Villanueva vs. Judge Querubin

A seizure made under a valid search warrant is lawful, and the issuing court retains jurisdiction over the seized property, which must be deposited in court. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not preclude a search and seizure as long as the element of reasonableness is not lacking, and the continued possession of seized property by the person from whom it was taken, after a court order for its return, lacks the element of legality.

Petitioner Oscar Villanueva was the owner of a house in Bacolod City where a gambling raid occurred. Respondent Judge Jose R. Querubin was the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental who issued the search warrant and later ordered the return of the seized money. The constitutional backdrop is Article III, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, which protects the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Rules of Court, specifically Section 11 of Rule 126, requires that property seized under a warrant be delivered to the court that issued the warrant.

On March 16, 1966, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a raiding party of the Philippine Constabulary led by Lt. Alexander Aguirre conducted a raid on the residence of Oscar Villanueva at 6th Street, Bacolod City, pursuant to a search warrant issued by respondent Judge on March 14, 1966. The raiding party arrested eight participants in a game of "Monte" held in one of the rooms of the house. Among the gambling paraphernalia seized was cash in the amount of P10,570.00, which the raiding party submitted to the court in endorsing the search warrant, thus subjecting the seized items to the control of the court.

On March 24, 1966, the City Fiscal of Bacolod City filed an information for violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code against the eight apprehended persons. All the accused pleaded guilty and were convicted by the City Court. Upon recommendation of the Fiscal, only the amount of P220.00 was ordered forfeited in favor of the government, and the amount of P10,350.00 was ordered returned to Oscar Villanueva, the owner of the house. On April 1, 1966, petitioner issued a receipt for the amount, with the condition that he would return the money if the higher authorities required the return of the same by legal orders.

On April 23, 1966, a motion was filed with respondent Judge by an assistant city fiscal of Bacolod City and a special prosecutor of the Department of Justice, setting forth the facts of the raid and the seizure, and seeking the return of the money to the court. Petitioner filed an opposition, asserting that the lower court was without jurisdiction and that the matter had become moot and academic because the money was spent in good faith for the payment of wages of his laborers. He also contended that there was a violation of his constitutional rights not to be deprived of property without due process of law and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

After a reply and rejoinder were submitted, respondent Judge issued the challenged order dated June 1, 1966, requiring petitioner to return and deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod City, the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden container stated in the receipt issued by the accused dated April 1, 1966, within forty-eight hours. The order cited the ruling in Philips vs. Municipal Mayor and held that the Court of First Instance that issued the search warrant had jurisdiction over the amount and its wooden container. The order also noted that petitioner's defenses were futile and untenable by estoppel, given his written promise to return the amount. A motion for reconsideration was filed but denied on June 11, 1966, prompting the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.

• Lack of Jurisdiction and Mootness: Petitioner argued that the lower court was without jurisdiction and that the matter had become moot and academic because the money was spent in good faith for the payment of wages of his laborers.
• Constitutional Violation: Petitioner contended that there was a violation of his constitutional rights not to be deprived of property without due process of law and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
• Specious Argument on Timing: Petitioner raised the argument that after the service of the search warrant on March 16, 1966, the motion of April 23, 1966 for the return of the money came too late, ignoring that the Rules of Court requires that things seized be deposited in court.
• Right of Ownership: Petitioner relied on his alleged rights as owner, arguing that his agreement to return the money by "legal orders" could not be considered a limitation on his right of ownership, citing Article 1306 of the Civil Code, since when an agreement conflicts with the provision of law, the latter must prevail.

• Validity of the Seizure: The Solicitor General argued that the assailed orders did not result in unreasonable search and seizure because the money and wooden box were confiscated during a gambling raid pursuant to a search warrant issued by the respondent court after due and appropriate proceedings, during which the petitioner and his witnesses were examined under oath.

• Validity of the Search and Seizure: Whether the lower court's order requiring petitioner to return the seized money violated his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
• Jurisdiction Over Seized Property: Whether the Court of First Instance that issued the search warrant had jurisdiction over the seized money and its container.
• Effect of Petitioner's Written Promise: Whether petitioner's written promise to return the money when required by legal orders estopped him from resisting the return of the seized amount.

• Validity of the Search and Seizure: No. The seizure was made under a valid search warrant, and petitioner did not even put in issue the validity of the search warrant. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not preclude a search in one's home and the seizure of one's papers and effects as long as the element of reasonableness is not lacking.
• Jurisdiction Over Seized Property: Yes. The Court of First Instance that issued the search warrant had jurisdiction over the amount of P10,350.00 and its wooden container, as the legal custody of the seized property was appropriately with the issuing court under Section 11 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
• Effect of Petitioner's Written Promise: Yes. Petitioner's written promise to return the money if required by legal orders estopped him from resisting the return, and his continued possession of the money lacked the element of legality.

• Validity of the Search and Seizure: The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, residence, papers, and possessions from interference by government. To be impressed with the quality of reasonableness, a search must be accomplished through a warrant issued upon probable cause, determined by a judge after examination under oath of the complainant and witnesses, with a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. In this case, petitioner did not challenge the validity of the search warrant. The facts showed that the raid was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, and the money was seized as part of the gambling paraphernalia. The Court noted that if petitioner had doubts as to the validity of the search warrant or the manner of its execution, he was called upon to establish such a claim in court, which he failed to do.
• Jurisdiction Over Seized Property: The Rules of Court, specifically Section 11 of Rule 126, requires that the officer executing a search warrant must forthwith deliver the property to the judge of the court that issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath. The legal custody of the seized property was therefore appropriately with respondent Judge. Citing Molo vs. Yatco, the Court held that even if the money could validly be returned to petitioner, there should be a motion for its restoration that must be affirmatively acted upon by the issuing court. The Court also cited People vs. Veloso for the proposition that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause.
• Effect of Petitioner's Written Promise: The Court found that petitioner's written promise, executed on April 1, 1966, stated that the money "will be returned to him if the higher authorities will require the return of the same by legal orders." The Court held that petitioner could not ignore his plighted word and that his contention that he is the owner of the amount was unavailing because the seizure was made under a valid search warrant. The Court emphasized that what lacks the element of legality is the continued possession by petitioner, and resort to a higher tribunal to nullify what was done by respondent Judge was futile and unavailing.

• Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure — This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, including one's residence, papers, and other possessions. A search and seizure must be accomplished through a warrant issued upon probable cause, determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses, with a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that petitioner did not challenge the validity of the search warrant, and the seizure was made pursuant to a valid warrant.
• Custody of Seized Property — Under Section 11 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the officer executing a search warrant must forthwith deliver the property to the judge of the court that issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the legal custody of the seized money was appropriately with respondent Judge, who issued the search warrant.
• Estoppel by Written Promise — A party who issues a written promise to return property when required by legal orders is estopped from resisting the return of such property. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that petitioner's written promise to return the money if required by legal orders estopped him from resisting the return, and his continued possession of the money lacked the element of legality.

• "This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. Since, moreover, it is invariably through a search and seizure that such an invasion of one's physical freedom manifests itself, it is made clear that he is not to be thus molested, unless its reasonableness could be shown." — This passage defines the scope of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures and articulates the requirement of reasonableness, which is central to the Court's analysis.
• "The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the municipal judge or judge of the city court or of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath." — This quotation from Section 11 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court establishes the legal custody requirement for seized property, which the Court applied to uphold the lower court's jurisdiction over the money.
• "It cannot be correctly maintained then that just because the money seized did belong to petitioner, its return to the court that issued the search warrant could be avoided when precisely what the law requires is that it be deposited therein. As a matter of fact, what lacks the element of legality is the continued possession by petitioner." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that petitioner's continued possession of the seized money was illegal, and that ownership does not defeat the requirement of depositing seized property with the issuing court.

• Philips vs. Municipal Mayor, 105 Phil. 1344 (1959) — Cited by respondent Judge in the challenged order to support the ruling that the Court of First Instance that issued the search warrant has jurisdiction over the seized property.
• Molo vs. Yatco, 63 Phil. 644 (1936) — Cited by the Court to support the proposition that there should be a motion for restoration of seized property that must be affirmatively acted upon by the issuing court, and that any officer in possession of seized property is an agent of the court with the obligation to return the property to the court upon termination of the investigation.
• People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 (1925) — Cited by the Court for the proposition that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause.

• Article III, Section 1, paragraph 3, 1935 Constitution — The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The Court applied this provision by finding that the search warrant was valid and that petitioner failed to challenge its validity.
• Section 11, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Requires that the officer executing a search warrant must forthwith deliver the property to the judge of the court that issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath. The Court applied this provision to hold that the legal custody of the seized money was with respondent Judge.
• Article 195, Revised Penal Code — The provision penalizing gambling, which was the basis of the information filed against the eight apprehended persons in the City Court of Bacolod.
• Article 1306, Civil Code — Cited by petitioner to support his argument that when an agreement conflicts with the provision of law, the latter must prevail, though the Court found this argument unavailing.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ., concurred. Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.