Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

Lack of cohabitation is not, per se, a ground to annul a marriage; it becomes relevant only if it arises from the perpetration of grounds that vitiate consent. Additionally, moral damages cannot be awarded based on mere supposition but require pleading and proof of actual suffering, and exemplary damages cannot be awarded unless the claimant first establishes a right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages.

Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva were married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Lilia subsequently gave birth prematurely to a child who died on August 29, 1988. Nearly five years later, Orlando filed a petition for annulment, alleging his consent was vitiated by threats and fraud regarding the paternity of Lilia's child, while simultaneously facing a bigamy conviction in a separate criminal case.

• The Marriage and Subsequent Petition: Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed for annulment, claiming threats from Lilia and New People's Army members forced him to marry her. He alleged Lilia committed fraud by claiming he impregnated her, which he denied, asserting he suffered from a lack of erection during their tryst. He further claimed he never cohabited with her after the marriage.
• Respondent's Version: Lilia asserted the marriage was voluntary, stating Orlando stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month, wrote her letters after returning to Manila, and visited her personally. She testified she delivered a premature fetus on August 29, 1988, which died, presenting documentary evidence from the Civil Registrar matching this date.
• Evidentiary Discrepancies: Orlando admitted to having sexual intercourse with Lilia in January 1988, contradicting his claim of inability to impregnate her. When confronted with thirteen letters, he initially admitted authoring seven containing expressions of love, but later recanted, claiming duress—a recantation deemed motivated by hindsight regarding the letters' evidentiary weight. Orlando's four-year delay in filing the annulment suit was unexplained, though Lilia alleged it was filed solely to bolster his defense in a pending bigamy case where he had already been convicted.

• Vitiated Consent: Petitioner argued that his consent was obtained through fraud, intimidation, and undue pressure, citing harassing phone calls, unwanted visits by men at his university, and the threatening presence of an NPA member who escorted him to Palawan to marry respondent.
• Lack of Cohabitation: Petitioner maintained that the marriage should be annulled due to the total absence of cohabitation between the parties.
• Improper Damages: Petitioner argued that the awards of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, were not allowed by law.

• Voluntary Consent: Respondent countered that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her, stayed with her for almost a month, and wrote her letters expressing love and concern, which belied claims of duress.
• Knowledge of Pregnancy: Respondent argued that petitioner knew of the progress of her pregnancy and admitted to having sexual relations with her in January 1988, negating the claim of fraud regarding paternity.
• Entitlement to Damages: Respondent prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs due to the baseless portrayal of her as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate.

• Annulment of Marriage: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent arising from intimidation, fraud, or lack of cohabitation.
• Damages: Whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs.

• Annulment of Marriage: The petition for annulment was correctly dismissed. Intimidation was not proven; as a security guard, petitioner could be expected to know self-defense or seek police assistance, neither of which he did, nor did he inform the solemnizing judge of his predicament. Fraud was negated by petitioner's admission of sexual intercourse with respondent in January 1988 and his failure to attribute the pregnancy to another man. Lack of cohabitation is not a standalone ground for annulment; it is relevant only if arising from vices of consent, which were not established here.
• Damages: Attorney's fees were properly awarded under Article 2208(11) of the Civil Code as just and equitable. However, moral damages were deleted for lack of factual basis; the lower court's award was based on mere supposition rather than testimony detailing actual physical suffering, mental anguish, or similar injury. Exemplary damages were deleted a fortiori, as Article 2234 of the Civil Code requires that a claimant must first establish a right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before exemplary damages may be considered.

• Lack of cohabitation as a ground for annulment — Lack of cohabitation is not, per se, a ground to annul a marriage, as this would allow spouses to terminate the marital union by simply refusing to cohabitate. Failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of grounds that vitiate consent, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence.
• Proof required for moral damages — Moral damages require both pleading and proof of actual suffering, such as physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, or social humiliation. Mere allegations or suppositions do not suffice; the claimant must substantiate them with clear and convincing proof, typically by taking the witness stand to testify to such personal suffering.
• Prerequisite for exemplary damages — Exemplary damages may be awarded only in addition to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. A claimant must first establish a clear right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may consider the award of exemplary damages.

• "Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate."
• "Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him."

• Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., G.R. No. 152753 — Followed. The rule that moral damages require pleading and proof of actual suffering was adopted, rendering mere allegations insufficient to sustain an award.
• Valdez v. Reyes, G.R. No. 152251 — Followed. The principle that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially when coinciding with those of the trial court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court was reiterated.

• Article 2208(11), Civil Code — Allows the award of attorney's fees where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances. Applied to uphold the award of attorney's fees to private respondent.
• Article 2234, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be awarded only in addition to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages, requiring the claimant to first establish a right to the latter. Applied to delete the award of exemplary damages because the claimant failed to establish a right to moral damages.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ.