Wright vs. Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co.

Mere intoxication does not constitute negligence per se; it is but a circumstance to be considered with other evidence tending to prove negligence, and no greater degree of care is required of an intoxicated person than of a sober one.

The defendant, Manila Electric Railroad & Light Company, was a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff, E. M. Wright, maintained a residence in Caloocan fronting on the street along which the defendant's tracks ran, obliging him to cross the tracks to enter his premises. The action was for damages for personal injuries sustained in an accident occurring on the night of August 8, 1909.

The defendant, Manila Electric Railroad & Light Company, operated an electric street railway in Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff, E. M. Wright, resided in Caloocan on a street along which the defendant's tracks ran, so that crossing the tracks was necessary to enter his premises from the street.

On the night of August 8, 1909, plaintiff drove home in a calesa. In crossing the tracks to enter his premises, the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to collide with the rails. The sudden stop threw plaintiff from the vehicle, resulting in the injuries complained of. It was undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed, not only the rails were above ground, but the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails some five or six inches or more above the level of the street.

The defendant admitted negligence in maintaining its tracks in such condition but contended that plaintiff was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly, and that such intoxication was the primary cause. According to the defendant, the "principal occurrence" was plaintiff's fall from the calesa, and his intoxication contributed to that fall — had he been sober, he would have crossed the track safely as he had done a hundred times before.

The trial court found both parties negligent, holding that plaintiff's negligence, though less than defendant's, contributed to the damages. Relying on Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep. 359), the court apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff P1,000. Both parties appealed — the defendant on the ground that it was not liable, and the plaintiff on the ground that the damages were insufficient. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on statutory grounds; the motion was denied, and proper exception was taken, conferring upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction to determine questions of fact. However, not all testimony from the trial was transmitted to the appellate court: evidence taken at a second hearing on September 28 was not included in the record, though evidence from the first hearing on August 31 was present. The Supreme Court therefore declined to consider even the evidence that was before it and was relegated to the facts stated in the trial court's opinion and the pleadings.

• Defendant's Negligence vs. Plaintiff's Intoxication: The defendant contended that its negligence consisted in failing properly to maintain the track, while plaintiff's negligence consisted in his intoxication. The "principal occurrence" was plaintiff's fall from the calesa, and plaintiff's intoxication contributed to that fall — if he had been sober, he would have crossed the track safely as he had done a hundred times before.
• Contributory Negligence Bar: The defendant argued that if plaintiff's negligence contributed to the "principal occurrence," he cannot recover; if it contributed only to his own injury, the trial court was correct in apportioning damages.

• Contributory Negligence — Intoxication: Whether the plaintiff was negligent, and if so, whether his negligence contributed to the principal occurrence or only to his own injury.
• Damages — Adequacy of Award: Whether the trial court's award of P1,000 should be modified.

• Contributory Negligence — Intoxication: No. The plaintiff was not negligent. Mere intoxication is not negligence per se but a circumstance to be considered with other evidence; the trial court's opinion contained no facts beyond intoxication supporting the conclusion that plaintiff's condition caused the accident.
• Damages — Adequacy of Award: The P1,000 award was affirmed, the Court finding no facts in the trial court's opinion justifying a larger verdict.

• Contributory Negligence — Intoxication: The Court examined the trial court's opinion and found that it stated no facts supporting the conclusion that plaintiff was negligent. The only basis was plaintiff's intoxication, as established by the testimony of Dr. Kneedler, the attending physician. However, intoxication is not negligence per se — it is merely a circumstance to be considered with other evidence tending to prove negligence. No greater degree of care is required of an intoxicated person than of a sober one; if one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether drunk or sober. The trial court's conclusion that a sober man would not have fallen was speculative: a horse crossing tracks with rails and ties protruding above ground, stumbling and falling, with the vehicle crashing against the rails with sufficient force to break a wheel, could throw any person from the vehicle regardless of condition. To conclude that a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. Numerous American authorities were cited in support of the proposition that intoxication alone does not establish negligence.
• Damages — Adequacy of Award: Having found that plaintiff was not negligent, the question of apportioning damages under Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. became unnecessary. However, the Court found no facts in the trial court's opinion justifying a larger verdict than the P1,000 awarded, and the award was accordingly affirmed.

• Intoxication as Negligence — Mere intoxication does not constitute negligence per se. It is but a circumstance to be considered with other evidence tending to prove negligence. No greater degree of care is required of an intoxicated person than of a sober one; if one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether drunk or sober. The Court applied this doctrine to reverse the trial court's finding of contributory negligence, holding that the trial court's opinion contained no facts beyond intoxication to support the conclusion that plaintiff was negligent or that his condition caused the accident.

• "It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the doctrine that intoxication is not negligence per se, establishing the ratio decidendi of the case.
• "to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork." — This explains why the trial court's finding of contributory negligence was unsupported by the facts, applying the doctrine to the specific circumstances of the protruding rails and ties.
• "It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence." — This defines the evidentiary status of intoxication in negligence analysis: it is probative but not conclusive, and must be weighed alongside other evidence.

• Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co., 7 Phil. Rep. 359 — Cited by the trial court as authority for apportioning damages between parties both found negligent. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to discuss its applicability after determining plaintiff was not negligent.
• Ward vs. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 85 Wis. 601; H & T. C. R. Co. vs. Reason, 61 Tex. 613; Alger vs. Lowell, 3 Allen, Mass. 402; Central R. R. Co. vs. Phinazee, 93 Ga. 488; Maguire vs. Middlesex R. R. Co., 115 Mass. 239; Meyer vs. Pacific R. R. Co., 40 Mo. 151; Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. vs. Drake, 33 Ill. App. 114 — American authorities cited in support of the proposition that intoxication is not negligence per se and that no greater degree of care is required of an intoxicated person than of a sober one.
• Conlan vs. Grace, 36 Minn. 276 — Cited in the dissent for the proposition that findings of fact should contain only ultimate facts forming the issues, not evidentiary facts or the processes by which conclusions were reached.

• Act No. 190, sec. 133 — Cited in the dissenting opinion for the rule that the statement of facts must contain only those facts essential to a clear understanding of the issues presented and the facts involved, supporting the view that the trial court's ultimate finding of negligence was sufficient without detailing all evidentiary facts.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, J., and Araullo, J.

• Carson, J. — Dissented on two grounds. First, the parties should have been given an opportunity to correct the accidental omission of part of the transcript before judgment was pronounced, as both parties labored under the mistaken impression that all evidence was in the record. Second, the trial court's findings of fact sufficiently established plaintiff's negligence: the trial judge expressly found that if plaintiff had been prudent and not driven while intoxicated, he would have avoided the damages. The dissent argued that a trial court is required to set forth only ultimate facts forming the issues, not all evidentiary facts underlying those conclusions, citing Act No. 190, sec. 133 and Conlan vs. Grace (36 Minn. 276). The finding of negligence was an ultimate fact, and the appellate court should assume that evidentiary facts disclosed at trial sustained it if the record was not examined.