Wilson vs. Ermita

A writ of mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a purely ministerial duty, and the petitioner must establish a clear legal right to the relief sought. The View issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol is merely recommendatory and does not, by itself, confer upon an individual a legal right enforceable through mandamus against the State, absent a domestic law transforming such View into municipal law.

Albert Wilson is a British national who was charged with and convicted of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and sentenced to death. The Philippines is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Optional Protocol thereto, having ratified the ICCPR on October 23, 1986, and the Optional Protocol on August 22, 1989. Republic Act No. 7309 created the Board of Claims under the Department of Justice to evaluate and investigate claims for compensation for persons unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal, among others.

Albert Wilson, a British national, was accused and charged on September 16, 1996, with consummated rape by a 12-year-old girl, the daughter of his Filipina live-in partner, who was assisted by her biological father in filing the criminal complaint. Wilson was immediately taken into custody. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, found Wilson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape in its Decision dated September 30, 1998, and imposed the death penalty pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, ordering him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Pending appeal, on June 15, 1999, Wilson filed with the United Nations Human Rights Committee, pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol, a case against the Republic of the Philippines for violations of the ICCPR, specifically Articles 2, paragraphs 2 and 3; 6; 7; 9; 10, paragraphs 1 and 2; and 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 6. In its Decision dated December 21, 1999, the Supreme Court reversed the RTC ruling, finding serious discrepancies and inconsistent statements in the victim's testimony and concluding that there was not enough evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court acquitted Wilson and ordered his immediate release from custody unless held for some other legal cause.

Wilson was released from detention the day after the acquittal and immediately left the Philippines for the United Kingdom. Upon his return, Wilson sought compensation from the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice pursuant to R.A. No. 7309 as one who was unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal. On January 1, 2001, the BoC-DOJ awarded Wilson P14,000.00, and on February 21, 2001, he was informed that he had to claim the compensation in person in the Philippines. Wilson moved for reconsideration, arguing that under R.A. No. 7309 he was entitled to P40,000.00. On April 23, 2001, the BoC-DOJ informed Wilson that a memorandum was issued directing the BOC to raise the award to the maximum amount subject to the availability of funds. Wilson applied for but was denied a tourist visa to travel to the Philippines due to his presence in the Bureau of Immigration watch list, which the BI attributed to his overstaying and his previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The BoC-DOJ thereafter issued Resolution No. 2001-25 dated August 24, 2001, granting Wilson an additional award of P26,000.00, bringing the total award to P40,000.00. In September 2001, the DOJ issued a check for P26,000.00 representing the additional award, made out to Wilson care of the Ambassador of the UK at his request.

On November 11, 2003, the Committee issued the View, finding that the allegations under Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the ICCPR were inadmissible. The Committee stated that the State party was under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, that the State party should compensate the author for violations of Article 9, and that compensation for violations of Articles 7 and 10 suffered while in detention should take due account of the seriousness of the violations and the damage caused. The Committee also stated that the State party should refund moneys claimed from the author for immigration fees and visa exclusion, and that all monetary compensation should be made available at the venue of the author's choice.

In a letter dated June 19, 2008, Wilson, through counsel, asked the Executive Secretary to take steps to effect payment of compensation, direct the BOC to release the sums awarded to his authorized representatives, and direct the BI to refund the amount unjustly imposed for overstaying. In a letter dated October 20, 2008, Wilson reiterated his request and asked that payment of compensation be effected, a comprehensive and impartial investigation be conducted, and monies paid for immigration fees and visa exclusion be refunded. On October 29, 2008, the letter was referred by the Executive Secretary to the DOJ Secretary for appropriate action. On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present petition for mandamus, insisting on his entitlement to the writ owing to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, arguing that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation, the RP is in breach of an international obligation since any View issued by the Committee constitutes part of international law.

• Enforceability of the View: Wilson insisted on his entitlement to the writ of mandamus owing to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, arguing that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation, the RP is in breach of an international obligation since any View issued by the Committee constitutes part of international law and the RP is obligated to enforce the same.
• Prayed Relief: Wilson prayed that respondents take steps to ensure he is paid and given reparation in an amount sufficient to compensate him for the torture and abuse he suffered under the penal system of the Philippines, in compliance with Philippine treaty obligations in the ICCPR as embodied in the Committee's Communication, and that respondents undertake efforts to ensure no torture and inhuman and degrading treatment are suffered by prisoners in the National Penitentiary and other places of detention, in the manner laid down in the Manila Bay case.

• Lack of Domestic Legislation: The RP, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that Wilson was not able to prove that there is any national law giving life to the ICCPR and Optional Protocol in order for it to have force and effect in the jurisdiction as required under Article 2(2) of the ICCPR.
• Recommendatory Nature of the View: The OSG averred that the findings of the Committee are merely recommendatory and do not give rise to an obligation to enforce and implement the View, and thus the View cannot be used to compel the Philippine Government to compensate Wilson.
• Prior Compensation: The OSG argued that Wilson's documents show that BoC-DOJ had already awarded him P40,000.00 pursuant to R.A. No. 7309, and it was of Wilson's own volition that the amount remains unclaimed.
• Inapplicability of Manila Bay: The OSG disagreed that the Manila Bay case is applicable because, unlike that case, the petitioner seeks to enforce international law and not domestic law.

• Ministerial Duty: Whether mandamus lies to compel the enforcement of the United Nations Human Rights Committee's View against the Republic of the Philippines.

• Ministerial Duty: No. Mandamus does not lie to compel the enforcement of the Committee's View. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus requires a purely ministerial duty and a clear legal right, neither of which was established. The View is merely recommendatory, not a per se decision enforceable outright, and Wilson had already been granted the maximum compensation under R.A. No. 7309.

• Ministerial Duty: The Court examined whether the View dated November 11, 2003, relied upon by Wilson, confers upon him any legal right which the respondents are ministerially required to perform but have unlawfully neglected. It is well-settled that a ministerial duty must be clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.

The Court noted that R.A. No. 7309 was passed on March 30, 1992, creating a BoC-DOJ to evaluate and investigate claims for compensation for persons who were: (1) unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal; (2) unjustly detained and released without being charged; (3) a victim of arbitrary or illegal detention and released without being charged; and (4) a victim of a violent crime. Under R.A. No. 7309, compensation for victims of unjust imprisonment or detention is based on the number of months of imprisonment, not exceeding P1,000.00 per month. Wilson was granted the maximum allowed compensation under that law, and it was his decision not to collect the money granted to him. Other than R.A. No. 7309, there is no other law or regulation that forms the basis of such ministerial right that the government is impelled to grant. Wilson did not present any law by which his ministerial right arises with respect to additional compensation, and it is not within the Court's discretion to adjust any monetary grant arbitrarily.

The Court further addressed whether Wilson had a clear and complete legal right. The Philippines became a party to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol on December 19, 1966, and ratified the ICCPR on October 23, 1986, and the Optional Protocol on August 22, 1989. The Court, citing the case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Health Sec. Duque III, stated that a treaty is transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, which provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.

The Court concluded that there must be an act more than ratification to make a treaty applicable in the jurisdiction. What was ratified were the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol; nowhere in the instrument does it say that the View of the Committee forms part of the treaty. The Committee itself, in its General Comment No. 33, stated that while the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering individual communications is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision. Any View issued by the Committee only displays "important characteristics of a judicial decision" and are not per se decisions which may be enforced outright. These Views are mere recommendations to guide the State against which they are issued. The Court stressed that it is beyond its purview to act on such recommendations, as these are matters best taken up by the Legislative and Executive branches of government, as can be seen by the formation of the Presidential Human Rights Committee. The Court derives its powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The Court found that there is no ministerial duty and clear legal right which would justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

• Mandamus requires a purely ministerial duty and a clear legal right — For the writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner must establish a clear legal right to the relief sought and a mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in relation thereto. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The Court applied this doctrine in denying Wilson's petition, finding that no ministerial duty existed on the part of the respondents to enforce the Committee's View.

• Transformation method of incorporating international law — Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, while ratified, do not automatically make the Committee's View enforceable as domestic law.

• Views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee are recommendatory — The views issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision but are not per se decisions which may be enforced outright. These Views are mere recommendations to guide the State against which they are issued. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the View relied upon by Wilson does not confer upon him a legal right enforceable through mandamus.

• "A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment." — This passage defines the controlling standard for determining whether a ministerial duty exists for purposes of mandamus, and the Court applied it to find that no such duty existed on the part of the respondents.

• "The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that '[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.'" — This passage articulates the doctrine of transformation as applied to treaties in the Philippine jurisdiction, forming the basis for the Court's conclusion that the Committee's View does not automatically become part of domestic law.

• "Any View issued by the Committee only displays 'important characteristics of a judicial decision' and are not per se decisions which may be enforced outright. These Views, therefore, are mere recommendations to guide the State it is issued against." — This passage establishes the recommendatory nature of the Committee's Views, which was the central ground for denying the petition for mandamus.

• Yuvienco vs. Hon. Canonoy, etc., et al., 148-A Phil. 532 (1971) — Cited as controlling precedent for the settled principles that mandamus lies only to compel a tribunal, board, or officer to comply with a purely ministerial duty, and that the petitioner must establish a clear legal right to the relief sought and a mandatory duty on the part of the respondent.

• Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. Hon. Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016 — Cited for the definition of a purely ministerial act or duty, which the Court applied in determining that no ministerial duty existed on the part of the respondents.

• Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Health Sec. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386 (2007) — Cited for the doctrine of transformation and incorporation of international law into domestic law, which the Court applied in holding that the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, while ratified, do not automatically make the Committee's View enforceable.

• People vs. Wilson, 378 Phil. 1023 (1999) — Referenced as the prior ruling in which the Supreme Court reversed the RTC conviction and acquitted Wilson of the charge of consummated rape.

• Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., 595 Phil. 305 (2008) — Distinguished by the Court as inapplicable because, unlike the Manila Bay case, Wilson sought to enforce international law and not domestic law.

• Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Defines the requisites for a petition for mandamus, requiring that a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, and that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this provision in determining that Wilson failed to establish a ministerial duty and clear legal right.

• Article VII, Section 21, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. The Court applied this provision in explaining the transformation method of incorporating treaties into domestic law.

• Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The Court cited this provision in explaining that it is beyond its purview to act on the Committee's recommendations.

• Republic Act No. 7309 — An Act creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for victims of unjust imprisonment or detention and victims of violent crimes. The Court applied this statute in finding that Wilson had already been granted the maximum compensation allowed thereunder.

• Section 3, R.A. No. 7309 — Lists who may file claims for compensation before the Board, including any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. The Court applied this provision in determining Wilson's entitlement to compensation.

• Section 4, R.A. No. 7309 — Provides the award ceiling for victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, stating that compensation shall be based on the number of months of imprisonment and shall not exceed P1,000.00 per month. The Court applied this provision in finding that Wilson received the maximum compensation.

• Article 2, ICCPR — Requires each State Party to take the necessary steps to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant, and to ensure that any person whose rights are violated shall have an effective remedy. The Court considered this provision in the context of the OSG's argument that no national law gives life to the ICCPR.

• Article 7, ICCPR — Provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The Committee found violations of this article, which the Court considered in the context of the View.

• Article 9, ICCPR — Provides for the right to liberty and security of person and the right to compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention. The Committee found violations of this article and stated that the State party should compensate the author.

• Article 10, ICCPR — Provides that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. The Committee found violations of this article, which the Court considered in the context of the View.

• Article 14, ICCPR — Provides for the right to a fair and public hearing, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, and the right to compensation when a conviction has been reversed. The Committee declared allegations under this article inadmissible.

• Article 41, ICCPR — Recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. The Court cited this provision in explaining the organization of the Committee.

• Article 1, Optional Protocol — Provides that State parties agree to recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any rights set forth in the ICCPR. The Court cited this provision in explaining the basis for Wilson's communication to the Committee.

• Justice Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson)
• Justice Peralta
• Justice Perez
• Justice Jardeleza