Virtucio vs. Alegarbes

A person who possesses alienable public land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least thirty years acquires ownership over it by extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which ipso jure converts the land into private property. The period of acquisitive prescription is interrupted only by natural or civil interruption, and civil interruption takes place only with the service of judicial summons to the possessor; a protest filed before an administrative agency and the resulting decision cannot effectively toll the running of the prescriptive period.

The case involves a dispute over Lot 140, Pls-19, a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed public land in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan. Respondent Jose Alegarbes filed Homestead Application No. V-33203 (E-V-49150) for the entire tract in 1949, which was approved on January 23, 1952. In 1955, the land was subdivided into three lots—Lot Nos. 138, 139, and 140—as a consequence of a public land subdivision, with Lot 139 allocated to Ulpiano Custodio and Lot 140 allocated to petitioner Jesus Virtucio, who each filed their own homestead applications. The dispute concerns the interplay between the Public Land Act's homestead application process and the Civil Code's provisions on acquisitive prescription.

Respondent Jose Alegarbes filed Homestead Application No. V-33203 (E-V-49150) for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land situated in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. His application was approved on January 23, 1952. In 1955, however, the land was subdivided into three lots—Lot Nos. 138, 139, and 140, Pls-19—as a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio, who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4493 (E-18-2958), while Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus Virtucio, who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4421 (E-18-2924). Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140.

On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to exclude Lots 139 and 140, giving due course only to Lot 138. The applications of Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140, respectively, were likewise given due course. Alegarbes appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who dismissed his appeal on July 28, 1967. He then sought relief from the Office of the President, which affirmed the dismissal order in a decision dated October 25, 1974. Alegarbes moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.

On May 11, 1989, an order of execution was issued by the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the Office of the President. The order directed Alegarbes and all those acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused. On September 26, 1997, Virtucio filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC.

In his Answer, Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was void ab initio, arguing that the Acting Director of Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act. He further alleged that the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was procured through fraud and deceit, thus void ab initio. Alegarbes also argued, by way of special and/or affirmative defenses, that the approval of his homestead application on January 23, 1952 had already attained finality and could not be reversed, modified, or set aside, and that his possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139, and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful, and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, thereby acquiring such lots by acquisitive prescription. In his Amended and Supplemental Answer, Alegarbes averred that his deceased brother, Alejandro Alegarbes, and the latter's family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955, and that Alejandro and his family, as well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been permanently occupying the lot and introducing permanent improvements thereon since 1960.

The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring Virtucio, ordering Alegarbes to vacate Lot 140 and surrender possession and ownership to Virtucio, and awarding attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit. The RTC noted in its decision that the approval of a homestead application merely authorizes the applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his favor, and that what divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. A perusal of the records revealed that there was no issuance of any patent in favor of either party.

Alegarbes appealed to the CA, which on February 25, 2009, reversed the RTC decision, declaring Alegarbes as the owner of Lot 140 and entitled to retain possession of it. The CA ruled that even if the decision to approve Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final, Alegarbes could still acquire the lot by acquisitive prescription. The CA found that the decisions of the administrative bodies never touched upon the issue of Alegarbes' open, continuous, and exclusive possession of over thirty years of an alienable land, and that such possession had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land, placing it beyond the jurisdiction of these agencies. The CA also deleted the awards of attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

• Review of Factual Findings: Virtucio argued that the CA erred in setting aside the judgment of the trial court, which awarded the lot in question to the respondent by virtue of acquisitive prescription and ordered the petitioner to surrender the ownership and possession of the same to them.
• Stare Decisis / Similar Case: Virtucio argued that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in CA-G.R. CV-26286, Custodio vs. Alegarbes, for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, which contained the same factual circumstances as in this case and ruled against Jose Alegarbes.
• Attorney's Fees: Virtucio argued that the CA erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees to the petitioner.
• Interruption of Prescription: Virtucio insisted that the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due course to his homestead application, and that since 1954, several extrajudicial demands were made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate the lot, which demands constituted the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated in Article 1155, thus tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.

• Void Administrative Decision: Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was void ab initio, considering that the Acting Director of Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that the said decision conferred no rights and imposed no duties.
• Fraud in Patent Issuance: Alegarbes alleged that the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was procured through fraud and deceit, thus void ab initio.
• Finality of Homestead Approval: Alegarbes argued that the approval of his homestead application on January 23, 1952 by the Bureau of Lands had already attained finality and could not be reversed, modified, or set aside.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Alegarbes argued that his possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139, and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful, and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and that he had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription.
• Stare Decisis Inapplicable: Alegarbes argued that by Virtucio's insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, called upon the Court to adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which is not legally possible because only final decisions of the Supreme Court are considered precedents.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription.
• Interruption of Prescription: Whether the protest filed by Alegarbes before administrative agencies and the resulting decisions effectively interrupted the period of acquisitive prescription.
• Stare Decisis / Precedential Value of CA Decision: Whether the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in Custodio vs. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV-26286, which involved similar factual circumstances.
• Attorney's Fees: Whether the CA erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees to the petitioner.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Yes. Alegarbes acquired ownership over Lot 140 by extraordinary acquisitive prescription, having been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of alienable public land for over thirty years, which ipso jure converted the lot into private property.
• Interruption of Prescription: No. Only a judicial summons can effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription; a protest filed before an administrative agency and the resulting decision cannot constitute civil interruption. Virtucio's reliance on Article 1155 of the New Civil Code was misplaced, as that provision refers to the interruption of prescription of actions, not acquisitive prescription.
• Stare Decisis / Precedential Value of CA Decision: No. A decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent; only final decisions of the Supreme Court are considered precedents under the principle of stare decisis. Moreover, Virtucio was not a party to the Custodio case, and the period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint, which was wanting in this case.
• Attorney's Fees: No. It would be ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay attorney's fees, as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding him to have acquired ownership over the property by acquisitive prescription.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good faith, under Article 1137. The Court cited Heirs of Gamos vs. Heirs of Frando, which ruled that the mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive, open, continuous, and notorious possession for the required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for. It likewise cited Susi vs. Razon and Pineda vs. CA, where the Court ruled that the possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property. In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as 1949 and had been in exclusive, open, continuous, and notorious possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR issued its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his possession for more than 30 years, and by the time Virtucio filed the complaint before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in possession of the subject property for forty-eight years. The RTC itself noted that there was no issuance of any patent in favor of either party, meaning the land remained in the name of the State, and neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes could claim ownership based on patent issuance. The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the OP, which never touched the issue of whether Alegarbes' open, continuous, and exclusive possession of over thirty years of alienable land had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and beyond the jurisdiction of these agencies.
• Interruption of Prescription: Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions, not acquisitive prescription. Interruption of acquisitive prescription is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption. Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is filed, there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents, and the period of acquisitive prescription continues to run. The Court cited Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo vs. Rañon, which ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession, and Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel, which stated that the acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's name cannot defeat another's right of ownership acquired through acquisitive prescription. In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. Records show that it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC, and the CA was therefore correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140.
• Stare Decisis / Precedential Value of CA Decision: The subject property in Custodio vs. Alegarbes was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio, and Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual circumstances. The Court also found from the records that the period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint, which is wanting in this case. Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Only final decisions of the Supreme Court are considered precedents.
• Attorney's Fees: The Court need not dwell on the complaint of Virtucio with regard to the deletion of the award of attorney's fees in his favor, as it would be ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay attorney's fees, as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding him to have acquired ownership over the property by acquisitive prescription.

• Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription — Under Article 1137 of the New Civil Code, extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Alegarbes' open, continuous, and exclusive possession of Lot 140 for over thirty years ipso jure converted the alienable public land into private property, vesting ownership in him.
• Interruption of Acquisitive Prescription — The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption under Articles 1120-1125 of the New Civil Code. Civil interruption takes place only with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. A protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription, as no judicial summons can be issued in such instances.
• Ipso Jure Conversion of Public Land — The possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property, as established in Susi vs. Razon and Pineda vs. CA, and applied in Heirs of Gamos vs. Heirs of Frando. The mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive, open, continuous, and notorious possession for the required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for.
• Stare Decisis — The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. A decision of the Court of Appeals does not establish judicial precedent; only final decisions of the Supreme Court are considered precedents.

• "The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption. Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on interruption of acquisitive prescription, distinguishing it from the interruption of prescription of actions under Article 1155, and forms the core of the Court's reasoning for rejecting Virtucio's argument.
• "In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an instance, no civil interruption can take place. Only in cases filed before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession." — This passage extends the rule on civil interruption to administrative proceedings, establishing that only judicial summons can effectively interrupt the prescriptive period.
• "The possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine on ipso jure conversion of public land into private property through prolonged possession, which is the basis for the Court's affirmation of Alegarbes' ownership.
• "A decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions." — This passage clarifies the scope of stare decisis, holding that only final decisions of the Supreme Court constitute binding precedents, and that Court of Appeals decisions cannot be invoked as such.

• Heirs of Gamos vs. Heirs of Frando, 488 Phil. 140 (2004) — Controlling precedent on the rule that the mere application for a patent, coupled with exclusive, open, continuous, and notorious possession for the required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for.
• Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 (1925) — Followed for the doctrine that possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property.
• Pineda vs. CA, 262 Phil. 658 (1990) — Followed for the same doctrine on ipso jure conversion of public land through 30 years of possession.
• Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo vs. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391 — Followed for the rule that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession.
• Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel, G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012 — Followed for the rule that acts of declaring property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title cannot defeat another's right of ownership acquired through acquisitive prescription, and that civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons.
• De Morales vs. CFI, 186 Phil. 596 (1980) — Cited for the distinction between acquisitive prescription (usucapcion) and extinctive prescription (litigation of action).
• Nepomuceno vs. City of Surigao, G.R. No. 146091, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 41 — Cited for the rule that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent.
• Land Bank vs. Hon. Pagayatan, G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 133 — Cited for the definition and rationale of the stare decisis principle.

• Article 1106, New Civil Code — Provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law, and distinguishes between acquisitive and extinctive prescription.
• Article 712, New Civil Code — Provides that ownership and other real rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition, and by prescription.
• Article 1117, New Civil Code — Provides that acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or extraordinary.
• Article 1134, New Civil Code — Provides that ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years.
• Article 1137, New Civil Code — Provides that extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
• Article 1155, New Civil Code — Refers to the interruption of prescription of actions, which the Court distinguished from interruption of acquisitive prescription, holding that Virtucio's reliance on this provision was misplaced.
• Articles 1120-1125, New Civil Code — Govern the interruption of acquisitive prescription, providing that the only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period are natural and civil interruption.
• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that only questions of law distinctly set forth shall be raised in petitions for review on certiorari, and that questions of fact are not reviewable in such petitions.

• Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (Acting Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad
• Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
• Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez