Villanueva vs. Velasco

A legal easement of right of way is inseparable from the dominant and servient estates, binds a subsequent purchaser of the servient estate even if not annotated on the Torrens title, and a final judgment enforcing it is conclusive upon a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to commencement of the action.

Maximo and Justina Gabriel owned a parcel in Quezon City that served as servient estate to an interior parcel owned by Romeo, Rodolfo, Nenita and Aurora Espinola. By Contract of Easement of Right of Way dated November 28, 1979, the Gabriels granted the Espinolas and their families a permanent two-meter-wide right of way along the southeast side of the Gabriel property as outlet to Tandang Sora Avenue, binding upon heirs, successors and assigns.

Petitioner Bryan U. Villanueva is the registered owner of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of Quezon City, bought from Pacific Banking Corporation. The bank had acquired it at public auction on March 19, 1983 from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. At the time of purchase there was a small house on the southeastern portion occupying one meter of the two-meter easement granted by the Gabriels to the Espinolas in the November 28, 1979 Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, the Gabriels had constructed that house before his purchase, and private respondents Julio N. Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, as successors-in-interest of the Espinolas, had already filed Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991 to enforce the easement.

In that case the trial court issued a temporary restraining order on May 15, 1991 and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on August 13, 1991 ordering demolition of the encroaching house. The Court of Appeals sustained those orders on March 26, 1992, and the decision became final on July 31, 1992. Thereafter Judge Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition on January 5, 1995, which the sheriff sought to enforce on June 20, 1995. Petitioner then filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash, asserting he was not a party to the civil case and that the easement was not annotated on his title.

Title in petitioner's name was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after his purchase from the bank. The trial court denied the third-party claim and reconsideration, and the Court of Appeals dismissed his certiorari petition. The courts below factually found the two-meter right of way to exist for the benefit of private respondents' estate, with the one-meter obstruction preventing entry of their cement mixer and motor vehicle and one meter being insufficient for their needs.

• Non-existence Without Annotation: Petitioner argued that a right of way cannot exist when not expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title, and that even if inherent under Art. 617 of the Civil Code, it was extinguished upon registration of the servient estate without annotation conformably with Section 39 of the Land Registration Law.
• Reliance on Clean Title and Lack of Lis Pendens: Petitioner maintained that he properly relied solely on the clean title, as a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond what is recorded, and that private respondents failed to have the easement or a notice of lis pendens annotated under Section 76 of P.D. No. 1529, so any decision could only be effectual between the parties thereto.
• Non-party Not Bound and Denial of Day in Court: Petitioner argued that since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, he cannot be bound by the writ of demolition nor divested of a portion of his land without his day in court.

• Adoption of Appellate Reasoning: Respondents countered by adopting the disquisition of the appellate court that a servitude like a right of way can exist even if not expressly stated or annotated because servitudes are inseparable from the estates, and that petitioner was bound both as voluntary and legal easement.
• Dismissal with Damages: Respondents argued that the petition should be dismissed and asked for P100,000.00 in damages.

• Inherence and Non-annotation: Whether a right of way can exist and bind petitioner even if not expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title, following the inherence and intransmissibility of an easement.
• Prudence of Buyer and Lis Pendens: Whether petitioner as buyer should have exercised ordinary prudence to determine the easement, and whether absence of annotation and of lis pendens notice prevents enforcement against him.
• Binding Effect on Non-party Successor: Whether petitioner, not being a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, can be bound by the judgment and writ of demolition therein.

• Inherence and Non-annotation: Yes. The easement exists and binds petitioner because servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong under Article 617, and the easement here is both voluntary and compulsory legal easement.
• Prudence of Buyer and Lis Pendens: No exoneration. Petitioner remains legally bound to provide ingress and egress as a legal easement, notwithstanding non-annotation and absence of lis pendens, the servient estate being compulsorily burdened by law.
• Binding Effect on Non-party Successor: Yes, bound. Under Rule 39, Sec. 47(b), a judgment is conclusive between parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to commencement of the action, and petitioner's title was registered March 24, 1995, after the May 8, 1991 filing.

• Inherence and Non-annotation: The subject right of way was originally voluntarily constituted by agreement but was also an easement by necessity or legal easement mandated by law for private interest as a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement inseparable under Article 617, its existence was conclusively established by concurrent findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals, with the five requisites for compulsory easement laid down in jurisprudence satisfied. Because the needs of the dominant estate determine width, the one-meter obstruction left only one meter insufficient for respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle, requiring demolition of the obstructing edifice.
• Prudence of Buyer and Lis Pendens: Lack of annotation did not extinguish the burden because a legal easement by its nature legally obliges the servient estate to afford the dominant estate ingress to and egress from the public highway. Section 76 of P.D. No. 1529 on lis pendens was therefore unavailing to defeat a continuing property right that persists unless removed in the conveyance or its sign removed before conveyance under Articles 649 and 617.
• Binding Effect on Non-party Successor: Rule 39, Sec. 47(b) makes a judgment conclusive with respect to matters directly adjudged upon parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to commencement of the action litigating for the same thing under the same title. Private respondents commenced Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991 against the Gabriels, while petitioner's title was entered only on March 24, 1995 after acquisition through the bank from the Gabriels. Although not a party, petitioner is such a successor-in-interest, so the final decision and demolition order bind him without denial of due process in this context.

• Inseparability of easements — Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. Applied to hold that a right of way persists with the estates despite transfer and despite non-annotation as an encumbrance on the Torrens title.
• Legal easement by necessity — A legal easement is mandated by law for public use or private interest and becomes a continuing property right; for right of way, the owner of an immovable surrounded by others without adequate outlet to a public highway may demand passage through neighboring estates upon proper indemnity. Applied to characterize the disputed passage as both voluntary grant and compulsory easement binding the servient estate.
• Requisites of compulsory easement of right of way — The essentials are (1) dominant estate surrounded by other immovables without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) isolation not due to proprietor's own acts; (4) right of way at point least prejudicial to servient estate; and (5) shortest distance consistent with the foregoing. Applied as the test under which the lower courts' finding of easement was re-affirmed.
• Width measured by dominant estate needs — The needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Applied to require the full two meters where one meter was insufficient for respondents' vehicles and equipment.
• Conclusiveness of judgment on successors-in-interest — A judgment is conclusive between parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to commencement of the action litigating for the same thing under the same title and capacity. Applied in Villanueva vs. Velasco to bind a purchaser who acquired title in 1995 to a 1991 action and final demolition order against his predecessors.

• "A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right." — Defines the compulsory character of the easement that sustains enforcement against the servient estate despite transfer of ownership.
• "It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement." — States the rule justifying restoration of the full two-meter passage where partial obstruction impeded respondents' use.
• "Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court." — Summarizes Rule 39, Sec. 47(b) to bind petitioner as post-commencement successor to the demolition judgment.

• Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 145, 153 (1968) — Cited as authority that a legal easement is mandated by law and becomes a continuing property right.
• Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122, 129 (1998) — Cited for the five essential requisites of a compulsory easement of right of way.
• Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 90, 92-93 (1998) — Cited for conclusiveness of concurrent factual findings of the courts below.
• Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351, 362 (1998) — Cited for the rule that needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
• Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, 294 SCRA 48, 65 (1998) — Cited for the binding and conclusive effect of judgment on successors in interest by title subsequent to commencement.

• Art. 617, Civil Code — Provides easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong; applied to sustain the right of way despite non-annotation and change of ownership.
• Art. 649, Civil Code — Grants an owner of an immovable surrounded by others without adequate outlet to demand right of way upon proper indemnity, with indemnity rules for permanent or limited passage; applied to support the compulsory nature of respondents' passage.
• Section 76, P.D. No. 1529 — Requires filing and registration of notice of lis pendens for actions affecting registered land to bind non-parties; invoked by petitioner but held unavailing against a legal easement burden.
• Sec. 47, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court — Makes judgments conclusive between parties and successors in interest by title subsequent to commencement; applied to bind petitioner who titled in 1995 to the 1991 action.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.