Villanueva vs. People

A single act of lascivious conduct committed against a child at least 12 years old and below 18 is punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of RA No. 7610, and the proper nomenclature of the offense is "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610," not merely "violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610." The intentional touching of the buttocks of a minor, even through clothing, constitutes lascivious conduct where lewd design is inferred from the overt act itself.

Petitioner Marvin Villanueva y Irodistan was charged under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which penalizes those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. The private complainant, AAA, was a 15-year-old female student at the time of the incident, her minority established by her Certificate of Live Birth showing she was born on December 31, 1994. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 7610 define "lascivious conduct" to include the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

At around 4:00 p.m. on November 25, 2010, AAA, then 15 years old, was on her way home from school together with her friend BBB and BBB's 11-year-old sister CCC. They were ascending the nonworking escalator of an overpass when Villanueva positioned himself behind AAA. BBB noticed Villanueva and told AAA to hurry. AAA then felt her skirt being lifted and her buttocks being touched by the person behind her. When AAA looked behind, she saw Villanueva holding a mirror below her skirt. She confronted him, but he hurriedly left and ran toward the highway. BBB shouted for help, and bystanders attempted to chase Villanueva. Traffic Enforcer Ronald Tolentino heard the commotion and apprehended him. Villanueva was then turned over to Police Officer III Wirrel P. Jualo and Police Officer I Anthony D. Antoyne, who brought him to the police station for investigation.

Villanueva denied the allegations and offered a different account. He averred that on the date of the incident, his mother had directed him to buy pancit. He boarded a tricycle and alighted near the overpass. At the foot of the nonworking escalator, he saw a group of female students giving each other beso-beso. He climbed the escalator while holding his two cellular phones and, when about two steps behind AAA, tried to overtake her from her left side. At that point, he heard someone shouting "Snatcher, snatcher!" He put his cellphones inside his pockets and ran down the escalator for fear of being mobbed. Bystanders chased him, and he asked Enforcer Tolentino for help, but the bystanders began to maul him. Enforcer Tolentino handcuffed him and requested police assistance, after which PO3 Jualo and PO1 Antoyne arrived and brought him to the police station.

The prosecution presented AAA, BBB, Enforcer Tolentino, PO3 Jualo, and PO1 Antoyne as witnesses. AAA's Certificate of Live Birth was presented to establish her minority. The RTC gave full credence to AAA's testimony, finding it clear, candid, and categorical, and held that it was corroborated by BBB's eyewitness account. The RTC found that all elements of sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 were satisfied, as Villanueva's act of lifting AAA's skirt and touching her buttocks constituted lascivious conduct from which lewd design could be inferred. The CA sustained these factual findings and agreed that the elements of the offense were present.

• Absence of Lewd Design: Villanueva argued that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt because there was no showing of lewd design on his part.
• Physical Impossibility: Villanueva maintained that the complaint held no water because the incident took place at a crowded place in broad daylight and with his hands occupied, as he was holding his two cellphones, making it impossible for him to perform any act construed as lascivious conduct.
• Victim's Credibility: Villanueva claimed that AAA's age at the time of the incident was an age of conditional responsibility, and considering her educational attainment as a senior high school student, she was capable of devious schemes such as lying and acting out to have been abused, even by an innocent person.
• Validity of Denial and Alibi: Villanueva contended that not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated, arguing that if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi.
• Disproportionate Penalty: Villanueva argued that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the crime allegedly committed and the surrounding circumstances of its commission.

• Moral Certainty of Guilt: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the CA did not err in affirming the conviction because there was moral certainty that Villanueva committed lascivious conduct constituting sexual abuse when he touched the buttocks of AAA, who was a minor at the time.
• Credible Testimony: Respondent maintained that AAA narrated in a straightforward and candid manner the details of how the lascivious conduct transpired, and that the existence of unchaste or lewd design can be inferred from the overt act of Villanueva.
• Respect for Lower Court Findings: Respondent argued that the findings of fact of the RTC, when affirmed on appeal by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect, as in this case.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the CA correctly affirmed Villanueva's conviction for violation of Article III, Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The prosecution duly proven all elements of lascivious conduct under Article III, Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610, and Villanueva's unsubstantiated denial cannot prevail over the positive and corroborated testimony of the minor victim.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The elements of sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 are: (a) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. All three elements were satisfied. AAA's minority was established by her Certificate of Live Birth showing she was born on December 31, 1994, making her 15 years old at the time of the incident. Villanueva's act of lifting AAA's skirt and touching her buttocks constituted lascivious conduct as defined in Section 2(h) of the IRR of RA No. 7610, which expressly includes the intentional touching of the buttocks. Lewd design was inferred from the overt act itself. The term "other sexual abuse" was construed broadly enough to include all other acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution, such that a single act of lascivious conduct is punished under Section 5(b) when the victim is at least 12 years old and below 18, pursuant to People vs. Tulagan. AAA's testimony was clear, candid, and categorical, and was corroborated by BBB, who saw Villanueva approach AAA from behind. The Court has held that when offended parties are young and immature girls, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version, considering their vulnerability and the shame and embarrassment they would be exposed to if their testimony were untrue. Villanueva's defense that it was physically impossible for him to commit the act because he was holding two cellphones in both hands at a crowded place in broad daylight was unsubstantiated and belied by AAA and the other witnesses. Denial is inherently a weak defense that cannot outweigh positive testimony; a categorical statement with the earmarks of truth prevails over a bare denial, which can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. The Court also corrected the nomenclature of the offense from "violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610" to "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610," as clarified in Tulagan. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua was properly imposed, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable notwithstanding that RA No. 7610 is a special law. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the CA correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Civil liability was adjusted to PHP 50,000.00 each as civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages pursuant to Tulagan, with 6% legal interest per annum from finality until full payment. A fine of PHP 15,000.00 was imposed under Section 31(f) of RA No. 7610. Although the Court found the penalty clearly excessive in relation to the attendant circumstances, it was duty bound to apply the law in full force, and accordingly invoked Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code to transmit the case to the Chief Executive for study and consideration of the mitigation of the penalty.

• Elements of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA No. 7610 — The elements are: (a) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. All three elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Definition of Lascivious Conduct under the IRR of RA No. 7610 — Lascivious conduct is defined as "the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person." The intentional touching of the buttocks of a minor, even through clothing, falls within this definition.

• "Other Sexual Abuse" as a Broad Term — The term "other sexual abuse" is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of RA No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. It is broad enough to include all other acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution. Accordingly, a single act of lascivious conduct is punished under Section 5(b), Article III, when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances. This doctrine was established in People vs. Tulagan and applied in this case.

• Proper Nomenclature of the Offense — When the victim of the lascivious act is a child at least 12 years old, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610," not merely "violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610."

• Weakness of Denial as a Defense — Denial is inherently a weak defense that cannot outweigh positive testimony. A categorical statement that has the earmarks of truth prevails over a bare denial, which can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law.

• Credence Accorded to Testimony of Young Victims — When the offended parties are young and immature girls, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true.

• Applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to Special Laws — Notwithstanding that RA No. 7610 is a special law, the accused may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall be taken from the medium period of the prescribed penalty.

• Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code — Excessive Penalties — When a strict enforcement of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence. The Court invoked this provision to recommend the mitigation of Villanueva's penalty, finding it clearly excessive in relation to the attendant circumstances.

• "The term 'other sexual abuse,' on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of 'child abuse' under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and 'sexual abuse' under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Tulagan, defines the scope of "other sexual abuse" under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 and establishes that a single act of lascivious conduct is punishable when the victim is at least 12 and below 18 years old.

• "the term 'other sexual abuse' is broad enough to include all other acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution. Accordingly, a single act of lascivious conduct is punished under Section 5(b), Article III, when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances." — This is the canonical formulation from Tulagan that the Court adopted and applied, establishing that a single lascivious act suffices for conviction under Section 5(b) without any requirement of habitual or repeated abuse.

• "Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law." — This passage articulates the doctrinal rule on the evidentiary weakness of denial, applied here to reject Villanueva's defense against the positive testimony of the victim.

• "when the victim of the lascivious act is a child at least 12 years old, the crime should be designated as 'Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610.'" — This passage establishes the correct nomenclature for the offense, correcting the lower courts' designation and providing guidance for proper charging and conviction under RA No. 7610.

• People vs. Tulagan, 849 Phil. 197 (2019) [En Banc] — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on Tulagan for three propositions: (1) the term "other sexual abuse" is broad enough to include all acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution, such that a single act of lascivious conduct is punishable under Section 5(b) when the victim is 12 to below 18; (2) the proper nomenclature of the offense is "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610"; and (3) the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies notwithstanding that RA No. 7610 is a special law. The Court also relied on Tulagan for the adjustment of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to PHP 50,000.00 each.

• Capueta vs. People, 883 Phil. 502 (2020) — Cited for the enumeration of the elements of sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610.

• People vs. Sanico, 741 Phil. 356 (2014) — Cited for the doctrine that courts lend credence to the testimony of young and immature female victims, considering their vulnerability and the shame and embarrassment they would face if their testimony were untrue.

• People vs. Moreno, 872 Phil. 17 (2020) — Cited for the proposition that a categorical statement with the earmarks of truth prevails over a bare denial.

• People vs. Molejon, 830 Phil. 519 (2018) — Cited for the doctrine that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion deserving no weight in law.

• Trocio vs. People, G.R. No. 252791, August 23, 2022 — Cited in support of the imposition of a fine under Section 31(f) of RA No. 7610, in furtherance of the law's objective to provide special protection to children and assist in the rehabilitation of child victims.

• Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. vs. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 225433, September 20, 2022 — Cited in connection with the award of legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the decision until full payment.

• Section 5(b), Article III, Republic Act No. 7610 — Penalizes those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse, prescribing the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Applied to Villanueva's act of lifting AAA's skirt and touching her buttocks, AAA being 15 years old at the time.

• Section 2(h), Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 7610 — Defines "lascivious conduct" to include the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Applied to classify Villanueva's touching of AAA's buttocks as lascivious conduct.

• Section 31(f), Republic Act No. 7610 — Authorizes the imposition of a fine to be determined by the court, administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim. Applied to impose a PHP 15,000.00 fine upon Villanueva.

• Article 5, Revised Penal Code — Authorizes the court to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, a statement regarding the mitigation of a penalty when strict enforcement of the Code would result in a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused. Invoked by the Court to transmit the case to the Chief Executive for study and consideration of the mitigation of Villanueva's penalty, without suspending the execution of the sentence.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to allow Villanueva to benefit from an indeterminate sentence notwithstanding that RA No. 7610 is a special law, resulting in the penalty of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred.