Villarico vs. Sarmiento

Property of public dominion cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of a private individual, nor can it be the object of possession by any party, such property being outside the commerce of man and its public use being merely by tolerance of the government; however, a party who has acquired title to a specific portion of formerly public land is entitled to possession of that titled portion.

Petitioner Teofilo C. Villarico is the registered owner of a 66-square-meter lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, covered by T.C.T. No. 95453. His lot is separated from the elevated Ninoy Aquino Avenue by a strip of land belonging to the government, on which the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several points to give the public access to the highway. Respondents Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo, together with Andok's Litson Corporation and Marites' Carinderia, occupied portions of that government strip for commercial structures. In 1993, petitioner acquired by deed of exchange a 74.30-square-meter portion of the same government land area, registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430.

Petitioner Teofilo C. Villarico owns a 66-square-meter lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, covered by T.C.T. No. 95453. His property is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue — a highway elevated by four meters above the adjoining areas — by a strip of land belonging to the government. To enable people to reach the highway, the DPWH constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land.

Sometime in 1991, respondents Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo had a building constructed on a portion of the government land. In November of that same year, part of the structure was occupied by Andok's Litson Corporation and Marites' Carinderia. Respondents asserted that they had been issued licenses and permits by Parañaque City to construct their buildings on the area.

In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30-square-meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City. Petitioner claimed that respondents' structures on the government land closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on the portion covered by his T.C.T. No. 74430.

In 1995, petitioner filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents before the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 259, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-044. The trial court found that petitioner had never been in possession of any portion of the public land in question and that respondents were the ones in actual possession; it further found that petitioner was not deprived of his right of way because he could use Kapitan Tinoy Street as a passageway to the highway. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that respondents' buildings were constructed on the portion of the lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioner's name.

• Insufficiency of CA Findings: Petitioner argued that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals contained conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they were based.
• Mischaracterization of the Issue: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in considering that the only issue was whether petitioner had acquired a right of way over the government land between his property and the highway.
• Improper Remedy: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that accion publiciana is not the proper remedy in the case.
• Right of Way and Possession: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the existence of his right of way does not carry possession over the same.
• Better Right of Possession: Petitioner asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in not resolving the issue of who has the better right of possession over the subject land between petitioner and respondents.

• Improper Remedy: Respondents maintained that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that petitioner's action for accion publiciana is not the proper remedy in asserting his right of way on a lot owned by the government.
• Government Ownership: Respondents argued that petitioner has no right over the subject property as it belongs to the government.
• Permits and Licenses: Respondents claimed that they had been issued licenses and permits by Parañaque City to construct their buildings on the area.

• Nature of the Disputed Lot: Whether the lot on which the stairways were built is property of public dominion and thus outside the commerce of man.
• Voluntary Easement over Public Dominion Property: Whether petitioner can claim a voluntary easement of right of way over property of public dominion.
• Better Right of Possession: Whether either petitioner or respondents has a better right of possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were built.
• Possession of Titled Portion: Whether petitioner is entitled to possession of the portion of the lot covered by his T.C.T. No. 74430.

• Nature of the Disputed Lot: Yes. The lot on which the stairways were built is property of public dominion under Article 420 of the Civil Code, being intended for public use as a passageway to the highway.
• Voluntary Easement over Public Dominion Property: No. Property of public dominion cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement; petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself or claim any right of possession over it, pursuant to Article 530 of the Civil Code.
• Better Right of Possession: No. Neither petitioner nor respondents has a right of possession over the disputed lot, it being property of public dominion; the lower courts erred in ruling that respondents have a better right of possession.
• Possession of Titled Portion: Yes. Being the owner of the portion covered by T.C.T. No. 74430, petitioner is entitled to its possession, as found by both lower courts.

• Nature of the Disputed Lot: Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as things intended for public use, such as roads, canals, bridges, and others of similar character. Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public." Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as a passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is property of public dominion.

• Voluntary Easement over Public Dominion Property: Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and therefore: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement. Because the lot is property of public dominion, it cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of petitioner. Its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself, as Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that only things and rights susceptible of appropriation may be the object of possession.

• Better Right of Possession: Since the disputed lot is property of public dominion and outside the commerce of man, neither petitioner nor respondents can claim a better right of possession over it. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents have a better right of possession over the subject lot. The correct disposition is that neither party has a right of possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were built.

• Possession of Titled Portion: Both lower courts found that respondents' buildings were constructed on the portion of the lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioner's name. Being the owner of that titled portion, petitioner is entitled to its possession. This portion is distinct from the public dominion lot where the stairways were built, and petitioner's registered title over it confers the right to possess.

• Property of Public Dominion — Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, property of public dominion includes things intended for public use, such as roads, bridges, and others of similar character. Public use is use open to the indefinite public, not confined to privileged individuals. The Court applied this doctrine to classify the lot on which the DPWH constructed stairways for public access to the highway as property of public dominion.

• Inalienability and Non-Prescriptibility of Public Dominion Property — Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and therefore: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement. The Court relied on this principle to hold that petitioner could not claim a voluntary easement of right of way over the disputed lot, nor could either party claim possession of it.

• Object of Possession — Under Article 530 of the Civil Code, only things and rights susceptible of appropriation may be the object of possession. The Court applied this provision to conclude that petitioner cannot claim any right of possession over the public dominion lot, as it is not susceptible of private appropriation.

• "Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession over it." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: property of public dominion cannot be burdened by voluntary easement or appropriated by private parties, and public use thereof is merely by government tolerance.

• "Public use is 'use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.' — This defines the concept of public use that determines whether property is of public dominion under Article 420, a formulation traced to US vs. Tan Piaco.

• US vs. Tan Piaco, 40 Phil. 853 (1920) — Cited as the source of the definition of public use as "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public." The Court applied this definition to classify the disputed lot as property of public dominion.

• Article 420, Civil Code — Defines property of public dominion as things intended for public use (roads, canals, rivers, ports, bridges, etc.) and things belonging to the State intended for public service or development of national wealth. Applied to classify the lot with stairways as property of public dominion.
• Article 530, Civil Code — Provides that only things and rights susceptible of appropriation may be the object of possession. Applied to hold that petitioner cannot claim possession over the public dominion lot, as it is not susceptible of private appropriation.

Panganiban (Chairman), Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concurred. Corona, J., was on leave.