Villasor vs. Medel

The nine-day period for exercising the right of legal redemption under Article 1524 of the Civil Code is absolute and peremptory, and is not suspended or tolled by the minority of the redemptioner, the period running from registration of the sale or, in its absence, from the redemptioner's knowledge of the conveyance.

A large tract of land in Bacolod, Negros Occidental, covered by several certificates of title, was conjugal property of Guillermo Villasor and Basilisa Camento. Upon Guillermo's death in 1914, the estate passed to his widow and children, and was later the subject of a court-approved partition and a donation intervivos by Basilisa to her grandchildren. The plaintiff, Guillermo P. Villasor, was one of those grandchildren and acquired a 3/20 undivided share through the donation, which was accepted by his court-appointed guardian but not registered until years after a key sale of co-ownership shares had already been consummated. The action was brought under Articles 1521 and 1522 of the Civil Code, governing legal redemption among co-owners.

A large tract of land situated in the municipality of Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and covered by several certificates of title, formerly belonged as conjugal property to Guillermo Villasor and Basilisa Camento, husband and wife. Guillermo Villasor died on September 21, 1914, leaving as universal heirs his widow and five children. One of the daughters died intestate while still a minor, and her share of the land passed to her mother, Basilisa Camento.

On July 15, 1921, Basilisa Camento, as judicial administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, submitted to the court a project of partition whereby 4/10 undivided part of the estate was allotted to her four surviving children and 6/10 to herself. The partition was duly approved. Thereafter, on April 16, 1926, Basilisa executed a deed of donation intervivos by which she gave all her 6/10 undivided share to her grandchildren in equal undivided shares. One of those grandchildren was Guillermo P. Villasor, the present plaintiff, who by virtue of the donation became the owner of a 3/20 undivided part of the estate. The donation was duly accepted by the legal guardian of the minors, Jose C. Villasor, who had been appointed by the court, but it was not registered until December 2, 1936.

Meanwhile, on July 1, 1931, Jose C. Villasor, as guardian and on behalf of three grandchildren of Basilisa Camento named Remedios, Luis, and Lilia Jurilla — and with the necessary court permission — sold their shares to Mariano Medalla. The sale also included the share of Resurreccion Villasor, one of the daughters of the original owners and the mother of the three minors; both Resurreccion and her husband Felipe Jurilla signed the deed of sale alongside the children's legal guardian. The total sale price was ₱22,000, of which ₱12,000 pertained to the three minors' shares, according to the plaintiff's computation.

On March 11, 1939, the plaintiff, who had reached majority on March 6 of that month, sent through his attorneys a registered special delivery letter to Mariano Medalla, formally offering ₱12,000 for the purchase of the shares of the three minors surnamed Jurilla, but he made no offer for Resurreccion Villasor's share. Other purchasers — Rodolfo A. Medel, Milagros C. Araneta, and Jose J. Justiniani — had bought the shares of other co-owners; they were initially joined as defendants under separate causes of action, but the suit against them was settled before or during trial or appeal.

Medalla raised three special defenses: first, that a final project of partition filed and approved by the court in Case No. 7612 on August 10, 1939 had segregated and adjudicated specific lots to him; second, that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and third, that the plaintiff was not yet a co-owner at the time of the sale on July 1, 1931, having become such only on December 2, 1936 when the donation was first registered. Medalla also alleged that since July 1, 1931 he had made important improvements on the portions he purchased and had obtained a valuable sugar production quota, spending considerable sums in the process. The trial court overruled the first and third defenses but sustained the second, dismissing the suit on the ground that the plaintiff's right of redemption had expired.

• Tolling of Redemption Period During Minority: Petitioner argued that the nine-day period under Article 1524 of the Civil Code should not run against him during his minority, and that the period ought to be suspended until he reached the age of majority before he could exercise the right of redemption.
• Co-ownership from Date of Donation: Petitioner maintained that he became a co-owner from the date of the donation on April 16, 1926, not from the date of its registration on December 2, 1936.

• Adjudication by Final Partition: Respondent Medalla alleged that a final project of partition approved by the court in Case No. 7612 on August 10, 1939 had segregated and adjudicated the specific lots in question to him.
• No Cause of Action: Respondent contended that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the plaintiff's right of redemption having already expired.
• Not a Co-owner at Time of Sale: Respondent maintained that the plaintiff was not yet a co-owner of the hacienda at the time of the sale on July 1, 1931, having become such only on December 2, 1936 when the donation was first registered.
• Improvements and Investments: Respondent alleged that since July 1, 1931 he had made important improvements on the purchased portions, obtained a valuable sugar production quota, and spent considerable sums of money, all of which would be jeopardized by a delayed redemption.

• Period of Legal Redemption: Whether the nine-day period for exercising the right of legal redemption under Article 1524 of the Civil Code is suspended or tolled by the minority of the redemptioner.

• Period of Legal Redemption: No. The nine-day period is absolute and peremptory, counted from registration or knowledge of the sale, and is not suspended by the minority of the redemptioner. Legal redemption is a statutory privilege, not a cause of action, and the tolling rules for prescription during minority do not apply.

• Period of Legal Redemption: The Court reasoned that legal redemption and the right to commence actions are entirely different in nature: the former is a substantive right that would not exist absent the statute, while the latter merely restricts the period for asserting a cause of action. Legal redemption partakes of a rescission of contract addressed to one of the contracting parties by the other, not to a court; it is a privilege created by law partly for public policy and partly for the convenience of the redemptioner. Because the law expressly fixes registration or knowledge of the sale as the starting point for the nine-day period, the maxim exclusio unius est exclusio alterius precludes adding minority as an additional tolling circumstance. The shortness of the period itself signals its peremptoriness and inflexibility. The Court drew an analogy to conventional redemption (pacto de retro), where the period is unanimously considered a matter of public interest and treated restrictively, citing Manresa's commentary that the Code's policy is to avoid keeping property subject to resolutory conditions for long periods. There is even stronger reason against relaxing the period for legal redemption, which is a pure creature of law benefiting only the redemptioner, unlike conventional redemption which rests on contractual consideration. Tolling the period during minority would keep property in a state of indivision for potentially twenty years or more, contrary to Article 400 of the Civil Code, which provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the community and each may demand partition at any time. It would also be unfair to the purchaser, who could not make improvements without risking loss of his investments. The Court distinguished Wenceslao vs. Calimo, 46 Phil. 906, as obiter dictum on the minority question and further distinguishable on its facts: the minors there had no legal guardian, whereas the plaintiff here not only had a guardian — Jose C. Villasor — but that very guardian was the one who sold the lots to Medalla and could have repurchased them for the plaintiff within nine days or, with court authority, sold them directly to the plaintiff instead.

• Legal Redemption as a Substantive Privilege — The right of legal redemption is a substantive right created solely by statute; it is not a fundamental or primary right and does not exist absent the law. It is addressed to the contracting party, not to a court, and is in the nature of a rescission of contract. Because it is a mere privilege rather than a cause of action, the rules on prescription that suspend the running of periods during minority do not apply to it. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the nine-day period under Article 1524 of the Civil Code was not tolled by the plaintiff's minority.

• Absoluteness of the Nine-Day Redemption Period — The nine-day period for legal redemption under Article 1524 of the Civil Code is absolute, peremptory, and inflexible, counted exclusively from registration of the sale in the Registry or, in its absence, from the time the redemptioner acquired knowledge of the conveyance. No other circumstance — including the minority of the redemptioner — suspends or extends the period. The Court relied on the maxim exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and on the analogy with conventional redemption under Article 1508, where the period is treated as a matter of public interest and construed restrictively, to conclude that the legislature intentionally excluded minority as a tolling factor.

• Public Policy Against Prolonged Indivision — The policy of the Civil Code disfavors keeping property in a state of indivision for extended periods. Article 400 provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the community and each may demand partition at any time. Tolling the redemption period during minority would keep the purchaser's title in suspense for potentially twenty years or more, preventing improvements and prejudicing both the purchaser and the public welfare. The Court invoked this policy to reject the plaintiff's construction of Article 1524.

• "The right of legal redemption and the right to commence actions are entirely of different nature. The first is a substantive right which, in the absence of the article, would never exist; the second restricts the period in which the cause of action may be asserted." — This passage articulates the foundational distinction between legal redemption and ordinary actions, establishing why the prescriptive rules tolling periods during minority do not apply to the redemption privilege.

• "An action seeks to assert a fundamental, primary right of which the plaintiff has been inflicted; legal redemption is in the nature of a mere privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been thrust." — This defines the essential character of legal redemption as a statutory privilege, supporting the conclusion that its prescriptive period is not subject to the same tolling rules as ordinary causes of action.

• "The construction of article 1524 which the plaintiff offers would keep the property in a state of indivision even if one of the co-owners wanted to separate. This is contrary to the express policy of the law that 'No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community, but each may, at any time, demand partition of the thing held in common.'" — This passage ties the ruling to the broader Civil Code policy against prolonged indivision, reinforcing the public-interest rationale for the absoluteness of the redemption period.

• Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the right of legal redemption is a substantive right distinct from the right to commence actions, and that the Code of Civil Procedure did not repeal or modify the nine-day period in Article 1524.
• Guinto vs. Lim Bonfing, 48 Phil. 884 — Cited for the proposition that a minor's natural guardian or whoever has the minor in custody may validly make the repurchase on the minor's behalf, undermining the argument that the redemption period should be tolled during minority.
• Wenceslao vs. Calimo, 46 Phil. 906 — Distinguished as obiter dictum on the question of whether Article 1524's period runs against minors, and further distinguished on facts because the minors in that case had no legal guardian, whereas the plaintiff here had one who was the very person who sold the lots to the defendant.

• Article 1524, Civil Code — Provides that the right of legal redemption may be exercised only within nine days, counted from registration in the Registry or, in its absence, from the time the redemptioner had knowledge of the sale; also provides that the right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjacent owners. The Court held this period to be absolute and not tolled by the redemptioner's minority.
• Articles 1521 and 1522, Civil Code — The statutory basis for the plaintiff's action for legal redemption among co-owners.
• Article 1508, Civil Code — Fixes the duration of conventional redemption at four years in default of express agreement, and ten years as the maximum beyond which parties may not agree. Cited by analogy to show that redemption periods are matters of public interest treated restrictively.
• Article 400, Civil Code — Provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the community and each may demand partition at any time. Invoked to demonstrate that the plaintiff's proposed construction of Article 1524 would contradict the Code's policy against prolonged indivision.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur. Briones, M., concurring separately, agreed with the ponencia on the ground that because the minors had a legal guardian when the right of redemption arose under Article 1524, the nine-day period ran against them.