Wong vs. Carpio

A person who enters upon real property and excludes another who has prior physical possession is liable for forcible entry, and the act of entering and excluding the lawful possessor necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, which is all that is necessary. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom.

The case involves a parcel of coconut land, Lot 3 (LRC) Pcs-295, situated at Colonga, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-4244) T-972. The land was originally owned by William Giger, who sold it to private respondent Manuel Mercado through a deed of sale with right to repurchase (pacto de retro) in 1972 for ₱3,500.00, and subsequently executed a new deed of pacto de retro sale (Exhibit "A") on November 5, 1973, for an additional ₱2,500.00. The dispute arose when the same property was later sold to petitioner Ignacio Wong, creating competing claims of possession between two purchasers from the same vendor.

Private respondent Manuel Mercado acquired rights to possess a parcel of coconut land in Colonga, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur, from William Giger through a deed of sale with right to repurchase executed in 1972 for ₱3,500.00. In 1973, Giger asked for an additional ₱2,500.00, and Mercado required Giger to sign a new deed of pacto de retro sale (Exhibit "A") on November 5, 1973, before Notary Public Gregorio C. Batiller in Davao City. Beginning in 1972, Mercado harvested coconut fruits from the land, paid the taxes on the property for Giger, and periodically visited the land to make copra. However, Mercado never placed any person on the land to watch it, did not reside there, and did not put any sign or hut to show actual possession. He knew that laborers were on the land as early as August 1976 and that they had a hut there, but he did nothing to stop them; instead, he was happy that there were people and a hut on the land.

Before July 1976, petitioner Ignacio Wong went to the land to find out if there were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner, and he found none. In July 1976, Wong bought the parcel of land from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela (Exhibit 5). After the execution of the sale, Wong asked for the delivery of the title and took possession of TCT No. (T-4244) T-974 in the name of William Giger. Wong declared the land for taxation purposes in his name, attempted to register the pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the registration fee, but due to technicalities, the sale could not be registered. Wong placed laborers on the land, built a small farm house after making clearings, fenced the boundaries, and placed signboards.

On September 27, 1976, Mercado again went to the land to make copra, and the matter was brought to the attention of the police of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur, with the incident entered in the police blotter (Exhibit 11). On November 18, 1976, Wong ordered the hooking of coconuts from the land, and nobody disturbed him. On November 29, 1976, Wong received a copy of Mercado's complaint for forcible entry with summons. During the pendency of the forcible entry case, spouses William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed a case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First Instance of Digos, Davao del Sur against Mercado, pertaining to Exhibit "A."

The Municipal Court found that Wong had prior, actual, and continuous physical possession and dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of First Instance drew a completely different conclusion from the same set of facts, ruling in favor of Mercado and finding that he had taken possession of the property earlier in point of time, that Wong was an intruder, and ordering Wong to return possession and pay monthly rental of ₱400.00 from August 1976 until the property is returned.

• Lack of Prior Possession: Petitioner argued that private respondent's periodic visits to the lot to gather coconuts may have been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the owner for the purposes of paying an obligation due to the person gathering said nuts, and that a person who enters a property to gather coconut fruits and convert them to copras may only be a hired laborer entering the premises every harvest season to comply with a contract of labor with the true owner.

• Absence of Force, Intimidation, Threat, Strategy, or Stealth: Petitioner questioned whether his entry to the property was characterized by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth in order to show that private respondent had prior possession so that the case would be within the jurisdiction of the inferior court.

• Lack of Basis for Rental Award: Petitioner argued that there was no legal or factual basis for the payment of monthly rentals because bad faith on his part was never proved.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the private respondent's arguments beyond the factual findings and the lower court's ruling in his favor.

• Prior Possession: Whether private respondent established prior physical possession of the disputed property sufficient to maintain an action for forcible entry.
• Character of Entry: Whether petitioner's entry into the property was characterized by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth as required for forcible entry.
• Rental Award: Whether the award of monthly rentals in favor of private respondent has legal and factual basis, and from what date such rentals should be computed.

• Prior Possession: Yes. Possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro (Exhibit "A"), and the later sale a retro (Exhibit 5) in favor of petitioner failed to pass possession because of the impediment of private respondent's existing possession.

• Character of Entry: Yes. The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force.

• Rental Award: Yes, but with modification. The award of rentals is in order, but the computation of the monthly rental should start from December 1976 instead of August 1976, because petitioner's good faith ceased upon service of summons on November 29, 1976.

• Prior Possession: The Court applied Article 531 of the Civil Code, which provides that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." The Court also cited the principle that the execution of a sale through a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the thing, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. However, if notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. Applying these principles, possession passed from Giger to Mercado through the first sale a retro, and the subsequent sale to Wong failed to pass possession because of the impediment of Mercado's existing possession. The Court further cited Article 538 of the Civil Code, which provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in cases of co-possession, and that should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

• Character of Entry: The Court answered petitioner's query in the affirmative, holding that the act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. The Court cited the rule that entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force, and that the foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. The Court quoted Tolentino's Civil Code commentary and cited Drilon vs. Gaurana for the proposition that if a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of a person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.

• Rental Award: The Court applied Article 528 of the Civil Code, which provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The Court cited the principle that possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Such interruption takes place upon service of summons, citing Manotok Realty vs. Judge Tecson and Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap. The Court noted that petitioner received private respondent's complaint for forcible entry with summons on November 29, 1976, and therefore his good faith ceased on that date. Accordingly, the computation of the monthly rental should start from December 1976 instead of August 1976.

• Acquisition of Possession — Under Article 531 of the Civil Code, possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that possession passed from the vendor to the first purchaser through the execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase.

• Delivery Through Public Instrument — The execution of a sale through a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. However, if notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the second sale to petitioner failed to pass possession because of the impediment of private respondent's existing possession.

• Preference in Case of Conflicting Possessions — Under Article 538 of the Civil Code, possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

• Force Implied from Exclusion — The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary for forcible entry. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom.

• Cessation of Good Faith Possession — Under Article 528 of the Civil Code, possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Such interruption takes place upon service of summons.

• "It should be stressed that 'possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right.' (Art. 531, Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on acquisition of possession and delivery through public instrument, which formed the basis for the Court's conclusion that possession passed to private respondent through the first sale a retro.

• "The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine that force is implied from the act of exclusion, which is the foundation of the forcible entry action.

• "Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner." — This passage defines when good faith possession ceases, which the Court applied to determine that petitioner's good faith ended upon service of summons on November 29, 1976.

• Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 (1985) — Cited as authority for the definition of acquisition of possession under Article 531 of the Civil Code.

• Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 (1987) — Cited for the proposition that forcible entry can be maintained even without actual force where a trespasser enters upon land and excludes a prior possessor, as force is necessarily implied from the acts of planting oneself on the ground and excluding the other party.

• Manotok Realty vs. Judge Tecson, 164 SCRA 587 (1988) — Cited for the rule that interruption of good faith possession takes place upon service of summons.

• Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap, 13 SCRA 190 (1965) — Cited for the holding that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons.

• Article 531, Civil Code — Defines how possession is acquired: by material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. Applied to determine that possession passed to private respondent through the first sale a retro.

• Article 538, Civil Code — Provides the rules of preference when a question arises regarding the fact of possession: the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit. Applied to resolve the conflicting claims of possession between the two purchasers.

• Article 528, Civil Code — Provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Applied to determine when petitioner's good faith ceased.

• Articles 544 and 1123, Civil Code — Cited through Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap for the rule that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.