Villegas vs. Subido

The power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer of Manila remains vested in the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments under the Manila City Charter; the general provisions of the Decentralization Act do not impliedly repeal that special charter provision.

Antonio J. Villegas was Mayor of the City of Manila, and Manuel D. Lapid was chief of the cash division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. The City of Manila was governed by Republic Act No. 409, its 1949 Charter, which expressly vested in the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the City Treasurer and his Assistant. Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Act of 1967, generally provided that all other employees paid out of local funds, except teachers, shall be appointed by the city mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. The controversy required determining which statute governed the appointment of the Assistant City Treasurer.

Antonio J. Villegas was the Mayor of the City of Manila, and Manuel D. Lapid was the chief of the cash division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. On June 3, 1968, Eduardo Z. Romualdez, Secretary of Finance, authorized Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective June 1, 1968, vice Felino Fineza, who retired from the government service on May 31, 1968.

In Administrative Order No. 40, series of 1968, dated June 17, 1968, Mayor Villegas directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer, on the ground that Romualdez was not empowered to make such designation. On January 1, 1969, Mayor Villegas appointed Lapid, then chief of the cash division, as Assistant City Treasurer.

In a 1st endorsement dated February 14, 1969, Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, disapproved Lapid's appointment. Subido based his action on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 19, 1968, to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers was still governed by Section 2088(A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, Republic Act No. 5185.

On February 25, 1969, Mayor Villegas and Lapid filed the instant petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and mandamus, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction. They prayed that judgment be rendered declaring illegal and void ab initio the authorization given by Romualdez to Gloria to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer of Manila, and that a writ of mandamus issue to Commissioner Subido commanding him to approve Lapid's appointment to the said office in accordance with the Civil Service Rules.

It was not until the filing of the petition that Jose R. Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City Treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed. The lower court found these facts as summarized above.

• Appointing Power Under the Decentralization Act: Petitioners argued that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185 provides that all other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city, or municipal general funds and other local funds shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the city mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned; on that basis, Mayor Villegas claimed authority to appoint Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer.
• Local Autonomy: Petitioners contended for a generous, if not latitudinarian, construction of the Decentralization Act in consonance with its avowed purpose of enlarging the boundaries of local autonomy.
• Invalidity of Romualdez's Authorization: Petitioners sought to declare illegal and void ab initio the authorization given by Secretary of Finance Romualdez to Jose R. Gloria to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer of Manila.
• Mandamus to Approve Appointment: Petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding Commissioner of Civil Service Subido to approve Lapid's appointment to the office in accordance with the Civil Service Rules.
• Implied Repeal: Petitioners pleaded that the provision in the Decentralization Act had the effect of repealing the specific provision in the Manila City Charter.
• Reliance on Prior Cases: Petitioners invoked Pineda vs. Claudio and Villegas vs. Subido to support the local executive's appointing prerogatives.

• No Legal Basis Under the City Charter: Respondent Commissioner Subido took the opposite position, arguing that there was no legal basis for the Mayor's claim in light of what was expressly ordained in the City Charter.
• Implied Repeals Not Favored: Respondent argued that interpreting the Decentralization Act provision as transferring the appointing power would disregard the well-settled doctrine that implied repeals are not favored.

• Appointing Power: Whether the Mayor of Manila has the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer under Section 4 of the Decentralization Act, notwithstanding Section 22 of the Manila City Charter vesting that power in the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
• Implied Repeal: Whether Section 4 of the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed Section 22 of the Manila City Charter.

• Appointing Power: No. The Manila City Charter expressly vests the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer in the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments; the Assistant City Treasurer is an officer, not an employee, and Section 4 of the Decentralization Act excludes city treasurers.
• Implied Repeal: No. Implied repeals are not favored; a general law does not repeal a special law unless the legislative purpose is manifest, and no clear and convincing repugnancy was shown.

• Appointing Power: The decisive question was the applicable law. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 409, the Manila City Charter, expressly conferred on the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the City Treasurer and his Assistant. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Act, granted city mayors the power to appoint all other employees except teachers paid out of local funds, subject to civil service law. The Assistant City Treasurer, however, is an officer, not an employee, under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2711, because his duties are not clerical or manual and may involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of a government function. Section 4 of the Decentralization Act also specifically enumerated the officials and assistants whom the city mayor may appoint and expressly excluded city treasurers. The expansive interpretation urged by petitioners was therefore unwarranted. Pineda vs. Claudio and Villegas vs. Subido did not aid petitioners because those cases involved a chief of police and a city legal officer, positions requiring the confidence of the local executive and whose appointment was expressly vested in the city mayor; the assistant city treasurer is of a different category and the power to appoint that officer is specifically granted to the President.
• Implied Repeal: Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be declared unless it is manifest that the legislature intended them. Before an implied repeal may be recognized, the statutes or provisions must deal with the same subject matter and the later provision must be inconsistent with the earlier one; the repugnancy must be clear and convincing, and the language of the later statute must be irreconcilable with the former. A subsequent statute general in character is not construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest, even if the general act's terms are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. Under the principle generalia specialibus non derogant, the specific provision controls unless the statute as a whole indicates a contrary intention. No such manifest intent or clear repugnancy appeared; the City Charter provision therefore remained in force.

• Implied Repeal Not Favored — Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be declared unless the legislature's intent to repeal is manifest. The Court required that the statutes deal with the same subject matter, that the later provision be inconsistent with the earlier one, and that the repugnancy be clear and convincing and the language irreconcilable. Applied here, the general Decentralization Act did not impliedly repeal the special Manila City Charter provision.
• Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant — A general law does not amend or repeal a special law unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest, even if the general act's terms are broad enough to cover the special subject. The specific provision controls unless the statute as a whole indicates a contrary intention. Applied here, Section 22 of the Manila City Charter controlled over Section 4 of the Decentralization Act.
• Officer Distinguished from Employee — Under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2711, an officer is one whose duties, not being clerical or manual, may involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of a government function, whether or not those duties are precisely defined by law. The Court applied this definition to hold that the Assistant City Treasurer is an officer, not an employee, and thus outside the "other employees" covered by the Decentralization Act's grant to city mayors.
• Appointing Power over the Assistant City Treasurer — The Manila City Charter expressly vests the appointment of the City Treasurer and his Assistant in the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The Court applied this provision to reject the Mayor's claim of appointing authority over the Assistant City Treasurer.

• "The Charter of the City of Manila, enacted in 1949, in express terms did confer on the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer." — This states the controlling charter provision that defeated the Mayor's claim of appointing power.
• "Clearly, the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer, not an employee." — This distinction removed the Assistant City Treasurer from the Decentralization Act's general grant to city mayors over "other employees."
• "It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended." — This articulates the presumption against implied repeal relied on to reject the argument that the Decentralization Act superseded the City Charter.
• "A subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest." — This states the generalia specialibus non derogant principle that made the special City Charter provision prevail over the general Decentralization Act.

• Pineda vs. Claudio, L-29661, May 13, 1969, 28 SCRA 34 — Invoked by petitioners; distinguished because it concerned the appointment of a department head, the chief of police, whose appointment was expressly vested in the city mayor and who necessarily had to enjoy the local executive's fullest confidence; the principle was not extended to the assistant city treasurer.
• Villegas vs. Subido, L-29588, December 27, 1968, 26 SCRA 531 — Invoked by petitioners; distinguished because it concerned the city legal officer, an office requiring the highest degree of confidence and whose choice rested solely on the city mayor; the assistant city treasurer presented a different situation.
• United States vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423 (1908) — Cited as the early decision establishing the constant holding that repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be declared unless the legislature manifestly intended them.
• Calderon vs. Provincia del Santisimo Rosario, 28 Phil. 164 (1914) — Cited for the requirement that before an implied repeal exists, the statutes or provisions must deal with the same subject matter and the later one must be inconsistent with the former.
• United States vs. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208 (1916) — Cited in support of the rule that an implied repeal requires a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.

• Section 22, Republic Act No. 409 (1949) — The Manila City Charter provision expressly vesting in the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the City Treasurer and his Assistant. The Court applied it as the controlling special law and held that the Mayor could not appoint the Assistant City Treasurer.
• Section 4, Republic Act No. 5185 (1967) — The Decentralization Act provision granting city mayors the power to appoint all other employees, except teachers, paid out of local funds, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, upon recommendation of the office head concerned. The Court held it did not cover the Assistant City Treasurer because that officer is an officer, not an employee, and because the provision's enumeration of appointable officials and assistants expressly excluded city treasurers.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 2711 (1917) — The Revised Administrative Code provision defining an officer as one whose duties, not being clerical or manual, may involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of a government function, whether or not precisely defined by law. The Court used this definition to classify the Assistant City Treasurer as an officer rather than an employee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concurred. Dizon and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.