Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy

A marriage vitiated by force exerted upon both parties is voidable, not void, and remains valid until annulled by a competent court; consequently, a subsequent marriage contracted before the first is annulled is void. Furthermore, a marriage that is void by reason of a spouse's pre-existing prior marriage still requires a judicial declaration of nullity, and until such declaration is obtained, the parties are regarded as married for all legal purposes.

Lilia Oliva Wiegel and Karl Heinz Wiegel were married in July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila. Prior to that marriage, Lilia had contracted a marriage with Eduardo A. Maxion on June 25, 1972 at Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Karl Heinz Wiegel subsequently filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City on the ground of Lilia's prior subsisting marriage to Maxion. The case was governed by the Civil Code provisions on void and voidable marriages, as the relevant marriages were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code.

Karl Heinz Wiegel and Lilia Oliva Wiegel were married in July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila. Prior to this marriage, Lilia had contracted a marriage with Eduardo A. Maxion on June 25, 1972 at Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Karl Heinz thereafter filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, alleging that Lilia's prior marriage to Maxion was subsisting and thus rendered their own marriage void.

Lilia admitted the existence of the prior marriage but claimed it was null and void, asserting that both she and Maxion had been forced to enter the marital union. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on a single issue: assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties to the first marriage, was that prior marriage void or merely voidable? Lilia thereafter sought to present evidence on two points: first, that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and Maxion, and second, that Maxion was already married to someone else at the time of their 1972 ceremony.

The respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence, holding that the existence of force exerted on both parties to the first marriage had already been agreed upon. The court issued an order dated March 17, 1980 compelling the parties to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts," and a subsequent order dated April 14, 1980 denying Lilia's motion to present evidence in her favor. Lilia then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, assailing both orders.

• Force as a Ground for Nullity: Petitioner maintained that her first marriage to Eduardo A. Maxion was null and void because both she and Maxion were forced to enter the marital union, and that she should be allowed to present evidence of such force.
• Prior Marriage of the First Husband: Petitioner argued that she should be permitted to introduce evidence that Maxion was already married to someone else at the time of their 1972 marriage, which would render their marriage void.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner contended that the respondent judge erred in denying her the opportunity to present evidence in her favor by compelling the case to be submitted for resolution based solely on "agreed facts."

• Legal Effect of Force on a Marriage: Whether a marriage vitiated by force exerted upon both parties is void or merely voidable.
• Effect of a Pre-existing Marriage of the First Spouse: Whether the first husband's pre-existing marriage at the time of the first marriage renders that marriage void without need of judicial declaration.
• Propriety of the Pre-Trial Order: Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner the opportunity to present evidence and in compelling submission of the case based on agreed facts.

• Legal Effect of Force on a Marriage: No. A marriage vitiated by force on both parties is merely voidable under Article 85 of the Civil Code and remains valid until annulled; absent a prior annulment, the first marriage subsisted, making the second marriage void under Article 80.
• Effect of a Pre-existing Marriage of the First Spouse: No. Even if the first husband had a prior existing marriage, such that the first marriage would be void, a judicial declaration of nullity is still required, and absent such declaration, petitioner would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted the second marriage.
• Propriety of the Pre-Trial Order: No. The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion, as the agreed facts were sufficient to resolve the case; the evidence petitioner sought to present would not alter the legal outcome.

• Legal Effect of Force on a Marriage: The Court applied Article 85 of the Civil Code, which classifies marriages vitiated by force as voidable, not void. A voidable marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court. Because the parties had agreed in pre-trial that force was exerted on both parties to the first marriage, this established at most a ground for annulment—not nullity. Since no annulment had been obtained, the first marriage remained valid and subsisting. Consequently, when Lilia married Karl Heinz Wiegel in 1978, she was still validly married to Maxion, rendering the second marriage void under Article 80 of the Civil Code, which provides that a subsequent marriage contracted by a person with a prior subsisting marriage is void. There was thus no need for petitioner to prove force, as even if force were established, it would not render the first marriage void but merely voidable.

• Effect of a Pre-existing Marriage of the First Spouse: The Court held that even if Maxion had a prior existing marriage at the time he married Lilia—such that their marriage would be void—the law still requires a judicial declaration of such nullity. Relying on the precedent in Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a void marriage must be judicially declared void before it may be treated as nonexistent for legal purposes. Absent such judicial declaration, Lilia would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with Karl Heinz Wiegel, and the second marriage would accordingly be void. There was therefore no need to introduce evidence about Maxion's prior marriage, as the legal consequence—validity of the first marriage until judicially declared void—would remain the same.

• Propriety of the Pre-Trial Order: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the respondent judge's orders. Because the agreed facts were legally sufficient to resolve the case, and because the additional evidence petitioner sought to present would not alter the legal outcome under the applicable Civil Code provisions, the denial of the motion to present evidence was proper. The petition was accordingly dismissed for lack of merit, and the assailed orders were affirmed.

• Voidable vs. Void Marriages — A marriage vitiated by force exerted upon both parties is voidable under Article 85 of the Civil Code, not void. A voidable marriage remains valid and binding until annulled by a competent court; until such annulment, the parties are treated as married for all legal purposes. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's first marriage, even if vitiated by force, remained valid and subsisting because no annulment had been obtained, thereby rendering her second marriage void under Article 80.

• Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages — Even a marriage that is void ab initio—such as one contracted by a person with a pre-existing subsisting marriage—requires a judicial declaration of nullity before it may be disregarded for legal purposes. Until such declaration is obtained, the parties are regarded as married. The Court relied on Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS in applying this doctrine, holding that petitioner could not simply assert the nullity of her first marriage based on her first husband's alleged prior marriage without first obtaining a judicial declaration to that effect.

• "There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the distinction between void and voidable marriages, establishing that force renders a marriage voidable and not void, and that a voidable marriage subsists until annulled.

• "There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel." — This passage articulates the doctrine that a void marriage requires a judicial declaration of nullity before it may be treated as nonexistent, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the subject.

• Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that a void marriage still requires a judicial declaration of nullity, and that absent such declaration, the parties are regarded as married for all legal intents and purposes. The Court followed this precedent in holding that petitioner could not disregard her first marriage without first obtaining a judicial declaration of its nullity.

• Article 85, Civil Code — Classifies marriages vitiated by force as voidable. The Court applied this provision to hold that force exerted on both parties to the first marriage rendered it voidable—not void—and therefore valid until annulled.

• Article 80, Civil Code — Provides that a subsequent marriage contracted by a person with a prior subsisting marriage is void. The Court applied this provision to hold that because the first marriage remained valid and subsisting, the second marriage to Karl Heinz Wiegel was void.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concurred.