthly from June 2007. He claimed that AAA was forcing him to obtain a PHP 5 million loan and execute deeds of sale in her favor without consideration. He characterized the criminal charges as a pressure tactic to coerce him into acceding to her demands. He argued that the law did not apply to AAA because she was merely his paramour, and that the children were already adults.

Proceedings Below and the Protection Order: The Regional Trial Court initially issued a Temporary Protection Order on November 16, 2007, which ordered XXX to stay away, prohibited him from communicating with AAA and the children, awarded her exclusive possession of the family home, and directed him to pay support pendente lite of PHP 279,650 monthly. After multiple extensions and hearings, the trial court rendered a Permanent Protection Order on March 6, 2009. The court found that the issues of support and damages had become moot because the children had attained majority and AAA, not being married to XXX, was not entitled to legal support, and there was insufficient evidence of further violent acts after the separation. Nevertheless, to prevent future violence and minimize disruption, the court made the Temporary Protection Order permanent, imposing, among others, a 500-meter stay-away radius, exclusive possession of the residence, and firearm prohibition.

• Equal Protection: Petitioner argued that Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause by affording protection exclusively to women and children, without a rational basis for distinguishing men as perpetrators of psychological and economic abuse.
• Due Process: Petitioner maintained that the ex parte issuance of temporary protection orders and the concomitant reliefs—custody of children, exclusion from the residence, and mandatory support—deprive the respondent of property, reputation, and parental rights without prior notice and hearing, in violation of procedural due process.
• Scope of Coverage — Paramour and Adult Children: Petitioner contended that AAA, being his mistress or paramour, does not fall within the law’s intended protection, which he asserted applies only to legally married couples or those without legal impediment to marry. He further claimed that respondents BBB and CCC, having attained the age of majority, are excluded from the definition of “children” under Section 3(h) and cannot be beneficiaries of a protection order.
• Conflict with Court Rules: Petitioner argued that the automatic grant of support pendente lite upon filing an application for a protection order renders Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure useless; that the immediate award of child custody deprives the noncustodial parent of the remedies under A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC (Rule on Custody of Minors); and that the prohibition on mediation in protection order cases contravenes A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, which promotes alternative dispute resolution.
• Improper Exercise of Police Power: Petitioner asserted that because Republic Act No. 9262 violates equal protection and due process, its enactment is an invalid exercise of police power.
• Economic Abuse: In his supplemental petition, petitioner sought a judicial declaration that mere intermittent failure to give support does not constitute economic abuse under Section 5(e)(2) of Republic Act No. 9262.

• Propriety of Remedy and Justiciability: Respondents moved for outright dismissal, arguing that Rule 45 was an improper remedy to challenge the constitutionality of a statute; the proper action was a petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court. They contended that the constitutional issue was not raised at the earliest opportunity in the trial court and that the petition violated the hierarchy of courts.
• Presumption of Constitutionality: Respondents asserted that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that Republic Act No. 9262 is constitutional.
• Coverage of the Law: Respondents countered that AAA, as a live-in partner with whom XXX had a common child, is expressly covered by Section 3(a) as a “woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” They further argued that the law does not distinguish based on legal impediment and that adult children may be included in a protection order as family or household members.
• Finality: Respondents emphasized that the Permanent Protection Order was immediately executory and had become final, and that petitioner had not shown compelling reasons for the Supreme Court to entertain the direct appeal.

• Nature of Questions Raised: Whether the petition raised purely questions of law cognizable under Rule 45.
• Timeliness of Constitutional Challenge: Whether the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 was raised at the earliest opportunity.
• Equal Protection: Whether Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause by limiting its protection to women and children.
• Due Process: Whether the provisions on ex parte issuance of protection orders and the accompanying reliefs violate the right to due process of the person against whom the order is sought.
• Exercise of Police Power: Whether Republic Act No. 9262 is an invalid exercise of police power for contravening constitutional guarantees.
• Coverage of Live-in Partner: Whether AAA, as a live-in partner of a married man and with whom he has a common child, is covered by the definition of “violence against women and their children” under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9262.
• Inclusion of Adult Children: Whether respondents BBB and CCC, who had reached the age of majority, may be included as beneficiaries of a protection order under Republic Act No. 9262.
• Conflict with Court Issuances: Whether the protection order remedies under Republic Act No. 9262 conflict with A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA (mediation), A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC (custody of minors), and Rule 61 (support pendente lite).
• Definition of Economic Abuse: Whether mere intermittent failure to give support constitutes economic abuse under Section 5(e)(2) of Republic Act No. 9262.

• Nature of Questions Raised: The petition was properly brought under Rule 45. The relevant facts—that AAA was petitioner’s longtime live-in partner, the birthdates of their children—were undisputed; the determination of whether the trial court erred in issuing the Permanent Protection Order based on those settled facts presented a pure question of law.
• Timeliness of Constitutional Challenge: The constitutional question was not raised at the earliest opportunity. While petitioner invoked constitutional provisions in his Motion to Dismiss before the trial court, he did not explicitly assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 nor raise it as a distinct legal issue; the pleading merely argued that AAA, as a paramour, was not within the law’s coverage. Consequently, the challenge could have been dismissed on this procedural ground alone.
• Equal Protection: Even if the constitutional challenge were considered on the merits, Republic Act No. 9262 does not violate the equal protection clause. Following Garcia v. Drilon, the classification is valid because (1) it rests on substantial distinctions—the unequal power relationship between men and women and the prevalence of violence against women; (2) it is germane to the law’s purpose of addressing violence against women and children, consistent with the State’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and other international instruments; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions but applies to future acts of violence; and (4) it applies equally to all women and children who suffer abuse, including those in lesbian relationships, as the perpetrator can be any “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman.
• Due Process: The ex parte issuance of temporary protection orders does not violate procedural due process. The urgency of preventing further violence and the risk of irreparable harm justify the immediate grant of relief without prior hearing, analogous to a writ of preliminary attachment. Due process is satisfied because the respondent is served with notice, furnished with copies of the petition and the temporary order, and given the opportunity to file an opposition and be heard through pleadings and at the scheduled hearing before the order is made permanent.
• Exercise of Police Power: Because Republic Act No. 9262 was not shown to violate equal protection or due process, the argument that it is an invalid exercise of police power is without basis. A law is presumed constitutional, and the grounds for nullity must be established beyond reasonable doubt, which petitioner failed to do.
• Coverage of Live-in Partner: AAA is covered by Republic Act No. 9262. The law defines “violence against women and their children” to include acts committed against a woman with whom the perpetrator “has or had a sexual or dating relationship,” which, under Section 3(e), includes a situation where the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. AAA, as petitioner’s longtime live-in partner and the mother of his children, unmistakably falls within this definition. Nothing in the statute limits its application to relationships without legal impediment; where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
• Inclusion of Adult Children: Adult children may be included in a protection order as designated family or household members. Following Estacio v. Estacio, Section 8(d) of Republic Act No. 9262 and Section 11(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC empower the court to require the respondent to stay away from “any designated family or household member,” without limitation as to age. The definition of “children” under Section 3(h) applies for purposes of defining the primary victims of abuse, but does not restrict the broader class of family members who may be protected by the order. The law mandates a liberal construction to advance its objectives of safeguarding the victim from further harm and minimizing disruption in her daily life.
• Conflict with Court Issuances: The protection order provisions do not conflict with the cited rules. The expanded reliefs in a protection order are complementary to, and do not supplant, the remedies under the Rule on Custody of Minors or Rule 61; they serve the specific purpose of promptly protecting victims of domestic violence. The prohibition on mediation is justified because violence is not a proper subject for compromise; the victim often cannot participate on equal footing with the perpetrator.
• Definition of Economic Abuse: The Court declined to rule on whether intermittent failure to give support constitutes economic abuse, as that issue was the subject of a separate criminal case pending before the trial court and was unnecessary to the resolution of the propriety of the protection order.

• Valid classification under the equal protection clause (Garcia v. Drilon test) — A legislative classification is valid if it (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class. Republic Act No. 9262 satisfies this test by targeting violence against women and children based on the unequal power dynamic and historical patterns of abuse.
• Due process in ex parte protection orders — The ex parte issuance of a temporary protection order under Republic Act No. 9262 does not violate due process. The immediate risk of further harm justifies provisional relief without prior notice and hearing; procedural due process is met when the respondent is thereafter given notice of the charges and a reasonable opportunity to be heard through pleadings and adversarial hearings.
• Liberal construction of protection orders to include adult family members — Protection orders under Republic Act No. 9262 may cover adult children as “designated family or household members” under Section 8(d) whenever necessary to prevent further violence and minimize disruption in the victim’s life. The statutory definition of “children” as those below eighteen years of age does not circumscribe the court’s discretion to designate other family members.
• No distinction based on legal impediment to marry — The protection of Republic Act No. 9262 extends to any woman with whom the perpetrator has or had a sexual or dating relationship, including a live-in partner, regardless of whether a legal impediment to marry exists. The law does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate relationships.

• “The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. ‘To be heard’ does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.” — This passage reaffirms the flexible nature of procedural due process, particularly in the context of protection orders under Republic Act No. 9262.
• “Pursuant to the State policy of protecting women and children from violence and threats to their security and safety, this Court will not interpret a provision of Republic Act No. 9262 as to make it powerless and futile.” — This declaration of the Court’s interpretative policy underscores the liberal and purposive approach mandated by the law.

• Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) — Controlling precedent followed in its entirety. The Supreme Court relied on this case to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 against challenges based on equal protection and due process, to explain the validity of the legislative classification, and to justify the ex parte nature of temporary protection orders.
• Estacio v. Estacio, G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020 — Instructive and followed. Relied upon for the ruling that adult children may be included as designated family or household members in a protection order, and that the definition of “children” under Section 3(h) does not restrict the class of persons who may be protected.
• Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 588 Phil. 532 (2008) — Cited for the principle that Republic Act No. 9262 is a remedial statute that must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of protecting women and children from violence.
• Dabalos v. RTC, Branch 59, Angeles City, 701 Phil. 56 (2013) — Cited to reinforce the State policy of interpreting the law in a manner that empowers the protection of women and children from violence.

• Republic Act No. 9262, Section 3(a), (e), (f), (h) — Defined “violence against women and their children” to include acts committed against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child. “Dating relationship” includes living as husband and wife without marriage. The definition of “children” as those below eighteen years of age was read in harmony with broader provisions on protection orders.
• Republic Act No. 9262, Sections 8, 15, and 16 — Set out the nature and reliefs of protection orders, including the authority to designate family or household members as beneficiaries, and the procedure for ex parte issuance of temporary protection orders followed by notice and hearing for permanent orders.
• Republic Act No. 9262, Section 33 — Prohibits the court or barangay officials from ordering or influencing the applicant to compromise or abandon the reliefs sought; this justified the non-referral of protection order cases to mediation.
• A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children), Sections 4(b), 4(c), 11 — Defined “children” and “members of the family,” and enumerated the reliefs available in a protection order, including directing the respondent to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household member.
• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 1 (Due Process) and Equal Protection Clause — Invoked by petitioner; the Court found no violation because the law provided adequate procedural safeguards and rested on a valid classification.

Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, and Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. concurred. No separate concurring opinions were recorded.

None.