Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. vs. Ledesma

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or order, reckoned from the date of receipt by counsel of record, and the client is bound by the counsel's negligence in procedural matters unless such negligence is so gross and inexcusable as to deprive the client of their day in court.

Ildebrando Ledesma was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. in Cebu City. His dismissal arose from complaints filed by Christe Mandal, a supplier of a concessionaire of the hotel, and Rosanna Lofranco, a job applicant at the same hotel, who accused him of committing lascivious acts and demanding sexual favors on hotel premises. The dispute traversed the full labor law adjudicatory hierarchy — from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, then to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 — before reaching the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Ildebrando Ledesma was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc., located at Salinas Drive, Cebu City. His employment was terminated on the basis of complaints filed before Waterfront by Christe Mandal, a supplier of a concessionaire of the hotel, and Rosanna Lofranco, who was seeking employment at the same hotel. During administrative hearings conducted by Waterfront, Mandal and Lofranco testified and submitted affidavits alleging that Ledesma had kissed and mashed Mandal's breasts inside the hotel elevator, and had exhibited his penis and asked Lofranco to masturbate him inside the hotel's conference room. Waterfront found these allegations substantiated and dismissed Ledesma from employment.

On August 12, 2008, Ledesma filed a complaint for illegal dismissal docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 08-1887-08. The Labor Arbiter found the accusations to be mere concoctions and declared Ledesma illegally dismissed, ordering reinstatement with full backwages, service incentive leave pay, and attorney's fees. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter, holding that Ledesma's acts of sexual overtures constituted grave misconduct justifying dismissal. The NLRC denied Ledesma's motion for reconsideration on February 22, 2010. A copy of the resolution was received by Atty. Gines Abellana, Ledesma's counsel of record, on March 15, 2010, while Ledesma himself received his copy on March 24, 2010.

On May 17, 2010 — sixty-three days after Atty. Abellana received the NLRC resolution — Ledesma's counsel filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. In the original petition, Ledesma erroneously computed the 60-day period from March 15, 2010, asserting that the 60th day fell on May 15, 2010, a Saturday, making May 17 the next business day. On August 5, 2010, Ledesma, now assisted by new counsel, filed an amended petition contending that the reckoning date should be March 24, 2010 — the date of his own receipt — thereby making the May 17 filing timely. The CA admitted the amended petition and rendered a decision on March 17, 2011 reversing the NLRC and reinstating the Labor Arbiter's ruling, relying on the absence of CCTV footage evidence which the CA itself raised despite Ledesma never having raised the argument. The CA denied Waterfront's motion for reconsideration on June 21, 2011, leading to the present petition.

• Timeliness of the CA Petition: Petitioner Waterfront argued that Ledesma's petition for certiorari before the CA was belatedly filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period, warranting outright dismissal.
• Procedural Infirmities of Respondent's Comment: Petitioner sought dismissal of Ledesma's Comment on the ground that Gaye Maureen Cenabre, Waterfront's representative, presented only a Community Tax Certificate instead of a current identification document bearing photograph and signature before the notary public, violating A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC and rendering the jurat defective, and that no certified true copy of the August 10, 2011 Board Resolution quoted in the Secretary's Certificate was attached to the petition.

• Reckoning Date of the Reglementary Period: Respondent Ledesma contended that his receipt on March 24, 2010 — not his counsel's receipt on March 15, 2010 — should be the reckoning date for the 60-day period, making the May 17, 2010 filing timely.
• Formal Infirmities of the Petition: Respondent sought dismissal of Waterfront's petition on the grounds that (1) the jurat in the verification and certification on non-forum shopping was defective due to use of a Community Tax Certificate instead of a compliant identification document, violating A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; and (2) no certified true copy of the August 10, 2011 Board Resolution quoted in the Secretary's Certificate was attached.

• Timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari: Whether the petition for certiorari filed by Ledesma before the Court of Appeals was timely filed within the 60-day reglementary period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
• Reckoning Date — Notice to Counsel vs. Notice to Party: Whether the 60-day period should be reckoned from the date of receipt by counsel of record or from the date of receipt by the party himself.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Misconduct: Whether substantial evidence supported the NLRC's finding that Ledesma committed misconduct justifying his dismissal.

• Timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari: No. The petition was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period, divesting the CA of jurisdiction to entertain it. The period is reckoned from counsel's receipt on March 15, 2010, making the last day May 14, 2010; the May 17, 2010 filing was three days late.
• Reckoning Date — Notice to Counsel vs. Notice to Party: The period is reckoned from the date of receipt by counsel of record. Notice to counsel is effective notice to the client; the client is bound by counsel's negligence in procedural matters absent gross and inexcusable negligence depriving the client of their day in court.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Misconduct: Yes. Assuming arguendo that the petition was timely filed, it would still be dismissed for lack of merit, as substantial evidence — the positive and credible testimonies of the complainants — adequately established misconduct or improper behavior constituting just cause for dismissal.

• Timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari: Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, mandatorily requires that a petition for certiorari be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. The amendment deleted the paragraph previously allowing courts to grant extensions, signifying that no extension of the 60-day period may be granted. While Domdom vs. Third & Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan allowed extensions in the court's sound discretion as an exception, Republic vs. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc. clarified that Laguna Metts Corporation states the general rule of strict application and Domdom the exception subject to sound discretion. Even under the exception, the party invoking liberality must advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for the failure to file within the period. Ledesma never invoked the liberality of the CA nor justified the belated filing; he maintained throughout that the petition was timely filed. Absent valid and compelling reasons for the procedural lapse, leniency could not be accorded.

• Reckoning Date — Notice to Counsel vs. Notice to Party: When a party appears by counsel, service of judgments and orders must be sent to counsel, because notice to counsel is effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in law. Receipt of notice by counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. Atty. Abellana received the NLRC resolution on March 15, 2010; applying Article 13 of the Civil Code — excluding the first day and including the last — the 60th day fell on May 14, 2010, a Friday. Ledesma's filing on May 17, 2010 was therefore late. The negligence of counsel in computing the period and reckoning it from the party's own receipt was rejected in Labao vs. Flores, where the Court ruled that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of counsel in procedural technique, and that the failure of counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid on its face. With the expiration of the 60-day period, the NLRC resolution became final and impervious to review through a Rule 65 petition, as no court could exercise jurisdiction to review it.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Misconduct: The CA reversed the NLRC based on the absence of CCTV footage, an argument not even raised by Ledesma but utilized by the CA on its own initiative. In labor cases, the evidentiary standard is substantial evidence, which was adequately established by the positive and credible testimonies of the complainants. Notably, Ledesma never refuted the allegations of Rosanna Lofranco that, after inducing her to perform a massage, he exhibited his penis and requested masturbation inside the conference room — an area not monitored by CCTV, access to which was facilitated by his position as House Detective. Such acts constituted misconduct or improper behavior, the elements of which are: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.

• Notice to Counsel is Notice to the Client — When a party appears by counsel, service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to counsel. Notice to counsel is effective notice to the client; notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in law. The receipt of notice by counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. Applied here to hold that the 60-day period under Rule 65 was reckoned from Atty. Abellana's receipt on March 15, 2010, not from Ledesma's own receipt on March 24, 2010.

• Binding Effect of Counsel's Negligence — The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception arises only when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of counsel to notify the client of an adverse judgment, resulting in loss of the right to appeal, is negligence that is not excusable and does not warrant setting aside a judgment valid on its face.

• Strict Application of the 60-Day Period for Certiorari — Under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. The deletion of the paragraph allowing extensions signified that no extension may be granted. While courts may relax this rule in the exercise of sound discretion, the party invoking liberality must advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for the failure to comply. Absent such explanation, the late filing divests the court of jurisdiction.

• Finality and Immutability of Judgment — A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. All issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. A denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits.

• Misconduct as Just Cause for Dismissal — Misconduct or improper behavior, as a just cause for dismissal, has three elements: (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. Applied here to Ledesma's lascivious conduct toward Christe Mandal and Rosanna Lofranco on hotel premises, facilitated by his position as House Detective.

• "As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration." — This passage, quoting from Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the general rule on the mandatory and strict nature of the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.

• "The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court." — This formulation, drawn from Labao vs. Flores, states the controlling doctrine on the binding effect of counsel's procedural negligence upon the client, applied here to reject Ledesma's attempt to reckon the reglementary period from his own receipt rather than his counsel's.

• "Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land." — This passage articulates the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, invoked to explain why the NLRC resolution, having become final upon the lapse of the 60-day period, could no longer be reviewed or altered by any court.

• Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 611 Phil. 530 (2009) — Controlling authority for the general rule that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as amended, must be strictly observed and can no longer be extended. Followed and applied as the general rule governing Ledesma's filing.

• Domdom vs. Third & Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341 (2010) — Recognized as the exception to the general rule, allowing extension of the 60-day period subject to the court's sound discretion. Distinguished from Laguna Metts Corporation as the exception rather than the general rule.

• Republic vs. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 192908, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 738 — Clarified the apparent conflict between Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, holding that the former states the general rule of strict application while the latter is the exception allowing relaxation in the court's discretion.

• Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014, 715 SCRA 153 — Reiterated the necessity for a party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for failure to file within the 60-day period. Also enumerated the recognized exceptions to strict application of procedural rules.

• Labao vs. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723 — Controlling authority on the binding effect of counsel's negligence upon the client and the principle that notice to counsel is notice to the client. Applied to reject Ledesma's argument that the reglementary period should be reckoned from his own receipt.

• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC — Provides that a petition for certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, or from notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration. Applied to determine that Ledesma's petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.

• Section 4, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Requires that the petition be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution assailed. Applied to reject Ledesma's argument that a certified true copy of the Board Resolution quoted in the Secretary's Certificate should have been attached, as only the assailed judgment or order is required.

• Article 13, Civil Code — Provides the rule for computing periods: the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Applied to compute the 60-day period, yielding May 14, 2010 as the last day for filing.

• A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC — Requires that a person appearing before a notary public present a current identification document issued by an official agency bearing photograph and signature. Found to have been violated by Waterfront's representative presenting only a Community Tax Certificate, but the resulting defect in the jurat was held to be merely formal, not jurisdictional.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Francis H. Jardeleza concurred with the decision of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.