Vino vs. People

An accused charged as a principal in an information may be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory when the evidence proves only that lesser participation, because the greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. The conviction of an accessory may be maintained notwithstanding the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding, as long as the commission of the offense and the accessory's participation are duly established in evidence.

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder before the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. Because Salazar was a member of the military, the municipal court indorsed his case to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO), while the case against Vino proceeded through the regular courts. The case was ultimately indorsed to the fiscal's office, which filed an information charging Vino with murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan. During the pendency of Vino's appeal, Salazar was discharged from military service, and his case was remanded to the civil court, where he was separately charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court.

At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left his house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. Ernesto saw Roberto ten meters away, so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto, who was crying, and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbors responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-mortem statement, which the victim signed with his own blood, identifying Jessie Salazar as his assailant. The autopsy report showed a gunshot wound with the point of entry at the sub scapular area, with the slug found subcutaneously, and the cause of death was tension hemothorax.

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office, which then filed an information charging Vino with the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan. Upon arraignment, Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, Vino filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence, to which the prosecutor filed an answer.

During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988, petitioner informed the Supreme Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a decision rendered on August 29, 1988. The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established, observing that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony was uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian, who were listed in the information and could corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution. The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The trial court also deplored the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet shells recovered at the crime scene and to compare them with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar.

• Variance Between Charge and Proof: Petitioner argued that an accused cannot be convicted as an accessory to murder for having aided in the escape of the principal if the accused is being charged solely in the information as a principal, for the reason that the crime proved is not included in the crime charged.
• Sufficiency of "Aiding the Escape": Petitioner argued that "aiding the escape of the principal" to be considered sufficient in law to convict an accused under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code must be done in such a way as to deceive the vigilance of the law enforcement agencies of the State, and that the "escape" must be actual.
• Procedural Orderliness: Petitioner argued that the conviction of an accessory pending the trial of the principal violates procedural orderliness.

• No Reversible Error: The Solicitor General, in behalf of respondents, submitted a comment asserting that the Court of Appeals had not committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.

• Conviction as Accessory Under an Information Charging Principal: Whether an accused charged in the information as a principal for the crime of murder can thereafter be convicted as an accessory.
• Independent Trial of Accessory: Whether the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal.
• Effect of Principal's Acquittal: Whether, considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted, the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory can be maintained.

• Conviction as Accessory Under an Information Charging Principal: Yes. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal, as the greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser.
• Independent Trial of Accessory: Yes. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other, and as long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
• Effect of Principal's Acquittal: Yes. The conviction of the accessory can be maintained notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal, where the commission of the crime and the responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory were established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Conviction as Accessory Under an Information Charging Principal: The Court reasoned that this is not a case of variance between the offense charged and the offense proved under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, nor a mistake in charging the proper offense under Section 12, Rule 119. The correct offense of murder was charged in the information, and its commission was established by the evidence. The variance lies only in the participation or complicity of the petitioner: while he was held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence showed his participation was merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser, so an accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal. Although the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory from the onset, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of the petitioner.

• Independent Trial of Accessory: The Court held that the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal because the corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.

• Effect of Principal's Acquittal: The Court distinguished the present case from prior jurisprudence. In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, the accessory was convicted notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity, because the crime was in fact established. In United States vs. Mendoza, the acquittal of the principal resulted in the acquittal of the accessory because no crime was committed, the fire being the result of an accident. In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory were established. The trial court acquitted Salazar on the ground of reasonable doubt, holding that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. However, the identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant cannot be identified, the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable, as he was seen driving a bicycle with a person holding a rifle fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after its commission. The Court also noted that Vino did not even adduce evidence in his defense during his trial.

• Greater responsibility includes the lesser — An accused charged as a principal may be convicted as an accomplice or accessory when the evidence proves only the lesser participation, because the greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. The Court applied this principle to uphold Vino's conviction as an accessory despite the information charging him as a principal.

• Independence of accessory liability — The criminal liability of an accessory is distinct from that of the principal, and the trial of an accessory may proceed independently of the principal's case as long as the commission of the offense is duly established in evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to allow the accessory's conviction to stand even where the principal was acquitted on reasonable doubt in a separate proceeding.

• Accessory liability independent of principal's identity — For the prosecution of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, the identity of the assailant or principal is of no material significance; what matters is that the commission of the crime and the accessory's participation in assisting the escape were established. The Court applied this principle to uphold Vino's conviction even though Salazar was acquitted for lack of positive identification.

• "The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi on the first issue, establishing that a conviction for a lesser participation is valid under an information charging a greater one.

• "The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal." — This passage states the controlling rule on the second issue, affirming the procedural independence of the accessory's trial.

• "The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable." — This passage is the crux of the Court's resolution of the third issue, holding that the principal's acquittal for lack of identification does not affect the accessory's conviction.

• United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 (1915) — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that an accessory may be convicted notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal, where the crime was in fact established and the principal was acquitted due to an exempting circumstance such as minority or insanity.
• United States vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 (1912) — Cited as a contrasting precedent where the acquittal of the principal resulted in the acquittal of the accessory because no crime was committed, the fire being the result of an accident.

• Article 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines the two other categories of persons responsible for the commission of an offense besides the principal: the accomplice and the accessory. The Court relied on this provision to establish that the petitioner could be held liable as an accessory.
• Article 19, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Defines accessories as those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having participated therein as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime. The Court applied this provision to Vino's act of driving the bicycle to assist Salazar's escape.
• Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Provides for conviction of an offense proved when it is included in the offense charged. The Court distinguished this provision, finding no variance between the offense charged and the offense proved since murder was properly charged and established.
• Section 12, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Addresses mistakes in charging the proper offense. The Court distinguished this provision, finding that the correct offense of murder was charged and that the variance was only in the degree of participation.

Narvasa, J., and Medialdea, J., concurred in the resolution.

• Justice Cruz — Dissented on the ground that the case is sui generis and not covered by the general principle that an accessory may be convicted even if the principal is acquitted. Justice Cruz noted that Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was specifically named as the principal at Vino's trial, and that Salazar was subsequently acquitted for lack of sufficient identification. Since Salazar was exonerated, Vino was being held liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Justice Cruz would have reversed Vino's conviction.
• Justice Griño-Aquino — Dissented, distinguishing among the three kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. Justice Griño-Aquino argued that an accessory under paragraph 3, who allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in the escape of the principal, may not be convicted unless the principal has been identified and convicted. Since Salazar was acquitted, the basis for Vino's conviction as an accessory under paragraph 3 was destroyed. Justice Griño-Aquino distinguished the Villaluz and Mendoza cases as involving paragraph 2 accessories, and applied the principle that "the accessory follows the principal." She voted to acquit the petitioner.