Villarosa vs. Festin and COMELEC

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division must first file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc; direct certiorari to the Supreme Court is premature. The formation of a Special Division to fill temporary vacancies in a COMELEC Division is valid under COMELEC rules and the Constitution.

Jose Tapales Villarosa and Romulo de Mesa Festin were rival candidates for the mayoralty of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional commission that may sit en banc or in two divisions and is empowered to promulgate rules to expedite election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies; motions for reconsideration of decisions are decided by the Commission en banc. COMELEC rules also govern substitution of members of a Division and creation of Special Divisions when a member is absent or otherwise unavailable.

Jose Tapales Villarosa and Romulo de Mesa Festin were two of the four rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May 15, 2013, Festin was proclaimed the victor with 20,761 votes, edging out Villarosa, who obtained 19,557 votes, a difference of only 1,204 votes.

With the narrow margin, Villarosa filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court, alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. Specifically, various voters complained that several ballots were pre-marked or that the ovals appearing on the face of the ballots corresponding to Villarosa’s name were embossed or waxed to prevent them from being shaded. Villarosa claimed massive electoral fraud and irregularities in the 92 clustered precincts of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and asserted that Festin was illegally proclaimed. In his answer, Festin likewise impugned the election results, particularly the number of votes credited to Villarosa.

With both parties raising as principal issue the accuracy of the vote count, a physical recount of the ballots was conducted under the auspices of the RTC, Branch 46 in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. On November 7, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Festin’s proclamation void and declaring Villarosa as the duly elected mayor. The RTC justified its ruling by deducting 2,050 votes from Festin that were allegedly pre-marked or tampered.

Villarosa thereafter filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which the RTC granted on January 15, 2014. On January 23, 2014, Festin’s motion for reconsideration was denied. On February 3, 2014, Festin elevated the case to COMELEC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief. Villarosa immediately moved for its dismissal on the ground that the petition’s verification was allegedly defective.

Without yet ruling on the motion to dismiss, the COMELEC First Division, on February 13, 2014, issued an Order requiring Villarosa to file his answer and issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the RTC from implementing its Decision. Without waiving the grounds relied on in his motion to dismiss, Villarosa timely filed his answer. On April 10, 2014, COMELEC granted Festin’s request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC Decision’s execution pending appeal. The injunction was issued by a newly constituted Special First Division, which was formed on April 8, 2014 through Resolution No. 9868 and was composed of Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Al A. Parreño, with the former presiding.

Villarosa filed an urgent motion praying for quashal of the injunction, which the COMELEC First Division denied through the assailed June 3, 2014 Order. Thus, Villarosa filed the instant petition.

• Jurisdiction of Special First Division: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC First Division acquired jurisdiction over the case on February 13, 2014 when it directed him to file an answer and issued a TRO, which precluded the Special First Division from acquiring jurisdiction and issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
• Effect of Commissioner Absences: Petitioner maintained that the mere absence of two commissioners in the division was not sufficient to oust it of jurisdiction and confer the same on a new one.
• Grave Abuse in Denying Quashal: Petitioner asserted that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his urgent ex-parte motion to quash the writ of preliminary injunction.
• Legality of Special Division: Petitioner challenged the legality of the formation of the Special First Division and the validity of the Orders it issued, specifically the April 10, 2014 Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether a COMELEC Division’s interlocutory order may be directly assailed before the Supreme Court via certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc.
• Formation and Jurisdiction of Special First Division: Whether the formation of the Special First Division was legal and whether it had jurisdiction to issue the April 10, 2014 writ of preliminary injunction.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction and in denying the motion to quash.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. The petition is procedurally infirm; under Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Ambil vs. COMELEC, certiorari generally lies only against final orders, rulings, or decisions of the COMELEC en banc, and a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, such a motion is automatically referred to the en banc.
• Formation and Jurisdiction of Special First Division: Valid. The formation of Special Divisions is sanctioned by COMELEC Resolution No. 7808, as amended by Resolution No. 9636, and by Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution; the First Division did not lose jurisdiction because only its composition changed.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. COMELEC acted within its constitutional and rules-based authority, and no grave abuse attended the issuance of the preliminary injunction or the denial of the motion to quash.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari within thirty days from receipt. In Ambil vs. Commission on Elections, this provision was interpreted to limit the remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings, and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a COMELEC Division for being premature, because a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Cagas vs. COMELEC reiterated that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the order in the Supreme Court through certiorari; the remedy is to seek review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the Division’s decision in due course. The exception in Kho vs. COMELEC allows direct resort to the Supreme Court when the COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not specifically provide that the challenged final order or decision may be considered by the COMELEC en banc. That exception does not apply here. Kho was resolved under the 1993 COMELEC Rules, which expressly provided that the COMELEC en banc did not have the power to resolve motions for reconsideration with respect to interlocutory orders issued by a Division, except when unanimously referred by the Division. The present case is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, Rule 20, Section 5 of which provides that upon filing a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division, the ECAD Clerk shall notify the Presiding Commissioner, who shall certify the case to the Commission en banc; Section 7 requires the en banc to decide the motion within fifteen days. Because a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc was available to petitioner, his direct resort to certiorari was premature, and the petition could and should be dismissed outright.
• Formation and Jurisdiction of Special First Division: Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and shall promulgate its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases; all election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Pursuant to this mandate, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7808 on January 16, 2007. Section 6, Rule 3 of that Resolution, as amended by Resolution No. 9636 on February 13, 2013, provides that whenever a member of a Division is on leave, seriously ill, temporarily disabled, absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the Chairman shall substitute him with another Commissioner, or the Chairman shall sit in place of said member and preside. Under either substitution, the Division is designated as “Special First Division” or “Special Second Division.” Invoking this rule, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9868 on April 8, 2014 to address temporary vacancies in both Divisions due to pressing matters concerning overseas absentee voting that required the attention and presence abroad of Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Christian Robert S. Lim of the First Division, and Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph of the Second Division. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. sat as presiding Chairman for both Divisions until his colleagues’ return. The Special First Division was composed of Chairman Brillantes as Presiding and Commissioner Al A. Parreño as Member; the Special Second Division was composed of Chairman Brillantes as Presiding and Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito F. Guia as Members. The formation of the Special Divisions was sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules and by the Constitution. No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, could be ascribed to COMELEC when the Special First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. The First Division and the Special First Division are not two distinct bodies. COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both Divisions; the term “special” merely indicated that the commissioners sitting therein were doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution. The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it before the substitution was made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014. This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation of the Special First Division, since this only entailed a change in the Division’s composition of magistrates; the case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. Petitioner was mistaken in claiming that jurisdiction was eventually re-acquired by the First Division from the Special First Division, because the First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with. Temporary or permanent shuffling of members in the Commission is not a novel practice; exigencies justify substitution of members and designation of special divisions to prevent paralysis in the administration of justice, ensure speedy disposition of cases, and unclog dockets. These advantages outweigh petitioner’s baseless claim of violation of due process.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The COMELEC’s actions find sufficient constitutional basis under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Since the Special First Division was validly constituted and the First Division retained jurisdiction over the case, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The denial of the motion to quash likewise did not constitute grave abuse of discretion, as petitioner’s claim of due process violation was baseless and the temporary shuffling of members was justified by exigencies to prevent paralysis in the administration of justice and to ensure the speedy disposition of cases.

• Certiorari Against COMELEC Division Interlocutory Orders — Under Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, as interpreted in Ambil vs. COMELEC, certiorari to the Supreme Court generally lies only against final orders, rulings, or decisions of the COMELEC en banc. A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division must first file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc; direct certiorari is premature. In this case, because COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 automatically refers motions for reconsideration of Division orders to the en banc, petitioner had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and his direct petition was dismissed.
• Kho vs. COMELEC Exception — Direct resort to the Supreme Court may be allowed when the COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not specifically provide that the challenged final order or decision may be considered by the COMELEC en banc. The exception did not apply because Kho vs. COMELEC was decided under the 1993 COMELEC Rules, which prohibited the en banc from resolving motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders unless unanimously referred; the present case is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, which permits en banc review.
• Special Divisions and Substitution of COMELEC Commissioners — Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 7808, as amended by Resolution No. 9636, the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and may promulgate rules to expedite election cases. When a commissioner is absent, on leave, ill, disabled, inhibited, or disqualified, the Chairman may substitute him or sit in his place, and the Division becomes a Special Division. The creation of a Special Division merely fills temporary vacancies and changes the composition of the Division; it does not create a distinct body or divest the original Division of jurisdiction over pending cases. The Court applied this to uphold the Special First Division’s authority to issue the preliminary injunction.

• "Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling,or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration." — States the general procedural rule that direct certiorari against a COMELEC Division order is premature because a motion for reconsideration is available.
• "In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final enbanc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory." — Emphasizes the mandatory nature of en banc review before Supreme Court certiorari.
• "Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case between the two." — Rejects petitioner’s jurisdictional theory that the Special First Division was a separate body.
• "With the foregoing discussion, it becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special Divisions is not only sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules but also by the Constitution no less." — States the ratio on the validity of Special Divisions.

• Ambil vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000, 344 SCRA 358 — Controlling precedent; interpreted Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution to limit certiorari against final orders, rulings, and decisions of the COMELEC en banc; held that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy and its filing is mandatory.
• Cagas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 644 — Reiterated that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly assail the order in the Supreme Court via certiorari; the remedy is to seek review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the Division’s decision in due course.
• Kho vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 124033, September 25, 1997, 279 SCRA 463 — Recognized an exception allowing direct resort to the Supreme Court when the COMELEC Rules do not provide for en banc consideration of the challenged order or decision; distinguished because it applied the 1993 COMELEC Rules, not COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.

• Section 7, Article IX, 1987 Constitution — Provides that each Commission shall decide by majority vote of all its Members any case or matter within sixty days from submission, and that unless otherwise provided, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari within thirty days from receipt. The Court used this provision to analyze the proper remedy and the finality requirement for COMELEC actions.
• Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and shall promulgate its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases; all election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. The Court relied on this as the constitutional basis for COMELEC’s authority to create Special Divisions and for en banc review.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, Rule 20, Sections 1, 5, and 7 — Governs motions for reconsideration. Section 5 provides that upon filing a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division, the ECAD Clerk shall notify the Presiding Commissioner, who shall certify the case to the Commission en banc; Section 7 requires the en banc to decide the motion within fifteen days. The Court applied this to hold that petitioner had an available remedy before the en banc, making direct certiorari premature.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 7808, Section 6, Rule 3, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9636 — Provides for substitution of members of a Division in case of temporary vacancy, including when a member is on leave, seriously ill, temporarily disabled, absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified. The Chairman may substitute another Commissioner or sit in place of the absent member and preside; the Division becomes a Special First or Special Second Division. The Court used this to uphold the formation of the Special First Division.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 9868 — Issued on April 8, 2014, it addressed temporary vacancies in both COMELEC Divisions due to overseas absentee voting concerns requiring Commissioners Tagle and Lim of the First Division and Commissioner Yusoph of the Second Division to be abroad. It designated Chairman Brillantes as Presiding Chairman of the Special First and Special Second Divisions. The Court cited it as the basis for the Special First Division’s composition.
• 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 3, Sections 2 and 5(c) — Cited to distinguish Kho vs. COMELEC. Under these rules, the COMELEC en banc did not have the power to resolve motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders issued by a Division unless unanimously referred by the Division. Because the present case is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, the Kho exception did not apply.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (on leave); Antonio T. Carpio (Acting Chief Justice); Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Arturo D. Brion (with Separate Concurring Opinion); Diosdado M. Peralta; Lucas P. Bersamin; Mariano C. Del Castillo; Martin S. Villarama, Jr.; Jose Portugal Perez; Jose Catral Mendoza; Bienvenido L. Reyes; Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe; Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen. The separate concurring opinion of Justice Brion is noted in the text but not reproduced in the provided material.